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Abstract 
This dissertation argues that in the years immediately following the Second 
World War, the United States Army created a set of intellectual, organizational, and 
ultimately institutional processes, which are essential to military innovation. Prior to 
the Second World War, innovation in the army had remained isolated, ad hoc, and 
difficult to harness towards a common goal. That changed substantively in the period 
after the war. 
Unlike most studies of military innovation, this work does not follow the 
efforts of a single genius but rather three interrelated activities that when fully 
developed provide the institutional foundations for an ability to change. First, the 
army adopted the field of operations research as an essential element of military 
analysis and decision-making. Second, the army created a set of activities known 
collectively as 'combat developments', where new ideas moved through a deliberate 
process of deliberation, analyses, testing, and prototyping in order to deliver a new 
military capability to the field. Finally, this dissertation describes the modernization of 
officer education and the change in doctrine development from a focus on near-term 
doctrine for a mobilizing force to forward-looking doctrine appropriate to a standing 
force in a time of technological change. 
Most historians have judged the army of early Cold War to be an innovative 
failure with a readiness crisis at the beginning of the Korean War, a spectacular failure 
with its Pentomic concept, and its supposed inability to anticipate and prepare for 
large-scale counterinsurgencies in the 1960s. However, as this dissertation 
demonstrates, it was during this same period that more fundamental changes occurred 
that set the pattern for how the institution would change over the course of the 
remainder of the century. 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
During the period 1945-1960, the United States Army created an institutional capacity 
to innovate. 1 Such an institutional capacity did not exist prior to the Second World War. 
While there were examples of innovation within the army during the prewar era, these were 
generally narrow applications of new technologies. Moreover, they were often developed in 
spite of, not as the product of, the organizations and even processes in which they occurred. 
In the post-war period, three loosely connected lines of effort emerged that resulted in new 
organizations and processes whose collective purpose was to prepare the army for the 'next 
war'. The three major elements of innovation described in this dissertation are: 
• Operations Research. Though widely used by the US Navy and Army Air 
Forces during the Second World War, operations research came to be seen by 
the Army as a legitimate source of professional knowledge about land force 
operations only after the War. 
• Combat Developments. The creation of a combat developments process 
provided the Am1y a means of 'tinkering' with the future. 
• Professional Military Education and Doctrine Development. A shift in both the 
pedagogical and doctrinal contribution of the Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC) drew a sharper line between studying the lessons of the last 
war and contemplating the nature and needs of the next one. 
Between 1945 and 1960, the army changed the way it 'evaluate[ d] the future 
character of war, and how [it] effect[ ed] change in the senior officer corps'. 2 The standards of 
readiness and measure of professional knowledge came to include an uncertain future, one 
beyond the near-term horizons of mobilization plans, published doctrine, existing 
J There are innumerable definitions of the term innovation. For simplicity this dissertation defines military 
innovation as the deliberate adoption of 'new military technologies, tactics, strategies, and structures. According 
to Farrell and Teriff, innovation is one of three ways a military can change, the other two being adaptation and 
emulation. Theo Farrel, Terry Terriff, ' The Sources of Military Change', in The Sources of Military Change: 
Culture, Politics, Technology, ed. by Theo Farrel and Terry Terriff(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications Inc., 
2002) (p. 6.). 
2 This phrase is part ofSteven P. Rosen's definition of peacetime innovation. Steven Peter Rosen, Winning the 
Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 52. 
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organizations, and even existing weapons. Taken together, these institutional changes 
represent a significant and overlooked example of peacetime innovation. 
The army's capacity for innovation did not result from a deliberate set of plans, the 
forceful action of a single maverick, or the specific support or pressure of an external 
political force. Instead it emerged out of the gradual, evolutionary acceptance by the army of 
a set of assumptions about the character of future war, which challenged traditional notions 
about preparing for the next war. When parsing the complex and interactive behavior of a 
bureaucracy, one should not discount broad factors shaping assumptions. Assessments of the 
Soviet Union's conventional strength as well as a continuous parade of new, if occasionally 
overhyped, weapons technologies animated the army's views in this period. Internal threats to 
its self-image, its waning influence over the direction of national security policy, and the 
associated loss of resources also helped shape its views. However, while these factors and 
others may explain the rush to the ill-fated Pentomic solution of the late 1950s, none fully 
accounts for the creation of a solution-independent capacity to innovate that endured well 
beyond the early Cold War. 3 
By the late 1940s despite strongly held convictions about the enduring nature of land 
warfare, key army leaders accepted the notion that success in future war requires continuous 
doctrinal, organizational, and materiel innovation. This shift gave energy and permanence to 
the institutional changes described in this dissertation. To many of the iconic army leaders of 
the Second World War, the antiquated notion that the exclusive role of the professional officer 
in peacetime was to 'preserve the habits and usages of war', was clearly out ofdate. 4 It would 
take, however, until 1960 for the army to have the physical capacity to move beyond a mere 
ad hoc alternative to 'preservation' and toward something capable of near continuous, ifnot 
always successful, development. 
The next section describes this dissertation's contribution to scholarship of military 
innovation. This is followed by a review of the literature on the army in the context of the 
early Cold War and related literature on the development of tactical atomic weapons. The 
3 Capacity building is a tenn adopted by the US Department of Defense to describe the creation of institutions 
and processes, usually within a partner nation, designed to adapt existing defense capabilities to anticipated or 
unknown future security requirements. The Pentomic army was a radical top-down redesign of existing am1Y 
tactical. organization and doctrine to create a flexible, nuclear capable, high technology force. Introduced in 
1956, the Pentomic concept was openly derided by 1959 and abandoned by early 1961. 
4 William T. Sherman, Memoirs o.fGeneral W. T. Sherman (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1891), p. 
406. 
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final three sections of the introduction examine the literature and sources of the major 
chapters of this dissertation; operations research, combat developments, and the CGSc. 
On Innovation 
Much of the literature on military innovation starts with a dissection of a successful 
case, for example the development of Germany's so-called 'blitzkrieg' capability in the 
interwar period, in order to identify its nature. Successful cases of innovation are relatively 
easy to trace because they often leave a trail of decisions, actions, and physical change that 
prove useful to a historian attempting to understand the attributes of success. Negative cases, 
where innovation failed or, more often than not did not occur at all, are obviously less 
interesting because they are the story of inaction and lost opportunity. Over the past thirty 
years scholars who study military innovation, like Williamson Murray, Alan Millett, Barry R. 
Posen, and Stephen P. Rosen, have established a set of general concepts to explain why 
innovation occurs and some of the major factors in success.s A full recitation of the 
similarities and differences between these scholars or the range of literature on military 
innovation is not the purpose here except to show where this dissertation fills a gap in the 
existing scholarship. 
The reasons why a specific military innovation occurs show a great degree of 
variability. Explanations range from a natural, evolutionary process to ones where the driver 
(or inhibitor) is an internal or external actor. Woven throughout, and the subject of more 
recent scholarship, is a question about the extent to which bureaucratic role or institutional 
5 The major works by these scholars on this topic are; Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. by 
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Barry R. Posen, The 
Sources of Militmy Doctrine (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1984); Rosen, Winning the Next War: 
Innovation and the Modern Militmy. There is a large body of work in this field to include a more recent 
subspecialty of so-called military revolutions. The work is generally split between historians and political 
scientists but most have a decidedly utilitarian purpose in supporting, explaining, or challenging aspects of 
recent examplcs of military innovation or the desire for what policy makers refer to as 'transformation'. Other 
useful, but more spccific, works which highlight the creation or support of institutional capabilities for 
innovation include Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Mathew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: IIow the 
United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Militmy Technologies (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 
1988); LB. Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During 
World War I, Reprinted from 1953 (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983); David E. Johnson, 
Fast Tanks and /Ieavy Bombers: Innovation in the u.s. Army, 1917-1945 (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 
1998); John T. Kuehn, Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the 
Japanese Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American 
Way of War since 1945 (New York: Columbia UniverSity Press, 2008); Norman Friedman Thomas C. Hone, 
and Mark D. Mandeles, American & British Aircrqfi Carrier Developmenl1919-1941 (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1999). 
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cultures play in innovation. 6 Despite the focus on identifying the major causal factors of 
innovation, most of these works touch only lightly on the question of a military's 'capacity to 
innovate' as either a precondition or essential quality to moving beyond just innovative ideas. 
Where historians address capacity they normally describe it as a positive (or negative) aspect 
of the underlying culture, not as a physical or organizational attribute. For example, Murray 
notes that '[r]igidity is undoubtedly a fact oflife in many military organizations - one which 
has exercised a baleful influence over institutional capacity to innovate '. These kinds of 
general statements, while useful as a descriptive, do not illuminate the more specific question 
of capacity. What is the impact on army culture or its ability to successfully innovate if it had 
a coherent set of institutional processes whose purpose is facilitating change? The question 
here is not one of simply judging a process successful because of the later success of its 
output. This is clearly a desired but never guaranteed outcome of any innovation. The 
question is about the efficacy of establishing within a military bureaucracy an ongoing 
process dedicated to change. Is such activity, in and of itself, evidence of or an essential 
ingredient for innovation? In the positive example cited earlier, the German military 
established organizations and processes to study, experiment, test, assess, and adapt new 
ideas to actual conditions. 8 In this example, the resulting tactical innovations were a success, 
but clearly insufficient for victory. However, this has not diminished the allure of the German 
case to students of peacetime military innovation. How then should one assess the impact of 
similar organizations and processes, created by the army in the early Cold War, whose near 
tern1 and, some would argue, long-term outputs were tactical failures? 
Another area of innovation literature this dissertation infornls is the fundamental 
question of the activity itself: innovate for what? Understanding how institutions answer this 
question is important to replicating success, but it often remains well hidden in a milieu of 
human judgments, prejudices, fears, and preferences. For example, consider the major 
schools of thought on this question. Military innovation, according to Posen, occurs through 
changes in a nation's grand strategy and broad doctrinal preferences for offense, defense, and 
6 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Militmy Innovation: The Impact ofCulural Factors on the Revolution in 
Militmy Affairs in Russia, the US, and IITael (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 20 I 0). In the category of 
ascribing to a military culture the primary factor in the army's 'failure to innovate', prior to Vietnam, I would 
also include John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Kntfe: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
, Williamson Murray, 'Innovation Past and Future', in Militmy Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. by 
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) (p. 322). 
8 For a detailed description of the German interwar capacity for innovation see James S. Corum, The Roots of 
Blitzkrieg: /lans Von Seeckt and German Militmy Reform (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992). 
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deterrence. 9 On the other hand, Rosen argues that it is actually the result of a complex 
analysis of the anticipated security environment including economic, technological, and 
political factors. 10 Millett argues that a more operational set of factors like 'the anticipated 
enemy, anticipated theaters of operations, the immediacy in distance and time from the 
possible outbreak of war, the balance between deterring war or simply preparing to fight it, 
the likely length ofa potential conflict, the role of allies, [and] the lessons of the last war', in 
combination account for innovation. It Finally, Murray argues that studies of military 
innovations show that regardless of the larger context, a focus on a 'specific military 
problem' was a key to a coherent process and ultimately success. He adds that this attribute of 
'specificity' applies to more than just the problem statement, but the proposed solution as 
well. In a successful innovation, Murray tells us, 'there must be clear institutional 
conceptions and interest in developing a new form of war' .12 In most of the cases examined 
by the above scholars, the question of how a military institution answers the 'for what' 
question, is a mix of personality, circumstance, and serendipity. Depending on the level of 
one's analysis, all of these explanations are useful but, again, incomplete. This dissertation 
aims to extend understanding of how nations or armies answer the question 'innovate for 
what' by examining the role-played by organizations and processes dedicated to exploring 
that question. Where a deliberate set of institutional processes and organizations are created 
to propose answers to these questions systematically, and on a continuing basis - is that a 
form of innovation? 
Finally, this dissertation offers a challenge to the view that the legacy of the army's 
early Cold War experience with innovation was negative. Certainly to judge by the short-
lived concept for a high technology, dual-capable (atomic and non-atomic) force, known as 
the Pentomic Army, the early Cold War was not a high point in terms of increasing the army's 
effectiveness. The army chief of staff immediatcly after the Pentomic division's demise noted 
that it 'would have had a difficult time fighting its way out of a wet paper bag'. \3 One finds a 
similarly negative legacy in personality and cultural explanations for the army's later 
9 Posen, The Sources oj'Military Doctrine, pp. 13-15. 
10 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern MilitGlY, p. 254. 
11 Millett described these factors as 'strategic calculations.' Allan R. Millett, 'Patterns of Miltary Innovation in 
the Interwar Period', in Military Innovation in the Intenvar Period, ed. by Williamson Murray and AlIan R. 
MilIett (New York Cambridge University Press, 1996) (p. 322). 
12 Murray, 'Innovation Past and Future' (pp. 311-312). 
\3 Lieutenant General Harold K. Johnson, 'Speech to Canadian National Defense College, 10 January 1964,' (10 
January 1964), p. 4; Harold K. Johnson Papers MHI - Series JI - Official Papers Box 136. Harold K. Johnson 
Papers, Series JI - Official Papers, Box 136: DCSOPS, Trips and Visits 1962-1964. MHI 
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performance in the Vietnam War. John A. Nagl, in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, explains the army's later failures by 
arguing it posessed a constrained, conservative, and learning impaired culture fundamentally 
incapable of recognizing the character of the next war. In addition to downplaying the context 
of the larger Cold War, Nagl concluded that '[t]o understand how and why an organization 
will change, it is essential to examine its past successes and failures - and those of the 
individuals who control the institution'. 14 
In a similar vein, Andrew J. Krepinevich, Jr., in his highly regarded analysis, The 
Army and Vietnam, described the army in this period as an institution blind to any innovation 
that did not fit a well defined and highly successful Second World War-based 'army concept' 
of 'how wars ought to be fought'. 15 While it is difficult to argue with the general proposition' 
that Vietnam was not the war the army prepared for, using a Vietnam War-centric lens to 
examine the innovative qualities of the period that went before distorts what actually 
happened. Despite their glaring near-term failures, the organizations and processes discussed 
in this dissertation were in part responsible for two dramatic changes in doctrine and 
organization within a span ofless than five years. 16 Whatever one can say about their near-
term utility, it is hard to argue that the three areas explored in this dissertation did not spur a 
significant amount of innovation or that they were not oriented at the problem they set out to 
address - namely the defense of Europe against the possibility of a Soviet-led conventional 
onslaught. 
Context - The Army in the Early Cold War 
A significant part of the army's institutional history in the early postwar era was 
characterized by a struggle to retain relevance. It was an unexpected and disorienting fall 
from the high point of victory over Germany and Japan. The period was one of change in 
which a fundamental shift in strategic requirements challenged long held assumptions about 
the army's role in national defense. The rapid development of new technologies, especially 
atomic weapons and their associated delivery systems, caused many inside and outside the 
14 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 216. 
IS Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
pp. 4-5. 
16 From the introduction of the first Pentomic units in 1956 to the approval of the Reorganization Objective 
Army Division (ROAD) in early 1961. 
13 
army to question its doctrinal foundations. Finally, dramatic shifts in long-standing defense 
policies fueled a climate of fierce bureaucratic competition for resources between the armed 
services and even among arms within army. 
One can break the literature of the early Cold War, more specifically the army's role, 
into three major time periods. In the first, 1945-1950, the dominant issues for the army 
concerned demobilization, readiness, and the creation of the Department of Defense. The best 
of the general histories, such as Russell F. Weigley's History of the United States Army, 
provide a clear description of the strategic and political issues that buffeted and significantly 
impacted the postwar army. 17 The most useful specific works on developments within the 
army during this time are in official histories such as Kenneth W. Condit's The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949 and Steven Rearden's contribution to the history of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Formative Years 1947-1950. /8 In terms of 
institutional histories, the most important is James E. Hewes, Jr. From Root to McNamara: 
Army Organization and Administration 1900-1963. 19 Despite the scope of his work, Hewes 
covers the transition from the War Department General Staff (WDGS) to the Department of 
the Army and subsequent changes to the army staff organizations throughout this entire 
period with great clarity. The V.S. Army Center of Military History archives contain a useful 
set of army ground forces historical monographs from this period, which document some of 
the internal changes resulting from broader institutional chaos. 20 Only a few works 
specifically address the impact on combat readiness of the institutional chaos of the later 
1940s. Thomas E. Jlanson's work, 'America's First Cold War Army: Combat Readiness in 
17 Russell F. Weigley, /listory of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967). 
Other works which provide useful context into the army of this period include Stephen E. Ambrose, 'The Armed 
Services and American Strategy, 1945-1953', in Against All Enemies - Intelpretatiol1s of American Militmy 
I listo/y ji-om Colonial Times to the Present, ed. by Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 305-320; Joseph C. Bernardo, Eugene H. Bacon, American Miitary Policy - Its 
Development since 1775, 2nd (Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, 1961); Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, For 
the Common Defense - A Military /listory of the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1984). 
18 Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chie.f.~ of Sta/f and National Policy, 1947-1949, History of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, II (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, 1996); Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years 1947-1950, 
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I (Washington DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary 
of De fen se, 1984). 
19 James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration (Washington DC: 
United States Army, Center for Military History, 1975). Another useful reference, although more general in 
nature, on the changes in defense is Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing/or Defense: The American Military 
Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 
20 Examples include Keith Sherman and Albert N. Garland, Studies in the llistOlY of Army Ground Forces 
During the Demilitarization Period (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1948); Planning 
Activities of Army Ground Forces, 1945-1948 Study No. XIV (Washington DC: U.S. Army Cent er of Military 
History, 1949). 
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the Eight Army, 1949-1950' is useful in describing the actual condition of the pre-Korean 
War army.21 
The second period of the Cold War is generally bounded by the start of the Korean 
War in 1950 and the truce agreement in 1953. As Weigley described it, the 'army of 1950 was 
very much a postwar army, shaped less by military doctrine looking to a future war, to which 
this army too often seemed irrelevant, than by the past, by the last war, of whose massive 
armies it was the remnant' . 22 The standard histories by T.R. F ehrenback and Clay Blair 
suffice to provide the context of war itself, but do not delve much into the army reaction to 
the war.23 Somewhat surprisingly, while the Korean War had a major impact on the 
operational army of the day, it played only an indirect role in the army's creation of a 
capacity to innovate. Events on the Korean peninsula informed decisions concerning 
operations research, combat developments, and CGSC, but in large measure did not drive 
them. The most significant impact of the Korean War on innovation in the army was to 
accelerate the drive to prepare for a future war in Europe. Lawrence S. Kaplan's official 
history, A Community of Interest - NATO and the Militmy Assistance Program 1948-1951 
details in the logic and policies which resulted in the increased emphasis on solving the 
challenges of a ground defense in NATO. 24 
The final period covers the two tern1s of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In terms of 
impact, the tension between the most respected retired soldier of his day and the army that he 
once led was second only to atomic weapons in terms of influencing how the army prepared 
for future war. Eisenhower's emphasis on strategic weapons not only accelerated a process 
that had begun in the late 1940s, but also established the budgetary context within which the 
army's leadership made decisions. The literature on the Eisenhower era is extensive. Again, 
in terms of correlating the broader strategic events to the institutional decisions of the army, 
the official histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 
21 Thomas E. Hanson, 'America's First Cold War Army: Combat Readiness in the Eighth U.S. Army, 1949-
1950' (unpublished PhD thesis, Ohio State University, 2006). 
22 Weigley, Ilistory of the United States Army, p. 502. 
23 Clay B1air, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Crown, 1987); T.R. Fehrenback, 
This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan Co, 1963). 
24 Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community oflnteresf- NATO and the MilitGlY Assistance Program 1948-1951 
(Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 1980). Kaplan expands on this study in 
Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984). 
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essential references. 25 The best work on the specific contours of the relationship between 
Eisenhower's strategy preferences and the army's are Saki Dockrill's Eisenhower:~ New-Look 
National Security Policy, 1953-1961, Gerard Clarfield's Security with Solvency - Dwight D. 
Eisenhower and the Shaping of the American Military Establishment, and David Fautua's 
'An Anny for the "American Century": The Origins of the Cold War United States Anny, 
1949-1959'.26 While Eisenhower's own two-volume memoir of the period tend to downplay 
the conflict with the anny, the records of the National Security Council illuminate the 
sometimes-open hostility between the president and the anny.27 Where Eisenhower's public 
memoirs downplay the tension, the chiefs of staff who served during his administration were 
not so forgiving. 28 
The anny's side of the debate exists in memoirs of fonner chiefs of staff Generals 
Mathew B. Ridgway and Maxwell D. Taylor. While autobiographies covering General Omar 
N. Bradley and Lawton J. CoBin's tenures as the anny's chiefs of staff have some useful 
insights, both are too general on the inner working of the anny or singularly focused on the 
postwar unification battles and the Korean War to infonn the subject at hand significantly. 
Ridgway's public criticism of Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation was well known 
long before he published Soldier: A Memoir of Matthew B. Ridgway in late 1956. Ridgway's 
memoir, when supported by the official record, helps establish the anny's fundamental 
25 See Doris M. Condit, The Test o/War 1950-1953, History of the Office of the Secretary of De fen se, 1I 
(Washington DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988); Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, 
Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, III (Washington DC: 
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 200 I); Robert 1. Watson, Into the Missile Age 1956-1960, 
History of the Office of the Secreary of Defense, IV (Washington DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 1997). On the JCS see Kenneth W. Condit, The joint Chiej~ of Staff and National Policy, 1955-
1956, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, VI (Washington DC: Historical Office, Joint Staff, 1992); Byron R. 
Fairchild and WaIter S. Poole, The joint Chief~ o/Staff and National Policy, 1957-1960, History of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, VII (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2000); Waiter S. Poole, The joint Chief~ 0/ Staff and National Policy 1950-1952, History of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, IV (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, 1998). 
26 Gerard Clarfield, Security with Solvency - Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Shaping o/the American Militwy 
Establishment (We sport: Praeger, 1999); Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-
1961 (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996); David T. Fautua, 'An Army for the 'American Century': The 
Origins of the Cold War United States Army, 1949--1959' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of North 
Carolina, 2006). A more accessible version ofFautua's thesis is found in David T. Fautua, 'The "Long Pull" 
Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War Army', The journal o/Militwy Ifistory, 61 
(1997),93-120. 
27 See especially, National Security Policy 1955-1957, ed. by William Klingaman, David S. Patters on, Ilana 
Stern, XIX (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1990); National Security Affairs 1952-1954, ed. by 
Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Peterson, 11 (2 Parts) (Washington DC: Government Printign Office, 1984). 
28 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate/or Change, 1953-1956: The White Ifouse Years (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1963); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House Years (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1965). 
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argument for a flexible force, which would continue for the remainder of the decade. His 
influence on the debate, however, remained limited by his shortened tenure as chief of staff 
and publication of his decidedly 'frank and angry account' of his time in office. 29 The tone of 
Ridgway's account, and the proximate source of Eisenhower subsequent anger toward him 
and the army's senior leaders, was his accusation that the administration's 'military budget 
was not based so much on military requirements, or on what the economy of the country 
could stand, as on political considerations'. 30 
General Taylor's The Uncertain Trumpet is, unlike his predecessor's book, less a 
memoir than a polemical essay on the failings of the Eisenhower strategy and a prescription 
of how to correct it. Taylor's book does not address the specific army machinations in 
reaction to the strategy of massive retaliation. Rather it describes the philosophic position that 
framed army decisions within the context of deliberations within the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS). The work is notable for two insights. First, Taylor explains, in great detail, the 
development of his strategic concept of flexible response and its emphasis on the non-nuclear 
capabilities of a dual-use force. Second, the book is almost completely silent on the army's 
transformation, which by the time of its drafting was already coming under withering 
criticism from within the amlY itself. Both of these positions perhaps give the strongest 
evidence to some observers, such as Andrew J. Bacevich, who argue that the Pentomic 
experiment was always a political pacifier to the administration and not a serious effort at 
innovation. 31 
The final senior officer memoir of the period, which reflects on the subject of this 
dissertation, is that of Lieutenant General James A. Gavin. Gavin's book War and Peace in 
the Missile Age is a combination memoir and wide-ranging discussion of the interface 
between national strategy, technology and politics.32 If there were ever a 'Maverick-like' 
personality during this period it was Gavin. One of the youngest generals in the army, Gavin 
was an early military member of defense establishment's Weapons Systems Evaluation 
29 Ridgway's initial thoughts were published in a series oflong articles in the 'Saturday Evening Post' 
beginning in January 1956. These were later expanded and published in Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The 
Memoir of Matthew B. Ridgway (New Yark: Harper and Brothers, 1956). 
30 Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoir of Matthew B. Ridgway, p. 272. 
31 A.J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Army: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1986). 
32 James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958). Another work 
which offers some valuable in sights into internal bureaucratic politics of the army's technical services and 
competition with the air force over missiles is found in Maj. General John B. Medaris, Countdown for Decision 
(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1960). 
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, Group (WSEG) and the director of army research and development during the critical debates 
over how the army would respond to the 'New Look' strategy. Gavin remained committed to 
the rapid development of new technologies, convinced of the inevitability of the use of 
tactical atomic weapons, and frustrated by what he called 'the deception and duplicity' of the 
defense department. 33 He represented a segment of the army that was convinced of its 
inability to deal adequately with limited wars (including those requiring use of atomic 
weapons). As Gavin argued, a gap between rhetoric and reality at the strategic level 
exacerbated this situation. A so-called 'missile lag' threatened 'limited defeats that we would 
rationalize at the time but that would ultimately lead to a general defeat, or a general war. ,34 
Gavin simultaneously advocated a more aggressive strategic policy, moving the 'high-
ground' to space, while simultaneously supporting the move to the Pentomic army. Despite 
his enthusiasm, however, Gavin warned that the necessary equipment, specifically 'missile 
fire power' and 'sky cavalry' were 'seriously lacking' and the army was in danger of creating 
its own rhetoric and reality gap.35 
The other major theme that cuts across this period and one that this dissertation 
identifies as animating force within the army was the advent and development of atomic 
weapons. 36 The standard work on the army's move toward integrating atomic weapons is 
Andrew J. Bacevich's The Pentomic Army: The Army Between Korea and Vietnam. Bacevich 
presents a searching treatment of the army's decision to pursue a dramatic transforn1ation 
centered on tactical atomic weapons that turned out to be 'striking for its impennanence.'37 
lIe concludes that the Pentomic experiment was born of political maneuvering and a 
'compulsive commitment to nuclear technology' without considering the alternatives. 38 While 
Bacevich presents a tight history of the various pressures shaping the army's decisions, he is 
dismissive of the sincerity of the effort to develop actual capabilities toward the objective 
promoted in the Pentomic concept. Part of this was the actual frailty of the effort and its 
apparent irrelevance to the demands of the decade that followed. A significant new addition 
to the literature is Ingo Trauschweizer's The Cold War u.s. Army: Building Deterrence/or 
33 Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, p. 155. 
34 Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, pp. 12-13. 
35 Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, pp. 270-272. 
36 Unless otherwise specified, this dissertation will use the phrase 'atomic' when referring to nuclear weapons 
and associated equipment. Although beginning in the late-1950's the more accurate term 'nuclear,' which was 
considered inclusive of fission and fusion weapons came into common use. 
37 Bacevich, The Pentomic Army, p. 142. 
38 Bacevich, The Pentomic Army, p. 151. 
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LimUed War. Trauschweizer places the army's development and innovation decisions in this 
period clearly within the larger Cold War context and demonstrates that the army's concept 
for limited war was driven by the search for an adequate force and warfighting doctrine for a 
war in Europe against the USSR.39 As this dissertation demonstrates, the effort to create 
future capabilities within the Cold War context Trauschweizer describes was in response to 
the challenges presented by a new war in Europe and not merely political window dressing. 
On the more specific topic of how the army addressed atomic weapons during this 
period, there is a wide range of general histories on atomic weapons development. 
Nevertheless, few address the institutional processes and organizations at work. There are 
two standard works, however, which specifically address the army's development of atomic-
related doctrine and organizations. The single best volume on the army's attempts to 
rationalize atomic weapons and land warfare as it existed in the early Cold War is John 1. 
Midgley's Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield. 40 The strength of 
Midgley's effort is that he shows how the outputs of the three processes described in this 
dissertation interacted on the army staff. Midgley clearly demonstrates that despite the 
questions concerning conceptual, technical, and practical viability of many of the components 
of the Pentomic army, decisions to proceed were based on a desire to acquire an atomic 
capability and less on how the army would actually fight with it. John P. Rose's The 
Evolution ofU.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine 1945-1980 is a less scholarly work than Midgley's 
and handicapped at times by the author's advocacy for updating the army's doctrine at the 
time it was written. 41 Notwithstanding these limitations, Rose presents a useful discussion 
and analysis of atomic warfare, as it appeared in the army's professional journals and within 
the curriculum of CGSC. 
A recent addition to the standard works on this question is Paul C. Jussel's, 
'Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960.'42 Jussel's work 
updates earlier scholarship on the origins of the actual concepts underpinning the Pentomic 
army. The significance of this work is that he deemphasizes the role of bureaucratic politics 
in Taylor's decision to field the Pentomic division and instead notes the steady development 
39 Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War u.s. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence, University 
Press of Kansas, 2008). 
40 John 1. Midgley Jr., Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986). 
41 John P. Rose, The Evolution of u.s. Nuclear Doctrine: 1945-1980 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980). 
42 Paul C. Jussel, 'Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956-1960' (unpublished PhD 
thesis, Ohio State University, 2004 ). 
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of concepts intended to address both atomic weapons and war in Europe. Jussel demonstrates 
that the conceptual ideas associated with Pentomic - mobility, firepower, and 
communications - were the result of a thoughtful, if informal, conceptual development 
process. This dissertation expands his thesis by showing that in some cases, the parallel 
development of formal organizations and processes were both the result of, and in some cases 
the source of, these early concepts. 
The next three sections of this introduction will briefly describe the main chapters of 
this dissertation and review the primary literature and sources associated with each. While the 
subject of each section stands alone in terms of development and purpose, the broad nature of 
changing the way the army approached future war is the common thread moving between 
them. Readers will note that while some individuals, like Lieutenant General James Gavin, 
play a role across all three, and some subjects, like the impact of atomic weapons, animate 
the activities, no single driver of this innovation is identified. 
Expanding the Boundaries of Professional Knowledge 
One of the major changes that occurred in the army after the Second World War was 
an expansion of what could be considered its traditional sources of professional knowledge. 
Samuel Huntington defined the professional characteristics of the modem officer corps as 
expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The responsibility and corporateness of the army 
would expand during in the early Cold War but for the most part would not be challenged. 
However, the idea of the army officer as possessing a unique and unassailable body of 
knowledge in the 'management of violence' was an unexpected casualty of the Second World 
War. 43 The large-scale introduction of science, civilian scientists, and a requirement to 
manage scientific developments forever changed what an officer, and perhaps more 
importantly, the society he served, considered the basis of professional knowledge. The army, 
unlike the air force or the navy, was not a technologically centric service. The army's 
relationship to science was always more about pragmatism than knowledge. Science was 
useful to the extent is produced new technologies for battlefield use. More importantly, the 
army want to know how new weapons might impact basic tactics and organization and in turn 
how new tactics might drive requirements for new weapons. The answer to these kinds of 
questions would be found in the newly created discipline of operations research. 
43 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics a/Civil Military Relations (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. pp. 11-18. 
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Definitions for operations research vary. For simplicity, this dissertation will use the 
U.S. Department of De fen se's definition: 
Operations Research: The analytical study of military problems undertaken to 
provide responsible commanders and staff agencies with a scientific basis for 
decision or action to improve military operations. Also called operational 
research; operations analysis. 44 
Some form of operations research has probably existed since the earliest days of 
organized armies and the introduction of technologies dedicated to the conduct of war. The 
early development of operations research began during the First World War and continued, in 
an unrecognized form, in small pockets across the fields of science, engineering, and industry 
over the next twenty years. 45 Operations research, in its fully developed form, began in 
Britain during the development of an air defense system in the late 1930s. These innovations 
spread to the United States during early military and scientific exchanges, but remained for 
most of the Second World War within the confines of the AAF and navy.46 Most of the major 
works on the development of operations research in the army focus on the work of Office of 
Science Research and Development (OSRD). The administrative and organizational side of 
the OSRD story is well covered by a wartime participant, Steward Irvin, in his Organizing 
Scientific Research/or War: The Administrative Histmy a/the Office a/Scientific Research 
and Development. 47 The most significant aspect ofOSRD's work from the perspective of 
long-term army interest in operations research, however, was the creation of the Office of 
Field Services (OFS) in 1943. Although the OFS had a mixed record of performance, it 
established precedent for scientists working with and directly for commanders engaged in 
44 Joint Staff, Joint Puhlication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionwy of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), p. 272. 
45 For a succinct summary of the early history see Joseph F. McCloskey, 'The Beginnings of Operations 
Research: 1934-1941', Operations Research, 35 (1987), 143-152. 
46 For examples of early air force, navy, and technical services operations research activity in the Second World 
War, see George Raynor George R. Thompson, and Dixie R. Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943 
through 1945) (Washington DC: Office of the Cheif of Military History, 1966); Charles W. McArthur, 
Operations Analysis in the US. Eighth Air Force in World War JI, History of Mathematics, 4 (Providence: 
American Mathematical Society, 1990); Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group: A lfistory of 
Naval Operations Analysis (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984). 
47 Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948). A broader and very insightful look at the relationship 
between science and WWII is A. Hunter Dupree, 'The Great Insaturation of 1940: The Organization of 
Scientific Reserach for War', in The Twentieth-Century Sciences: Studies in the Biograpahy of Ideas, ed. by 
Gerald Holton (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972). 
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combat. Erik P. Rau's research, 'Combat Scientists: The Emergence of Operations Research 
in the United States During World War 11,' offers perhaps the best explanation for how this 
new form of knowledge gradually found acceptance within the American military. 48 
The historiography of operations research in the early Cold War is a sub-set of a 
much larger body of scholarship on the growth of what Edward Teller called the era of 'big 
science' .49 The great debates over the role of science in society; the proper relationship 
between the military and academia, and the implications, good and bad, of defense-oriented 
research funding all emerged during this period and remain a productive field of 
scholarship. 50 The most relevant part of this work is that which centers on the creation of 
specific internal and external organizations founded upon or dedicated to the use of 
operations research. The most iconic of these postwar organizations was the RAND 
Corporation. 51 In many ways much of the army's early emphasis on operations research in the 
late 1940s was a reaction to the almost ubiquitous influence of RAND's work in support of 
the newly independent air force. 
On the specific topic of army operations research in the early Cold War, the best and 
most comprehensive work is History of Operations Research in the United States Army, 
1942-1962 by Charles R. Shrader. 52 Shrader's work is especially valuable because it traces 
the development of operations research as a discipline within the institutional context of the 
army. This is an important distinction since the majority of scholarship, as noted in the 
RAND case, focuses on either the personalities involved or the relative impact of the work 
itself. By the early 1950s, and in large measure as a result of military or military sponsored 
work, operations research had grown from a niche activity to a highly visible and 
increasingly influential force in national security. In the early 1950s practitioners of 
48 Eric Peter Rau, 'Combat Scientists: The Emergence of Operations Research in the United States During 
World War Il' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1999). Rau expounds on the early 
resistance to the work ofthe OFS in Erik P. Rau, 'The Adoption of Operations Reserach in the United States 
During World War Il', in Systems, Experts, and Computers - the Systems Approach in Management and 
Egnineering in World War 1I and After, ed. by Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes (Cambridge: The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2000) (pp. 57-92). 
49 Edward Teller, 'The Era of Big Science', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 27 (1971),34-36 (p. 34). 
50 See for example; Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York: Atheneum, 1971); Gregg Hcrken, Counsels of War 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Fred Kaplan, The Wizard~ of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
Inc., 1983); Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
51 RAND is short for Research And Development. For RAND's role and influence, see A1ex Abella, Soldiers 
o.fReason: The RAND COIporation and the Rise of the American Corporate Empire (Orlando: First Mariner 
Books, 2009); David Hounshell, 'The Cold War, RAND, and the Generation of Knowledge, 1946-1962', 
Ilistorical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 27 (1998), 237-267. 
52 Charles R. Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army: 1942-1962', I (Washington 
DC: United States Army, 2006). 
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operations research established a professional society and began publishing a highly regarded 
journal, Operations Research. This journal is a tremendous resource for insights into both the 
developments the field and the new discipline's history. 
This dissertation traces the influence of operations research on the army and the 
creation of a capacity to conduct operations research related work through two organizations. 
The first was not actually an arn1Y organization. However, the Weapons Systems Evaluation 
Group (WSEG) played an important role in how the army began to accept a new source of 
professional knowledge. Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal agreed to the creation of 
the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in December 1948 in order 'to provide rigorous, 
unprejudiced, and independent analysis and evaluations of present and future weapons 
systems under probable future combat conditions' .53 Harkening back to some of the unique 
attributes of the Second World War's OSRD, the WSEG consisted of of civilian scientific and 
academic experts paired with a small group of uniformed service representatives. The only 
general history of the WSEG is a comprehensive study by John Ponturo entitled, Analytical 
Support/or the Joint Chief,> o/Staff: The WSEG Experience, 1948-1976. 54 The WSEG is 
important to understanding the army's experience because of its role in several major studies 
of atomic weapons in the defense of Europe, and the influence it had on key individuals who 
in turn influenced the direction of the army's approach to future war. In addition to 
discussions of the politics and influence ofWSEG in various memoirs, an important 
perspective is found in the oral histories of Gavin's replacement as the WSEG's senior army 
representative, Major General Garrison H. Davidson. 55 Davidson would go on to command 
CGSC and would credit his education at the WSEG for the development of the college's 
doctrine and development missions. 
The genesis of the army's own postwar operations research organization is found in 
Eisenhower's 30 April 1946 memorandum directing the army to develop a means to 'have 
civilians assist in military planning as well as for the production of weapons' . Eisenhower's 
memorandum, which one can only view ironically as a call for the same military-industrial-
complex he would later warn against, argued the army had a duty; 
53 Reproduced as Annex C in John Ponturo, 'Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG 
Experience, 1948-1976' (Arlington: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1979), pp. C-l. 
54 Ponturo, 'Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
55 William C. Baldwin, 'Engineer Memoirs: Lieutenant General Garrison H. Davidson, USA Retired (Oral 
History)', (Oakland: Office of History, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1986); Dr. John T. Greenwood, 
'Interview with Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson' (Oakland: U.S. Department ofthe Army, Corps of Engineers, 
1980). Other useful memoirs include Phi lip M. Morse, In at the Beginnings: A Physicist's Life (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1977). 
23 
to take the initiative in promoting closer relations[s] between civilian and 
military interests. It must establish definitive policies and administrative 
leadership that will make possible even greater contributions from science, 
technology, and management than during the last war. 56 
The development of the army's own semi-independent operations research capability 
would come to fruition in 1948 under a unique collaborative contract with the Johns Hopkins 
University. The army and Johns Hopkins administrators quickly assembled a group of 
talented scientists under the leadership of a veteran of the navy's operations research 
program, Dr. Ellis Johnson. ]ohnson would be the first and only director, remaining with the 
program through its transition outside army control in 1961. One author noted that '[t]he 
history of [ORO] is inseparable from the history ofEllis A. Johnson' .57 ]ohnson's 
correspondence, available in the archival records of the ORO at Johns Hopkins, is useful in 
tracing the growth, frictions, and demise of the organization he created. 58 The organizational 
history of the ORO is documented primarily through its formal studies and reports, many of 
which have been declassified and are accessible at both the archives at the U.S. Army 
Heritage & Education Center and on-line through the Defense Technical Information Center. 
Although ORO was the first and largest operations research activity in the army, it 
was not the only one created during the early years. As discussed in the next section, 
operations research became a part of the combat developments activities on the army staff, 
Army Field Forces (AFF) and its successor, Continental Army Command (CONARC). A 
significant number of the early ORO projects included some aspect of social science research 
such as troop morale, training, and personnel performance. Still other efforts delved into 
issues of psychological warfare, country studies, and anthropological research in support of 
counterinsurgency planning. The growth and acceptance of operations research approaches to 
a wide range of issues eventually led to the creation of the Human Resources Research Office 
(IJumRRO) at George Washington University and the Special Operations Research Office 
(SORO) at American University. More than any technical research conducted by ORO over 
56 Memorandum from Eisenhower to Directors and Chiefs of War Department, subj: Scientific and Technical 
Resources as Military Assets, 30 April 1946, CCS 020 (l 0-4-44), Sec I, Document 883, Part 4 Chapter 8, in The 
Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Chiefof Staff, ed. by Louis Galambos, VII (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), pp. 1045-1049. Eisenhower's papers from his time as chief of staff are useful in 
understanding the army's early relationship with science in general and OR in paIiicular. 
57 Eugene P. Visco, 'The Operations Research Office', Army /listory 3(1996), 24-33. 
58 The Johns Hopkins University Archives, Baltimore Maryland. See Records of the Office ofthe President, 
Series I, Boxes 33, 34 and 
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the course of this era, it would be the application of operations research to the social sciences 
that would see a fundamental change in the way the army leveraged this discipline. A general 
survey of these organizations is found in Shrader's, History of Operations Research in the 
United States Army and an official history, A History of the Department of Defense Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers. 59 As with ORO reports, a significant number of 
declassified I-IumRRO and SORO studies are in available in both national and military 
archives and on-line through the Defense Technical Information Center. 60 
The Birth of Combat Developments 
For most of its history, until the early Cold War, the army's approach to the 
development of new concepts, doctrine, and technology remained at best ad hoc. The 
founding fathers designed deliberate separation into the army at its birth in the late eighteenth 
century aimed at keeping its warfighting arms and the administrative and logistics 
organizations separate. Congress created an eclectic mix of organizations such as the 
Quartermaster General, Commissary General of Stores and Provisions, Commissary General 
of Musters, Commissary of Artillery Stores, Adjutant General, Clothier General, Paymaster 
General, Chief of Engineers, Wagonmaster, and a Medical Department to manage the 
materiel of war. One historian has described it as an 'unsystematic, ill-managed 
administrative system that divided responsibility for maintaining the army among 
congressional committees, state authorities, military commanders, staff officers, and 
civilians'.61 The mix of bureaucracies would change over the next century, and the basic 
processes would mature, but the "un systematic and ill-managed" description remained 
applicable. 62 
59 Office of Technology Assersment US Congress, A lIis/OIy of the Department of Defense Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers, OTA-BP-ISS-157 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1995). 
60 Examples include: Peter A. Bordes, John L. Finan, Joseph R. Hochstim, Howard H. McFann, Shepard G. 
Schwartz, 'HumRRO Tr-l, Desert Rock I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion' 
(Washington DC: George Washington University - Human Resources Research Office, 1952); Meredith P. 
Crawford, 'Research Bulletin 1: What Is HumRRO Doing?', 1 (The George Washington University - Human 
Resources Research Office, 1954). 
61 E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political 
Culture. 1775-1783, (University of North Carolina Press: 1990), p.19. See also Lucille E. Horgan, Forged in 
War: The Continental Congress and the Origin of Militmy Supply and Acquisition Policy (Greenwood Press: 
2002). 
62 A useful survey of the army in this period is James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logisitics 1775-
1953, Army Historical Series (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1997). 
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One of the best studies of the ineffective and purposely incoherent process is David A. 
Armstrong's, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the United States Army 1861-
1916. 63 Slowly, beginning with the 1902 Root Reforms and accelerating with the military and 
civilian mobilization of the First World War, bottom-up initiatives of creative officers and an 
occasional maverick began to drive small pockets of what one can best describe as 'local 
coherence', but there was still no coherent process. 64 
In the period between the world wars, most of the effort toward establishing a process 
for developing combat capabilities remained tied directly to mobilization for war and 
production of proven equipment designs. Developing new capabilities was never an easy task 
given the confusion over who controlled the process. Moreover, even where it showed 
glimmers of coherence, development in this period was a nearly fruitless task considering the 
lack of resources. On the mobilization and the development, in the interwar years, two 
official histories place development well within the context of near-term mobilization; The 
Ordnance Department: Planning Munitionsfor War and History of Military Mobilization in 
the United States Army 1775-1945. 65 On the specific issue of doctrine development in this 
period, the best overall study is William O. Odom's After the Trenches: The Transformation 
of us. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939. Odom argues that the irrelevance of the army's 1939 
capstone doctrine manual to the challenges of the approaching war was proof of 'the lack of a 
doctrine development system; at worst, it suggested the stagnation of intellectual activity 
within the army. ,66 
During the first two years of the Second World War, introducing new technologies 
represented a second priority to the rapid tactical training and equipping of newly formed 
divisions. There were a few exceptions to this rule that would provide a preview of an 
integrated development process. The development of the army's tank destroyer force is 
63 David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the United States Army 1861-1916 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982). 
64 See George F. Hoffman, 'Army Doctrine and the Christie Tank: Failing to Exploit the Operational Level of 
War', in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The !listory o/U.S. Armored Forces, ed. by George F. Hoffman and Donn 
A. Starry (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 92-143. WilIiam Mitchell, Our Air Force: 
The Keystone o/National De/ense (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1921). 
65 Contance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning 
Munitions/or War United States Army in World War 1I, the Technical Services (Washington DC: Office of the 
Chief of Military History, 1955); Marvin A. Kreidberg, Merton G, Henry, IIistOlY 0/ Military Mobilization in 
the United States Army 1775-1945, DA Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 
1955). 
66 WilIiam O. Odom, Afier the Trenches: The Tran~formation 0/ u.s. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p. 241. 
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informative. This nascent process took a concept through equipment development into the co-
development of organization and doctrine and foreshadowed a process that would not reach 
maturity until the late 1950s. It is equally instructive that advocacy of an influential officer, in 
this case Lieutenant General Leslie 1. McNair, championed the idea beyond what both the 
technology and initial combat feedback warranted. Christopher R. Gabel's Seek, Strike, and 
Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Doctrine in World War 1I provides a succinct description of the rise 
and fall of this wartime adaptation. 67 
New developments during the war, generally emerged through a bottom-up system 
that existed during the interwar years, but with two major modifications. First, the process 
was now well-funded. The challenge was no longer a lack of money, but one of rapid design, 
testing, and production. The second major change was the 1942 War Department general 
Staff (WDGS) reorganization and the creation of the ASF and the Army Ground Forces 
(AGF). For the first time there were higher headquarters with responsibility and some degree 
of central control over developments within the various arms and services. This marked the 
beginnings of an all-arms development approach. Organizational demands, user feedback 
from actual combat, gave rise, to the army's first holistic process. The Green Book series of 
official histories, specifically The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, The Organization 
and Role of Army Service Forces and The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply 
remain the best single sources for understanding this short-lived process. 68 
The army's first attempt to address the post-war combat development process came in 
the form of the 1946 Report of War Department Equipment Board or the Stilwell Board after 
its president General Joseph W. Stilwell. Despite its progressive nature, the Stilwell Board's 
near-term utility suffered because its analysis was unconstrained by resources. As if to 
emphasize that point, the reports release coincided with the acceleration of what would 
become a chaotic demobilization process. Despite this failing the report offered a clear 
description of the kind of development program the army required to keep up with the 
anticipated pace of technological change. The board argued that the army required 'vigorous 
research and development of new or anticipated types of equipment an continued 
67 Christopher R. Gabel, Seek Strike and Destroy: U S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War 11 (Fort 
Leavenworth Combat Studies Institute, 1985). 
68 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, Bell 1. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization oJ 
Ground Combat Troops United States Army in World War II (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 
1987); John D. Millett, The Organization and Role oJthe Army Service Forces, United States Army in World 
War II (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1954); Harry C. Thomson, Lida Mayo, The Ordnance 
Department: Procurement and Supply, United States Army in World War II (Washington DC: Center of 
Military History, 1960). 
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improvement of existing equipment as an interim measure [ ... and must] supervise 
continuously research and development merging or terminating projects at the feasible, 
economical moment and assur[ ed] a step-by-step change-over from the discarded material to 
the new'.69 
As described in Hewes' Root to McNamara, the late 1940s became an organizational 
battle between the army's diffuse combat development past and an increasingly consolidated 
future. An internal institutional power struggle began between the technical services, re-
empowered after the postwar dissolution of the ASF, and the combat arms, represented by the 
AFF (successor to the wartime AGF) over the fate of research and development. During the 
late 1940s, this internal bureaucratic turf battles for control played out just under the surface 
as the larger unification and reorganization debate took place above. Inertia and the weight of 
history may have won the day for the status quo had it not been for the emergence of tactical 
atomic weapons. The need to conceptualize a future war animated in large measure by 
weapons which did not yet exist, shifted the internal debate toward the development of a 
system much more in line with that advocated by the Stilwell Board. 
Beginning with the recommendations of an independent study of tactical nuclear 
weapons in the defense of Europe, Project VISTA, and continuing through several important 
organizational studies throughout the decade, the army gradually consolidated it development 
activities. 70 The creation of a 'Combat Development Group' within the new Continental 
Army Command (CON ARC), which replaced the AFF in 1955, provided the nucleus around 
which combat developments would eventually grow. The history of organizational change in 
this period is documented primarily in Hewes' Root to McNamara study, as well as several 
official histories and monographs, such as the United States Army Combat Development 
Command: Origins and Formation and the Combat Development System. 71 Several official 
histories of the changes in army doctrine and organization during this period provide some 
69 'Report of War Department Equipment Board (Stilwell Board)' (Washington DC: War Department, Office of 
the Chief of Staff, 1946), p. 2. 
70 The multi-volume Project Vista report is available at the MHI archives. Additional information on the 
project is available in the California Institute of technology Archives, Project Vista Collection. For a useful 
analysis of the process and major recommendations see David C. Elliott, 'Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in 
Europe', International Security, 11 (1986), 163-183; W. Patrick McCray, 'Project Vista, Caltech, and the 
Dilemmas of Lee Dubridge', Ilistorical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 34 (2004), 339-370. 
The most influential reorganization study of the period was Paul L. Davies, 'Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Army Organization (the Davies Report)' (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1953) 
<http://www.whs.mil/library/Dig/Rpt.%209-18-53.pdf> [accessed 1 March 2011]. 
71 'U.S. Army Combat Development System' (Fort Monroe: Headquarters, United States Army Continential 
Army Command, 1960); Jean E. Keith, Howard K. Butler, 'United States Army Combat Development 
Command: Origins and Formation' (Fort Monroe: US Army Combat Developments Command, 1972). 
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indication of both the pace of change and the limitations of the processes as they then existed. 
The first is Robert A. Doughty's The Evolution of us Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976. 
Doughty, who was an army officer at Fort Leavenworth in the mid-1970s, was involved in 
another period of dramatic change, noted that the lesson of the Pentomic era was 'the dangers 
of a strategic concept dictating tactical doctrine without consideration of the technical and 
intellectual capability to follow'. 72 Another useful work oriented on the organizational 
machinations of the period is John B. Wilson's, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of 
Divisions and Separate Brigades. Wilson argues that despite the failings of the army's post-
war combat developments process, 'the effort resulted in a set of "fertile ideas" with regard to 
new equipment and organizational concepts which would 'see further development in the 
next two decades' . 73 To that list, this dissertation would add coherent, if still immature , 
combat developments. 
The final chapter in the dissertation examines the role of the army's education and 
doctrine development process. The CGSC was an important near-term integrator of many of 
the ideas emerging out of operations research and combat developments. Just as importantly, 
it shifted the army's conceptual framework of the next war from one that exclusively starts 
with current capabilities to one that includes the possibility of wholly new solutions to future 
challenges. 
Learning to Keep Pace with the Future 
From its founding in the late nineteenth century through the period of this 
dissertation, the army school at Fort Leavenworth Kansas played an important role in shaping 
the anny's future. First, the CGSC is the army's most influential officer training and 
education institution. The other mission of the CGSC was as the army's primary developer 
and integrator of combined arms doctrine. This dissertation examines the development of 
both of these missions over the course of the early Cold War as well as CGSC's influence on 
the army's approach to future war. Changes in how the army thought about the future 
72 Major RobeIi A. Doughty, The Evolution o/US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 (Fort Leavenworth: 
Combat Studies Institute, 1979), p. 19. Another useful survey of the broader changes in doctrine over the entire 
century see Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Wmjare: A Survey 0/20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, 
and Organziation, Research Survey No. 2 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1984). 
73 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution o/Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army 
Lineage Series CMH Pub 60-14 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), p. 
286. 
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emerged through debates over curriculum and the appropriate methods of reviewing and 
creating army doctrine. As this dissertation demonstrates, changes at the CGSC during this 
period impacted the army's near term efforts to integrate atomic weapons into land warfare 
and at the same time lifted the institution's horizon for thinking about future war. 
One advantage of researching an educational institution is the professional habit of its 
staff and supporting library system to document both administrative and curricular activity. 
Records on the various Leavenworth schools dating to its founding in the early 1880s is 
available in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) archives and special collections. 
The collection includes locally produced histories of the college and its activities, annual 
reports from the commandants, and an extensive collection of student papers and reports. 
Significant for this dissertation's purpose, the collection covering the early Cold War includes 
an almost complete set of the annual reports of curriculum development, the internal and 
external review boards, correspondence of the commandants, as well as the special studies on 
doctrine and doctrine development procedures. 
The other significant source of information on the college, its organization, and the 
topics de jour is the college's journal Military Review. Published monthly beginning in 1922, 
Military Review provides a window into what should be considered a 'semi-official' 
institutional perspective on major issues. Given the pressure, especially in the early Cold War, 
for instructors to write for the journal and a lack of an independent peer review process, one 
cannot consider Military Review an accurate gage of what the officer corps was actually 
thinking, but rather an indicator of what the institution wanted them to think. 
In order to establish the degree of change that occurred after the Second World War , 
this chapter briefly describes the creation and development ofCGSC. The early history of the 
CGSC is well documented in the secondary literature. The best chronicle of the college's 
early developmental years is available in Timothy K. Ninninger's The Leavenworth Schools 
and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States 
Army, 1881-1918. 74 The two best studies of the school in the interwar period are Peter J. 
Schifferele's America s Schoolfor War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in 
74 Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the 
Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978). The best works on 
the intelIectual development underway in the army at th~s tin~e are T. R. Brereton, Educating the u.s. Army: 
Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905 (Lincoln: Ul1lverslty of Nebraska Press, 2000); Carol A. Reardon, 




World War II and a longjoumal article by Nenninger entitled 'Leavenworth and Its Critics: 
The V.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1920-1940.'75 
The early Cold War, as noted above, is well documented in official records but 
somewhat less so in the secondary literature. In terms ofplacing CGSC in the broader context 
of officer education the standard work in this period is John W. Masland and Laurence 1. 
Radway's Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy. 76 This highly 
regarded work is a scholarly treatment of the relationship between military education and the 
changing needs of national security. The authors provide a readable survey of both the 
general history of military education and the contemporary organization and curriculum. 
Two other works provide a general overview of CGSC in the Cold War. The first is a 
report prepared for the college by Robert A. Doughty in 1976 entitled 'The Command and 
General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976'. In this thoughtful study, Doughty usefully 
categorizes the changes at CGSC according to 'education versus training, generalist versus 
specialist, and scope of instruction'. 77 A more recent effort to examine CGSC in the Cold War 
is Michael David Stewart's 'Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College 1946-1986.' Stewart's work is a useful survey of the 
complete CGSC mission during this period, including material not considered here. Such as 
the courses offered to reserve forces and allies. While Stewart's work adds much to the 
scholarship in this period, he argues that much of the blame for the college's hesitancy to 
move toward a more progressive approach to its mission lay with the facuIty's 'hesitancy to 
adopt new methods or to attempt to predict some part of the future.' What this dissertation 
makes clear is that the evidence does not support that position. 78 
In addition to anecdotal information found in memoirs of former commandants, staff 
officers, and students at CGSC, no study of this institution would be complete without 
7S Timothy K. Nenninger, 'Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Coml~1and and General Staff School, 
1920-1940', The Journal 0/ Military //istOlY, 58 (1994), 199-231; Peter J. Schlfferle, America's School/or War: 
Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education and Victory in World War IT (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
2010). 
76 John W. Masland, Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
77 Robert A. Doughty, 'The Command and General Staff College in. Transition, 1?46-1976' (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and General Staff College, 1976), p. 3, in Defense Techl11cal InformatIOn Center (DTIC) 
<<http://handle.dtic.milll00.2/ADA030436>> [accessed 1 December 20 I 0]. 
78 Michael David Stewart 'Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College 1946-1986' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kansas, 2010), p. 99. 
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consideration of the oral history of Dr. Ivan 1. Birrer. 79 Birrer became one of the college's 
first full-time civilian staff members in 1948. A year later, he became the senior education 
advisor to the commandant - a position he held for thirty years. In addition to his oral 
history, the recollections of Davidson, Brigadier General William F. Train, and Major John H. 
Cushman provide critical background material that establishes a missing context to many of 
the changes instituted by the final CGSC commandant during the period of this dissertation. so 
Major General Lionel C. McGarr served as the commandant of CGSC from 1956 
through 1960. During that time he instituted major changes to the curriculum, the college's 
organization, and the relationship of the college to the army's doctrine and combat 
development processes. Many ofMcGarr's initiatives in terms of curriculum and 
organization would continue to shape CGSC and the army officer corps for decades after his 
departure. McGarr's aggressive championing of the Pentomic concept and his rejection of the 
Davidson design for an integrated concept-doctrine-combat development process provided 
the negative evidence necessary for the army to eventually adopt the Davidson design. 
McGarr's tenure at CGSC is well documented in the CARL archives; see especially his end-
of-tour report and the special report he wrote to explain the dramatic changes he instituted 
during his first year. 81 Given the self-promotional tone of some of this material, it seems that 
McGarr was more determined to impress upon his superiors the enthusiastic degree to which 
he was making changes rather than the intellectual basis for doing so. 
The above introduction and literature review provide the thesis and necessary 
background material for the three substantive chapters that follow. Although all three major 
themes in this work are connected, and in many areas overlap one another, they each 
represent a distinct and necessary part of a military institution's ability to innovate. The 
fundamental argument of this dissertation is that in the period between the end of the Second 
World War and 1960, the army moved from a limited and largely ad hoc ability to prepare for 
79 Robert A. Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan 1. Birrer: Service at the Command and General StaffCoIlege, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978' (unpublished thesis, Command and General Staff 
CoIlege, 1978). 
80 Baldwin, 'Davidson - Oral History'; John H. Cushman, 'F0I1 Leavenworth - A Memoir, Vol. I,' U.S. Army 
War ColIege Library, UB 200.C87 2001 VI;; Greenwood, 'Interview with Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson'; 
Reginald G. Moore, 'Oral History - William F. Train, Lieutenant General, USA Retired', II (Carlisle Barracks: 
US Army Military History Institute, 1983). Cushman would eventually command CGSC and retire as a 
Lieutenant General. 
81 Lionel C. McGarr, 'End of Tour Report of the Commanding General Fort Leavenworth and Commandant 
United States Army Command and General Staff CoJlege ' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff 
College, 1960); Lionel C. McGarr, 'Special Report of the Commandant' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and 
General Staff CoJlege, 1959). 
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future war to an institution with a coherent capacity to innovate. The distinction is important 
because while peacetime innovations, some successful and some not, have always occurred, 
estimates of the pace of change and the risk of failure in the early Cold War demanded more 
than genius and passion. Over the course of fifteen years the army created the capacity to 
change as the result of a three distinct processes. As stated at the outset, innovation in and of 
itself, whether the result of an ad hoc or institutional process, does not guarantee success. 
lIowever, as one scholar of military change has observed, having an institutional capacity 
gives one 'a reasonable chance of beginning the next war adequately configured to make the 
always necessary adjustments '.82 
82 Harold R. Winton, 'Introduction - On Military Change', in The Challenge o/Change: Military Instituions and 
New Realities, 1918-1941, ed. by Harold R. Winton (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000) (p. xii). 
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Chapter One - The Army and Operations Research 
In the early Cold War, the United States Army's adoption of operations 
research as a legitimate, if sometimes problematic, source of professional knowledge 
changed the way it approached war. This chapter charts the background, development, 
and ultimately the demise of the Operations Research Office (ORO), the army's first 
organization dedicated to operations research. The army's early relationship with the 
field began slowly and ran in two parallel tracks. The first was the use of operations 
research to fill significant institutional gaps in knowledge ranging from the use of 
tactical atomic weapons to psychological operations. The second was the use of 
operations research as an institutional tool for strategic analysis, co-equal to 
professional military judgment. The ORO's demise after a thirteen-year existence 
might have spelled the end of operations research in the army had not been so 
successful in addressing a diverse set of challenges. The rise and fall of the ORO is 
one of those rare cases where the utility and inherent flexibility of the tool proved far 
more valuable than the skill of the mechanic. 
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Amid the profound changes shaping the army after the Second World War, 
the rapid development of technology and the fundamental shift in the strategic posture 
of the United States had the most far-reaching impact.! The rapid introduction, 
diversity of purpose, and inherent complexity of new weapons were changing the 
character of war at a pace the army had never experienced. It was no longer enough 
for a young officer to carry his technical and tactical mastery of a particular weapon 
through to the end of his career, assuming a long career, of course. As the recent war 
had demonstrated, weapons, or more specifically systems, might retain a degree of 
stability by general type, such as tanks, mines, or radios, but the potential now existed 
for generational changes in the specific hardware in a matter of a few years. 
Moreover, such changes increasingly required a degree of scientific and technological 
literacy on the part of officers in an institution still predisposed to notions of 'heroic' 
knowledge. 2 
America's new strategic posture was the other major change that affected the 
army in the early Cold War. The army was no longer a small force that mobilized for a 
national emergency and then just as quickly demobilized. The rapidly evolving 
concept of deterrence, while focused in the early years exclusively on atomic 
weapons, soon expanded to include forward deployed 'trip-wire'. The army, while 
slow to move away from concepts like universal military training and an updated 
version of the 1939 mobilization plan, had to adapt to the demands of a standing 
force. The reality of a relatively large standing force, ostensibly maintained in a high 
state of readiness, placed new demands on the officer corps for management skills on 
a scale unknown outside of managing large organizations in wartime. Six years of 
building, fighting, sustaining, and demobilizing the largest army in American history 
taught the institution many lessons. Nevertheless, as any runner can attest, sprinting 
does not prepare one for a marathon. 
I On the changes in this period and their impact on military professionalism see Samuel P. Huntington, 
'Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession', Daedalus, 92 (1963), 785-807 (p. 785). 
2 Heroic knowledge here refers to what Brian McAllister Linn called a tradition that emphasized 'the 
human element, and defined warfare by personal intangibles such as military genius, experience, 
courage, morale, and discipline.' Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo o.(Battle - the Army~s Way of War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 1. 
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The combined weight of these changes created a requirement for a new source 
ofprofessional military knowledge. Prior to the end of the Second World War, an 
army officer was considered professionally well qualified if, in addition to the 
mastery of his particular arm, he was a student of history and had demonstrated his 
martial skills on a battlefield. An understanding of history, especially as developed 
through the applicatory method of study as it came into practice in the staff college 
before the First World War, was the ultimate source of knowledge in the American 
view of the profession of arms. Given the pace of change for most of the army's 
history, events within an officer's lifetime were a reliable source of up-to-date 
knowledge on how the army should operate once mobilized. The second source, 
personal experience, was by definition an idiosyncratic, but nonetheless powerful 
source of professional knowledge. It is not an accident that when soldiers, in 
professional or personal correspondence or memoirs, referr to a colleague, especially 
an admired one, they note that soldier's battlefield resume. Experience was also the 
source of Basil Liddell Hmi's observation that 'the only thing harder than getting a 
new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out'. 3 
Over the period covered by this dissertation, operations research became a 
third and influential source of professional military knowledge. This is not to say 
army officers gave up on the traditional sources or became scientists themselves. The 
story of operations research is how civilian scientists, by providing a novel approach 
to solving increasingly complex challenges, bridged the gap between two divergent 
trends. 
The first trend was an increasing move toward specialization. Technology was 
in part responsible but, in general, specialization was a trend in all professions. For 
the military profession, however, this was problematic. Army officers began their 
professional lives as specialists. Training and initial assignments rested on a narrow 
skill set such as artillery, cavalry or infantry. Over the course of a career, officers 
became increasingly generalized as they gained experience and worked in larger and 
more integrated organizations. This is the opposite of most other professions. Most 
doctors, for example, graduate as general practitioners and then move to increasingly 
specialized fields such as cardiology or orthopedics. For senior army officers in the 
3 Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), p. 115. 
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early Cold War, this trend toward specialization and the rapid pace of development 
increasingly chipped away at the near-term value of both their experience and 
knowledge of history, even recent history. 
The second trend ran in the opposite direction. The Cold War required much 
more of the army as an institution than either its leadership or civilian masters could 
have anticipated. Large-scale overseas occupation, forward-deployed formations 
maintained at a high state of readiness, the political and strategic responsibilities of 
sustaining alliances, and the responsibilities and challenges of a unified Department 
of Defense, all greatly expanded the scope of general knowledge expected of senior 
officers. Waiter Millis described the invasion of 'once pure sanctuaries of the general 
staffs' with such issues as '''psychological warfare," propaganda, policy aims, 
infiltrative methods, espionage, terror, threat, "economic warfare," and the industrial 
base by which one nation might affect the fortunes and policies of another beside the 
simple detonation of high explosives.,4 So while demands of the Cold War remained 
in keeping with the generalist role of senior officers, there was little in their 
backgrounds to prepare them beyond the sphere of the narrowly military. While it is 
true that there is little on the list that did not occur at some point in the history of the 
United States prior to the Cold War, the difference was one of scale, volume, and 
duration. 
A small group of scientitis working in a still developing field, served to bridge 
the gap that developed between these trends. In so doing, civilian scientific advice 
moved from being the musings of 'longhaired nuts' to a valued and integral factor in 
decision making. A number of scholars have charted the rise of the civilian defence 
intellectuals and Cold War strategists. s Sometimes derisively referred to them as slide-
rule strategists or paper-prophets, individuals like Bemard Brodie, Herman Kahn, 
Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, and Albert Wohlstetter had a significant impact at 
the highest level on national security decision-making. In many ways, these new 
strategists were an antidote for an American tendency to 'seek refuge in technology 
4 Waiter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Militmy lIistory (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1956), p. 305. 
5 See Colin S. Gray, 'What RAND Hath Wrought', Foreign Po/i(y (l971), 111-129; Gregg Herken, 
Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Fred Kaplan, The Wizard~ of Armageddon (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1983). 
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from hard problems of strategy and policy'. 6 Just below the strategists was second tier 
of civilian defence intellectuals, mostly in the field of operations research, who 
occupied the seam between strategy and technology. This group worked closely with 
the services even as they both tried to maintain their independence. The operations 
researchers associated with the army in the early Cold War found themselves involved 
in every major issue the institution confronted, helped to shape the way it adapted its 
organizations, and changed the way senior army leaders thought about the future. By 
1960, this chapter argues, operations research as a source of professional knowledge 
was of significant, if not equal, value to an army officer as was his personal 
experience and understanding of history. 
Operations Research: The Science of Better 
The U.S. military currently defines operations research as 'the analytical study 
of military problems undertaken to provide responsible commanders and staff 
agencies with a scientific basis for decision on action to improve military 
operations,.7 One of the first books on operations research defined it as 'a scientific 
method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions 
regarding the operations under their control'. 8 In practice these definitions have not 
moved far from the more descriptive statement of purpose first articulated in 1941 by 
the man considered the father of operations research: 
The object of having scientists in close touch with operations is to 
enable operational staffs to obtain scientific advice on those matters, 
which are not handled by the service technical establishments. 
Operational staffs provide the scientists with the operational outlook 
and data. The scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to these 
data, and are thus able to give useful advice. 9 
6 RusseIl F. Weigley, The American Way l?fWar,(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 
p.416. 
7 Joint Staff, Joint Publication J -02, Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitwy and Associated 
Terms (Washington DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), p. 272. 
8 Philip M. Morse, George E. KimbaIl, Methdy l?fOperations Research, Revised (New York: The 
Technology Press ofMassachusets Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), p. I. 
9 P.M.S. Blacklett, 'Scientists at the Operational Level' (1941) reproduced in P.M.S. Blackett, Studies 
l?fWar: Nuclear and Conventional (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962), p. 171. 
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Like military decision-making, operations research is not a purely philosophic 
pursuit; it is about solving specific problems. The emphasis on a 'systematic method 
of learning by experience' in support of decision making, makes operations research a 
unique branch of science. It is a science 'with a severely practical goal'. 10 Operations 
research is an applied science defined by its approach to problem solving. 11 By its 
nature it is eclectic. It has no fixed methodology or narrow philosophic core. 
Practitioners of operations research can and do come from across the academic 
spectrum and include physicists, chemists, mathematicians, biologists, sociologists, 
political scientists, doctors, historians, and lawyers. What holds the discipline together 
as a science, and in fact what made it so valuable to the army, is its methods, 
concepts, and techniques applicable to a range of complex problems. 
One of the pioneers of the field, E. C. WilIiams, described what he called the 
'four main streams' of operations research work: 
• Work concerned equipment or weapon evaluation and redesign for 
better performance with its human operators; 
• Analysis of specific operations to improve the tactics, and tactical 
experiments; 
• Prediction of the outcome of future operations whether in the tactical 
or strategic field with the object of influencing policy; 
• Study of the efficiency of organizations, which wielded the equipment 
and weapons in battle. 12 
In the service of military decision makers or field commanders, operations 
research seeks to answer the perennial question - is there an alternative or better 
combination of means to accomplish a desired end? The question is hardly new or 
original. Commanders across military history have entertained some variation of this 
10 B1ackett, Studies of War, p. 199; Committee on Operations Research, 'Operations Research with 
Special Reference to Non-Military Applications' (Washington DC; National Research Council, (951), 
p. 3. One industrialist termed operations research, 'quantitative commonsense.' 
11 There have always been debates over the question - is operations research a science? Blackett 
himself questioned whether 'operational research,' as he termed it, should be a field of its own. Others 
have called it a part of management science, or engineering. This dissertation accepts the assertion by 
the majority of operations research practitioners at the time that it is a distinct science. 
12 E.C. Williams, 'The Origin of the Term "Operational Research" and the Early Development of the 
Military Work', OR, 19 (1968), lll-113 (p. 113). 
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most fundamental of questions. Prior to the industrial age, the science of war more 
often than not simply deferred to the art of war. The proliferation of means and the 
scale of war ushered in by the industrial revolution shifted, or at least indicated a need 
to shift, the balance between art and science. Consideration of the science of war and 
management of its means became an essential if still unsolvable equation. Carl Von 
Clausewitz mused on a classic operations research problem in On War: 
If one could compare the cost of raising and maintaining the various 
arms with the service each performs in time of war, one would end up 
with a definite figure that would express the optimum equation in 
abstract terms. 
Clausewitz, in his standard fashion, dashed any hope that, given the nature of 
war, the search for a 'definitive figure' was anything more than a 'guessing game'. 
The great number of variables including the 'monetary factor,' the 'value of human 
life,' and 'the fact that each arm really depends on a different sector of the national 
economy' conspired, he argued, to confound any human calculus. As any modern 
defence analyst can attest, the nature of these 'outside determinant(s),' as Clausewitz 
called them, gave purely monetary factors an outsized weight in any discussion of 
means. He noted that the problem only got worse when one tried to measure and 
compare the effectiveness of the various anns. Clausewitz concluded that '[i]n theory 
[ ... ] there is an optimum proportion between the arms, which in practice remains the 
unknown X, a mere figment of the imagination'. 13 
Almost 150 years after On War, practitioners of operations research would 
generally agree with the great military theorist - the optimum still remains the 
'unknown x.' Charles Hitch, a RAND Corporation economist and significant 
contributor to the development of operations research in the early Cold War, asked: 
So what does the poor operations researcher do? Here he is, faced by 
his fundamental difficulty. The future is uncertain. Nature is 
unpredictable, and enemies and allies even more so ... how can he find 
the optimal course of action to recommend to his decision maker? 14 
t3 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. by Michael Howard 
and Perter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1993), p. 340. 
14 Charles Hitch, 'Uncertainties in Operations Research', Operations Research, 8 (1960), 437-445 (pp. 
443-445). 
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In answering his own question, Hitch recognized both the limitations as 
emphasized by Clausewitz and the demonstrated reality that one can reduce 
uncertainty but only through a combination of scientific analyses coupled to realistic 
decision-making. 
The simple answer is that he probably cannot [ ... ] It is our job and 
opportunity to find, invent, within constraints, some better pattern of 
adjusting to an uncertain world than our betters would find if we 
weren't here, or some better way, taking costs and pay-offs into 
account, to buy information to reduce the uncertainly. 15 
The Birth of Operations Research 
The fact that operations research draws on a multitude of disciplines and 
attracts scientists from across the philosophical spectrum makes it easy to identify 
'elements' of operations research in any number of historical cases. Historians often 
cite Archimedes as one of the earliest examples of an individual applying 
mathematical principles and a scientific approach to the challenges of war. 
Throughout history, creative geniuses have applied the leading-edge science of the 
day to the problems of technology and weapon designs. What these early examples 
share was not a common scientific methodology or set of well established principles 
but scientists 'prepared to research into any question even though it was quite outside 
[their] previous specialized knowledge'. 16 
Examples of precursors to operations research abound. 17 Efforts by scientists 
and engineers throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries added to the 
body of knowledge and toolbox of methodologies still used by operations'researchers. 
Work by Frederick Winslow Taylor, the engineer and father of scientific management 
in the decade prior to the First World War is a good example. Taylor's efforts sought 
to replace 'rule-of-thumb' management techniques with the so-called scientific 
15 Hitch, 'Uncertainties in Operations Research', (p. 445). 
16 Harold Lamder, 'The Origin of Operational Research', Operations Research, 32 (1984), 465-475 (p. 
467). 
17 A listing of scientists whose work constituted the 'precursors' of operations research from 1564 
through 1935 is found in Saul I. Glass and Arang A. Assad, Annotated Timeline of Operations 
Research: An Informal History (Boston: Springer Science + Business Media, Inc., 2005), pp. 1-44. 
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approach that would take into account the entire system. 18 His work was influential in 
that it explicitly combined the observational and analytical attributes of science with 
the value added decision-making purpose of management. But it was engineering 
rather than research. A pioneer of operations research would later argue that 'Taylor's 
ideas were the essence of our profession, but the fire was not kindled by the spark'. 19 
Another example, closer to the military but no less an example of scientists 
crossing the boundaries of their discipline, was the work of Frederick W. Lanchester. 
Lanchester, a British engineer and restless inventor, postulated a set oflinear and 
square mathematical 'laws' to explain the tactical interaction between forces in his 
1915 work Aircra.ft in Warfare: the Dawn of the Fourth Force. 20 Developed as a part 
of his research and advocacy for the field of aeronautics, the so-called 'Lanchester 
equations' provided a mathematical tool useful in modelling and estimating complex 
combat interactions. Lanchester's foundational work was important to the 
development of operations research and remains useful for simple attrition 
modelling.21 
One of the interesting, but little noticed, aspects of Aircra.ft in Wmfare was its 
preface. Written by Major General David Henderson, then Britain's director general 
of aeronautics, it provides a preview of the tension, and eventual grudging respect that 
would develop between scientists and the military during the early years of operations 
research. In his preface Henderson, the future commander of the Royal Flying Corps 
and a driving force behind the creation of the Royal Air Force (RAF), complained of 
the knowledge gap between new technology and reliable infonnation about its 
potential use. He argued that this situation left the public, and the military, vulnerable 
18 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles oj Scentific Managment (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1913). 
19 Ellis A. Johnson, 'The Long Range Future of Operational Research', Operations Research, 8 (1960), 
1-23 (p. 3). 
20 F. W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Wwfare: The Dawn q[the Fourth Arm (London: Constable and 
Company, Ltd., 1916). On Lanchester's lasting impact on the field see Joseph F. McCloskey, 'Of 
Horseless Carriages, Flying Machines, and Operatons Research', Operations Research. 4 (1956), 141-
147. 
21 On the continuing relevance of these early equations see Paul K. Davis, 'Aggregation, 
Disaggregation and the 3:1 Rule in Ground Combat' (Santa Monica: Project Air Force, Arroyo Center, 
National Defense Research Institute, 1995); Morse, Methd~ ojOperations Research, pp. 63-80. 
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to 'any plausible rogue, gifted with sufficient assurance, and aided by a ready pen or 
supple tongue' posing as an 'aeronautical expert'.22 
Hendcrson's lament was an acknowledgment that existing sources of expertise 
and professional knowledge were increasingly inadequate. For three years he and 
Lanchester debated many of the issues addressed in Aircraft in Waifare. The civilian 
, 
'well protected by his profound knowledge of physical science [ ... ] and engineering,' 
and the soldier, 'strongly entrenched behind a barricade of military prejudice with 
some dim recollections of early scientific training as reserves for counterattack' did 
not, in the end, agree on all the issues. However, Henderson heartily endorsed and 
encouraged Lanchester's work because, he argued, scientists were among the few 
students of this new field, who 'by reasons of their receptive minds, and their wide 
and varied experience, have mastered so many of the fundamental problems that they 
are well qualified to review the general position, and to put forward a reasoned 
statement of their views'. 23 A tribute to Lanchester, written a decade after his death in 
1946, credited him with 'recognizing the power of scientific insight and mathematical 
tools in the solution of operational problems long before "operations research" was 
coined'.24 Notwithstanding advances by men like Lanchester and Taylor, the military 
would have to wait until the run-up to the Second World War before the emergence of 
the key concept of operations research - teams of scientists working at the 
operational level of military commands - came into practice with an eclectic group 
of British scientists helping to prepare the air and then naval defence of their island. 
In 1934, Albert Percival Rowe, a meteorologist working for the Director of 
Scientific Research in the Air Ministry, successfully agitated for a scientific study of 
the nation's air defences, arguing that current efforts were essentially worthless. The 
Committee for the Scientific Study of Defence was formed to 'consider how far 
advances in technical knowledge could be used to strengthen the present methods of 
defence against hostile aircraft'. 25 Henry Tizard, a former First World War test pilot, 
22 Lanchester, Aircraft in WO/fare, pp. v-xi. 
n .' Lanchester, Aircraft in WO/fare, pp. V-XI. 
24 McCloskey, 'Of Horseless Carriages', (p. 141). Other contr!butors include American inventor 
Thomas A Edison. His use of statistics and invention of a tactIcal board game to help convoys evade 
submarine attack anticipated work by naval operation~ ~esearchers in the Se~ond World War. Edison's 
efforts however remained isolated from military decIsIOn makers and had httIe effect on events. 
WilliaJ~ F. Whit;nore, 'Edision and Operations Research', Operations Research, 1 (1953), 83-85. 
25 P. M. S. Blackett, 'Tizard and the Science of War', Nature, 185 (1960), 647-653 (p. 647). 
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noted chemist, and rector of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, agreed 
to lead the investigation. Other members of the committee included Archibald Vivian 
Hill, a Nobel Prize winning physiologist who led an anti-aircraft experimental 
research team in the Great War; P.M.S. Blackett, a physicist, veteran of the First 
World War navy, and future Nobellaureate; as well as Rowe and his boss H.E. 
Wimperis. From the beginning the Tizard Committee embodied several characteristics 
that would define operations research - a specific military operational problem in 
need of solution, and a diverse pool of civilian scientific talent to consider the options. 
Another attribute of operations research, a willingness to explore seemingly 
odd ideas, was immediately evident in the Tizard committee's preparation for its first 
meeting. They asked Robert Watson-Watt, the superintendent of the National Physical 
Laboratory's Radio Research Department, if it were possible to use radio waves as a 
kind of 'death-ray' to stop incoming bombers. Watson-Watt reported back that the 
idea of using radio as a weapon was not feasible. However, he informed them, one 
might use radio waves to detect aircraft at long range. The concept of radar (then 
called radio direction finding) was born. Within a month, field experiments were 
underway. 
The development of radar proceeded quickly and within two years, radar 
stations were under construction along Britain's eastern and southern coasts. Tizard 
and his scientists understood that detection was only part of the ultimate solution. To 
be effective, radar would have to be integrated with the RAF Fighter Command, air 
defence artillery, and other elements of an early warning system. A series of 
experiments integrated the various streams of information and tried to maximize the 
impact of anyone part of the whole system. As these experiments, exercises, and 
attempts to do 'the best you can with what you have' continued, they gave rise to the 
term 'operational research.'26 Operational research grew rapidly. Fighter Command 
took advantage of the radar scientists to improve its operations procedures and 
coordination. For example, early in the Battle for France, Air Marshal Hugh Dowding 
26 Joseph F. McCloskey, 'The Begining of Operations Research: 1934-1941', Operations Research, 35 
(1987), 143-152 (p. 146). See also Williams, 'The Origin of the Tem1 "Operational Reseach"'. 
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relied on calculations from the operational researchers to guide his advice to Churchill 
on how many squadrons Britain could afford to keep in France. 27 
The reputation and utility of these scientific teams spread to other parts of the 
British military. In late 1940, Blackett created the Antiaircraft Command Research 
Group, soon dubbed 'Blackett's Circus'. After six months of applying what had been 
learned in radar development and Fighter Command to improve both the coordination 
and efficiency of air defence, Blackett moved to Coastal Command. During a nine-
month period, Blackett and his team made significant contributions to anti-submarine 
efforts. Blackett's role as an organizational integrator and articulate advocate of a 
scientific approach to military problems finally landed him the job as Scientific 
Advisor and Director of Naval Operations Research, a position he would hold for the 
remainder of the war. In December 1941, he wrote a short memorandum entitled 
'Scientists at the Operational Level,' which he described as 'hurriedly and somewhat 
flippantly written,' on basic principles and lessons of operations research. 28 This 
document, and a more technical treatment of the subject written in 1943, formed the 
foundation of what became operations research. 
The British experience produced four principles of successful science at the 
operational level. These principles were, the outline for operations research in the 
United States Army after 1948. First, there must be a specific problem. In this case it 
was radar, where the actual solutions took precedence over developing the theory 
behind the solution. The sccond was the need to bring senior military officers together 
with senor scientists to create a common understanding of major issues. Third, below 
the level of senior people, one needed to create an environment where serving officers 
and university scientists could work on 'brilliantly creative and sometimes 
obstreperous teams'. Finally, one had to create in the minds of the military the 
recognition that scientifically trained personnel could contribute to more than just the 
design and testing of weapons but 'also in the actual study of operations.' 29 
By the late 1930s the basic ideas behind operations research were slowly 
making their way across the Atlantic, but sti1llacked an advocate. On 27 June 1940, 
27 Maurice W. Kirby, Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Expriencefroll1 the 1930s 
to 1970s (London: Imperial College Press, 2003), p. 79. 
28 Both documents are reprinted in Blackett, Studies o.f War, pp. 171-198. For a recitation ofthe 
problems studied during Blackett's various postings during the war, see p. 205-234. 
29 Blackett, 'Tizard and the Science of War', (p. 647). 
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President Franklin Roosevelt approved the creation of the National Defense Research 
Committee (NDRC) and selected Vannevar Bush, the energetic president of the 
Camegie Institution, as its leader. 3D The president designed the NDRC to 'support 
scientific research on the mechanisms and devices of warfare'. Imbued with a sense 
of urgency, the NRDC organized itself into divisions and sections oriented on major 
categories of weapons research, secured the services of some of the country's best 
scientific talent, and let contracts for research with universities and laboratories. 31 
One of the early functions of the NRDC was to establish scientific liaison with 
Allied powers. The first of these came at the initiative of the British. 32 In August 
1940, at the height of the Battle of Britain, Tizard led a British mission to Washington 
to initiate what was essentially a unilateral transfer of classified technology to their 
still uncertain ally. For the British, this was part of a larger campaign to bring the 
United States along as an ally and potentially tap its manufacturing capacity.33 For the 
Americans, the visit was a windfall of scientific data and technology, including such 
areas as asdic (sonar), atomic energy, the influence (VT or variable time) fuze, the 
sonabouy, and anti-aircraft gun laying. The most important single item of technology 
was the cavity magnetron. This device was the heart of advanced radar and almost 
ovemight changed the direction of American research. The exchange was a successful 
one for both nations. The United States received a two-year jump-start in many areas 
and was 'getting infinitely more than [it] could give'. For his part, Tizard reported to 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill that 'broadly speaking the Americans are far 
30 Vannevar Bush (1980-1974) was described as a Twentieth Century American without peer in terms 
of influence in the growth of science and technology. Trained as an engineer at MIT, Bush worked on 
submarine detection technology during the First World War, taught and became the dean of the 
Engineering Department ofMIT, was a member of the National Academy of Science, and the National 
Research Council. During the Second World War he led the NRDC, the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD), the Joint New Weapons Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Military Policy Committee of the Manhattan Project. Following the war, Bush continued to coordinate 
and advocate for research in support of national defense by leading the Joint Research and 
Development Board and it successor until 1948. See Jerome B. Wiesner, 'Vannevar Bush 1890-1974 -
Biographical Memoir' (Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1979). 
31 Rexmond C. Cochrane, The National Academy a/Sciences: The First lIundred Years 1863-1963 
(Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978), pp. 382-399. 
32 Numerous, primarily informal contacts between military staffs occurred throughout this period. In 
the run-up to the Tizard visit, A.V. Hill made what can only be described as a scientific intelligence 
tour of the United States between February and June 1940. He returned to London convinced of the 
mutual value of an open technical collaboration. 
33 The Tizard mission met without expectation of a quid pro quo. 
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behind' and that the rewards of a long-term scientific relationship would be great, but 
only if the contacts were to continue though the formal exchange of scientific 
missions and were carefully managed. 34 
What was less clear at the time was the degree to which the basic idea of 
operations research was part of this scientific exchange. Many of those who 
participated in the Tizard mission or were selected for liaison duty over the next year 
were veterans of operations research work in the United Kingdom. American missions 
and liaison teams began flowing the other direction as well. Most of the development 
of operations research in the United States during the war occurred in three areas: the 
navy, the army air forces, and the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD). 
There is little evidence of any significant interest in operations research on the 
part of the anny's non-aviation combat arms or the technical services. Elements of 
operations research occurred in other areas, but generally on a small scale or in a 
limited fashion. The best example is perhaps the Signal Corps. In the immediate 
aftermath or the disaster of Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military mission in London asked 
Watson-Watt to conduct a survey of American air defences. At the time, American air 
defences were divided among the interceptors and barrage balloon units of the GHQ 
Army Air Corps, air defence regiments of the active army and National Guard, and a 
nascent aircraft warning service of the Signal COrpS.35 Watson-Watt's report was 
highly critical of the pace and relevance of the Signal Corps' technical efforts. The 
main problem, the blunt Scotsman noted, beside the 'absurd attitudes' displayed by 
some in the U.S. military toward radar, was the 'insufficient organization applied to 
technically inadequate equipment used in exceptionally difficult conditions'. 36 In 
response, the Signal Corps established the Technical Research Group on Radar. After 
34 Alfred Loomis as quoted in Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson diary, 2 October 1940. Cited in 
David Zil11merman, Top Secret Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), p. 138 and 172. 
3S Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelamn, Byron Fairchild, The Western llemisphere: Guarding the United 
Slates and Its Outposts, United States Army in World War n (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, 1964), pp. 54-64. 
36 Quoted in Plans and Early Operations, Janurary 1939 to August 1942 ed. by Wesley Frank Craven 
and lames Lee Cate, New Imprint, I (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 291-292. 
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the initiall1urry of activity, however, this effort gradually became a technical and 
engineering research and test programme. 37 
Somewhat surprisingly, the navy's development of operations research during 
the war had more impact on the army's later efforts than did the activities of its own 
air arm. Like the arn1Y's later experience, early encounters between the navy and the 
scientists were not promising. Phi lip M. Morse, a pioneer in American operations 
research, recalled that the sea service was always 'apprehensive about trusting its 
secrets to civilians, and Admiral Ernest J. King, the new [ ... ] Chief of Naval 
Operations was particularly strict'. 38 Things changed after the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor and V-Boat attacks against shipping along the East Coast. A naval 
officer who saw at first hand the work of Blackett's Circus, Captain Wilder Baker, 
began advocating a programme based on the tenets of spelled out in 'Scientists at the 
Operational Level'. The formula was simple' [ military] staff provide the scientists 
with the operational outlook and data' and in return 'the scientists apply scientific 
methods of analysis to the data ... to give useful advice'. Blackett's approach allowed 
scientists, to do more than just tinker with 'new gadgets'. They could 'encourage 
numerical thinking on operational matters, and so can help to avoid running the war 
by gusts of emotion'. 39 Once again, it was informal relationships with the British that 
convinced the navy's leadership to break the stoic tradition of the naval officer as 
'absolute master'. 40 
The navy formed the first active operations research group, the Mine Warfare_ 
Operations Research Group (MWORG) in January 1942. The MWORG grew out of 
research into German magnetic mines at the navy's ordnance laboratory and was led 
by the future head of the army's major post-war operations research, Ellis A. Johnson. 
Johnson, a physicist, along with a group of scientists augmented their technical work 
37 The army did avail itself of the work ofOSRD's Statistical Research Group from 1942-1945. This 
group, like the efforts in the Signal Corps did not progress to the level of operations research. See W. 
Alien Wallis, 'The Statistical Research Group, 1942-1945', Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 75 (1980),320-330. 
38 Phi lip M. Morse, 'The Beginnings of Operations Research in the United States', Operations 
Research, 34 (1986), 10-17 (p. 11). Morse worked on naval issues through an NRDC contract with 
MIT. 
39 Quoted from 'Scientists at the Operational Level' reproduced in Blackett, Studies of War, pp. 171-
176. 
40 Morse, 'The Beginings of Operations Research', (p. 12.). 
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with simple war-gaming as a way to improve effectiveness. 41 Informal collaboration 
between members of 10hnson's staff and members of 'Blackett's circus' working on 
similar problems for the RAF Coastal Command accelerated the process of combining 
academic disciplines and moving the research out of the laboratory and into the 
operating forces. 42 
Despite initial resistance on the part of some conservative naval officers, the 
navy's Vice Chief of Naval Operations was impressed with both the British operations 
research efforts and recent reports by 10hnson's team. In the early summer the navy 
expanded its operations research efforts by creating the Antisubmarine Warfare 
Operations Research Group (ASWORG). Despite its early growth, old habits died 
hard. 10hnson and his fellow scientists found it difficult to obtain operational data. 
Working from laboratories in Washington and Boston, they found it easier to obtain 
classified technical data and operational reports from the British than from the their 
own navy sponsors. 43 
Several changes took place in the navy's programme over the course of the 
war that would provide lessons to 10hnson in his later position developing the army's 
operations research. First, operations research did not begin to add value and build 
trust with naval personnel until the organization moved from the supervision of the 
bureau of ordnance to an office under the Chief of Naval Operations in October 1942 
and later to commanders of the fleets: 44 As one history noted, 'the very purpose of 
operations research is neutralized if the results cannot be handed to a central authority 
endowed with the power to change procedures'. 4S The second lesson was a subset of 
the tirst; 10hnson could not influence events unless he was in the same physical place 
41 Among the scientists recmited for the Johnson's efforts was Or. William B. Shockley, who would 
go on to invent the transistor and win the Nobel Prize for physics. 
42 Charles R. Shrader, 'H istory of Operations Research in the United States Army: 1942-1962', I 
(Washington DC: United States Army, 2006), pp. 18-19. Johnson was at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941 as part of a navy wargame effort on countermining. Johnson and his team assisted in the wake of 
the attack with planning the clearance of the harbor against the possibility of Japanese mining. The 
value offusing scientific approaches to ongoing military requirements could not have been clearer. 
43 Joseph F. McCloskey, 'U.S. Operations Research in World War 11', Operations Research, 35 (1987), 
910-925 (p. 11); Philip M. Morse, In at the Beginnings: A Physicist's Life (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1977), pp. 185-188; George Shortley, 'Operations Research in Wartime Naval Mining', Operations 
Research, 15 (1967), 1-10 (p. 5). 
44 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States AmlY', p. 20 
45 Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group: A lIistory of Naval Operations Analysis 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 57. 
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as the operational commander he served and was working with the actual data on 
which the commander made decisions. 46 Accordingly, in early 1943 Johnson accepted' 
a naval reserve commission and deployed to the Pacific to work on mining issues for 
the Pacific Fleet. The final lesson was that earning the trust and respect of the military 
in an operational setting required patience and a willingness to compromise. After 
some initial setbacks, Johnson slowly became a trusted member of Admiral Chester 
Nimitz's staff. This trust, in turn, created the freedom of action he needed for his 
work. 
By summer 1944, Johnson and his team were directing aerial mining 
operations for the entire Pacific. lIowever, a lack of aircraft and the slow pace of 
surface mining limited the operational value of their work. In spring 1945, with 
support from Nimitz, Johnson convinced General Henry 'Bap' Arnold to divert a 
small portion of his B-29 fleet, then dedicated to bombing Japan, to aerial mining 
efforts aimed at the Shimonoseki Straits. Using analysis of sea-lanes, available 
shipping, ports, and supply, the operations research team deternlined that halting 
traffic through aerial mining would effectively cut Japan off from its last remaining 
sources of outside supply. The appropriately named Operation STARVATION, which 
ran through the end of the war, eventually cut off some 140 Japanese ports. One 
participant called it 'the most complete example of the successful application of 
military operations-research techniques during the war' .47 
The lessons from the efforts of the Army Air Forces (AAF) are less direct. 
Operations analysis (OA) as operations research was called in the AAF, had two 
nearly simultaneous starting points. One was a discussion between Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson and the commander responsible for the defence of the Canal Zone in 
Panama in early 1942. No doubt influenced by the recent Watson-Watt inspection 
tour, the local commander requested 'a group of analytically minded civilians, some 
scientific and some technical [ ... to assist in] solving the usual and insistent problems 
of planning and tactics involved in the defense of the Canal' .48 The second start point 
came in the form ofa request from the commander of the newly deployed Eighth Air 
46 Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group, pp. 41-46. 
47 Shortley, 'Operations Reserach in Wartime Naval Mining', (p. 5). 
48 Conversation between Major General Andrews and Secretary of War StimsOI1, spring 1942, cited in 
Charles W. McArthur, Operations Analysis in the U.S. Eighth Air Force in World War Il, History of 
Mathematics, 4 (Providence: American Mathematical Society, 1990), p. 3. 
50 
Force Lieutenant General Ira Eaker asked Amold to create operations research 
elements on the model of the RAF. 
Over the summer 1942, a small team under the direction of a Harvard law 
professor and major in the army reserves, W. B. Leach, studied the existing operations 
research work in both Britain and the United States. The study's primary 
recommendation was to create operational research activities in all major AAF units 
following the British model. On 24 October and based on Leach's study, Amold 
directed air force commands to include in their staff 'highly qualified civilians, having 
unusual scientific or analytical attainments [ ... ] for the purpose of improving tactics, 
equipment, methods of training and methods of supply'. 49 
With the assistance of the NRDC, Leach began assembling and deploying 
civilians to England to create and propagate Operations Analysis Sections (OAS) 
throughout Eighth Air Force. The institutional backing provided by Amold assured 
that OASs would quickly open in almost every air force and subordinate commands 
across the globe. The fundamental question posed to the first OA group by the 
commander in Britain was 'how can I put twice as many bombs on my targets?' As 
one analyst noted after the war, this represented the perfect question for a group of 
civilian scientists: it was 'of major importance, of broad scope, and stated in quite 
vague terms, by scientific standards.' In other words the scientists could use the 
'whole bomber command as their laboratory'. 50 OAS scientists, working closely with 
the bomber crews, isolated seven factors that explained why only fifteen percent of 
bombs hit within 1000 feet of their desired aim point. By methodically working 
though each category and making detailed statistical analyses, supported by direct 
observations of the benefits of modifying one factor over the other, the OAS 
recommended a set of changes to reduce the error over time. Bombing accuracy rose 
to better than sixty percent. 51 
In a post-war history of the AAF's OA efforts, General Carl Spaatz, Eighth Air 
Force commander, wrote that his OASs 'were essentially field units [ ... ] devoted [ ... ] 
to the problems of the particular command which they served--to the mission it had to 
49 McArthur, Operations Analysis in the u.s. Eighth Air Force, p. 4. 
50 Leroy A. Brothers, 'Operations Analysis in the United States Air Force', Journal of the Operations 
Reseach Society of America, 2 (1954), 1-16 (pp. 1-2). 
SI Brothers, 'Operations Analysis', (p. 8). 
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accomplish'. The semi-autonomous nature of the AAF model meant that the analysts 
became specialized in solving the local command's problems and 'acquiring the 
confidence of the officers by whose side they worked'. 52 
The final wartime influence on the army's postwar operations research efforts 
was the OSRD's Office of Field Services (OFS). In June 1941, Roosevelt created the 
OSRD to fix the deficiencies of the NDRC. The NDRC suffered from a weak 
bureaucratic position because, among other things, it was not a federal agency and so 
was left to react to requests for research by the various elements of the War 
Department. Moreover, even when the NDRC was productive, there was a gap 
'between the completion of research and the initiation of a procurement program [ ... ] 
which the armed services were slow to fill'. 53 The OSRD, on the other hand, had 
direct access to the president, a broad mandate to mobilize the scientific talent and 
facilities of the nation, and an independent budget. After the war Bush, the OSRD's 
only leader, recalled the difference between the two organizations: 'orders could be 
given to OSRD only by the President of the United States, and he never gave any'. 54 
This created the inevitable frictions with the services, most famously with Admiral 
King, but was considered by Bush as the price for maintaining his organization's 
independence and maximizing its overall impact on the war effort. 55 
As the fruits of the OSRD and NDRC began to arrive in the field, there were 
increasing calls from both the military and the scientists for technical support. The 
scientists, laboratories, and contractors did not want 'military dissatisfaction with 
performance' caused by improper use or lack of technical knowledge to 'delay an 
entire program of research' . Similarly, the military commands were increasingly 
asking for technicians to train people in how to use new equipment, maintain it, and 
52 Leroy A. Brothers, 'Operations Analysis in World War Il' (Washington DC: United States Army Air 
Forces, 1946), p. forward. 
53 Irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Researchfor War: The Administrative lIistory of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p. 35. Stewart served as the 
Deputy Director of the OSRD and Executive Secretary of its Administrative Office during its 
existence. The OSRD essentially absorbed the NDRC, which continued to operate research committees 
under James B. Con ant. 
54 Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York: WilIiam Morrow and Company, Inc., 1970), p. 82. 
ss On the relationship with King, see G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer 
of the American Centwy (New York: Free Press, 1997), pp. 161-171. 
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'aid in the broader problem of finding out how [the new equipment] could best be 
employed in actual military or naval operations'. 56 
Despite his role in the development of the capabilities that drove the military 
to ask for operations research advice along with the technologies being delivered to 
the battlefield, Bush did not support this expansion of his mandate. It was not that he 
did not have the authority or expertise, although a growing shortage of experienced 
scientists was becoming a concern; rather, it was his philosophical view of the need to 
keep a barrier between science and its sponsors. Bush feared that his scientists would 
be co-opted by the military. This was a mirror image of the fear of some military that 
scientists would co-opt decision-making processes that were inherently military. Bush 
preferred a narrower concept, more along the lines of the AAF OA program. By 
encouraging the use of general analysts, including lawyers and statisticians, as the 
AAF had, he hoped to preserve scientific intelligence for research and development 
work, free from direct military control. It was a losing battle, both in terms of the rate 
at which operations research activities were proliferating within the navy and AAF 
and because significant numbers of his own OSRD and NDRC staffs disagreed. 57 
Rather than continue the ad hoc arrangements already underway, Bush created 
the OFS on 15 October 1943. He placed one of the most experienced members of the 
NDRC, Kart T. Compton, a strong proponent of the scientist-in-the-field concept, in 
the lead. Within eighteen months, the OFS staff had grown to more than 500 
scientists, a third of whom were physicists, over 40 percent with doctorates, by 
tapping into universities like Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Yale, and 
Princeton. 58 
It did not take long for the deployed scientists to move beyond the task of 
simply assisting with the employment of new weapons. They quickly began to ask 
probing questions about the underlying concepts of employment. Finally, this logical 
sequence opened the door to the question - what alternative might exist to current 
weapons and approaches? The OFS provided a wartime model of how the army might 
move from its conservative method of determining future requirements, where 
56 Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research/or War, p. 128. 
57 Eric Peter Rau, 'Combat Scientists: The Emergence of Operations Research in the United States 
During World War II' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1999), pp. 127-146. 
58 Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research/or War, pp. 128-129 and 144. 
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existing capabilities predominated, to one that would begin with probing the nature of 
the problem. 
By the end of the war attitudes on both sides of the professional divide 
softened. Bush later described the value of a close working relationship with the 
military not in utilitarian terms, like the weapons created, but in organizational terms, 
the kind of relationships established. Recalling his work on the Joint New Weapons 
Committee with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Bush wrote that it 'did not 
accomplish much'. However it 'did form a link between [the] civilian effort and top 
echelons of the services'. He added 'the relationship between civilian and military 
personnel went through an evolution during the war'. 59 One commentator pointed out 
that in the end it was not the technology that emerged from the OSRD that created the 
relationship with the military but, in fact, the relatively small operations research 
activities. 
Operations research practice formed the venue and its quantitative 
methods the medium, in which these two social groups forged a bond 
of trust; it allowed researchers and officers to appreciate the 
complexity and usefulness of the other's contributions, and it permitted 
them to see one another as collaborators in a common purpose. 60 
In terms of actual operations research, the OFS was more successful in Europe 
than in the Pacific. Its most important contribution was validating the concept that 
outside operations research teams could successfully partner with the military to work 
on so-called' action-problems'. 61 This was a lesson the army largely missed but one 
thoroughly grasped by the scientific veterans who formed its future operations 
research workforce. 
Post-War Operations Research - Setting the Conditions 
Research in the army during the first years of the Cold War fell victim to the 
same demobilization fever afflicting the rest of the force. There was no shortage of 
interest in developing either better versions of the equipment on hand, as 
59 Bush, Pieces of the Action, pp. 52-53. 
60 Rau, 'Combat Scientists', p. 335. 
61 The OFS experience in the Pacific occurred late in the war and was plagued by personality and 
coordination issues. See Roy MacLeod, "'Combat Scientists"; The Office of Scientific Research and 
Development and Field Service in the Pacific', War & Society, 11 (1993), 117-134. 
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recommended by many post-war boards, or pushing into new areas of research, such 
as missiles. However, as demobilization deepened, so did competition for scarce 
resources between research and development and operations and maintenance. 
Operations research organized on a scale approaching what the navy or even the AAF 
had done during the war was not possible. As one historian noted 'the ground [a]rmy, 
which had not developed a comprehensive [ operations research] capability during the 
war, abandoned what few [operations research] organizations it had,.62 
Operations research did, however, continue in the newly independent air force 
and navy. Each service approached the problem of continuing its operations research 
programmes in distinct ways. The AAF's operations analysis efforts during the war 
were large and increasingly relied upon to conduct analyses to grow and justify the air 
force programme. 63 As demobilization cut deeply into the scientific organizations and 
staffs created during the war, Arnold became concerned that 'we have not yet 
established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the 
military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities'.64 Assisted by MIT 
researcher Edward Bowles and his close friend Donald Douglas, president of the 
Douglas Aircraft Company, Arnold created a contract for a division of Douglas 
Aircraft to support the air staff's research and development office with a 'continuing 
programme of scientific study and research' and 'independent objective analysis'.65 
By 1948, concerns about potential conflicts of interest between the thinking and 
aircraft manufacture business led to the creation of the freestanding, private, non-
profit research organization known as the RAND Corporation. The air force would 
retain an in-house operations analysis capability on its staff, but increasingly turned to 
RAND for the broader subjects inherent in operations research. 
62 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States AmlY', p. 54. 
63 In the Eighth Air Force alone the programme grew from its single location with 16 analysts in 1942 
to 17 sections with more than 400 civilians, officers, and enlisted. Brothers, 'Operations Analysis in 
World War II', p. 1. The overall size of the AAF civilian effort was 275 researchers assigned to 26 
different activities around the globe. Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States 
Army', p. 58. 
64 David Hounshell, 'The Cold War, RAND, and the Generation of Knowledge, 1946-1962' (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1998), p. 241. 
65 RAND charter cited in Alex Abella, Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Cmporation and the Rise of the 
American Corporate Empire (Orlando: First Mariner Books, 2009), p. 14. For more on the early years 
see Martin J. Collins, Cold War Lahoratory - RAND, the Air Force, and the American State, 1945-
1950 (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2002). 
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The navy believed in the value of operations research and had no doubts about 
continuing its programme in peacetime. At the end of the war, King was 'unequivocal 
in his desire to see the navy continue to harness this analytical resource' and secured 
the backing of the secretary of the navy. 66 Two of the scientists who had led the navy's 
wartime operations research efforts, Dr. Philip M. Morse and George Kimball, 
pressed their institution, MIT, to accept a contract to continue the navy's post-war 
operations research efforts. 67 King and his advisors believed that an operations 
research group's 'value to the navy stemmed from its ability to provide original 
scientific thought, free from bias and with an academic orientation [ ... ] The group, 
therefore, should be attached to an academic institution to preserve the integrity of its 
work and the independence of its members'. 68 In November 1945, the Operations 
Evaluation Group (OEG) was born. Significantly, the OEG reported to the Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations (fleet operations and readiness) and not to the office of 
Naval Research or the Naval Ordnance Bureau (NOB). 69 
Since the anny did not benefit directly from operations research during the 
war, in the immediate aftermath, there was no effort to follow either the navy or air 
force lead. However, by the late 1940s, the army increasingly felt increasing pressure 
from being the proverbial 'odd-man-out' when it came to justifying its strategic 
position, its research and development priorities, and increasingly, its proposed 
budgets. The final push toward creating an army operations research capability came 
during deliberations over the creation of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group 
(WSEG). 
Chartered in December 1948 by the Secretary of Defense, the WSEG was 
designed to fill a widening gap between the JCS, his advisory body on strategy, and 
66 Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group, p. 95. Admiral King was effusive in his praise for not 
only the scientific advances during the war but also the close collaboration with the scientists. Fleet 
Admiral Ernest 1. King, 'Third Official Report to the Secretary of the Navy', in The War Reports 0/ 
General George C. Marshal!, General Il. Il. Arnold, Admiral Ernest J. King (Washington DC: J. B. 
Lippincott Company, 1945), pp. 651-778 (pp. 715-722). 
67 Morse and Kimball spent the last few months of the war recording the methods used by the various 
naval operations research activities. Their multi-volume study was classified by the navy and only 
declassified in 1950. Republished as Methods of Operations Research, this work became the first real 
textbook of the new discipline. Morse, Methd~ o/Operations Research. 
68 Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group, p. 96. 
69 The OEG was significantly smaller than its wartime predecessor. At its height, ASWORG included 
ninety scientists and a budget of$800,000. The new OEG had a staff of twenty-five scientists and a 
budget of$300,000. Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 57. 
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the Research and Development Board (RDB), tasked with coordinating military 
research and development activities. 70 The RDB and the JCS were to work in close 
collaboration, constantly reviewing the impact of strategy on research and research on 
strategy and adjusting both as the situation dictated. However, in practice, as a history 
of the WSEG generously noted, 'communication [between the two] was imperfect 
and collaboration infrequent'. 71 
Service debates over roles and missions, strategy, and budget share conspired 
to make it all but impossible for the Secretary of Defense to achieve a consensus on 
anything. 72 The service debates of this period are well developed in other histories. Of 
note, however, is the fact this organizational dysfunction was the reason Forrestal 
authorized the creation of an independent organization to 'provide rigorous, 
unprejudiced and independent analysis and evaluations of present and future'.73 
The WSEG was co-managed by the JCS and the RDB, led by a rotational 
three-star officer and managed by a civilian research director. The staff was composed 
of civilian scientists - a mix of full-time staff, consultants, and personnel borrowed 
from service laboratories and operations research activities. Each service provided a 
general officer, who was supported by a small number of senior officers (colonels for 
the most part). The first director was Lieutenant General John E. Hull, an officer with 
extensive experience in strategic planning. To fill the research director's position, Hull 
70 Between the unification of the armed forces under the National Security Act of 1947 and the 
modifying legislation of 1949, the Secretary of Defense coordinated the actions of the services loosely 
through four groups: the War Council (policy), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (military strategy), the 
Munitions Board (production and procurement), and the Research and Development Board. Each was 
composed of service representatives, which created a poor atmosphere for executive decision-making. 
71 John Ponturo, 'Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience, 1948-1976' 
(Arlington: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1979), p. 10. 
72 See Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949, History of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, II (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, 1996), pp. 87-98; Steven L. Rearden, 
The Formative Years 1947-1950, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I (Washington DC: 
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of De fen se, 1984), pp. 29-55 and 385-422; James F. 
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73 Directive establishing the WSEG (11 December 1948) reproduced in Appendix C, Ponturo, 
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Forrestal by Bush. 
57 
recruited physicist and OSRD veteran Morse. Morse accepted the position despite his 
concerns that such a group would find it difficult to deliver independent judgments. 74 
In terms of influence over the nearly simultaneous development of the army's 
operational research organization, the WSEG played two roles. First, establishing a 
secretary of defense level organization to study issues with a direct impact on the 
anny's budget, as well as its place in national security strategy, created a strong 
incentive for development of its own operations research capability. 75 The second 
influence generated by the WSEG related to the first. Since the army could not control 
the group's study agenda, it had an incentive to send capable officers to serve either as 
director or senior army representative. An unintended effect was that these same high 
quality officers would in-turn influence the army's views on operations research. 
The first senior army officer assigned was Major General James M. Gavin, the 
Second World War commander of the 8211d Airborne Division. Gavin wrote of his 
initial efforts after arriving in March 1949, 'I devoted the entire summer of 1949 to 
reading everything on the subject I could get my hands on and visiting our 
laboratories and talking to our scientists [ ... ] nuclear weapons became more 
understandable to me'.76 Gavin's enthusiasm for attacking the army's problems 
through the use of leading-edge science made him an early and consistent supporter of 
operations research. In fall 1950, as part of his WSEG research, Gavin led a small 
group of prominent scientists to Korea to examine tactical air support in the hopes 
that 'drawing on their unexcelled knowledge of scientific technology', they could 
generate some new ideas. 77 The tour offered little immediate assistance to the forces 
in the field. However, it did lead to creation of an influential study on how science 
might provide new solutions to the problems of land combat. 
Gavin's trip and research already underway by the WSEG motivated a small 
group of scientits to convince the army to partner with the air force on a study of air-
74 Morse described the officers on the WSEG as 'new to systems analysis, but interested and hopeful 
about its possibilities.' Morse, In at the Beginnings: A Physicist's Life, p. 245. 
75 The first study agenda, approved on 1 September 1949, included studies of strategic air offensives, 
antisubmarine weapons, weapons for airbome operations, carrier task force operations, air defense 
weapons, and projected ground force weapons. Ponturo, 'Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, pp. 56-57. 
76 James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 114. 
Gavin summarized his understanding of the utility of tactical atomic weapons in Major General James 
M. Gavin, 'The Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb', Combat Forces JOllrnal, 1 (1950),9-11. 
77 Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, p. 129. 
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ground tactical operations. Project VISTA, as the study became known, was designed, 
in the words of one participant, to generate some 'technological developments, which 
will be of concrete help to the heretofore scientifically neglected doughboy' .78 
Conducted in collaboration with California Institute of Technology during summer 
1951, the project's eight-volume final report made recommendations on a wide range 
of tactics and weapons, to include a strong endorsement for development of tactical 
atomic weapons, and associated doctrines to defend Western Europe. The study also 
included a recommendation for how to 'forge and develop the tactics and techniques 
of this new kind of warfare'. It recommended the army create a combat development 
system that would include 'a permanent staff including scientists' and work closely 
with the army's new operations research organization. 79 
Gavin's replacement was an officer whose experiences at the WSEG would 
influence both the army's attitudes toward operations research and how the army 
approached the problem of thinking abouth future war. Major General Garrison 
Davidson joined WSEG in 1951 and served until he departed to become commandant 
of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in 1954. Davidson learned as 
much about the process of research and development while in the WSEG as he did the 
scientific process. When asked many years later about his experience, Davidson 
described it as interesting but tough work. He praised the teamwork and the civilian 
scientists with whom he was paired, but added 'the work that I did didn't amount to a 
damn thing because the die was already cast [ ... ] so it [had] no purpose [ ... ] I was 
very disappointed' . 80 
78 Dr. WiIliam Fowler, scientific director of Project VISTA, quoted in W. Patrick McCray, 'Project 
Vista, Caltech, and the Dilemmas of Lee Dubridge', lIistorical Studies in the Physical and Biological 
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Davidson's assessment was echoed by his protege Colonel WilIiam F. Train. 
Train joined the WSEG staff in 1952 and subsequently followed Davidson to CGSC 
in 1955. He recalled the difficulty they had trying to isolate the variables in ground 
combat in the same way one would with aircraft or ships. Train bemoaned the fact 
that two years of work which resulted in a multi-volume study on ground warfare was 
destined to occupy, unread, shelves in the archives. 81 Neither Davidson's nor Train's 
assessments, however accurate they were of the WSEG's value, prevented them from 
carrying away from the experience the basic principles of operations research. As will 
be discussed in a later chapter, Davidson and Train based much of their redesign for 
the army's doctrinal development as well as the CGSC's role in combat developments 
around the processes they had learned while serving on the WSEG. 
The Birth of Army Operations Research - The Operations Research Office 
The army began the Cold War with no effective operations research 
organization. The creation of the independent air force effectively stripped the last 
remaining operations research function from its upper echelons. Operations research 
techniques and methods continued to be employed in the technical services 
laboratories, especially the Ordnance Corps, and occasionally by the equipment 
boards of the AFF. However, much as in the years leading up to the Second World 
War, the army's research activities generally returned to small-scale efforts oriented 
on specific weapons. One source describes the army's postwar attitude toward 
operations research as stemming from the limited contact most officers had with 
actual practitioners during the war and 'the continued assumption that the problems of 
land warfare were less amenable to [ operations research] techniques and [ ... ] 
ignorance of how [operations research] methods might be applied to ground 
combat'.82 
The creation of the army's postwar operations research capability began with 
Eisenhower's 30 April 1946 memorandum, 'Scientific and Technological Resources 
as Military Assets'. After praising the fact that in the recent war 'scientists and 
81 Reginald G. Moore, 'Oral History - William F. Train, Lieutenant General, USA Retired', II (Carlisle 
Barracks: US Army Military History Institute, 1983), pp. 378-384. 
82 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 63. 
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business men contributed techniques and weapons which enabled us to outwit and 
overwhelm the enemy', Eisenhower argued that 'this pattern of integration must be 
translated into a peacetime counterpart'. Among the attributes of this peacetime 
arrangement, he advocated: 
• Civilians be involved in military planning and not just weapons production 
• Scientist and industrialist were more likely to make 'new and unsuspected 
contributions' if detailed direction was held to a minimum. 
• Some 'of our industrial and technological resources' should be made 'organic' 
parts of the military structure in time of war. 
• The army must keep research and development separate from 'the functions of 
procurement, purchase, storage, and distribution. 
• AmlY officers, through fomlal education and inducements, must become 'fuIIy 
aware of the advantages which the army can derive from the close integration 
of civilian talent.' 83 
The immediate, but impermanent, effect of the memorandum was the elevation of 
research and development within the war department. As Eisenhower noted, a senior 
director for research and development, supported by one or more civilians, would 
ensure 'confidence of both the military and the civilian in this undertaking'. The 
second desired impact was one that Eisenhower knew would take time. 'The 
association of military and civilians in educational institutions and industry,' 
Eisenhower wrote, 'wiII level barriers, engender mutual understanding, and lead to 
the cultivation of friendships invaluable to future cooperation.' He concluded that 'the 
realization of our objectives places upon us, the military, the chaIIenge to make our 
professional officers the equals in knowledge and training of civilians in similar fields 
and make our professional environment as inviting as those outside'. 84 This was 
nothing less than a caU for a new source of professional knowledge and a roadmap for 
how to access it. 
83 Memorandum from DDE to Directors and Chiefs of War Department, General and Special Staff 
Divisions and Bureaus and the Commanding Generals of the Major Commands, subj: Scientific and 
Technological Resources as Military Assets, 30 April 1946. CCS 020 (10-4-44) Sec I, doc 883 in The 
Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower. the Chief of StqlJ, ed. by Louis Galambos, VII (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 1045-1049. (See Appendix I). 
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By 1948 it was clear that, in the competition for resources within the new 
national defense establishment, the arguments for the army's share of the budget 
would have to rely on more than just memories of the last war. The navy and 
especially the air force were quickly mastering the ability to quantify their arguments 
with quantitative data, backed by scientific analyses. One of the roles of the RDB was 
to serve as a scientific judge among various service proposals for research. To serve 
this purpose, it needed each service to have a robust and credible operations research 
capability. An RDB report from 1947 noted that while both the air force and the navy 
had such a capability, 'the army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no analytical 
groups of a similar nature within their organizational structure'. The report continued 
that 'the application of scientific analysis techniques to military problems offers a 
useful adjunct to military thought [ ... ] we suggest therefore that our armed forces 
expand the facilities and the scope of their operational analysis units' .85 
Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe, the defender of Bastogne and the 
army's Deputy Director for Research and Development, initiated a study to determine 
how his service could move into the operations research business. After considering 
the air force's approach, where independent research was obtained through a contract 
with Project RAND, and the navy's solution, which was a contract with a major 
university, McAuliffe chose to use the navy model. With the encouragement of the 
chairman of the RDB, Vannevar Bush, the army would establish its first university-
based, independent, nonprofit research organization. 
McAuliffe's search quickly settled on The 10hns Hopkins University in 
Baltimore as the most logical choice. The reasons were simple: the location of 10hns 
Hopkins main campus in Baltimore was convenient to the Pentagon; the university 
possessed the academic experience necessary for a wide-ranging program; and the 
university had recently established the Institute for Cooperative Research (ICR), 
designed to administer externally sponsored research activities such as the 
university'S Applied Physics Laboratory.86 The concept negotiated between 10hns 
85 RDB study quoted in Memorandum Major General A.c. McAuliffe Deputy Director for Research 
and Development Logistics Division, 'General Research Program,' (May); The lohns Hopkins 
University Archives Office of the President 47.2/RG2/8ox33/May-Dcc 48. (See Appendix 2) 
86 The JHU's APL was responsible for the research, development and early production of the 
proximity fuze, one of the technological wonders of the Second World War. After the war its 
technological research would expand to include ballistic missiles and space vehicles. 
62 
IIopkins and the army envisioned a staff of 130 to 140 personnel with a small 
administrative office in Baltimore, a primary activity in Washington, and provisions 
for field observers and agents. 
In early summer 1948, McAuliffe outlined the basic research programme for 
what he called the General Research Office (GRO). The work plan for the army's 
proposed operations research organization was ambitious. He described an 
organization that would 'research on problems or phases of problems which are 
unique to the Department of the Army' in the following general areas: 
• Combat and strategic intelligence techniques; 
• Combat psychology and morale; 
• Analysis of weapons and weapons systems; 
• Comparative over-all economic cost of various methods of waging 
ground warfare; 
• Psychological warfare and "Cold War" techniques; 
• Logistics; 
• Analysis of general progress in psychology as it pertains to Army 
application and other related broad fields of non-mat erie I research. 87 
The lead negotiator for Johns IIopkins, Dr. Arthur E. Ruark, a physicist and 
veteran of the OSRD, strongly supported McAuliffe's basic proposal, but noted that 
'the army is behind the game in operations analysis [ ... ] clearly the pressure to 
establish a hard-hitting activity, promptly, comes from very high quarters,.88 It was for 
these reasons that he recommended the university's president establish a firm 
understanding of the army's intent with its most senior leadership. Ruark warned that 
despite pressure on the army to acquire an operations research capability in a hurry, 
recruiting the necessary talent would take time. Even under wartime personnel rules it 
had taken the OSRD eighteen months to staff the OFS. The army should understand 
87 McAuliffe _ 'General Research Program'. The tcnn 'Cold War' in this context referred not to the 
overall strategic standoff between the U.S. and USSR but to less confrontational means of competition 
such as various forms of psychological, political, and economic 'warfare.' 
88 Memorandum from Arthur E. Ruark Assist. Djr. JHU to Mr. Bowman and Mr. MacCauly, 'Subject: 
Check Sheet for Discussion 6 May, Operational Studies for Army and for Navy,' (5 May 1948); JHUA, 
Office of the President 47.2/RG 2/Box 33 (Jan - Dec 1948). Ruark was relating an undated 
conversation with Lawrence R. Hafstad, Executive Secretary of the RBD, 
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that lohns Hopkins had no 'Aladdin 's Lamp' and needed the latitude to 'permit 
steady, conservative progress rather than hurried construction of a jerry-built crew and 
an ineffective subcontract structure, which, indeed, would defeat the goals which we 
are all interested [in]'. 89 
Acting on Raurk's advice, the university's president, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, 
wrote a carefully worded letter to McAuliffe to establish an understanding that was 
'not conveniently incorporated into the contract'. Specifically, Bowman wanted to 
ensure that 'it was the intent of all parties concerned that the army wished to have the 
right to prescribe "what" was to be done under the contract but that the university 
should be at liberty to determine "how" such work should be performed,.90 Bowman's 
point may have seemed obvious given the army's stated intent to secure the services 
of an 'independent' research organization. However, experience taught many in the 
scientific community that collaboration even when born out of a sense of crisis, would 
not easily overcome the arnlY's reputation for resistance to outside experts. 
McAuliffe's reply was positive, but included a hint of reservation: 'I am in accord 
with the concept as to the general intent and mode of carrying out the work as 
outlined in your letter.'91 The definition of the term 'general intent' would be tested 
early and often as the army institutionalized outside knowledge in a substantive way 
for the first time since its founding. 
Building ElIis A. Johnson's 'Thinking Machine" 
The first, and as it would turn out only, director of the ORO, was Dr. Ellis A. 
10hnson.92 lohnson was a well-known name in the growing operations research 
community. A history of army operations research described lohnson as possessing a 
89 Ruark - 'Subject: Check Sheet for Discussion 6 May', p.9. 
90 Letter from Isaiah Bowman Pres. lHU to Mlti Gen A.c. McAuliffe, 'Subject: Understanding 
Concerning Contract No. W44-109-Qm-2073 between lohns Hopkins University and the Department 
of the Army,' (21 July 1948); JHUA, Otlice of the President 47 .2/RG 2/Box 33 (Jan - Dec 1948). 
91 President JHU Letter from Maj Gen A.C. McAuliffe to Dr. Bowman, ' Concurrence,' (2 August 
1948); JHUA, Office of the President 47.2/RG2/Box 33 (Jan-Dec 1948). 
92 One of 10hnson's earliest actions was to request an organizational name change. The GRO was 
renamed the Operations Research Office (ORO) in December 1948. Dr. Maccauly Letter from Ellis A. 
lohnson to JHU Acting President, 'Request for Name Change,' (27 Dec 1948); lHUA Office of the 
President 47.21 RG 21B0x 33 (Jan-Dec 1948). Maccauly approved the request on 29 December. 
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'forceful, enigmatic, and sometimes quarrelsome personality'. 93 As is often the case, 
the personality traits that made 10hnson successful in introducing the army to 
operations research also contained the seeds of his undoing thirteen years later. 
However, in 1948 it was clear the army had secured the services of one of the most 
qualified operations research scientist in the country. In 1934 10hnson had earned a 
doctorate in physics from MIT and worked briefly in the college's famed electrical 
engineering department. An academic interest in magnetism soon led him to work in 
Washington for a government survey organization and then at the Carnegie 
Institution, where he established a lifelong and professionally beneficial friendship 
with its director, Vannevar Bush. Soon after arriving in Washington, 10hnson began 
consulting part-time with the Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL) where he initially 
worked on mines and de-mining technology. It turned out to be his niche and he soon 
became the laboratory's full-time associate director. 
10hnson's technical and operational accomplishments point to several 
attributes that made him an inspired choice for the new army position. 94 First, like the 
early pioneers of British radar and operations research, he developed his 
understanding of the field in a technical speciaJty and expanded his understanding by 
working outward from a laboratory setting. 10hnson 'felt that for good effect, the 
work of the technical people had to be very closely meshed with the knowledge, 
thought, and practices of the operating people [ ... ] the research had to include 
operations research'.95 The fact that he had learned that sometimes he had to make 
compromises in the context of his work, such as taking a reserve commission in the 
navy to overcome prejudice against civilians and earn the trust of Nimitz's staff, 
would serve 10hnson well in later years. 
When the war ended, like many of his peers, 10hnson was anxious to return to 
non-military pursuits. Despite his significant contribution to ending the war, he 'got 
out of the service as fast as he could'. His wartime service left him with 'the feeling 
93 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 73. 
94 In 1946, 10hnson and a colleague prepared a detailed treatment of their wartime experiences and the 
operations research techniques created during the war. The manuscript was not declassified until after 
his death in 1973. Ellis A. Johnson, David A. Katcher, Mines against Japan (Washington DC: US 
Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 1974). 
95 Thomton Page, George S. Pettee, William A. Wallace, 'Ellis A. Johnson, 1906-1973', Operations 
Research, 22 (1974), 1141-1155 (p. 1143). All three authors were members of the 0 RO staff during the 
1950s. 
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that his hands were bloody,' as he believed his role had involved 'starving enemy 
civilians' and 'sending airmen on perilous tasks from which some had not returned'. 
Enticed back into military work a few years later in an advisory capacity by Bush, 
10lmson recalled that he became alarmed at learning of the country's relative military 
weakness compared to the Soviet Union. In the course of these advisory meetings, 
10hnson met McAuliffe, who gauged 10hnson's interest in starting an operations 
research activity by reportedly telling him that 'we've got a tough job in the army 
too' .96 JIis former colleagues and subordinates said it was his' intense interest in the 
possibility of [operations research] helping the armed forces with the complex and 
fast-changing problems of warfare' that caused him to accept the position as director 
of ORO. 97 It was also his enthusiasm and dedication to the field of operations research 
that largely explains how he overcame his 'revulsion for war'. As he told a journalist, 
'I've always thought a scientist could do more for his country before a war. ,98 
In addition to his scientific qualifications and operational experience, 10hnson 
also demonstrated an ability to select and cultivate scientific talent. Whatever value 
operations research brought to the army in the early Cold War was the direct result of 
scientists who learned their trade in the navy and OFS. 10hnson brought to ORO 
several of his colleagues from the navy including George H. Shortley, Lynn H. 
Rumbaugh, WiIliam L. Watson, and Robert 1. Best. 99 Despite their qualifications, the 
first group of scientists was not sufficient to cover the specific issues and diverse 
operational environments in which the army operated. 10hnson's first priority in 
August 1948, was to hire the rest of his scientific and support staff. In that first year 
two particular hires underline 10hnson's eye toward navigating new territory. Among 
his recruits was Dr. George S. Pettee, the first of many researchers from the social 
sciences, who within a year would become the deputy director. Another early hire was 
Dorothy K. Clark, the first of many historians to work in ORO. IOO To provide the day-
to-day management, 10hnson hired Lester D. Flory, a retired army brigadier general 
96 Herbert Yahraes, 'The Mysterious Mission ofORO', The Saturday Evening Post, 23 February 1952, 
pp. 36-82 (p. 77). 
97 Page, 'Ellis A. 10hnson, 1906-1973', (p. 1148). 
98 Yahraes, 'The Mysterious Mission ofORO', (p.77). 
99 Page, 'Ellis A. 10hl1son, 1906-1973', (p. 1148). 
100 Other notable historians who worked for ORO over the years include S. L. A. Marshall, Forrest C. 
POb'1le lr., and Hugh M. Cole. 
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with a master's degree in electrical engineering from MIT, to serve as executive 
director. 101 There is little doubt that Flory, a West Point graduate (Class of 1919), 
successful regimental commander in the Second World War, and former military 
governor of Austria, was hired for his army relationships as much as for his 
management skills. 
The remainder of the hirings reflects both the character of the early tasks and 
the philosophy of ORO's director. Johnson understood that the problems of ground 
warfare were 'not likely to be as simple and manageable as were some of those dealt 
with by operations research for the navy and air force [ ... ground operations] took 
place on much more complicated terrain [ ... ] Many more critical factors could affect 
ground combat'. \02 Despite early dominance by the physical sciences, operations 
research in general had always been understood by its practitioners as 'nearer, in 
general, to many problems, say, of biology or of economics, than to most problems of 
physics, where usually a great deal of numerical data is ascertainable about relatively 
simple phenomena'.1031n keeping with this reality, Johnson sought to create a diverse 
work force. 
Physical Sciences Engineers Social Sciences 
3 Physicists 2 Electrical 5 Sociologists 
I Chemist I Mechanical 8 Economists 
3 Biophysicists I Production 3 Historians 




3 Medical Researchers 
,'''" Table 1 ORO Personnel by ProfeSSIOn (January 1949) 
Operations research was new and the talent pool small. Only a portion of the 
self-taught operations researchers from the war remained in the field. In 1948, 
101 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 67. 
102 Charles A.I-I. Thomson, The Reseach Analysis Corporation: A JIistory of a Federal Contract 
Research Center (McLean: The Research Analysis Corporation, 1975), p. 9. 
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universities were only just beginning to recognize operations research as a field, and 
they would not award the first PhD until 1954.105 A flexible contract with the army 
allowed 10hnson to engage research universities and private firms in sub-contracts as 
well as to hire consultants from across a variety of communities. Within the first year 
ORO had consulting agreements with staff from seventeen major universities and 
several private research firms. 106 A decade after starting, ORO conducted a survey of 
its staff and asked them to list the qualities of an analyst. The results reflect the kind 
of people 10hnson hired and also suggest the research environment he fostered. 
• Be fairly mature, with five or more years of professional 
experience in his or her field; 
• have a genuine interest in operations research; 
• be able to get to the heart of a problem; 
• have better than average mathematical skills and the ability to 
show results in quantitative form; 
• be able to get along with the client's representatives; 
• be resourceful and able to get by with a minimum of support; 
• be willing to go anywhere, at any time, and do anything ethical, 
and; 
• have a strong sense of loyalty to country, employer, and 
client. 107 
Organizationally, the ORO did not have much of an internal structure for most 
of its existence. In 1949, two different models were proposed but apparently neither 
was put in place. As 10hnson noted in March 1949, 'the organization involved is not a 
rigid one, and the nature of our work actually prevents this' .108 The ORO's external 
organization ran through two independent reporting chains. The first was through 
10hns Hopkins' ICR in Baltimore. The ICR provided primarily administrative and 
fiscal support for the persOlmel and contracts initiated by ORO. The relationship with 
105 Ellis 10hnson, 'A Survey of Operations Research in the U.S.A.', OR, 5 (1954), 43-48 (p. 47). 
106 President JHU Letter from ElIis A. Johnson to Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, 'General Status ofORO,' (11 
November 1949); JHUA, Office of the President 47.21 RG 21B0x 33 (Jan-Dec 1949). (See Appendix 
3). 
107 Operations Research Office, 'Fields of Knowledge and Operations Research' (Bethesda Operations 
Research Office, 1960), p. 5; Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 
96. 
108 Memorandum from Ellis A. 10hnson to Director Institute for Cooperative Research, 'Subj: 
Proposed Organization for the Operations Research Office,' (4 March 1949); JHUA, Office of the 
President 47.21 RG 21B0x 33 (Jan-Dec 1949). This proposal was a functional design with major 
divisions being studies, analysis, and administration. The alternative design in June was project 
category-centric, organized into strategic, technological, and human resources. 
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the army initially ran on a year-to-year contract. In one of the early lessons of 
managing outside research, the army had to be convinced that the uncertainty of 
annual funding was detrimental to the continuity of research and the hiring of quality 
staff. The contract cycle changed to a three-year term after 1952. Finally, ORO's 
initial budget was modest. The initial contract for ORO was $1,000,000. 
Nevertheless, funding would grow steadily as ORO expanded and added staff and 
functions. 109 
The second reporting chain ran from 10hnson to the deputy director for 
research and development within the amlY staff's logistics division. Despite the fact 
that ORO was administratively assigned to one directorate, the intent was for it to 
examine a full array of army problems. The implementing directive stated 
'[o]perations research and/or analysis on problems that are not unique to anyone 
agency [and entail] basic research of a nonmateriel nature for which primary 
cognizance has not been assigned to a specific army agency' .110 To ensure ORO was 
available to assist across the staff directorates, the army established an advisory 
committee consisting of one officer from each staff division, each technical service, 
Army Field Forces (AFF), and the army's comptroller. The ad hoc board assisted the 
selection of tasks and provided assistance to ORO in obtaining necessary access and 
data to support its research. III 
Dcvcloping A Mutual Undcrstandings 
10hnson understood that the success of ORO, as well as the success of 
operations research in the army, depended on developing mutual understanding 
between scientists and the officers. He would later remark 'it takes an effort to 
remember how relatively unwelcome military operational research was in the United 
States in the early years to the executives whom it was to serve'. 112 For most anny 
109 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 65. By way of comparison, 
in 1950, ORO's budget was $1,500,000. The air force budget for RAND in 1950 was $4,000,000 while 
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110 Department of the Army Memorandum No. 3-50-2,20 September 1948 cited in Shrader, 'History 
of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 65. 
111 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 65. 
112 Johnson, 'The Long Range Future', (p. 1). 
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officers, the presence of civilian scientists represented an uncomfortable novelty. An 
early military advisor to ORO, Colonel Seymour I. Oilman, noted that when it came 
to the relationship between the military and civilian scientists 'the degree of success 
achieved [ ... ] dcpend[ ed] largely on the degree of mutual understanding, consultation, 
and cooperation attained'. This was never easy because of their 'wide differences in 
background, training, and experience'. 113 Much as Henderson had complained in 
1915, the military was still confronted 'salesmen,' who presented operations research 
as 'some kind of magic cure-all'. When it came to educating the ORO's sponsor on 
operations research, the emphasis was on 'the fact that [operations research] is 
research, that it takes time, and that, while the payoff cannot be guaranteed, it is well 
worth the risks involved' .114 The issue of time and timeliness of research is one that 
throughout ORO's history would remain an unresolved point of friction. 
Many of the new researchers did not have field experience, and those who did 
were likely to have been veterans of the navy or army air force organizations. Much 
like his experiences in the Pacific, Johnson knew his researchers would have to 
establish an understanding of the army context. Moreover, operations research was 
not a static discipline and Johnson was determined to lead an organization that made 
fundamental contributions to the field. To that end, he made the continuing education 
ofORO's researchers a priority. The ORO staff employed two methods of education. 
The first was the use of internal seminars, which covered 'the concepts and 
methodologies of statistics, psychology, economics [ ... ] as well as basic courses in 
mathematics'. The point was not to cross-train the existing disciplines, but instead 'to 
ease the communication problem and acquaint the staff with the capabilities and 
limitations of the tools and methods'. 115 10hnson also encouraged his staff to reach 
outside the army and stay informed of the development of operations research 
developments within the business world. 
The second part of the education process involved learning about the army. It 
was important, and in peacetime difficult, to establish in the minds of scientists the 
113 Seymour 1. Gilman, 'Operations Research in the Am1y', Militmy Review, 36 (1956), 54-64 (p. 57). 
Gilman served as a senior military advisor to the ORO from 1950-1953. Prior to his ORO assignment, 
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context within which the problems they were researching existed. Joh11son pushed his 
researchers to 'live with the customer' on maneuvers as well as to attend military 
courses. 116 Taking advantage of ORO's initial location, Johnson had his research staff 
attend lectures and participate in the academic life of the National War College and 
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. In addition, researchers attended a wide 
number of army courses. Between 1949-1952, more than sixty ORO researchers 
attended courses ranging from the staff officers' orientation course at the Pentagon to 
the atomic weapons' staff course at Sandia Base, New Mexico. Despite disruptions in 
work flow and pressures to deliver tasks early, Johnson believed this investment was a 
'means of deepening the appreciation of the army's problems within ORO'.1I7 
The army too had much to learn in managing an independent research activity. 
The biggest challenge resulted from a clash of cultures. As one historian noted: 
When the scientist enters the world of command, he finds the decision-
maker dominated by problems thrust upon him, not those that happen 
to interest him. Where the scientist's allegiance is to the truth, the 
decision-maker's allegiance is to the organization he serves. The 
decision-maker says, 'What must we do now?' not 'what can we learn 
hcre?,1I8 
The clash was not between the field of operations research and the military. No two 
fields could have had more natural an affinity. The clash lay in the cultural 
backgrounds and predilections of those whose formal training predisposed them to 
approach issues in different ways. The anny's bureaucracy aimed at gaining and 
maintaining control over its assigned responsibilities. This occurred regardless of 
whether officers were heroic leaders, military managers, or even military 
technologists. 1 19 The pressures of peacetime scarcity and a general ignorance of the 
nature of a scientific enterprise only exacerbated these tendencies. For the army of 
116 McCloskey, 'Training', (p. 387). 
117 Operations Research Office, 'Report to the Tmstees Committee for the Period I April 1952 to 30 
June 1952' (Washington DC: Operations Research Office, 1952), pp. 4-5.; JHUA, Office of the 
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1949, the concept of managing a research program, as opposed to research itself, was 
still an alien one. 
Despite Eisenhower's optimistic 1946 memorandum on the subject, the 
attitude of one senior officer toward the proper relationship between an officer and a 
scientist is instructive. Major General Leslie R. Groves, the head of the Manhattan 
Project from 1942-1945, had more interaction with scientists than any other senior 
army officer of his day. Although not a scientist himself, Groves oversaw the largest 
scientific program in to that time and had direct supervision of hundreds of the 
country's most talented scientists and technicians. In a 1946 speech, Groves argued 
that 'if we are going to continue, as we surely must, scientific research and 
technological development [ ... ] then we must have more scientifically trained men in 
the military establishment'. By men, Groves specifically meant military officers of 
sufficient skill to 'direct and lead civilian scientists and industrialists; otherwise, our 
officers will be led by them, and they are not equipped to lead us on matters so vital to 
military success'. 120 
In addition to such direct frictions, ORO found itself at the mercy of internal 
army debates over who should manage peacetime research. As a result of the 
December 1947 organizational demotion of the Directorate of Research and 
Development, ORO was under the supervision of the Director of Logistics. 121 This 
was the situation Bush had warned against, politely telling a military audience in 1946 
that 'industry learned [ ... ] fairly well and some time ago, that to place research under 
production, or under the purchasing department, or under sales is to wreck it'. 122 The 
debate exposed ORO's research agenda to the ongoing bureaucratic politics between 
120 Washington DC, National Defense University, Army Industrial College Lectures L46-3, L46-3, 
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the anny staff, the field forces, and the resurgent power of the technical services. One 
history argues that the situation was proof that, when compared to its sister services, 
the anny did 'not seem equally alert to the value of innovations' but instead 'seemed 
to be seeking ways to apply operations research to questions of logistics and supply 
rather than weaponry for combat'. 123 
In 1953, lohnson instituted an annual conference between of the ORO staff 
and senior members of the anny staff, either those directly involved in ORO oversight 
or more broadly in research and development. Dubbed the PISGAH Conference, after 
the biblical mountain from which Moses saw the Promised Land, the gatherings 
occurred away from Washington and aimed to help leaders 'visualize anny operations 
as they might evolve' out to some point ten-twelve years in the future. The conferees, 
isolated from the day-to-day and stimulated by a series of briefings and facilitated 
discussion, then produced a con census set of research and development 
recommendations. In terms of establishing relationships across the cultural divide, 
these kinds of conferences were useful. Given the fact that 10hnson and his team built 
the agenda and ran the conferences, a major secondary purpose was to shape army 
understanding of both the nature of operations research and the projects ORO thought 
important. 124 
Expanding Knowledge - Early ORO Projects 
The purpose of describing the ORO projects is not to provide a comprehensive 
accounting of i~s studies but to describe the scope and influence of its work. Most of 
its early research focused on near-tenn problems. It is difficult to show significant 
long-tenn changes resulting from a specific project or report. 125 The first status report 
of the new organization, issued shortly after the office opened and apparently meant 
123 Thomson, The Reseach Analysis Corporation: A Ilistory of a Federal Contract Research Center, p. 
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to codify relationships between 10lmson and his sponsors in the army staff, listed the 
specific 'policy criteria' for a developing a research agenda. According to the report, 
all projects would: 
• Eventually involve major action by the army. 
• Involve integration of military and technical courses of action 
especially if two or more agencies of the army are involved. 
• Not involve issues of technical planning or materiel 
development, as they are the responsibility of the technical 
branches. 
• Involve the army but not those of a joint nature except for 
specific army portions of such problems. 126 
After initial discussions between 10hnson and the army, three were approved 
to begin before the end of 1948. The first two, Project ANALAA and Project 
EVANAL, were equipment oriented. m Project ANALAA studied the appropriate mix 
of missiles versus antiaircraft guns in air defence, given prospective technological 
changes. In Project EVANAL, the army asked for a methodology to conducting 
environmental tests on its field equipment. Both projects fell within the general 
expectations of the army sponsors. A third project was more in keeping with what 
10hnson had in mind. Project MAID was a wide-ranging look at the potential value of 
U.S. Military aid programs to foreign countries. This was a significant early project 
for several reasons. First, it had a near-term policy impact in helping to shape the 
anny's position on the 1949 Mutual Defense Act. 128 Although heavily reliant on 
external sub-contracted research with the University of Washington, Harvard 
University, and firms like the Stanford Research Institute, the main report was also 
notable because it delved into topics much broader than the mechanics of mutual aid. 
Project MAID gave 10hnson significant discretion with regard to the scope of 
the research. Under the major problem definition relating to foreign aid, 10hnson 
created numerous subordinate problem sets. Some, like 'Overseas Transportation 
Vulnerability to Communist Subversion' had an obvious link to military aid to allied 
126 General Research Office Quarterly Report, Vo\. 1, No. I (Washington D.C.: General Research 
Office, The 10hns Hopkins University, 30 September 1948), pp. 20-21. Cited in F. L. Smith, 'A History 
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powers. Others, like the study of' Atomic Warfare' seemed tangential at best. 129 
However, the freedom to explore the issues and problem sets as the scientists thought 
relevant represented one of the tenets 10hnson sought to protect. In the end, the 
'Atomic Warfare' portion of Project MAID had a more influence than did the larger 
study of which it was a part. For example, in 1949 Project MAID's atomic work 
attracted the attention of the coomandat of CGSe. An informal collaboration between 
ORO and the college led to the creation of the army's first useful doctrinal text on 
tactical atomic weapons. Access to reliable scientific data, and tactically oriented 
scientists to help interpret the data, had a major influence on the college's direction. 
Two additional studies from early 1949 are also worth noting. Project 
POWOW aimed to 'determine, by scientific analysis and synthesis, the maximally 
effective weapons, instruments, and techniques that may be employed by ground 
forces in the conduct of psychological warfare operations'. The study summary 
admitted the nature of the subject was 'of a character markedly different from 
operations research in other fields'. Project POWOW was notable because of its 
significant use of social scientists. Some of the more,than twenty project reports and 
papers that resulted from this project, which lasted until 1953, were used to support 
the expansion of the army's psychological warfare capabilities and the later creation 
of specialized operations research organizations designed to focus on the human 
equation in war. 130 
Another important first-year study was Project ALCLAD. For this project, the 
ORO analyzed 'individual protection means from all known forms of warfare and 
[ made] recommendations for future research on, development, and use of the 
optimum equipment and systems to protect the individual soldier'. Most of the 
recommendations focused on improvements to such things as helmets and clothing. 
The exception came after ORO analysis showed that despite 'a requirement to reduce 
[ ... ] loads carried by the soldier and the difficulties in eliminating or reducing the 
weight of present equipment, no chance is offered to include body armor without 
129 Operations Research Office, 'ORO Publications Graded Excellent 1948-1958' (Bethesda: 
Operations Research Office, 1958). 
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seriously decreasing battle effectiveness'. Therefore, the study recommended that 
'[o]ther than arm or helmets, the general provision of body armor to ground combat 
troops is not recommended'. \31 As one historian noted, the recommendation against 
the development of body armor was 'an example of how logical scientific analysis 
might lead to conclusions that run counter to common sense or might be politically or 
morally unsound'. \32 It was also the kind of analysis that could force new, if 
uncomfortable, thinking, because it conflicted with professional military judgment. 
Despite this being the cause of friction in the early years, many in the army staff soon 
learned that even when they strongly disagreed with the recommendations of an ORO 
study, the results 'increased their capacity for recommending the best course of 
action' .133 
The Army's Initial Assessment of ORO 
From the perspective of a near-term return on investment, the army's early 
experience with operations research was mixed. Organizational growing pains lasted a 
considerable period of time. The ORO delivered dozens of reports and papers in its 
first year of work, but some of the feedback was less than favorable. 134 Part of the 
problem lay in cultural biases. Officers resented the intrusion of civilians into matters 
of strategy; some felt ORO researchers were 'spying on military management' and 
were reluctant 'to work on day-to-day problems' .135 Others 'simply could not accept 
the intrusion of 'civilian longhairs' into military matters. 136 It was always a difficult 
issue when ORO's research extended, as it often did, into the role of decision-making 
and infornlation management. This, as lohnson well understood, was the military 
131 'ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31 1952', pp. 4, 7. 
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profession's 'sacred ground'. Unit commanders and branch parochialists were also 
sensitive to critiques or even implied by outsiders of the efficiency of a particular 
weapon system, especially one that had many entrenched interests. 10hnson had had 
some experience with this problem during his aerial mining work with the navy and 
AAF during the war and warned his staff they 'should avoid [ ... ] criticizing the 
performance of any military individuals lest [they] lose [their] welcome as a member 
of the team'. 137 The problem for 10hnson and his team in the early years was that 
knowing such a line existed and knowing when one was crossing it were two different 
matters. The necessity of listening to non-military experts on military issues may have 
been recognized by the army's upper eschelon but convincing the rest of the 
institution would take time. 
In September 1949, the army staffs conducted a study of the ORO's first year 
and recommend several changes. While the staff study was generally positive and 
supportive of continuing the relationship, it argued that ORO should place 'greater 
emphasis on weapons-use level' projects. 138 Moreover, the ORO studies at the 
strategic level should remain limited and those looking at 'matters of joint concern' 
should be the responsibility of the WSEG or be conducted only on request by a higher 
authority. In a hopeful sign, the anny staff's report explicitly recognized that the 
friction of the first year resulted largely from the army's general ignorance of 
operations research. The solution, it said, was threefold. First, the army should assign 
additional military personnel to work with the scientists on the various studies. 
Second, ORO should create a field liaison office at the AFF to enhance its awareness 
of the work underway by the various equipment boards. Finally, 'appropriate steps 
should be taken to educate military personnel at the [headquarters] Department of the 
Army and AFF in the aims and purposes of operations research' .139 These initiatives 
were, in the long run, a useful strategy for how to solve the problem of embedding the 
137 ElIis A. 10hnson quoted in Gilman, 'Operations Research', (p. 57). 
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30 Spetember 1949' (Washington DC: Plans and Operations Division, U.S. Army General Staff, 1949), 
pp. 1-2. 
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techniques of operations research into the wider army. They did not, however, solve 
10hnson's near-term challenges. 
The major issue in the year before the Korean War was simply an expectation 
gap. For those officers looking for quick answers to complex questions, some of 
ORO's early work, especially that with a major social science component, was not 
satisfying. Gilman's assessment was that '[operations research] has been very 
successful in the solving of discrete technical and tactical problems [ ... however] the 
more complex the problem and the greater the number of non-quantitative aspects 
involved, the less chance it has for success'. It is difficult to know how representative 
Gilman's views were of those of his fellow officers. However, his position as a 
military liaison to ORO in the three years prior certainly makes his an informed 
opinion. Gilman estimated the odds of success in any ORO study, success defined 
here as an 'important payoff' as 'perhaps 1 in 10 studies' .140 
After the release of the army report, 10hnson wrote a rebuttal to the president 
of 10hns 1I0pkins in the form of a list ofORO's major problems with the army. The 
first problem was the ill-defined boundaries on the scope ofORO's work. The 
question, as reflected in some negative army feedback on wide ranging research like 
Project MAID, was 'should the scope be very wide and include a serious attempt to 
apply operations research methods to the strategic problems of the army?' In 
10hnson's opinion, officer views on this question had a 'wide and normal 
distribution'. On the 'extreme right' were officers who believed strategy was the 
exclusive domain of military officers and scientists should be 'concerned solely with 
consideration of the design of weapons' . On the 'extreme left' were officers who 
believed that only civilians, with assistance from the military, could solve strategic 
problems and therefore ORO should not be overly constrained. Related to this issue 
was the practial issue determining the degree to which operations research 'integrate 
the findings of social science in its solutions of action-problems'. Many officers, as 
well as academics, questioned the role of 'qualitative insights' in pursuit of 
quantitative ends. 141 
140 Gilman, 'Operations Research', (p. 60). 
141 Early criticism was usually answered in the form of caveats to findings. Qualitative approaches 
would become an increasingly important factor on their own terms during operations research in the 
Korean War. 
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10hnson believed that the army should consider strategic problems. Given this 
position, he believed that qualitative measures relating to 'economic and other human 
factors' were critical to army operations research. 142 To support his assertion, 10hnson 
commissioned a study, which catalogued the utility of social science research during 
the Second World War. He also surveyed the other operations research organizations 
in the department of defense for their opinion on the value of incorporating social 
science. The navy's OEG was 'neutral, or possibly negative' to the idea. The WSEG 
was 'at best luke-warm'. Only the air force and RAND were 'enthusiastic and 
believed application of social science disciplines constituted the only new and hopeful 
approach towards the solution of action-problems' .143 10hnson admitted that there was 
'an exceedingly strong contingent within the army which [felt] that although social 
science [was] important and may have much to contribute, the army ought to stick 
strictly to hardware and to tactical problems'. This was, of course, exactly the 
opposite of the direction 10hnso11 believed both the army and ORO should go. It was, 
he believed, 'a mistaken and short-range policy' to leave 'these more difficult 
problems to the higher echelons' .144 
The second problem was immediately below the surface and easily glossed 
over in high-level discussions. 10hnson complained that ORO was gradually losing its 
freedom to pursue research independent of direction. He felt that 'at the present time 
there is an intense effort on the part of the army to develop a system for detailed and 
specific control over all of ORO's work'. This, in his estimation, was a result of a 
'very high pressure to provide immediate and useful answers' which would, ifnot 
checked, lower the quality ofORO's work and lead to conflicts with its sponsor. 
Despite having strong views as to how operations research should develop, 
10hnson was sympathetic to the army's position. The army established ORO to look 
more systematically into new and complex problems. The army staff and the skills of 
its officers had yet to adjust to the expanding organizational and intellectual demands 
of the Cold War. However, 10hnson was also acutely aware that the army's lack of 
technical competence with respect to 'most weapons of the future' did not give it a 
pass from having to make daily decisions concerning those very weapons. He wanted 
142 lohnson 'General Status ofORO'. 
143 lohnson 'General Status ofORO'. 
144 lohnson 'General Status ofORO'. 
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to find a compromise whereby ORO could ensure a long-range focus for a portion of 
the research agenda, while at the same time accommodating 'a reasonable proportion 
of short-range studies meeting the immediate needs of the army'. Failure to do so 
would create a situation where: 
The best battleships or the best tanks will be developed, only to find 
that when war actually occurs, that battleships or tanks may no longer 
be useful weapons, in proportion to their costs. A war can be lost 
because of such reasons (Germany is a case in point).145 
Johnson's patience paid off. Through a process of slow negotiations, he was 
able to secure a program of 'block funding' and a negotiated study agenda. The ORO 
staff and the am1Y would each build a nomination list of studies - the two lists were 
then reconciled in an annual conference. 
Project ANALAA Analysis of antiaircraft weapons systems. 
Project EV ANAL Determining a means for evaluating performance of amlY 
equipment under various environmental conditions. 
Proj ect MA ID Analysis of military aid programs. Expansive background research included examining tactical atomic warfare. 
Project ALCAD Analysis of individual protection mcans from all known forms of 
warfare. 
Project GUNFIRE Determine deficiencies that contribute to inaccuracy of predicted 
IREDLEG at1i1lelY fires. 
Project POWOW Determine the effectiveness of means used by ground forces 
conducting psychological warfare. 
Project DONKEY Analysis of the use of surface-to-surface missiles. 
Project TREMABASE Comparative feasibility of air, sea, or land transportation options in 
establishing and maintainif1g an advanced base. 
Project TEAM Determine most effective means of controlling social behavior as a 
means of increasing tactical proficiency of a military unit. 
Project SITE Determine most effective methods for planning and conducting 
army training and cducational programs. 
Project ATTACK Evaluate on a continuing basis the use of atomic weapons in support 
of army operations. 
Project ARMOR Determine most effective means of countering armor by use of land 
mines. 
• J40 Table 2 ORO Assigned or Proposed Projects (1949) 
To maintain freedom of action on both sides of the ledger, the programme 
would only plan to use only eighty percent of the research budget. The remaining 
twenty percent would be split betwecn 'projects that the army wanted to have done 
145 Johnson 'General Status ofORO'. 
146 'ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31 1952'; Shrader, 'History of 
Operations Research in the United States Army', pp. 71-73. 
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but for which the ORO could see no value, and projects that the ORO wanted to do 
but for which the Army could see no need' .147 Although Johnson's vision for the kind 
of work ORO should undertake was increasingly accepted, the above project list in 
early 1950 still showed a strong a bias toward tactical rather than strategic topics. 
However, 'the growing Cold War with the Soviet Union soon made it clear the 
anny could no longer confine it OR program to matters of a purely military nature, 
such as the design of weapons and the development of tactical doctrine'. 148 J ohnson 's 
pragmatic solution of a three-tier project approval process satisfied, but did not 
completely mollify the various camps identified in his letter. The underlying tensions 
remained and with every change in the anny's senior leadership, the issue was born 
again. As Major General Ward H. Maris, McAuliffe's replacement, noted a year later, 
he and Johnson 'had many, many discussions bordering on arguments" on the subject 
of research priorities. Maris, and his replacement, believed it was their duty to 'keep 
the military viewpoint and military requirements before his splendid group of 
scientists,.149 It is clear that within two years of coming into existence, the key 
question was not whether operations research had something to add but where it 
should best be deployed. In tenns of setting the research agenda above the purely 
technical, Johnson eventually won most of the arguments but it was battle he would 
have to refight every two-to-three years. 
The ORO and the Korean War 
During the first two years ofORO's existence, Johnson successfully 
established the capability to study a 'full spectrum of future problems'. Less than two 
years after starting, the ORO staff was engaged in studies ranging from 'nuclear 
weapons, ground tactics, logistics, military costing, psychological warfare, guerilla 
warfare, and air defense' . 150 The start of the Korean War did not change study 
147 Visco, 'The Operations Research Office', Cp. 32). 
148 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 77. 
149 Operations Research Office, 'The Second Tripartite Conference on Army Operations Research, 23-
27 October 1950, Vol. Il' (Washington DC: Operations Research Office, 1950), p. 36. (National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (hereafter NARA), RG 319, Entry 82, Box 
2136) 
150 Page, 'Ellis A. Johnson, 1906-1973', (p. 1150). 
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priorities as much as it shifted the context in which ORO analyzed the problems. In 
fact, many of the subjects deemed superfluous by the army staff in early 1950 took on 
new importance. 
Beyond the specifics of the project list, 10hnson understood that the focus of 
effort must change because, as Blackett warned a decade earlier, '[r]esearch workers 
must also guard against the temptation to expect the executive machine to stop while 
they think [ ... ] War, manufacture, trade, government business - all must go on, 
whether the scientist is there or not' .151 10hnson also subscribed to the sentiments of 
Field Marshal Sir William 1. Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on the utility 
of operations research to soldiers. Slim told a conference of operations researchers in 
London that on two occasions during his career he had asked his commanders after an 
operation what they had achieved. On both occasions the answer was 'not very much, 
but we have gained a lot of experience'. 'It struck me at the time,' Slim continued 
'that the application of a little scientific method to finding out the answers is a much 
more efficient and quicker way than going off and risking several thousand men'. 152 
10hnson established three organizational goals for the ORO in its support for 
the Korean War. First, he would quickly resolve any administrative issues necessary 
to 'contribute directly to the solution of problems encountered by United Nations 
(UN) forces in the field'. The second goal was to obtain the maximum amount of 
actual field data for ongoing projects. The Korean War, for all of its tragedy, was the 
ultimate source of data for the problem sets 10hnson was pressuring the arn1Y to study. 
Finally, he saw the war as an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the full capabilities 
of operations research in a way no peacetime environment could match. 153 Operations 
research was, after all, a science born in the service of war. As their military 
counterparts with experience in the Second World War understood, no peacetime 
training event, or in ORO's case no model or laboratory methodology, could approach 
the conditions of actual combat. 
Goals in hand, and permissions secured, 10hnson flew to lapan in early August 
1950 to make arrangements for the follow-on deployment of ORO staff. By 
151 B1ackett, Studies 0.( War, p. 203. 
152 Field Marshall Sir William J. Slim, speaking to the first Tripartite Conference on Operations 
Research held in London May 1949. Quoted in Yahraes, 'The Mysterious Mission ofORO', (p.37). 
153 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 86. 
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September, he and three other analysts were accompanying UN forces on the 
scramble north following the breakout at Pusan and the landings at Inchon. As in the 
Pacific only six years earlier, Johnson validated a core tenet of operations research -
being there was half the battle. As he hoped, he found the army in the field an anxious 
and willing customer and secured an agreement to attach his analyst teams to the 
Office of the 0-3, Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Korea (EUSAK).154 To 
overcome hesitation about sharing operational data with civilians, Johnson secured a 
special arrangement with the commander to allow his civilians to wear a quasi-
uniform and officer equivalent ranks. Shoulder patches identified the ORO civilians 
as Far East Command (FEe) 'Operations Analysts' .155 
By November 1950, ORO had some forty analysts, divided into eight teams 
along with military personnel assigned by the army staff, attached to commands 
across Korea. By summer 1953, more than one hundred and fifty ORO analysts, 
contractors, and consultants had served on the ground in Korea. Most of the ORO 
teams served long enough in the combat zone to earn the UN Service Medal. 156 The 
analysts, generally assigned at division and corps level, worked under all conditions 
and in several instances came under enemy fire. Johnson himself had to dive into a 
ditch to avoid being hit by North Korean small arms fire as he inspected a destroyed 
tank near the front lines. An ORO consultant named Sam W. Marshall was shot down 
behind enemy lines while collecting data for a study on air-to-ground coordination 
techniques. He managed to add helicopter rescues to his data collection. While 
Johnson did not encourage his staff to take such risks, he believed it was 'necessary 
for operations-research people to comprehend military problems not just intellectually 
but with their guts'. 157 
Some of the most important anaysis to emerg from the battlefield was on 
unplanned subjects. One of the best examples occurred in late 1950 near the end of 
Johnson's his first trip into Korea. He and his deputy William L. Whitson were in 
154 This was in stark contrast to the ORO's primary relationship with the R&D section of the 
Directorate of Logistics. 
155 Page, 'Ellis A. Johnson, 1906-1973', (p. 1150); Yahraes, 'The Mysterious Mission of ORO', (p. 
36). 
156 Letter from Lowell J. Reed Pres. JHU to Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, 'Subj; Award of the UN Service 
Medal,' (11 May 1955); JHUA Office of the President 47.2/RG2/Box33(ICR-ORO Reports, Jan-Dec 
55); Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 86. 
157 Yahraes, 'The Mysterious Mission ofORO', (p.82). 
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Pyongyang following closely behind the action as it moved north. In late November a 
senior planner in the EUSAK G-3, Colonel William F. Train, asked them if they 
would help him with a short-notice, and compartmentalized planning task. As Train 
later recalled, 'I was directed to prepare a plan for the dropping of the atomic bombs 
on the Chinese.' Intelligence had increasingly pointed to Chinese intervention as U.S. 
forces approached the Yalu River. Train studied what limited information he could 
find on Chinese tactics and the terrain. His problem, as he told 10hnson and Whitson, 
was that he did not 'know anything about atomic bombs', He desperately needed 
advice on 'where you could drop them to have the most effect' ,158 
At this time, with the exception of some preliminary and still draft work 
underway at ORO, and CGSC, the army had no doctrine that addressed the tactical 
use of atomic weapons, their effects, or even their potential impact on friendly troops. 
Train happened to have asked for help from the two most qualified men on this 
question in Korea. In addition to ORO studies, Johnson had some practical knowledge 
of atomic weapons effects from government consulting work he had performed for 
Bush prior to his time at ORO. Winston, a physicist and veteran of OSRD research on 
bomb delivery techniques during the Second World War, was also familiar with 
ORO's early conceptual work on atomic weapons. As Train recounted 'working with 
these two scientists from ORO [,.,] gave me some information about effects of the 
atomic bombs, how many we would need, and where they should be dropped', 159 
Thankfully for all involved, Train's plan was never executed. The swift evacuation of 
North Korea by UN forces in the face of the Chinese onslaught forced the hurried 
evacuation of the city, According to Train 'when we were driven out of Pyongyang, I 
158 Moore, 'Oral History - William F. Train', pp. 264-266. Based on his oral history, it seems Train was 
developing a target nomination list for tactical atomic strikes by the U.S. Air Force. This would have 
been one of the first such planning processes in history. The possibility of using atomic weapons had 
been discussed but not seriously planned for since the disasters of that summer. General Douglas 
MacArthur requested authority to direct atomic strikes if necessary. General Omar N. Bradley found 
the idea 'preposterous.' By late November, General Collins initiated preliminary planning for 'against 
troops and materiel concentrations.' The Air Force was against tactical targeting of any kind. On 30 
November Truman, somewhat casually, hinted at the possible use of atomic weapons when he said the 
U.S. would employ 'every weapon we have' to end the war and that the decision would be left to the 
commanders on the ground. See Conrad C. Crane, 'To Avert Impending Disaster: American Military 
Plans to Use Atomic Weapons During the Korean War', The Journal o.fStrategic Studies, 23 (2000), 
72-88 (pp. 72-78); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War (New 
York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1980), pp. 329-337. 
159 Moore, 'Oral History - William F. Train', pp. 354-365. 
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was directed to destroy all copies of that plan so there is no official record, or 
otherwise' .160 
As the saying goes, 'plans are worthless, but planning is everything'. 161 It is 
doubtful that when Johnson set a goal to collect the 'maximum amount of actual field 
data for ongoing projects,' he thought that might include potential the use of atomic 
weapons. However, true to his purpose, by the end of December, Johnson's team 
quickly produced a technical memorandum and released a full report a few months 
later entitled, Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons. 162 The contents, while they do 
not refer to the events in Pyongyang, were strongly influenced by the very practical 
problem presented by Train. These ORO reports, along with related studies, provided 
the army with its first practical and scientifically sound sources of information on 
atomic weapons. 163 
For the remainder of Korea War, the ORO rotated research teams into theater 
to conduct research either on a major study already under way or in direct support of a 
FEe sponsored study. In June 1951, the ORO established an office at the 
Headquarters, FEe in Tokyo to facilitate direct theatre support. During the period 
1950 - 1953, ORO worked on a diverse set of studies that included: combat 
operations, including weapons, equipment, tactics, and doctrine; logistics and costs; 
social and cultural studies, including strategy, economics and politics; personnel, 
training, psychological warfare, and counterinsurgency; and special studies on 
research management and operations research methodology. 164 Even those studies not 
focused on the FEe's problems, such as work done in support of army forces 
stationed in Europe, were informed by data collected in Korea. In all, more than two 
hundred ORO reports, studies and technical memoranda on research conducted 
between 1950-1953 were delivered to the tactical commands, EUSAK, FEe, and the 
160 Moore, 'Oral History - William F. Train', pp. 365-366. 
161 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Remarks at the National Defene Executive Reserve Conference, 14 
November, 1957, ed. by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (Washington DC: The American 
Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1 0951.> [accessed 1 December]. 
162 This and many other FEC ORO studies of the period have been declassified and are available in the 
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163 See chapter on Command and General Staff College for a discussion of the limited knowledge of 
atomic warfare in the army and the role that these studies played in changing that situation. 
164 Lynn H. RUl11baugh,' A Look at US Army Operations Research-Past and Present,' RAC-TP-l 02 
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army. In addition to the atomic weapons study, a sample of the major FEC titles gives 
a flavor for the work accomplished. 
Document Number Title 
FEC R-l, vol. I and 
The Employment of Armor in Korea II 
T-I09 The Employment of Land Mines 
T-161 The Effects of Terrain on Batt\Cfield Visibility 
T-261 The Structure of Battle - Analysis of a UN-NK 
Action North of Taegu, Korea, Septcmber 1950 
T-264 Civil Affairs Relations in Korea 
T-278 Tank-vs-Tank Combat in Korea 
Organization and Activities of Psywar Personnel in the 
FEC-AFFE T-1O Lower Echelons of Eighth Army - 24 January -5 April 
1951 
T-23 A Study of Battle Casualties Among Equivalent Opposing 
Forces, Korea, September 1950 
T-46 The Vulnerability of Army Supply to Air 
Interdiction 
EUSAK T-3 A Proposed Joint Intelligence Center for the Se\cction of Targets in Air Support and Ground Action I 
Table 3 Sample ofORO Korean War Fiel - ,l65 d Research (1950 1953) 
Some of the major ORO studies relating to Korea or which depended on Korea as a 
'highly valuable laboratory for operations research' are worth noting because of their 
high profile and role in the expanision of operations research in the army. 166 
Project CLEAR aimed to 'determine how best to utilize Negro personnel 
within the Army'. 167 This early and far-reaching study was important, not only for its 
impact on the army and society at large, but also for its ability to demonstrate the 
value of applying operations research to complex questions beyond technology. On 26 
July 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981. The order left 
implementation to the Department of Defense, which, reflecting the social climate of 
the times, delayed and studied the process for over a year. Amoung the services, the 
army was the most resistant to integration. In March 1949, Army Chief of Staff Omar 
N. General Bradley testified to a defense department committee that: 
165 'ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31 1952'; Operations Research Office, 
'ORO Publications Graded Excellent 1948-1958'. 
166 Operations Research Office, 'Report to the Trustees Committee for the Period 1 December 1951 to 
31 March 1952' (Washington DC: Operations Research Office, 1952), p. 4. (JHUA, Office of the 
President 47.l/RG21B0x33 (Jan 1951-Jun 1952) 
167 'ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31 1952', p. 43. 
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I consider that a unit has high morale when the men have confidence in 
themselves, confidence in their fellow members of their unit, and 
confidence in their leaders. If we [were] to force integration on the 
army before the country is ready to accept these customs we may have 
difficulty attaining high morale. 168 
Institutional desegregation was a problem of finding a convincing argument 
that could overcome strongly held beliefs. The army's senior leaders had two related 
problems. One was to institute what many of them believed to be a disruptive social 
policy. The second problem was an acute personnel shortage, exacerbated by the very 
existence of segregated units. 169 The Korean War became the laboratory from which 
army could derive data that could provide a 'quantitative basis for decisions' .170 There 
seems to be little doubt that some in the army leadership hoped to find quantitative 
data to support their existing qualitative jusdgements. A contemporary history noted, 
Korea inadvertently served as the testing ground for the army's new 
policies of abolishing racial quotas and initiating integrated units ... For 
the first time the Army could observe and compare the performances of 
integrated and segregated units like that of the 24th Infantry Regiment 
under almost identical battle conditions, which, in effect, meant 
appraising the relative merits of the policies of integration and 
segregation. 171 
The team, led by Alfred H. Hausrath, conducted 'a partly quantitative 
operations research study' from May-June 1951 to define the critical elements of the 
problem statement and make recommendations. 172 The team employed a 
characteristically diverse set of qualitative and quantitative methodologies to analyze 
the problem. In addition to a literature review and analysis of army historical data, it 
interviewed 450 enlisted soldiers and 150 officers, provided 3000 surveys to front-
line units; performed a 'content analysis' of the written material; analyzed 'critical 
168 Testimony of General Omar N. Bradley, Fahy Committee Hearings, 28 Mar 49, afternoon session, 
pp. 71-72. Cited in Jr. MacGregor, Morris 1., Integration of the Armed Forces, Defense Studies Series 
(Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1985), p. 351. 
169 For a detailed explanation of the demographics of desegregation in the army see Alfred H. 
Hausrath, 'Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army', Operations Research, 2 (1954), 17-30. 
170 'A quatitative basis for decisions' was part of Dr. Charles Kittel's definition of operations research. 
Cited in Committee on Operations Research, 'Operations Research with Special Reference to Non-
Military Applications', p. 2. 
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incident' behavior to better understand squad-level behavior concerning race; and 
employed standard tools of statistical analyses. 173 
The ORO team found that the critical problem across all issues was quality. 
'The Negro soldier' was ofa poorer overall quality compared to his white counterpart 
because of 'limitation in the educational and economic opportunities represented in 
his background'. This finding seemed to support the argument that integration would 
be disruptive both socially and in terms of effectiveness. However, further analysis 
found that separating units (regardless of race) by quality had a measurably negative 
impact on overall readiness. After further analysis, the study team concluded that 'the 
Negro soldier, whose performance in all-Negro units was in general considered poor, 
became a good soldier in an integrated unit, and that no adverse effects on the 
performance of the hitherto all-white unit were detected'. 174 It found that overall 
performance improved in integrated units, while segregated units present 
'unwarranted military risks,' and 'no racial quota is needed if personnel [were] 
accepted and assigned on the basis of qualification'. 175 The army accepted the 
findings out of necessity and began desegregating units in Korea almost immedialty. 
By establishing 'a clear advantage of integration over segregation on effectiveness 
grounds,' the ORO not only helped the army solve its immediate problem but also 
made it possible to pass what proved to be a major milestone in the larger civil rights 
movement that followed. 176 
Another series of high profile studies that emerged from the ORO's work 
stand out, as much for the notoriety of the researcher as for the value of the work at 
the time. S.L.A. Marshall was a reserve army colonel, a newspaper reporter, and a 
noted military historian when the Korean War began. During the Second World War, 
he served as a senior military historian in Europe and collected oral histories and 
monographs from captured German officers. In 1947 he wrote a compelling but 
173 Project Clear: Social Research and the Desegregation o/the United States Army, ed. by Leo 
Bogart, 2 (New Bnmswick: Transaction Publishing, 1992), pp. 2-3. Hausrath, 'Utilization of Negro 
Manpower', (pp. 20-23). 
174 Hausrath, 'Utilization of Negro Manpower', (p. 26). 
175 'ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31 1952', pp. 44-45. 
176 Page, 'El/is A. Johnson, 1906-1973', (p. 1152). 
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highly controversial, book Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command. 177 
While highly acclaimed for its sympathetic treatment of front-line infantry, it was 
Marshall's claim that only fifteen to twenty-five percent of soldiers fired their 
weapons in combat that was, and still is, hotly debated. 178 
Despite the controversy, in September 1950 the ORO hired Marshall as a 
consultant to lead research on Project 5, a 'study of infantry weapons systems, 
logistics, mobility, and tactics to determine how the effectiveness of our ground forces 
can be increased'. Using the same oral history and after-action review techniques he 
pioneered during the Second World War, Marshall 'compiled a large amount of data 
on infantry operations in Korea during the winter of 1950-51 '.179 In February 1951, 
the ORO renewed Marshall's contract under Project DOUGIIBOY. An ambitious 
effort to determine 'methods of increasing the effectiveness of infantry,' Project 
DOUGI moy led to numerous ORO publications over several years. 180 Several of 
Marshall's papers, such as his distillation of Chinese infantry tactics based on 
interviews of the American infantry who fought them, were very much in demand in 
1951. In general however, it is difficult to gage the impact of Marshall's work or his 
contribution the ORO mission. In Marshall's posthumous autobiography, he was 
somewhat derisive of his scientific colleagues 'who were supposed to measure all 
problems in mathematical terms'. Calling them 'too windy to do their work' Marshall 
thought the whole lot, with the exception of 10hnson whom he called 'rock steady,' 
should be shipped back to Tokyo. 181 
Despite the interest in Marshall's work, the ORO was careful to draw a line 
between his methodology and any 'scientific' findings. The summary of Project 
DOUGlIBOY included the caution that the numbers of variables considered by 
177 S.L.A. Marshall, Men against Fire: The Prohlem of Battle Command, Originally Published 1947 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000). 
178 Most critics, to one degree or another, agree with Roger 1. Spiller's assessment that Marshall's 
general in sights into soldiers in combat are correct, but they question the accuracy, even existence, of 
his data and, to a lesser degree, the rigor of his methodology. See John Whiteclay Chambers n, 'So L. 
A. Marshall's Men against Fire: New Evidence Regarding Fire Ratios', Parameters, 33 (2003), 113-
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Marshall were 'complex and closely interrelated,' and that reason, '[ ... ] actual combat 
or maneuver situations do not provide sufficient control to permit complete analysis 
of these variables'. I82 As always, the real value of Marsh all's work was the battle 
narrative and evocative descriptions of men in combat. Based largely on his work for 
the ORO, Marshall continued to develop his reputation as an historian with two 
widely read works on the Korean War, The River and the Gauntlet and Pork Chop 
Hill.ls3 
The final area of research that was an important legacy of the ORO's 'Korean 
War laboratory' was that of psychological operations. Although the army employed 
psychological warfare in the Second World War, it was neglected afterwards. The 
army's capability to execute psychological operations (psysops) had fallen so low by 
early 1949 that it officially considered it, along with atomic warfare, radiological 
defence, biological warfare, guided missiles, and subversive warfare, as a 'new 
development'. 184 The character of the Korean War quickly changed attitudes, and 
demand for rebuilding a psyops capability grew rapidly. In September 1950, one of 
the first ORO teams to deploy, went to Headquarters FEe G-2, where it became 
become part of the Special Projects Office. Once there, the ORO team, including 
members of the ongoing Project POWOW, worked to improve psychological 
operations by testing the effectiveness of various messages on the enemy. 185 
Although the ORO's efforts in psychological operations were extensive, the 
problem over specificity of research that had afflicted the relationship with the army 
in 1949 came to the surface again. This time the friction was between the ORO and 
the growing number of newly minted psyops practitioners flooding into Korea. While 
182 'ORO Projects Special Studies and Field Operations to May 31 1952', p. 53. The variables 
identified in this study were: Personnel selection, classification, and assignment; Training; Equipment 
and clothing; Physiological and psychological factors; Leadership; Communications; Organization; 
Weapons and weapons employment; Tactics; Supply, evacuation, and maintenance; Staff functioning; 
and Combat intelligence. One result of the study was the creation of a tactical laboratory at Fort 
Benning to both study these factors under more controlled circumstances and to improve the methods 
for collecting and analyzing information on infantry units. 
183 S.L.A. MarshalJ, Pork Chop lIill; the American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring, 1953 (New 
York: Morrow, 1956); S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the 
Chinese Communist Forces, November, 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River (New York: 
Morrow, 1953). 
184 Alfred H. Paddock Jr., US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins - Psychological and Unconventional 
Waljare, 1941-1952 (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1982), p. 64. 
IS5 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 87. 
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the operations research team tried to connect its activities to the broad requirements of 
what it saw as the FEC's psychological operations problem, officers in the field 
viewed the ORO's efforts as 'too general in concept and not suitable for use by the 
army's psychological operators'. 186 In part as a result of general dissatisfaction that 
operations research had failed to provide the detailed answers needed, and in part as a 
result of findings from Project POWOW, beginning in early 1952 the army shifted 
much of its psychological operations research to the new Human Resources Research 
Office (HumRRO). 
The initial idea for HumRRO emerged out of an Office of the Secretary of 
Defense staff study reviewing the need for human factors research. The study 
recommended the amlY establish an ORO-like relationship with a major university to 
conduct 'research in the areas of training methodology, motivation and morale, and 
psychological warfare techniques' .187 The 'and psychological warfare techniques' 
portion of the HumRRO was clearly a late addition, since the study'S emphasis was on 
human factors primarily related to training. The army quickly approved the project. 
The JIumRRO opened its doors at George Washington University in August 1951. Its 
first task was to investigate the psychological impact of atomic explosions among 
soldiers participating in the Desert Rock atomic tests. Eventually, HumRRO opened 
offices at major training facilities across the country with a focus on a subset of 
ORO's original problem space - the human. 
The IIumRRO's approach to research was similar to the ORO's. HumRRO 
provided 'a disinterested scientific approach to the gathering of facts, the controlled 
experimental approach with careful measuring devices and the orderly examination of 
data from a research perspective' .188 Despite methodological similarities and 
overlapping problem definition, the HumRRO was not conducting operations 
research, at least not as 10hnson defined it. 10hnson was promoting a concept of 
186 Paddock Jr., US Army Special Waifare, p. 117. One can get a sense of the nature of the ORO 
studies by the titles such as: Psychological Warfare: Leaflets; North Korean Propaganda to South 
Korea; An Evaluation ofPSYWAR Influence on North Korean Troops; and An Evaluation of 
PSYW AR Influence on Chinese Communist Troops. 
187 Meridith P. Crawford, 'Highlights in the Develpment of the Human Resources Research 
Organization (HumRRO)" American Psychologist, 39 (1984), 1267-1271 (pp. 1267-1268); Alexandria, 
HumRRO. 
188 Human Resources Research Office, 'What Is HumRRO Doing? (Research BlJlletin I)' (Washington 
DC: Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, 1954), p. iii. 
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operations research that fit well with Blackett's observation that operations research's 
'relative novelty lies not so much in he material to which the scientific method is 
applied as in the level at which the work is done, in the comparative freedom of the 
investigators [ ... ] and in the direct relation of the work to the possibilities of 
executive action' .189 
The creation of the HumRRO represented a milestone in development of 
operations research in the army. At one level, it was indicative of the limits of 
operations research, when the problems became increasingly social science centric 
and solutions were tied to long-term trends and programmatics. However, it also 
marked an institutional victory for the ORO. By creating the HumRRO, the army was 
validating the idea that one could apply outside knowledge to operational, and in 
many cases purely military problems in a way that was both relevant and non-
threatening to the profession of arms. The rapid expansion of the HumRRO into 
specific areas of psychological testing, training management, and motivation freed the 
ORO to seek problems more in line with 10lmson's philosophy. 190 
Despite the HumRRO's explicit mandate to support psychological operations, 
the ORO continued to research and report on the subject, normally as a sub-set of 
larger strategic studies. From the ORO's founding through 1954, it produced more 
than sixty studies related to psychological operations. As the field matured and 
perceived threats from insurgencies proliferated, so did demands from the army for 
more specific cultural knowledge than either ORO or HumRRO could provide. In 
1956, the army contracted with The American University to establish the Special 
Operations Research Office (SORO).191 Much like the ORO, the SORO was a 
university administered, non-profit body established to conduct nonmateriel research 
'on problems involved in understanding, influencing, or supporting foreign peoples 
189 P.M.S. Blackett, 'Operational Research', Operational Research Quarterly, 1 (1950),3-6 (p. 4). 
190 Early HumRRO reports include Desert Rock I: A Psychological Study of Troops Reactions to an 
Atomic Explosion; Desert Rock IV: Reactions of an Armored Infantry Battalion to an Atomic Bomb 
Maneuver; Survey of the Educational Program of the Artillery School; Effects of Four Orientation 
Procedures on Airborne Trainees; and Psychological Warfare Research: A Long Range Program. 
Human Resources Research Office, 'What Is HumRRO Doing? (Research Bulletin 1)" p. 53. 
191 The meaning of 'special operations' has changed significantly since 1956. In this context it was 
meant to refer to the kinds of operations that fell below the threshold of traditional military conflict. 
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and societies'. 192 It is beyond this dissertation's scope to recount the growth, 
contributions, and ultimately negative role the SORO would play in relationships 
among the military, universities, and perceptions of civilian scientists in the early 
1960s. 193 However, at the time, and although it did not specifically conduct operations 
research studies, its existence, lik that of the HumRRO supported 10hnson's attempts 
to keep the ORO focused on broader matters of strategic interest to the army. 
The Maturation of the ORO and Army Operations Research 
The relationship between the field of operations research and the army had 
solidified by the time of the uneasy truce in Korea in 1953. During that period, the 
ORO had gone from a small team ofless than forty scientists and support staff to a 
staff of some 300 with an additional 140 consultants. 194 The expansion of the 0 RO 
staff was inevitable with Korea. A year after opening its Tokyo office in 1951, the 
ORO opened one in Heidelberg to support US Army Europe (USAREUR). Both 
offices remained small, usually four to ten full-time staff, working in the respective 
G-3 sections. General activities of the field offices included liaison with the major 
am1Y units, promoting operations research with allies, and participating in field 
exercises. Despite their small size, they were influential and operationally focused on 
'assisting in the preparations of war plans and exercises and to collect data and 
provide assistance'. 195 
192 The Special Operations Reseach Office, 'Annotated Bibliography of SORO Publications' 
(Washington DC: The American University Special Operations Reseach Office, 1966). 
193 On the SORO controversy and the implications for civilian research for military use see Seymour J. 
Deitchman, The Best-Laid Schemes: A Tale o.!,Social Research and Bureaucracy (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1976). For the two sides of the so-called 'Camelot Affair,' see George E. Lowe, 'The 
Camelot Affair', Bulletin of the Aromic Scientists, 22 (1966), 44-48; Theodore R. Vallance, 'Project 
Camelot: An Interim Postlude', American Psychologist, 21 (1966), 441-444. 
194 Operations Research Office, 'Report to the Trustees Committee for the Period 1 April 1953 to 30 
June 1953' (Chevy Chase: Operations Research Office, 1953), pp. 11-12. (n-IUA, Office of the 
President 47.2, Record Group 2, Box 33, (Reports 1952-1953). 
195 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 92. 
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As one would expect with such small staffs, the utility of the ORO to 
sponsoring organizations was in part dependent on the personality of the local 
director. For the first ORO-USAREUR office director, lohnson selected the historian 
Hugh M. Cole. Cole's historical work on the Second World War was well respected as 
history, and was held in high regard by the former division commanders now rotating 
though commands at corps and army level in Europe. 196 The ORO field offices had a 
long-range impact on the army's attitudes toward civilian research by placing senior 
ORO personnel in direct support of officers who were influential and in many cases 
still rising in the institution's leadership. 
Each of the field offices, in addition to supporting the main research agenda, 
also generated its own research tasks. The ORO-USAREUR office was particularly 
busy with the development and assessment of concept plans, and procedures for the 
integration and use of tactical atomic weapons in theatre. One such effort was a multi-
year project designated 'EUCOM Report 1 - The Tactical Employment of Atomic 
Weapons in the Defense of Central Europe'. The summary report was delivered to 
EUCOM in October 1954, but, as indicated by the list of supporting studies in Figure 
4 below, it was in fact the summation of a wide-ranging multi-year effort. 
196 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 92. It is not surprising that 
Cole eventually added historians Forrest C. Pogue, Roland Ruppenthal, and Charles B. Macdonald to 
his staff. Cole was as replaced as director in April 1954 by Dr. Thornton L. Page. 
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Title Report Number / Date 
The Physical Bases for the Selection of a Family RI (App A) / Apr 53 
of Tactical Atomic Missiles 
Organization, Staff, Procedure, and Equipment for 
the Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons in RI (App B) / Dec 52 
Support of NATO Forces Europe 
Intelligence Requirements for Atomic Warfare RI (App C) / Dee 52 
Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Forces in 
Western Europe and a Probable Course of Action RI (App D) / Apr 53 
in a Conventional War 
Troop, Demolition and Interdiction Targets for RI (App E) / Aug 53 Atomic Missiles in Central Europe 
Vulnerability of the EUCOM Logistical System to RI (App F) / Dec 52 Atomic Attack 
Atomic Weapons Delivery Problems and RI (App G) / Jan 53 Capabilities in Europe 
Training and Indoctrination for Atomic Warfare RI (A pp H) / Dec 52 
Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare in Europe RI (App I) / Dec 52 
Effects of Atomic Weapons on Forests of Western RI (A pp J) / Mar 53 Europe 
An Analysis of the Proper Balance of Special RI CApp K) / Jul 54 Weapons Forces, Central Europe 
Table 4 Appendices ofORO-EUCOM R-1 Study on Tactical 
Employment of Atomic Weapons (1952-1954)197 
This particular study is notable because given the relatively primitive level of 
arnlY expertise in planning for the use of atomic weapons, the lack of mature tactical 
atomic doctrine, few warheads or delivery systems, and no trained planners, the ORO-
USAREUR staff were not only the most knowledgeable part of the staff on the 
subject, but they were for all practical purposes the command's atomic planning staff. 
One of the most important extension offices created during this period was the 
Combat Operations Research Group (CORG) at AFF, at Fort Monroe Virginia. 198 The 
idea of placing operations research personnel within what was still the AFF, emerged 
out of the Project VISTA study. Its final report recommended the army create a group 
'to bring to an operational state the newest tactics, ideas, and inventions having 
application to the kind of warfare envisaged for Western Europe'. This group, 
197 Reseach Analysis Corporation, 'RAC Publications List' (McLean: Research Analysis Corporation, 
1965), pp. 2-4. RAC assumed responsibility for ORO's work and catalogue of projects on 1 September 
1961. 
198 In 1955 the Office, Chief Army Field Forces became the Continental Army Command, which, in 
addition to becoming a major command, also absorbed many of the staff responsibilities for research 
and development, doctrine, and education. 
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according to Project VISTA, should have a pennanent staff that 'includes civilian 
scientists [ ... ] and access to specialists in all relevant fields; and it must work in close 
coordination with Operations Research Office of the Anny'. 199 While the anny 
worked out specific details for implementation, General Mark W. Clark, chief of AFF, 
asked 10hnson ifhe could augment his small team of officers struggling to develop a 
combat development system. In December 1952, ORO established a field office at 
Fort Monroe to support the 'the design of field test and exercises and to conduct 
simulations and wargames' and assist in the implementation of the anny's new 
combat development system. 200 
The AFF struggled throughout most of 1953 to separate its current operations 
mission from its combat developments mission. In August, responsibility for combat 
developments was taken out of the AFF G-3 and placed under a new organization, the 
CORG. The members of the small ORO office were then absorbed to create a new 
entity close to what the Project VISTA report recommended. The CORG functions 
were to apply scientific methods of analysis to combat development problems; to 
develop new methods of detennining changes for doctrine, organization, and material; 
and to design troop tests as required by the first two functions. 201 While theirs was not 
specifically an operations research mission, ORO scientists provided a sound 
methodological basis for the army-wide combat development system that would 
emerge from CORG. The ORO-Fort Monroe field office operated semi-autonomously 
until late 1955 when a contract was in place for a private finn to provide CORG's 
civilian personnel. 202 Even though CORG diverted ORO personnel from their primary 
task, it proved to be a useful exercise in institutional influence. Over three years, the 
ORO staff found itself involved in the development of doctrine, capabilities 
requirements, and field experiments. The general acceptance of civilian scientists 
within the heart of what professional officers do in peacetime - preparing for the 
next war - was a major shift in the arl!ly's institutional ethos. CORG also served, as 
199 'V.S. Army Combat Development System' (Fort Monroe: Headquarters, United States Continental 
Army Command, 1960), p. 4. (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington DC 
(Hereafter CMH) U393.A25) 
200 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 92. 
201 'U.S. Army Combat Development System', p. 7. 
202 The civil service rules in effect at the time made direct hiring of scientific personnel difficult ifnot 
impossible. 
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WSEG had for the ORO, as a driving force behind proliferation of operations research 
activities in the commands, branches, and services. 203 
The increased activity and geographic scope of ORO's work had, by 1954, 
reached a point where a project-based organization with a small overhead staff for 
administration and publications would no longer suffice. Beginning in April, ORO 
reorganized into five main research divisions (Strategic, Tactical, Logistics, 
Intelligence, and Continental Defense), a committee on war gaming, a business 
administration division, and a field support division. The reorganization was also a 
reflection of where 10hnson wanted to take ORO in the future. As he stated in a 1954 
report, early ORO work was 'concentrated [ ... ] upon weapons evaluation studies, and 
[ ... ] learning to master army problems [ ... ] recruiting and training personnel, and 
proving the possibility of success in army operations research'. As a result of a shift 
'in the nature of direct demands from the army,' the ORO was now taking on more 
strategic and fewer tactical studies.204 
Colleagues recalled that it was through building the army's nascent program 
that 10hnson realized the 'opportunity to display to the full his grasp of the potential 
of operations research in the national service'. 205 10hnson, not unlike others who 
believe they are pioneers, was almost evangelical in spreading the gospel of 
operations research. As director of the ORO, increasing interest in operations research 
in general was simply good business. However, from the earliest days of ORO 
10hnson was a pied piper. He maintained an aggressive traveling and speaking 
schedule promoting the field. He viewed outreach as 'essential to our mission for the 
army in that many of our studies and recommendations affect arnlY relations with 
industry [ ... ] it is also essential to the future of ORO in that we must reach out to a 
broad cross section of the scientific community'. 206 
10hnson was an early and strong supporter of the creation of the Operations 
Research Society of America (ORSA), a professional association created in 1952 to 
203 By 1962 there were nine so-called 'in-house' operations research organizations. Smith, 'A History 
of the U.S. Army in Operations Research', p. 72. 
204 Operations Research Office, 'Report to the Trustees Committee for the Period 1 April 1954 to 30 
September 1954' (Chevy Chase: Operations Research Office, 1954), p. I; Shrader, 'History of 
Operations Research in the United States Army', pp. fig 3-1,89. 
205 Page, 'Ellis A. Johnson, 1906-1973', (p.1148). 
206 Operations Research Office, 'Report to the Trustees Committee for the Period I April 1954 to 30 
September 1954', p. 6. 
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promote operations research in public, business, and educational institutions thorough 
conferences and its journal. ORSA grew steadily from its founding meeting of seventy 
in 1952 to more than 2500 in 1960.207 He invested in ORSA's success by providing 
office space for the journal's editor, who also happened to be one of the ORO's 
division directors, Dr. Thornton Page. 208 The ORO's close affiliation with ORSA and 
its journal continued throughout the 1950s. In addition to providing editorial services 
and managing, 10hnson subtly promoted the ORO and the army's research agenda by 
encouraging his staff to write for the journal. Moreover, many submissions resulted 
from ORO sponsored monthly research seminars designed to attrack industry and 
academia to the field. 
The long-range viability of the army's operations research depended on 
ensuring a steady supply of well-trained scientists and an academic system capable of 
solidifying and even expanding the theoretic basis of the discipline. There had always 
been a fundamental disagreement in the operations research community about the best 
way to educate individuals for the field. 10hnson came down on the side of a 
combination of undergraduate work in science and graduate degrees in operations 
research as the correct approach. He advocated, with limited success, an operations 
research academic program at 10hns Hopkins, and even started a successful summer 
high school student program to stimulate interest in young scholars. 209 
One area of operations research that was of personal interest to 10hnson was 
wargaming. His connection to gaming as an analytical tool dated back to his work in 
the Naval Ordnance Laboratory before the Second World War. By the mid-1950s, the 
ORO was a major influence in the development of computer-assisted war games. In 
1955 the ORO purchased one of the first large computers, the UNIVAC 1103, opened 
a computer laboratory on its Chevy Chase Maryland campus, and developed a series 
of games focused on strategic and tactical questions. Developing answers to specific 
207 ElIis A. 10hnson, 'The Long-Range Future of Operational Research', Operations Research, 8 
(1960), 1-23 (p. 5). 
208 10hnson was an early member of the ORSA Education Committee and made educational outreach a 
priority mission of the society. Page, 'ElIis A. 10hnson, 1906-1973', (p. 1153). Letter from ElIis A. 
10hnson and Members to JHU Pres Dr. Detlev Bronk, 'Subj: Report of the Academic Council,' (8 
December 1951); JHUA Department of Physics, Series IIRG 03.040/Box 4/(Dept ofPhysics-ORO). 
209 For a listing of the non-research related operations research promotional activities see ORO 
Reports to the Trustee Committees and Reports to the Committee on Sponsored Research (1952-1960) 
(JHUA, Office of the President, 47.2/G21B0x 33 and 34) 
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questions was not the main purpose of either the computer or gaming, although that 
may have been an expectation of some uniformed participants. Johnson used this 
process to bring officers and scientists together to achieve 'military insights,' which 
would in turn identify 'a need for more detailed operations analysis and field 
experiments, which leads to revision of the war games [ ... ] the results go 
continuously to the army, which in turn provid[ ed] continuous guidance'. 210 
As Johnson's vision of the ORO's research agenda increasingly moved toward 
the strategic problems facing the army, the ORO increasingly became involved in 
national level research efforts. One study in particular, ORO R-17 "Defense of the US 
Against Attack by Aircraft and Missiles,' became a centerpiece of the research behind 
a major examination of national defence. 2I1 In 1957 the White House established a 
prominent committee, named the Gaither Committee after its director, to study the 
issue of civil defence in the event of a Soviet atomic attack. The ORO study, by 
pointing out the large weaknesses in U.S. air defences, was a major factor in the 
committee's recommendations for massive increases in U.S. spending on civil 
defence. The implications for the ORO were two-fold. First, the ORO's work and 
increasingly ORO's scientists were becoming part of the national conversation on 
strategy - outside of the army's narrow mandate for its operations research 
c~pability. 212 The second circled back to the original assessment in 1949, that it was 
not focused on army issues to the extent necessary and the products failed to meet the 
army's desire for timely research. 213 Neither issue was particularly new. Except of 
course to the new rotation of senor officers now responding to strategic questions 
raised by an army activitiy in a public forum. Given the army's already strained 
210 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', pp. 114- liS. 
211 The examination was formally known as The Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory 
Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization. ORO R-17 was a large study with chapters covering 
enemy capabilities, the effects of atomic attack, and assessment of US plans, the effectiveness of 
specific weapons systems, defense against ballistic missiles, and planning considerations for 
continental air defense. 
212 The Gaither Report, following closely after the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik, caused a major 
political crisis for the Eisenhower administration. See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear 
Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 19!11), pp. 160-171; Kaplan, The Wizards 0.( Armageddon, pp. 
125-143. 
213 ORO published a study in 1960 (ORO-TP-16 Analysis of the ORO Research Program with Respect 
to Timeliness) which restated the original position; delays were 'inherent in any research,' caused in 
many cases by the need to assemble the necessary scientific talent, and army instigated 'crash studies' 
caused delays across the entire program. Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States 
Army', pp. 103-104. 
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relationship with the White House over almost every other issue, this additional 
burden was not welcome. 214 In earlier years, 10hnson may have been more sensitive to 
the complaints but he seems to have lost the energy to refight the issue of the ORO's 
scope and independence with the latest rotation of staff officers. 
The rapid growth of the ORO in the mid-1950s led to some complaints from 
the army over the quality of its reports. In response, 10hnson and his staff redesigned 
ORO's workflow, institutionalized a more rigorous peer review program, and a 
revamped the way it presented its work to the army. The use of so-called 'murder-
boards' (panels of subject matter experts) to review the ORO's studies proved more 
difficult than either the army or ORO anticipated. With an unclassified publication, 
ORO brought-in academic experts on the subject and sought their unbiased 
comments. However, inherent in classified research is the problem that the pool of 
experts is small and limited to many of those involved in the subject under study. As 
the ORO report noted, 'impartial evaluation tends to be difficult because of the 
invidious effects of partisanship, so prevalent in classified work, because much 
classified work involves serious effects on the budgets of the military services'215 
There were no simple answers to this problem, and it made rebutting complaints of 
quality a difficult if not impossible proposition. 
The End of the ORO and the Rise of Operations Research 
The ORO, as constituted in a 10hns Hopkins contract and under the leadership 
of Ellis A. 10hnson, came to an end in August 1961. There are a number of reasons 
why this happened, some institutional, some organizational, and, as is often the case 
with small organization under a strong leader, personal. Institutionally, 10hnson's 
determination to keep army operations research out ofthe 'trenches' remained a point 
of friction from the earliest discussions. High visibility studies, regardless of their 
long-term value to the army's legitmate role in the strategic debate, did little to satisfy 
214 On the controversary and the White House's reaction see Morton H. Ha1perin, 'The Gaither 
Committee and the Policy Process', World Politics, 13 (1961), 360-384; 'Interview with Dr. ElIis A. 
Johnson Who Directed the 'Top-Secret' Johns Hopkins Report', u.s. News and World Report 1958, pp. 
50-55. 
215 Operations Research Office, The Professional Evaluation ofORO Publictions (Chevy Chase: 
Operations Research Office, 1958), p. 3. (JHU Archives, Office of the President, 47.2/RG2IBox 
34/Jan-Dec 1958) 
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staffs struggling with more immediate and generally technical questions. Speaking at 
a conference in 1959, Johnson reiterated the case for a broad research agenda. As he 
had done for ten years, Jonson argued that operations research 'must be concerned 
continuously with research in the broadest operational sense, rather than merely 
successful repetitive operational engineering application of the previous successful 
results of operations research [ ... ] it must, therefore, always be concerned with 
pioneering' . 216 
Between 1948 and 1961, ORO produced some 1600 studies and 632 
publications. The distribution of studies by topic and ORO division (Figure 5) 
indicates that Johnson was successful in maintain a 'balanced' study agenda. 
Table 5 Major ORO Studies by Topic (1948-1961)217 
July 1948- July 1951- July 1954- July 1958-
Study Topic June 1951 June 1954 June 1958 June 1961 
Combat operations: 
weapons and equipment; 41 45 39 
intelligence; 47 
organization, tactics, and 
doctrine 
Logistics and costs 21 17 
24 29 
Background Studies: 
social, cultural, and civil 11 6 10 
affairs cnvironment; 2 
international strategy, 
economics, and politicS 
General studies: 
personnel selection, 
training, and 14 21 10 3 performance; 
psychological warfare; 
special warfarc and 
counterinsurgency 
Special studies: R&D 




216 10hnson 'The Long Range Future', (p. 2). 
217 ' , at US Army Operations Research-Past and Present,' RAC-TP-102, 
Lynn H. RUl11baugh, A Loo~ fO ations Research in the United States Army'. The shift 
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Lieutenant General Gavin, in his capacity as chief of anny research and development, 
reportedly said before he retired that 'ifnot immediately, then within a few years after 
publications, most of the ORO's recommendations are adopted by the anny'. 218 The 
anny, however, adopted more than just the ORO's recommendations. At every turn, 
10hnson pushed this boundary, while trying to not lose sight of the obligation and 
practical necessity to remain responsive to the executive. 'At times,' he maintained, 
'operations research, like a part of a good and creative brain, will come up with an 
answer to a question that has never been asked but that has become self-evident 
because of the continuous correlation of data. ,219 This insight was one that the 
institutional amlY gradually assimilated though the ORO, even if the rotational cadre 
of staff officers did not remain in place long enough to observe the phenomenon. 
Other issues had less to do with the army than the evolution of 10lmson's 
thinking. In 1960, writing to the president of 10hns Hopkins, 10hnson said that an 
anticipated cut in overall army research funding for 1961 might reduce the ORO's 
funding by almost twenty percent. To make up this shortfall and keep the ORO as a 
'pioneering organization,' he proposed a new research organization, in collaboration 
with Howard University, to focus on African development. Operations research in the 
military was now well served. 10hnson suggested that within three years, the ORO's 
work on military problems would no longer be of a 'pioneering nature'. 220 While the 
development never materialized, the letter is indicative that 10lmson had, to some 
degree, moved on. 
Organizationally, the situation within the amlY in terms of operations research 
had changed dramatically in thirteen years. By the early 1960s, eleven anny agencies 
and commands had operations research activities. 221 The creation of a combat 
development system also shifted the nature ofthe research questions. Pioneering 
studies were still were useful, but the flood of new warfighting concepts created a 
218 W.L Whitson 'The Growth of the Operations Research Office in the U.S. Army', Operations 
Research, 8 (1960), 809-824 (p. 815). 
219 ElIis A. Johnson, 'The Application of Operations Research ~o Industry: A Speech ~elivered at the 
Fifth Annual Industrial Engineering Institute, 31 Janurary 1953 (Chevy Chase: OperatIOns Research 
Office, 1953), p. 8. . 
220 Letter from Ellis A. Johnson to Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower Pres JHU, 'Appli~ation of Operations 
Research to the Development of Large Areas,' (n.d.); JHUA, Office of the PreSIdent 47.21RG21B0x34 
(ICR-ORO Jan-Dec 1960). 
221 Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 121. 
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serious need for reliable data and analyses. One long time ORO analyst, noted that the 
rate of theory development was out of balance with the rate at which new factual 
information was generated by 'the means [by] which the theories may be tested'. 222 A 
decade earlier, the army had a deficit of new concepts and no scientific method for 
assessing the few proposed. By 1960, a lack of concepts and methods was no longer 
the issue. The new problem, highlighted by the spectacular failure of the Pentomic 
concept, was the army's inability to reconcile what was possible against what was 
required or even prudent. As one historian noted, 'the technology lagged behind the 
doctrine, [while] strategic concepts raced ahead of tactical realities '. 223 
lohnson's 'irascible personality' also helped to accelerate the ORO's final 
demise. Specific personality traits aside, the natural turnover of army officers and the 
continuity of 10hnson 's position likely increased his frustration toward his sponsor 
and the requirement to continuously refight the battle of 1949. This frustration, 
combined with the tension between 'pioneering research' and tactical solutions, came 
to a head in 1961. A group of army officials, perhaps believing the issue was primarily 
personality based, approached Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, president of 10hns Hopkins, 
about replacing 10hl1son. The request, regardless of its merits, placed the university in 
a difficult position. The ORO staff was the responsibility of the university and the 
independence of the underlying relationship was now in question. As one member of 
the ORO staff later wrote, 'if the army wanted more control over the management and 
direction of an institution providing operations analysis support [ ... ] it would have to 
do so without the 10h11S Hopkins'. 224 
The story of the rise and fall of the ORO traces a major thread in the army's 
institutional innovation after the Second World War. The army was the last of the 
services to adopt operations research. Lack of enthusiasm for a field that emerged 
from and had its greatest wartime successes in highly technical areas was not 
surprising given the army's continuing focus on mobilizing and training an infantry-
222 Whitson, 'The Growth ofthe Operations Research Office', (p. 823). 
223 Major Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution o/US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 (Fort 
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1979). 
224 hA I . C . In 1961 the army contracted with a private firm, the Resear~ na YSlS orporatlOn (RAC), to 
Continue with some ongoing ORO projects. Visco, 'The OperatIOns Resear~h Office', (p. 32); Eugene 
P. Visco, Carl M. Harris, 'Operations Research Office and. Research AnalysIs Corporation', in 
Encyclopedia o/Operations Research and Managment SCience, ed. by Saul 1. Gass, Carl M. Harris 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 595-599. 
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centric force. The army's initial interest in operations research first arose not out of a 
desire to see what it could provide on the battlefield, but instead what it could 
contribute in the competition for resources. The relationship between civilian 
scientists and the army officers with whom they worked was always a complex one. 
Nevertheless, the ability of the ORO, or more specifical1y the field of operations 
research, to help the army address an ever-expanding list of missions ranging from 
atomic weapons to psychological warfare earned it, sometime begrudgingly, a place at 
the table. 
Operations research never developed an iconic uniformed champion. 1ts most 
visible supporter was Gavin, but his interests, while inclusive of operations research, 
Were always much broader. However, the nature of the field, going back to Blackett's 
1941 description, meant that, to be successful, operations research has to serve a 
Specific decision maker looking to solve a specific problem. As the number and 
complexity of the problems exploded after t11e Second World War so did the number 
of officers open to their assistance. As historian Alex Roland described it: 'instead of 
assuming that the old weapon will serve, officers now assume that the old weapon is 
Obsolete, or at least obsolescent. ,225 The demand for operations research grew across 
the breadth of the army, even as Johnson and his organization were becoming 
increasingly isolated at the top. Operations research was, in terms of peacetime 
innovations, primarily an intellectual one: Officers making fundamental decisions on 
the fonn and functions of the future army were now in a position to consider three 
sources of professional knowledge: history, personal experience, and the results of 
operations research. 
225 Alex Roland, 'Technology, Ground Warfare, and Strategy: The Paradox of American Experience', 
Journal ~f MiIi/my Ilistory, Vo!. 55, No. 4 (October 1991), p. 466. 
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Chapter Two - The Birth of Combat Developments 
This chapter examines of the institutional processes through which the U.S. 
Army sought to determine requirements for future wars. Known as 'combat 
developments', this process represented a deliberate approach to the research, 
development, testing, and integration of new doctrine, organization, and materiel 
solutions. I The previous chapter described how the army adopted a scientific process, 
operations research, as an integral part of both its approach to problem solving and 
thinking about future war. This chapter describes combat developments as a set of 
activities that occur across the institutional anny, for the purpose of determining the 
full-range of requirements for a future war. This chapter is divided into four parts. 
First, it defines combat developments. Second, it provides a brief overview of the era 
before the Second World War, when the institutional approach to developing 
capabilities for the future rarely extended beyond mobilization and manpower issues. 
The third section describes how the tension between the organizational traditionalists 
and new combined arms functionalists delayed the emergence of combat 
developments as an institutional process during the early Cold War. The last section 
describes the eventual triumph of the functionalists and how this resulted in a 
coherent institutional process designed prepare the army for future conflicts. 
I The term combat developments and combat development are used interchangeably throughout the 
literature. 
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Combat Developments and the Army 
Modern atmies are complex systems of men, ideas, and materials designed to 
operate as a single entity toward a designated purpose. 2 The nature of land warfare, 
unlike air or naval war, makes developing and testing new systems difficult. New 
technology or doctrinal based changes in air warfare, for example, can be developed, 
tested, and demonstrated by relatively small organizations in general isolation from 
the whole. This is in sharp contrast with an equivalent change in land warfare. The 
introduction of a new weapons system, doctrine, or organization, for example, has 
significant ripple effects across all the of semi-autonomous parts of the ground-force. 
Combat developments is a term that captures the institutional process of moving from 
an idea to a concept, to an evaluating and testing scheme, and finally to the 
publication of a requirements document which aims to introduce a change or new 
capability. 3 The input to the process is an idea or concept, perhaps the result of an 
operations research study. The output of the combat developments process is 
essentially a plan detailing to the various entities that comprise the institutional arn1Y 
what should be changed, created, or purchased and, in many cases, how the change 
should be integrated into the existing force. 
Combat developments, as a generic description of how one introduces a new 
military capability, have always existed. Some degree of planning and coordination 
was always required to add new capabilities to the army from its earliest days. The 
problem, until the early Cold War, was that the army lacked a defined institutional 
process to develop capabilities holistically. For most of the army's history, a combat 
arn1, the ordnance corps, an instructor at a military college, a senior field commander, 
or a member of the War Department staff could weigh in on the loosely defined 
2 A system in this case is defined as 'a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements 
forming a complex whole.' 
3 A capability is a description of what an army must be able to do. For example, an army may be 
required to deploy strategically, conduct sustained combat operations in an urban environment, or 
conduct airborne operations. The elements of a capability vary but are generally described as 
combinations of means and ways across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, personnel, and facilities. See Joint Capabilities Integrations and Development System 
(C/CSI 3170.01g) (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 2009). 
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processes of combat developments in a positive or negative way depending on a 
constantly shifting set of variables. The right combination of military genius, 
opportunity, and timing often spelled the difference between a new capability to 
conduct operational manoeuvre and a mobile infantry support gun. Clausewitz's 
description of the nature of war - as the 'interplay of possibilities, probabilities, 
good luck and bad' - is also an apt description of the army's peacetime development 
process. But success in war, like cards, is not solely a matter of chance. A deliberate 
program of study, practice, and deternlination in the approach to peacetime innovation 
can improve, but never guarantee, the odds on yet undetermined field ofbattle. 4 In 
1946, Major General Otto Nelson Jr., articulated the requirement for such a new 
process: 
Just as there must be machinery to enable top leadership and 
management to be effectual through the budgetary process, so too must 
there be the organizational means to facilitate the performances of the 
most difficult and the most important responsibility of military 
leadership to discover, develop, adopt, and exploit new and improved 
weapons, equipment, tactics, and techniques, and to discard the 
obsolete. 
As one of the mechanics of General George C. Marshall's wartime transformation of 
the war department and general staff, Nelson was clear-eyed about the challenge of 
forcing an organizational form to follow a new function. lIe warned that despite the 
obvious need, 'there are powerful forces of an institutional character that tend to stifle 
the development of initiative in the armed forces'. 5 The internal institutional 
challenge was clear: convince a conservative and triumphant army that the process, 
which created the army of 1945, was inadequate to the challenge of preparing for next 
war. In its simplest form, the combat developments process needed to answer three 
questions: how should the army be organized, how should it be equipped, and how 
should it fight?6 Answering these questions, as Nelson noted above, required a new 
4 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. by Michael Howard 
and Perter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 1993), p. 97. (Book One, Chapter I, 21) 
5 Otto L. Nelson Jr., National Security and the General Sl4f(Washington DC: Infantry Journal Press, 
1946), pp. 599-600. Nelson was a highly regarded expert on the subject of military staffs. His 1946 
book was based on his 1940 Harvard PhD dissertation. Nelson also served on the 1942 War 
Department Reorganization Committee. 
6 These three qu~stions were the essential elements of the eventual Combat Development Command's 
mission statement as articulated by its first commander. Lieutenant General John P. Daley, 'Address to 
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institutional approach. The story of the creation of combat developments between 
1945-1960 is the story of an institutional innovation. 
Antecedents - Combat Developments before the Second World War 
Many elements of the process that would come to be called combat 
developments existed before the Second World War; after all new weapons, associated 
doctrines, and necessary organizations were in some form continuously under 
development by and for the army throughout its I 70-year history. However, new 
capability development prior to Second World War was rarely future oriented and 
almost always the result of highly idiosyncratic processes. As one official historian 
described changing the army on the eve of Second World War 'the entire process of 
conception, development, standardization, and eventual procurement [ ... ] escape 
precise definition in terms of organizational and jurisdictional boundaries'. 7 
The lack of a coherent institutional approach to the challenge of preparing 
capabilities for future war was, like most characteristics of large organizations, the 
result of many factors. Complex influences of American history including the nation's 
political culture, strategic geography, economic resources, and the particular character 
of its previous wars all converged to shape how the army prepared for future war. 
These factors also shaped the particular institutional characteristics of the army. For 
example, for most of the army's history before the early 1940s, a purposefully weak 
command and general staff system contended with a powerful and semi-autonomous 
combat anns and bureaus system. The structural competition between the users and 
producers of military capabilities made coalescing around a single institutional view 
of the future all but impossible. In many ways the story of how the army created a 
combat developments capacity is the story of the on-again-off-again civil war 
between the army's institutional 'tribes'. 8 
Army Policy Council, Status Report on U.S. Army Combat Development Command, 20 March 1963' 
(Washington DC: Combat Developments Command, 1963). (MHI UA 23.3 D34 1963). 
7 R. E1berton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, The United States Army in World War fI 
(Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1959), p. 50 .. 
8 Although the ~pecific composition of each category did change over time, in 1939 the chiefs of the 
combat arms consisted of the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and the Air Corps. The 
technical services were; the Quartermaster Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Medical Department, 
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It would not be surprising that such a system would create internal incentives 
whereby the various parts of the institutional army operated in an atmosphere of 
'isolation, competition, and dissention,.9 In fact, any cooperation in such an 
institutional environment was, as EIting E. Morison acerbically described it, the result 
of a 'genial conspiracy among the responsible officers' and nothing more. 10 
In part or in whole, deliberately or by default, some degree of preparation in 
tenns of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities is required before battle. Unless the forces involved are 
leadcrless mobs, doctrine or some agreed upon concept must be developed and 
promulgated; technologies primarily in the form of weapons and their supporting 
systems must be created; and the force must be deployed with some organizational 
structure to facilitate the actual fight and maintain control. From its earliest days, the 
anny was no different. 
The reason such an inefficient system remained in place for so long was part 
political but an equal measure was given the country's natural strategic defences and 
reticence to fund a large standing anny, there was little to develop. Occasional bursts 
of innovation and adaption during the wars of the late eighteenth and throughout the 
nineteenth centuries were the exception and not the rule. Soldiers in the War of 1812 
saw little if any appreciable difference in the quality of anns, or the provisioning of 
same, from that which their fathers experienced in the revolution. 11 Soldiers marching 
into Mexico City in 1847 were only just beginning to benefit from new infantry 
weapons. A majority still carried flintlock's little changed for generations. As a history 
of the American rifle described the situation, 'between the 1790s and the 1840s the 
the Inspector General Division, the Chemical Warfare Service, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal 
Corps. Finally, the administrative bureaus were the Judge Advocate General, The Adjutant General, the 
Provost Marshal General, the Chief of Special Services, the Chief of Chaplains, and the Chief of 
Finance. 
9 Marc K. Blackbum, The United States Army and the Motor Truck: A Case Study in Standardization 
(Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 1996), p. 2. See also Ronald Spector, 'The Military 
Effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces, 1919-1936', in Military Effectiveness in the Interwar 
Years, ed. by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, 2 (Boston: Alien and Unwin, 1988) (pp. 70-97). 
10 James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963, 
Special Studies (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975), p. 63; Elting 
E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study (if the Life and Times of I lenry L. Stimson (New York: 
Houghton Miftlin Company, 1960), p. 414. 
1\ See Merritt Roe Smith, 'Army Ordnance and the "American System" of Manufacturing, 1815-1861', 
in Militmy Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience, ed. by 
Merrit Roe Smith (Boston: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1985), pp. 39-86 (pp. 49-50). 
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general emphasis in the weapons develop had been not on making firearms more 
lethal but on making factories more efficient at producing them' . 12 A comparable 
situation existed with doctrine. Manuals for drill and ceremony were more common 
than any describing common battlefield tactics in the years prior to the Civil War. The 
first tentative step towards a concept of army-wide doctrine would not emerge until 
after America's bloodiest war. 13 The crushing demands of the Civil War stimulated or 
drove the development of new capabilities but did little to change the institution's 
approach to the problem of future war. 
The army was bom as a twin. It consisted of two halves of a single institution 
that for much of its existence operated not so much as close siblings, but as rivals for 
the attention of fickle parents. The never-ending argument was simple. The combat 
arms sought a process where more men and new materiel were available on demand 
while the technical services, primarily the procurement departments of quartermaster 
and ordnance, sought to sustain the army in the most efficient way over time. The 
tension between the twins was purposeful since it provided Congress a source of 
control over the commander-in-chief (the president). The depth of the cultural divide 
between the users and suppliers of arms is indicated in a 1861 letter to the secretary of 
war from Brigadier General lames Wolfe Ripley, a forty-seven year veteran of the 
army and at the time, the Union's chief of ordnance. 
A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for the military 
service is the vast variety of new inventions [ ... that] has already 
introduced into the service many kinds and calibers of arms, some in 
my opinion, unfit for use as military weapons, and none as good as the 
U.S. musket, producing confusion in the manufacture, the issue and the 
use of ammunition, and very injurious to the efficiency of troops. This 
evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any 
requisitions for, or propositions to sell new and untried arms, and 
steadily adhering to the rule of uniformity of all arms for all troops of 
the same kind, such as cavalry, artillery, and infantry. 14 
12 Alexander Rose, American Rifle: A Biography (New York: Delacorte Press, 2008), p. 109. Bruce 
Winders, Mr. Polk's Army: The American Militmy Experience in the Mexican War (Austin: Texas 
A&M Press, 2001), pp. 88-112. The Army in Mexico did benefit from recent period in artillery 
renewal, which introduced several new weapons including a series of howitzers and mortars. 
13 The first example of what would be considered doctrine in a twentieth century sense was the 1863 
General Orders No. 100, Instructions/or the Government c<f Armies c<fthe United States in the Field. 
The V.S. Army's first combined arms doctrine, Field Service Regulations, was not published until 
1905. 
14 J. W. Ripley, Ordnance Office to Secretary of War, sub: Notes on sub~e~t of contracting for s~lall 
arms, June 11, 1861. 711e War (~f the Rebellion: A Compilation c<f the OjJIClal Records of the UI1l011 and 
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The 'evil' Ripley described was the flood of new weapons, some based on 
requirements and some unsolicited. Ripley's concerns were reasonable from a 
logistical efficiency perspective but in pursuing 'uniformity of all arms for all troops', 
he was evidently unconcerned with user requirements. 
A similar pattern developed around the development of doctrine after the war. 
Doctrinal debates began to mature in the late 1800s with the emergence within the 
army of a group of reformers determined to learn from the lessons of Civil War and 
the battlefields of the new European war. 15 Serious study of higher-level tactics, 
military theory, and eventually service level doctrine saw their beginnings in 1882 at 
the Infantry and Cavalry School, the predecessor to the CGSc. However promising 
these early combined arms musings, the army still lacked a process to move new ideas 
and materiel throughout the institution. The army struggled for more than twenty 
years to develop and issue a new rifle or determine how to mobilize and deploy an 
expeditionary force. Most of the lessons of the 1898 Spanish-American War revolved 
around organizational and staff failures as well as a lack of a coherent system to 
articulate requirements for future war. A major factor behind the so-called Root 
Reforms of 1903 and the development of a general staff was the lack of a process to 
match the needs of the combat arms. 16 
Despite reforms, in the years before the First World War the technical services 
either controlled or institutionally dominated the question of which capabilities the 
COI?/ederate Armies, ed. by Fred C. Ainsworth, Joseph W. Kirkley, 1 (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1899), pp. 264-265. David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun 
and the United States Army 1861-1916 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 13. Ripley was 
upholding the position of the first chief of ordnance, Colonel Decius Wadsworth who in 1812 made 
'Uniformity, Simplicity, and Solidarity' the motto of the new department. Smith, 'Military Enterprise 
and Technological Change' (p. 49). 
15 Members of this group include: Emory Upton, Arthur L. Wagner, William T. Sherman, and Wesley 
Merritt. See T. R. Brereton, Educating the u.s. Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000); Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Baffle - the Army's 
Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 40-67. Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Soldier and the State: 771e TheO/y and Politics of Civil MilitaJY Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 
1957), pp. pp. 222-269. 
16 In arguing for the creation of a general staff, Secretary of War Elihu Root told a congressional 
committee 'our organization is weak at the top [ ... ] because the system is defective, because there is a 
distribution of powers and no coordination of the exercise of powers provided for in the system'. 
Testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs, 13 December 1902 published in Elihu Root, 
Estahlishment of a General StqU'Corps: Statements by the Secretary of War (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 11, 
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anny should develop. The anny considered weapons, and by default weapons 
development, to be a logistical or procurement issue. Thus, the driving logic of 
combat developments was less fulfilling a requirement for a potential war, but 
maximizing peacetime economy and stockpiling for mobilization. Moreover, 
individual requirements tended to follow a narrow path from the using community to 
the procurement community and back. Rarely, if ever, were weapons judged against 
alternative solutions emanating from different combat anns or viewed in the context 
of emerging concepts of employment. 
The army generally developed requirements within a using combat ann. By 
law most design and development activities were conducted within existing 
government owned or operated annouries. With no single vision, each arm or bureau 
was free to make a claim against the limited resources afforded to the anny in 
peacetime. Combat development activities were isolated affairs rarely brought 
together with a purpose to validate the whole. Once a prototype of a new weapon was 
developed, an ad hoc board of officers established by the using ann evaluated it. Jfthe 
weapon passed its user evaluation, even those based on often-arbitrary technical 
requirements, it was refered back to the technical service for procurement or 
manufacture. Often the boards, either by manipulation of membership, circumscribing 
their mandates, or ignoring their findings, became venues for inter-ann bureaucratic 
competition. 17 
Between the World Wars 
The general pattern of 'combat developments' began to change in the 
aftennath of the First World War. One of the most significant lessons of the war and 
the one that received the lion's share of attention was the inability to mobilize and 
synchronize both the military and the civilian economy for war. Temporary 
organizations were created to bring coherence to the chaos of mobilization. These 
organizations worked because of strong and well-connected personalities, but the war 
17 An ordnance officer wrote iri 1896 that 'owing to want of harmony of views' boards made up of 
mixed officers were much less effective that those composed of purely ordnance officers. Major C. E. 
Dutton, 'The Ordnance Department,' in The Army o/the United States: lIistorical Sketches o/Staff and 
Line with Portraits (~fGenerals-in-Chief, ed. by Theohilus Rodenbough, F., Willian L. Haskin (New 
York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1896), p. 129. 
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ended before the inherent strengths or weaknesses of these adaptations could 
outweigh the inertia of pre-war institutions. Other factors were indirect and resulted 
from changes to the institutional structure of the war department or temporary 
innovations such as the organized integration of the scientific community into the war 
effort. As it did with many things, the First World War did not represent a turning 
point, but provided a glimpse of the future of 'combat developments.' 
Some development activities, such as the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) continued after the war but most did not. However, the potential 
for change did imbue several officers with an idea of the potential for deliberate 
institutional activities dedicated to development. As one commentator noted, there 
were two kinds of officers at the end of the First World War, the technological 
optimists, officers like Brigadier General Billy MitcheIl, and sceptics, like General 
John J. Pershing. 18 Mitchell, the iconic American advocate for air power, argued in 
1921 that 'the first battles of any future war will be air battles ... the nation winning 
them is practically certain to win the whole war,.19 One of the reasons Mitchell and 
his followers were so threatening to the traditional arms was the disruptive 
implication of their proposals. Pershing, despite his support for new technologies 
during his command of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was a technological 
pessimist. Only a few years before he had employed horse cavalry in the punitive 
expedition into Mexico. In 1919, in response to the more zealous voices promoting 
aviation, Pershing argued: 
[I]n preparing for war aviation is not an independent arm and cannot 
be for a long time to come, if ever. War has not changed in thousands 
of years in that regard. The man who carries the spear or the rifle or the 
bayonet [ ... ] it is the man that we are trying to support [ ... ] in order to 
win the victory. 20 
18 David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and IIeavy Bombers: Innovation in the u.s. Army 1917-1945, 
Paperback (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1998), p. 58. 
19 William Mitchell, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Deji;mse (New York: E.P. Dutton and 
Company, 1921), p. xix. Mitchell's argument was well received in some circles for strategic reasons 
because it fell within the preferred isolationist camp that wanted to emphasize naval power and the 
protective value of oceans. Ironically, the Navy was his preferred target in demonstrating the 
advantages of air power. 
20 Sixty-Sixth Congress (First Session), 'Army Reorganization (H.R. 8287, 8086, 7925, 8870) Hearing 
before the U.S. Congressional Committee on Military Affairs " 29 (Washington DC: U.S. Congress, 
1919), p. 1550. The Mexican Expedition, which was built around a force of5,000 horse-mounted 
cavalry, did incltide eight Curtis JN2s airplanes of the 1 st Aero Squadron (most would crash early in 
the operation) and was also supported by a small contingent of motor transport. 
114 
In the end the sceptical view dominated the anny for historical, cultural, 
economic, and bureaucratic reasons. The 1920s saw the combat anns retreat into their 
traditional domains where they sought only to expand their capabilities along narrow 
paths. The technical services re-established a state of near complete independence 
after their temporary subservience to the temporary agencies of mobilization and the 
Services of Supply in the AEF. However, beneath the surface and with none of the 
notoriety that would accrue to public mavericks or prominent conservatives, there was 
a subtle shift in how the anny should develop capabilities for the next war. 
One of the most important post-war boards among those established to study 
the lessons of the Great War was the so-called Westervelt Board. Established in 1918 
to make recommendations on the future of field artillery, the board made the 
sweeping declaration that American annaments were unsatisfactory and required near 
complete replacement. Moreover, the board noted that the anny in the field had 
reached the limits of animal power and nothing short of complete motorization should 
be considered for the future. As the board's namesake later recalled, the 
recommendation elicited an 'amazed look upon the faces of many hardened veterans 
in high places to whom the Board first revealed its dream of complete motorization'. 21 
Motorization of the entire force would demand the development of new concepts 
(technology matched to doctrine and organization) and would stretch across all 
combat arm and services. As the official history of ordnance in the Second World War 
noted: 
The post-war innovation whereby not the Ordnance Department but 
the using arms stated their needs and specified the military 
characteristics new equipment [ ... ] users and Ordnance Department 
alike were strongly influenced by Westervelt Board recommendations. 
Indeed in 1939 and 1940 officers still cited the board as the 
incontrovertible authority on annament. 22 
The idea that users, not logisticians or procurers, were the best judges of 
weapon system requirements was a major milestone toward a coherent combat 
developments approach. But as of yet responsibility and authority to develop new 
21 William I. Westervelt, 'A Challenge to American Engineers', Army Ordnance, 1 (1920),59-64 (p. 
60). Cited in Contance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance 
Department: Planning Munitions/or War United States Am1Y in World War n, the Technical Services 
(Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955), p. 172. 
22 Green, Planning Munitions/or War, p. 172. 
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capabilities remained diffuse. The chiefs of both the combat arms and the technical 
services remained responsible for determining the military characteristics within their 
specified domains. As an official army history noted of the development of tanks 
during the interwar period, 'the circle was endless: doctrine depended on tactical use 
intended; tactical use depended on what tanks were capable of; what tanks were 
capable of depended on developing models for predetermined use.' 23 What was 
lacking was an institutional place for concepts and experimentation to stimulate both 
the user and developer communities in such a way that parts did not detract from the 
whole or become just another venue for bureaucratic competition. A 1929 Irifantry 
Journal article summed up both the frustrations and expectations of young officers in 
the interwar period: 
Our Army is lacking a suitable agency for general research, 
experimentation, and development. We have branch boards (Infantry 
Board, Tank Board, Air Corps Board, Field Artillery Board, and so on), 
each of which can make studies, within limits. But these minor 
agencies are severely limited as to what they may do, and they have, 
individually, scant resources with which to operate. And most of all, 
they are isolated from one another [ ... ] Criticism that attributes our 
slow progress to ultra-conservatism is unjust. The fault lies not there 
but in the lack of a suitable agency. 24 
Institutional conservatism was the dominant cultural characteristic of the army 
on the eve of the Second World War. Small, qispersed, underfunded, and socially 
insulated, the army suffered what Major General John S. Wood called 'the apathy that 
follows periods of high endeavour. ,25 By the early 1930s, with the notable exception 
of an increasingly independent air arm, a significant percentage of the army's First 
World War ground equipment and concepts were out-dated and worn-out. The army 
was is in a readiness' death spiral'. One commentator described the problem 
succinctly; 'without money, the army could not afford the personnel and material 
required to conduct meaningful training [ ... ] the inability to train deprived the army 
23 Green, Planning Munitions/or War, p. 192. 
24 Ralph E. Jones, 'The Weak Spot in the Military Progress,' Infantry Journal, 34 (March 1929), p. 
290. Cited in Johnson, Fast Tanks and IIeavey Bombers, p. 58. 
25 Quoted in Johnson, Fast Tanks and IIeavey Bombers, p. 220. 
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of opportunities to test new ideas [ ... ] stagnation of doctrine accompanied the 
resulting deterioration of readiness.' 26 
The onset of the Great Depression meant the continuation of the army's 
anaemic funding. The institutions' conservative nature all but guaranteed the army 
would pull back from innovation and strive to preserve its core capabilities. Army 
Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, reported in 1933 that continued use of 
'obsolete and inefficient equipment' and the suspension of 'technical research and 
development work' was the preferred lesser of two evils, when the alternative was 
'the deterioration either in strength or efficiency of the human organization 
maintained as the backbone of our land defence establishment'. 27 
One historian has described the army at this time as an institution being pulled 
in two directions. On the one hand it was 'psychologically as well as organizationally 
[ ... ] an extension of the Indian-fighting constabulary', where maintaining the small 
but highly professional cadre of regular army soldiers was the key to preparing for 
future war. The development of new capabilities, such as broad-based mechanization, 
threatened the concept of an infantry-centric force. 28 The official lessons of the army's 
recent combat experience provided the foundation of this approach with dogmatic 
statements like 'the infantry of the army must be recognized as the basic arm and all 
other arnlS must be organized and made subordinate to its needs, functions and 
methods. ,29 Challenges to this primary culture inhibited the development of an army 
wide process of preparing for future war and had the effect of suppressing new 
capabilities even as their military potential became increasing self-evident. Army 
leaders 'limited their efforts to improving past performance rather than learning from 
26 WilIiam O. Odol11, Afier the Trenches: The Transformation o/U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p. 200. 
27 Douglas MacArthur, 'Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, US Army FY Ending June 30, 1933', 
Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1933 (Washington DC: War Department, 
1933), p. 19. 
28 David E. Johnson, 'From Frontier Constabulary to Modern Army: The United States Army between 
World Wars', in Challenge o/Change: Militaty Institutions and New Realities, ed. by Harold R. 
Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), pp. 162-2 I 9. 
29 American Expeditionary Forces, 'Report of Superior Board on Organization and Tactics' 
(Chaumont: United States AmlY, 1919), p. 18. It would be difficult to argue against this official line at 
the time given the generally accepted official view that operations in the First World War had validated 
the Army's approach. See Russell F. Weigley, JIistory o/the United States Army (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), pp. 394-400. 
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and building on present achievements, applying new technology, and developing new 
doctrine' . 30 
The army on the eve of the Second World War 'believed that victory in a 
major war must be achieved through the application of superior, overwhelming 
power' .31 The process through which it generated the necessary power was detailed 
mobilization planning. However, until 1938, the army's plans were written with 'an 
air of unreality because their recommendations were presented not with any hope of 
obtaining immediate results, but so that those responsible would understand the 
situation,.32 Mobilization plans in 1928 and 1933 rested on the assumption that 
'equipment for those 1,000,000 [newly mobilized] men was no severe problem since 
it [was] already stored in army depots (First World War surplus) or be made readily 
available from commercial sources'. 33 For those officers during the period concerned 
with mobilization planning, new capabilities represented a different kind of threat. 
The late development of disruptive new capabilities introduced risk to the execution 
of complex procurement, production, and mobilization plans. 
Finally, reinforcing the army's cultural proclivities was the politics of isolation 
and the economic impact of the Great Depression. These factors combined to make 
arnlY budgets a low priority for administration and the public alike. Funding for 
research and development was a particular challenge. In 1932, the War Department 
published a six-year program to align equipment and organizational requirements of 
the soon to be revised 1933 mobilization plan. This forward-looking plan included a 
prioritized list for research and development with the highest priorities given to 
motorization, mechanization, and aircraft. Even as it was drafting the plan, the army 
saw its funding drop from $346,979,179 in 1931 to $277,066,381 in 1934.34 As with 
30 See George F. Hoffman, 'Army Doctrine and the Christie Tank: Failing to Exploit the Operational 
Level of War', in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The /Iistory ofU.S. Armored Forces, ed. by George F. 
Hoffman and Donn A. Starry (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 92-143 (p. 
131 ). 
31 Russell F. Weigley, 'The Interwar Army', in Against All Enemies: Interpretations o.f American 
Military /listory from Colonial Times to the Present, ed. by Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 257-277 (pp. 270-271). 
32 Joseph C. Bemardo, Eugene H. Bacon, American Miitmy Policy - Its Development since J 775, 2nd 
(Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, 1961), p. 403. 
33 Marvin A. Kreidberg, Merton G, Henry, /listory of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 
1775-1945, DA Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1955), p. 446. 
34 Cited in Johnson, 'From Frontier Constabulary to Modem Army' (p. 178). 
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the mobilization plans it was to support, the six-year program did not survive. The 
army was struggling to find what it called the 'proper balance' between men and 
materiel. The budget debates of the mid: 1930s treated personnel and materiel as 
'opposing conceptions of warfare' where personnel won out over arguments for 
increased mechanization. 35 
In October 1936 an increasingly unstable international situation caused the 
army's new Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig, to yet again change the institution's 
research and development priorities. Funding a broad, but shallow, set of activities 
was consuming too much of the army's meagre resources. With the exception of 
aviation, Craig was willing to accept that the army would not have the most up-to-
date capabilities. His real concern was that 'the Army would never get equipped'. In 
anticipation of possible mobilization, something not spoken of public ally, the priority 
was to 'get the army equipped with the best materiel currently available,.36 The result 
was that by 1937 development of new combat capabilities for land power came in a 
distant second to development of purely defensive or aviation-related capabilities. 37 
One creative exception to the general rule of limited research and development 
was the use of so-called educational orders with civilian industry. Leveraging an 
initial sum of $2,000,000 in 1939, these small contracts allowed the existing arsenal 
system to 'prime the pump' of civilian industry by having it manufacture to 
specification a testable quantity of new materiel without commitment to production. 
Between 1929 and 1941, almost $35,000,000 was available for educational orders. 38 
Such small-scale efforts allowed the creation of the necessary manufacturing 
materials, technical design staffs, and relations necessary for full-scale mobilization 
and kept a spark of creativity alive in the combat arms boards. 
In summer 1939, the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall 
reported to the secretary of war that the army was 'that of a third-rate power.' He 
35 Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword: Control o/the Army by Congress through Military 
Appropriations, 1933-1950 (Ithaca: ComelI University Press, 1950), pp. 139-140. One congressman 
complained that MacArthur was trying to 'Chinaize our army by giving it more men, more men, and 
less equipment.' 
36 Memorandum, ACofS, G-4, for CoS, 30 Oct 36, sub: Research and Development for FY 1939, G-
4/295.52. DRB TAG. Cited in Kreidberg, Ilistory 0/ Military Mobilization, p. 455. 
37 Mark Skinner Watson, Chie/o/Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations, United States Army in World 
War n, the War Department (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1950), p. 43. See also Green, 
Planning Munitions/or War, pp. 204-208. 
38 Kreidberg, Ilistory 0/ Military Mobilization, p. 53 I. 
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complained that as a result of almost 'continuous paring of appropriations' over the 
past twenty years, the army's equipment was still 'in a large measure obsolescent'.39 
As global events pushed the United States toward partial and then full mobilization, 
the chronic underinvestment in development meant high-rate production went to 
capabilities with existing (and therefore outdated) designs. 
The organization and doctrinal aspects of a military capability were equally in 
deficit by 1939, but had greater time to recover. The use of large-scale field 
manoeuvres on the eve of America's entry into the war was a critical and successful 
aspect ofpre-war 'combat development' activity. Marshall declared that the 
manoeuvres' constitute a field laboratory to accept or discard new methods' .40 The 
Louisiana manoeuvres established a high fidelity 'experiential' venue, through which 
the institution could test new doctrines, organizations, and technologies. Under 
direction of then Major General Leslie J. McNair, the manoeuvres 'followed the 
theory that the normal functioning of a military machine with all of its attendant 
problems could best be achieved by having all of its parts operating simultaneously in 
a representative environment. ,41 
The logic of mobilization planning placed an institutional focus on 
synchronizing requirements with production capacity. The advantages accrued by the 
quasi- mobilization and Lend-Lease, observations from the war in Europe, in addition 
to the buffer of secure borders allowed the army to make up some of the ground lost 
39 George C. Marshall, 'Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Anny (July 1, 1939 
to June 30, 1941) " in The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the 
Army Il.Il. Arnold, and Fleet Admiral King (Philadelphia: lB. Lippincott Company, 1947), pp. 13-60 
(p. 16). Chronic underfunding of the Army did not begin with the Great Depression but rather with the 
first budget following the enactment of the 1920 National Security Act. In terms of budget, the 
situation began to slowly recover between 1935-1939. However, with minor exceptions, the 
development options were still constrained by a dysfunctional development process. Odom, A.fter the 
Trenches, pp. 98-117. See also Kreidberg, !listOlY of Military Mobilization, pp. 377-532; Weigley, 
!listory of the United States Army, pp. 395-420. 
40 Marshall Speech, 15 September 1941, Milwaukee, Wisconsin in The Papers o.fGeneral George 
Catlel1 Marshall, "We Cannot Delay" _ July 1, 1939 - December 6, 1941, ed. by Larry I. Bland, Sharon 
R. Ritenour, Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., 11 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 
606-607. 
41 Jean R. Moenk, 'A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964' (Fort 
Monroe: Historical Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Military Operations and Reserve 
Forces, U.S. Continental Army Command, 1969), p. 4. 
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in developing necessary capabilities. 42 After an initial surge of activity to build a force 
capable of sustained global commitment, new dynamics took hold. The institutional 
army shifted its focus from quantity to quality. As one historian noted, it was the 
quality as well as quantity of American anTIs that 'turned the tide of war but also 
reduced the loss of American lives'. The general lesson was that by 'substituting 
prodigality of materiel for prodigality of manpower the United States demonstrated 
that its oft-criticized "materialism" was an instrument for enhancing [ ... ] 
effecti veness' . 43 
Combat Developments and Second World War 
Ajournalist and military analyst of the time wrote of America's Army in 1940 
that 'many of our present tactics stem from an age that is gone; the dead hand of 
tradition still lies heavily upon our military thought processes. We must renovate our 
thinking, for our final citadel is the citadel of the mind. It must be broad and spacious 
and strong, receptive of new ideas. ,44 As it would turn out, the citadel Baldwin 
referred to, while robust, was effectively breached during the Second World War. A 
new generation of senior officers benefited from or had a direct hand in the 
formulation of new concepts, doctrines, and weapons. They were receptive to the 
promise of new capabilities based on personal experience. More importantly, although 
not always to the benefit of the army, the country developed an elevated sense of the 
possible with regard to technology-centric military capabilities. 45 
The hardest challenge was not breaching the outer walls, which fell under the 
conditions of near immediate feedback and the existential requirement to adapt to the 
conditions of current war. The challenge was assailing the inner walls, the 'dead hand 
of tradition.' The problem wasn't just nostalgic officers, who dreaded the loss of the 
42 For example the artillery in use in 1938 was almost completely replaced by new designs and fielded 
by 1943. Harry C. Thomson, Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply, United 
States Army in World War IJ (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1960), pp. 68-74. 
43 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, p. 706. 
44 Hanson Baldwin, 'The New American Army', Foreign Affairs, 19 (1940), 34-54 (p. 34). 
45 News stories, popular magazines, journals, and books flooded the market by the end of the Second 
World War extolling the fear and wonder of new weapons in the coming age of 'Pus~ B~tton War.' , 
See Hanson W. Baldwin, 'The Atom Bomb and Future War: There May Be Devestatmg Push-Button 
Battles', Life, 20 August 1945, pp. 17-20. 
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horse cavalry and dug in their spurs against the tide of mechanization. The real 
problem was the fact the institution had no rational process to, as Nelson argued, 
'discover, develop, adopt, and exploit new and improved weapons, equipment, tactics, 
and techniques, and to discard the obsolete,.46 The challenge was not narrow-minded 
troglodytes, but the nature of organizational relationships. Disparate tribes that tended 
to inhibit innovation during peacetime never matured even under the pressure of war 
because mobilization created highly centralized but temporary workarounds to 
institutional dysfunction. The army's transition from 'parsimony to abundance' 
occurred in May 1940 with the approval of more than $1,800,000,000 for acquisition 
of equipment and personnel required under the protective mobilization plan. 47 The 
reality, as it had been understood for a decade, was that to equip and train 1,000,000 
men by 1 October 1941, the overwhelming emphasis had to be on existing 
capabilities. With few exceptions, emerging ideas stood in line behind those that were 
ready for production. 48 
One of the exceptions to the rule in temlS of early combat developments was 
the effort to give the army a modem anti-tank capability. The threat posed by German 
amlour was not a surprise, and the requirement for a counter was not new. In 1937, in 
reaction to overseas developments, the chief of staff ordered the ordnance department 
to 'concentrate intensively' on developing an antitank weapon that would place the 
amlY on a 'substantially equal footing with a possible enemy.49 Doctrine for a modem 
anti-tank defence was first developed and then improved at the Command and 
General Staff College between 1936 and 1939. The 1939 Field Service Regulations 
included what one history called 'some sound fundamental principles'. 50 The problem 
was that the army had failed to develop the antitank guns or the organizations to 
employ them. There was a significant gap between the means and ways. Top-down 
guidance for the army's anti-tank capability was passed in accordance with existing 
46 Nelson Jr., National Security and the General Staff, pp. 599-600. 
47 Kreidberg, lIistory of Military Mobilization, p. 654. 
48 Memorandum Colonel Burns, Executive Assistant to Secretary of War to Assistant Secretary of 
War, 13 Jun 1940, Subject: National Policy on Munitions Productive Capacity. Cited in Kreidberg, 
lIistmy ~r Military Mobilization, p. 658. Burns projected production requirements for January 1942 to 
support 2 million men and 4 million for 1943. 
49 Christopher R. GabeJ, Seek Strike and Destroy: U. S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War 
II (Fort Leavenworth Combat Studies Institute, 1985), pp. 3-18. 
50 Gabel, Seek Strike and Destroy, pp. 5-6. 
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regulations to the infantry ann as 'the most interested ann' with instructions to 
develop the detailed doctrine and provide technical requirements to the ordnance 
branch. 51 Accordingly, specifications for the anti-tank weapon were narrowly tailored 
to 'the maximum that four men could comfortably wheel over the ground' before 
anyone had examined serious alternative or concepts of employment. 52 Owing to the 
emphasis on quick mobilization, and despite scattered protests from within the 
ordnance and artillery communities, the anny made the decision to rapidly procure 
some 2500 copies of the Gennan PAK 36 (a 37-mm antitank cannon), a weapon that, 
in the opinion of one observer at the time, 'does not guarantee success in engaging 
tanks known to be used by any prospective enemy'. 53 As the case of the anny's anti-
tank capability demonstrates, the problem was not just one of hardware. The part of 
the 'capabilities development' process responsible to develop and promulgate 
combined arms doctrine was, as a 1939 Anny War College (AWC) study put it, 'a 
rather hit or miss affair'. The development of all but the narrowest doctrinal topics 
generally split between the chiefs of the various combat anns, the instructors at the 
CGSC, and an increasingly overworked general staff. As a result, the instructors at the 
CGSC often developed instructional versions of 'current' doctrine, which they passed 
to students and which became the army's de facto doctrine. With 'meagre impetus 
from the top', efficacy of doctrine development was 'directly dependant upon the 
personality and judgment of the officers concerned and varies from year to year'. 54 
In 1941 this lack of a coherent combat development function within the army 
was painfully evident to Marshall. As the potential operational failings of the anti-tank 
weapons became clear, he sent a memorandum to his Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 
Brigadier General Harry L. Twaddle and noted, 'the organization, tactical doctrine, 
and development of such a force seems beyond the scope of any chief of arm and 
needs thorough coordination as well as strong direction.' Recognizing the 
complexities and entrenched interests, Marshall admonished the G-3 that this 'subject 
should be attacked with imagination and with untiring effort. I believe that it is a 
51 Army regulations placed all research and development under the technical services and limited the 
using branches to developing requirements. Army Regulation 850-25: Miscellaneous - Development, 
Class!ficalion of, and Spec!fication for Types of Equipment (Washington DC; War Department, 1924). 
52 Green, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 182-186. 
53 Gabel, Seek Strike and Destroy, pp. 3-18. Quote cited in Green, Planning MlInitions for War, p. 186. 
54 Odom, After the Trenches, p.227. 
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function of the general staff and should be initiated and carried through in your office. 
I do not want the question of another branch or arm brought up at this time. ' Marshall 
then laid out an institutional solution to this challenge: 
There seems to be an element missing in the War Department General 
Staff, namely a group whose sole responsibility is thinking and 
planning on improved methods of warfare. Our organization and 
methods should not lag behind developments abroad. You should 
organize in your division a small planning and exploring branch, 
composed of visionary officers, with nothing else to do but think out 
improvements in methods of warfare, study developments abroad and 
tackle such unsolved problems as measures against armoured force 
action, night bombardment, march protection and the like. Such a 
group should be divorced of all current matters and should work 
closely with the National Defense Research Committee, Inventors' 
Council, G-2 and the development people in G_4.55 
Part of the solution came in the activation of the GHQ in July 1940. The GHQ 
emerged out of the War Plans Division (WPD) in accordance with a concept dating 
back to the 1921 Hobard Board to provide the chief of staff with a deployable 
headquarters to command forces in the field. Under the leadership of General Leslie J. 
McNair, GHQ initially focused on training a rapidly expanding army. Within a month, 
McNair's responsibilities expanded to include; 
The preparation of plans and studies and the supervision of activities 
concerning actual operations [ ... ] In conjunction with WPD, G-3, and 
G-4 on major items of equipment, and the organization or activation of 
combat or service units essential to prospective plans. 56 
This change established the GHQ as the army's overall combat developments 
activity. During the conduct of GHQ-directed manoeuvres in Louisiana and the 
Carolinas, McNair examined new capabilities in as high fidelity a setting as was 
possible at the time. McNair directed that the manoeuvres have 'all the realism of 
actual warfare except the destruction and casualties'. 57 Armed with knowledge of 
55 Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subj: Defense against Armored Forces, 14 May 
1941. The Papers of General George Catleft Marshal!, "We Cannot Delay" - July 1, 1939 - December 
6, 1941, ed. by Bland, pp. 500-501. 
56 Memo, AcTG ACoS WPD for CofS, 12 Aug 40, sub: Allocation of Responsibilities between WPD 
and GHQ, WPD 3209-5. Cited in Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 
United States Army in World War n, the War Department (Washington DC: Center of Military 
History, 1990), p. 61. 
57 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, 'Origins of the Army Ground Forces, General 
Headquarters U.S. Army, 1940-1942, Study No. I' (Washington DC: Historical Section, Army Ground 
Forces, 1946), p. 23. 
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current capabilities and a close relationship with the emerging requirements from war 
plans, the GHQ was in a position to introduce and protect innovative organizations. It 
established new activities to perform the 'combat development' function for a range 
of emerging capabilities such as the antiaircraft training centre, the provisional 
parachute group, the tank destroyer tactical and firing centre, and two amphibious 
forces with the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.58 While each new activity was unique all 
shared the same general attributes as the tank destroyer tactical and firing centre, in 
that they were: 
a new arm of the service, the War Department surmounted the lethargy 
and apathy that had existed in the present arms and had stunted 
progress in the antitank field for so long. Also by centralizing 
authorities for antitank matters, the War Department assured the 
systematic development of tank destroyer doctrine, equipment, and 
personnel. 59 
The establishment of the GHQ as a quasi-combat development activity did not 
solve the issues inherent in developing new capabilities. The diffuse nature of 
responsibility for moving capabilities to the field remained a concern throughout the 
war. In early 1942, Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower penned a note to the war 
plans division logistics officer and requested an update on the latest in tanks and anti-
tank guns. His memorandum closed with a line that defined the problem: 'I know that 
G-4 takes these matters up with ordnance as a matter of responsibility - my thought 
is that we're just vitally interested - not responsible'. 60 (Emphasis added). The 
phrase 'vitally interested not responsible' could be a moniker for the development of 
capabilities well into the future. On 9 March 1942 the War Department and general 
staff reorganized to delineate between the planning and supervision function of the 
latter and 'operative' functions necessary to generate and sustain theatre commanders: 
58 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, The Army Grollnd Forces: The 
Organization o.fGround Combat Troops United States Army in World War II (Washington DC: Center 
of Military History, 1987), p. 32. 
59 Gabel, Seek Strike and Destroy, p. 18. 
60 Handwritten Note, Eisenhower to Robert W. Crawford, WPD 4308-12, dated 13 January 1942. 
Reproduced in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower - the War Years, ed. by Alfred D. Chandler, I 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 53. 
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anny ground forces (AGF), the services of supply, later renamed the anny service 
forces (ASF), and the army air forces (AAF).61 
The AGF, more so than the temporary experiment with the GHQ, served as a 
laboratory for future combat development efforts. It received the charge to 'provide 
ground force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations'. 62 
To do so its commander absorbed the development responsibilities of the GHQ as 
well as those of the chiefs of infantry, cavalry, field artillery, and coastal artillery. 
Thus, AGF provided much needed coherence to the development of doctrine, the 
definition of requirements, and the development of tables of organization and 
equipment. 
From the perspective of combat developments the table of organization and 
equipment (T/O&E) became the integrating tool for creating combined-anns 
capabilities during the war. 63 This document prescribed the tactical organization to 
include manpower and equipment into identifiable building blocks for larger military 
organizations. Changes to the T 10&E, based on resource constraints, lessons from 
previous operations, and new requirements from the field, often stimulated changes to 
doctrine, development of new equipment, or elimination of dated doctrine and 
equipment. Regardless of the source of change, the T 10&E was the focal point of 
AGF 'combat developments'. Unit and individual training became inseparable from 
the organizational design the T/O&E articulated. Similarly, changes in doctrinal 
concepts forced changes to the organizations tasked with execution, which in turn 
drove training. 
The official anny history notes that early in the war T/O&E changes derived 
from two sources. The first was a combination analysis of military theory, historical 
experience, and foreign experience. This was the traditional domain of military 
61 As noted earlier in this dissertation, the Anny Air Forces are not included in the analysis due to the 
increasingly independent and separate nature of their combat development activities. 
62 'Study No. 2 Chapters I and II of A Short History of the Army Ground Forces' (Washington DC, 
n.d.), p. 26 <http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF002/index.htm> [accessed 5 March 2011]. 
This document can be found at Center of Military History Online Bookshelves 
http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF002/index.htm 
63 T/O&Es, when summarized with other related organizational documents, formed what was called 
the Troop Basis. The Troop Basis prescribed the 'kind ofamlY authorized to exist.' See Robert R. 
Palmer, "Ground Forces in the Army December 1 941-April 1945: A Statistical Study," in Greenfield, 
The Organization o/Ground Combat Troops, pp. 163-165. The AGF was responsible for the T/O&E of 
the infantry, cavalry, field artillery, coastal artillery, and eventualIy armour. 
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experts in which experience, no matter how distant or specifically relevant, was 
considered the primary source of knowledge for change. The second, after 1942, was 
'the guiding ideas of General Leslie McNair' based on his 'intimate understanding of 
the army.' That McNair was a driving force behind early combat development 
activities was not a surprise to his peers, given his' experience and inclination'. 64 
Beginning in 1938, he had used exercises to drive a series of questions, which in turn 
generated useful data for analyses. He sought to find a balance between the 'specialist 
and the man on the spot' by enforcing' a rigorous sense of what was meant by fact as 
distinguished from theory or speculation,.6s 
In December 1942, McNair dispatched observers to North Africa to report on 
operations. While he cautioned that these reports 'represent the views of the 
individual observer and are furnished for information only' they were widely 
circulated helped to drive doctrinal changes and training plans. One such report was 
submitted by Major Allerton Cushman, who was dispatched from the newly 
established tank destroyer centre to North Africa to report on operations in Tunisia. 
Cushman's report commented on the efficacy of American training, doctrine, morale, 
organization, and equipment and thus contrasted it with that of the enemy. After 
observing several operations in a short period of time, he warned those charged with 
preparing the army for war: 'the German Army makes war better than we are now 
making it [ ... ] unless this is realized and unless steps are taken to improve the quality 
of our fighting forces, we are bound to suffer defeat, when meeting it on anything like 
equal terms. ,66 
McNair made his own observations on the situation in North Africa. In 
addition to drawing his own conclusions, many in line with those of Cushman and 
others, he spoke to senior field commanders about their conclusions and 
recommendations. However, he saw field observations as only one of several valid 
inputs to the complex issue of designing, fielding, and equipping a force. After 
discussing possible changes to the armour division T/O&Es with Patton in North 
Africa in April 1943, he reported to the AGF requirements section that 'even though 
64 Greenfield, The Organizati~n o/Ground Combat Troops, p. 271. 
6S Greenfield, The Organization o.fGround Combat Troops, p. 272. 
66 Army Ground Forces, Memorandumji-om /lq Army Ground Forces, Sub: Observer Report, 
319.1148 (Foreign Ob.\)(S), 29 March 1943 (Washington DC:, 1943). (CARL N-6234). 
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they [Patton, etc] have the prestige born of combat experience, I certainly feel that 
their offhand and fragmentary views are not infallible.'67 
The issue with which McNair and the army were grappling was the 
inordinately complex set of competing forces at work when developing new 
capabilities. There is a tendency when judging the efficacy of one case of innovation 
or adaptation over another to underplay the context in which both the individuals and 
the institutions operated. This hindsight-view of innovation often compares the 
'optimal' solutions with the capability actually developed. The problem was that 
officers like Marshall and McNair were not trying to develop the optimal solution, but 
the best possible. All combat developments, especially in wartime, must account for 
the limits of industry, the unknowns about the adversary, the vagaries of the 
operational environments, the unique strengths and weaknesses of newly mobilized 
soldiers, the time available, and the fact that bureaucratic competition and friction did 
not disappear during a crisis, they only changed forn1. Marshall, described what an 
unbounded combat developments system might look like in a September 1942 
memorandum to McNair: 
I have felt for a year or more that our figures as to divisional 
transportation were extravagant, that they represented what a division 
commander asked for rather than meeting the problem on the basis of 
over-all requirements. I might say right here that if we gave each 
theater commander what he asks for we would have only one theater 
and all the rest would have to be evacuated for lack of means. 68 
As American army units entered sustained combat both in European and 
Pacific, the AGF shifted to 'analyzing, comparing, evaluating, and recommending 
action upon theater requests for increases or modifications in allowances to personnel 
and equipment' .69 The holistic and interactive nature of this process was, for the first 
time, explicitly recognized in both the organization and authorities of those charged 
with combat development. From its inception the AGF had two missions. One was 
67 Robert R. Palmer, 'Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat - Study No. 8' (Washnington DC: 
Headquarters - Army Ground Forces, 1945), pp. 272-273 
<http://www.history.army.millbooks/agf/AGF08/index.htm>. According to McNair, after a brief 
explanation Patton supported the AGF's proposed am10ured division reorganization plan. 
68 The Papers o.fGeorge Cat/ett MOI'shall, "the Right Man/or the Job," December 7, 1941- May 31, 
1943, ed. by Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour, 1II (Baltimore: The lohns Hopkins University Press, 
1991), p. 370 ... 
69 Greenfield, The Organization o.fGround Combat Troops, pp. 268-271. 
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training; the other was tenned the' developmental mission'. The traditional boards, 
schools, and personnel functions of the infantry, cavalry, field artillery, and coastal 
artillery together with the new annoured force and tank destroyer centre were 
combined under the requirements division of AGF Headquarters. The output was 
development of equipment requirements, tables of organization, and doctrine and 
'training literature' for the 'for the anns and "special combat units" combined in the 
ground forces'.70 With exception of special boards and activities of supervising 
committees on large field exercises, the AGF's requirements division was the first 
example of institutional combat developments in the anny. As the war progressed and 
the traditional anns became more 'combined' on the battlefield, the AGF increasingly 
delved into doctrine that cut across the traditional boundaries held by the fonner 
chiefs of arms. 
The 1942 WDGS reorganization did not resolve the inherent complexity of the 
combat developments function. The user community, now represented at the highest 
level by the single voice of the AGF, still had to work closely with the providers of 
the materiel component. The process of developing and delivering new capabilities 
was much improved, but still required considerable staff coordination and time. 
Throughout the war, despite efforts to create a responsive system, Marshall was often 
frustrated to the point that he took direct action. Marshall's biographer recounted 
specific examples of his top-down interest in innovation. One was the simple 
modification of anti-aircraft shells for use in trench mortars in the Pacific where there 
was a desperate need to 'lessen the casualty rates in the way of heavier gunfire'. As 
Marshall recalled, he personally dispatched an officer from Washington because he 
did not want to hear 'about something that took a year to produce.' 71 Part of 
Marshall's frustration was a result of complex relationships between the AGF and the 
ASF and more importantly between the ASF and the technical services it oversaw. 
The friction was reduced but not eliminated when officers from the requirements 
section, AGF, were stationed at major ASF ordnance, signals, and quartennaster 
installations to facilitate direct liaison. 72 
70 'Study No. 2 Chapters I anin of A Short History of the Army Ground Forces', p. 39. 
71 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall. Organizer o/Victory (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), 
p.137. 
72 'Study No. 2 Chapters I and II of A Short History of the Am1y Ground Forces', p. 45. 
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Creation of the ASF represented a temporary subjugation of the technical 
services under a single command. 73 The ASF, under the direction of General Brehon 
B. Somervell, was designed to relieve the fighting arms of the 'distraction and effort 
required by supply, procurement, and general housekeeping duties.' An exception to 
this mission was the 'experimental development and procurement peculiar to the air 
forces. ,74 In practice the ASF shared responsibility for research and development and 
testing of new equipment with the AGF. 75 
Two full years into mobilization and war the problems were less an issue of 
identified needs, manufacturing capacity, or resources than it was the perennial issue 
of how to rationalize the process of combat developments. The requirement for heavy 
artillery is a case in point. Ordnance officers and army staff planners on the general 
staff had disagreed on the need for heavy artillery in terms of both the concept for 
employment and the manufacturing opportunity costs at the war's beginning.76 In late 
1942 McNair 'unsuccessfully urged' production of heavy artillery. In April 1943, he 
fUliher complained about the lack of heavy artillery units. 77 
In May 1943, the Ordnance Department finally relented and endorsed the 
recommendation to begin production of heavy artillery. The recommendation was 
approved by Somcrvell on 16 July and forwarded to the general staff where the 
original debate between ordnance officers and army level planners re-opened. The 
WDGS complained that the requirement for heavy artillery was not properly staffed 
and 'they did not approve of the general idea'. In August 1943, the deputy chief of 
staff, General Joseph T. McNarney, complained, that the problem of providing the 
necessary means of war was not one of resources but of 'poor staff procedures' . 78 The 
delay and debate were made worse by the practical issues of production where 
73 War Department Circular 59 established the Services of Supply (SOS) along with the Army Ground 
Forces, and Army Air Forces. The AEF title SOS was replaced by ASF in March 1943. 
74 War Department press release, Bureau of Public Relations, 'Reorganization of the War 
Department,' 2 March 1942. Cited in John D. MiIlett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service 
Forces, United States Army in World War II (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1954), p. 
37. 
75 As noted the AAF was granted independence for all of its 'unique' R&D requirements. 
76 The heavy artillery in question ranged from 155-mm guns and howitzers to 240-mm howitzers and 
later 16-in rail guns. 
77 Thomson, Procurement and Supply, pp. 100-101. 
78 War Departn1ent, Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, Office of the Deputy Chief o/Staff, 9 
August 1943 (Washington DC, 1943). (MHI UA 23.7.U549). 
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'capacity that had been laboriously built over a long period of time and th,en 
dismantled had now to be built up again.,79 
The organization of the ASF, unlike that of the AGF, remained unstable 
throughout the war. The independent nature and external constituencies of the 
technical services fought back at every attempt to make permanent modifications 
necessitated by war. 80 A prequel to the post-war debate over whether the technical 
services are more effectively organized along functional lines first broke out in 1943. 
The issue was how to reduce the complexity of the increasingly functional combat 
arms users, having to work through narrowly specialized, commodity based, technical 
services. Somervell argued his case for functionalization to under secretary of war 
John J. McCloy in September 1943. lIe noted that, while the current organization of 
the ASF was successfully supporting the needs of the war department, 'we can do a 
better job' and he argued that the proposed reorganization 'would have far reaching 
effects, extending to the next war,.81 The plan, well designed but poorly staffed, 
became a political issue that drew in the long silent protectors of the pre-war system. 
Marshalllater observed, 'if we are ever to secure acceptance of the idea of a single 
department, I believe that we must first demonstrate within the army a satisfactory 
relation of service agencies to the combat forces'. 82 
The problem had as much to do with internal ASF relationships as it did with 
the nonnal complexity of relationships between the ASF and the AGF. The 
organizational arrangement between the ASF and the technical services, such as the 
ordnance department, began as a tense one and deteriorated throughout the war. 
Somervell, and his ever-increasing staff, were judged to be amateurs by long-standing 
ordnance officers. For their part the ASF staff came to view many in the ordnance 
community as a 'decided fraternity or clique' who jealously guarded their domain.83 
79 Thomson, Procurement and Supply, p. 102. 
80 The complex politics and insightful institutional lessons of this episode are clearly explained in 
Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, pp. 401-416. 
81 Memorandum Hq, USAFICPA (signed by Somerville) for Marshall, 12 Sep 43, CG ASF cited in 
Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, p. 406. 
82 Memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, October 26, 1944 [Washington, 
D.C.], Subject: Army Service Force Responsibilities. Larry 1. Bland, Sharon Ritenour Stevens, The 
Papers ofGeorge Catlett Marshal!, Aggressive and Determined Leadership, June 1,1943 - Deceber 31 
1944,4 (Baltimore: The lohns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 638-639. 
83 Green, Planning Munitions for War, p. 91. 
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An official history of the ordnance department noted that as Somervell sought tighter 
central control over his charge, the ordnance department 'vigorously resisted further 
moves to limit its prerogatives and to interfere with its methods of operation'. S4 
Post-War - Traditionalists Versus the Functionalists 
The army's first post-war Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, set in 
motion a series of conflicting institutional policies that both promoted the continued 
evolution of combat developments and inhibited its near-term success. The first 
initiative created an independent research and development division on the general 
staff and the second aimed to eliminate the ASF. Of course these two decisions were 
not made in a vacuum, or even with the yet to be defined combat developments 
function in mind. They were part of a large set of changes emerging from national 
debates over what kind of national security system the United States should adopt, 
changes that would clarify the concept of 'combat developments', and yet delay its 
emergence for more than five years. 
In a speech before Congress in October 1945, President Harry Truman 
succinctly articulated the accepted range of organizational options for a post-war 
military; 
[W]e can maintain a large standing Army, Navy, and Air Force. Or we 
can rely upon a comparatively small regular Army, Navy and Air 
Force, supported by well trained citizens, who in time of emergency 
could be quickly mobilized.,s5 
Prudence and tradition, Truman noted, demanded America prepare for the future with 
a citizen-based force. He cautioned, however, that '[i]n our desire to leave the tragedy 
of war behind us, we must not make the same mistake that we made after the First 
World War when we sank back into helplessness'. 86 To prevent such a calamity, he 
argued the nation needed to build this force on the foundations of two continuous 
84 Green, Planning Munitions for War, p. 91. 
85 President Harry S. Tnnnan,'Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Universal Military 
Training, 23 October 1945,' Government Printing Office, 
<http://www. trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/indes.php?pid= 183&st=&stl > [accessed 5 March 201 I]. 
S6 Truman, 'Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Universal Military Training,' October 
23, 1945, pp. 407 and 4 I I. 
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programs. The first was a realization of the long-standing call to create a robust 
system of Universal Military Training (UMT).87 
For veterans of the First World War and proponents of 'a military system of 
maximum economy', UMT was the only rational option. 88 These same veterans also 
understood manpower would not be enough. The recent war had demonstrated that 
the weapons of the last war would be inadequate to the needs of the next. Truman's 
second proposal was a 'continuous research in science and new weapons [ ... no] 
matter what the cost, we cannot afford to fall behind in any of the new techniques of 
war or in the development of new weapons of destruction' . 89 As the larger national 
debate took shape, the army was busy conducting a series of studies to settle on a 
post-war organization. A board of officers, later known as the Patch-Simpson Board, 
convened in August 1945 to make recommendations to the chief of staff. The ?oard's 
recommendations, based primarily on a series of interviews, reflected more the 
board's personality than analysis. The interviews were weighted toward the veterans 
of the European Theater's that not surprisingly resulted in a view of the post-war 
army that reflected Eisenhower's more than the Washington staff created by 
Marshall. 90 
Eisenhower endorsed a modified set of recommendations presented by the 
Patch-Simpson Board. One historian has called the decision 'a victory for those 
favoring a return to the Pershing organization' .91 The AGF would remain intact and 
absorb the wartime service commands into six regional armies. The ASF would be 
dissolved and its staff divisions' responsibilities absorbed by the newly established 
87 Several version ofa program ofUMT were proposed as amendments to the National Defense Act of 
1920 but never gather the necessary political support and were not adopted. 
88 MarshalI's public position for UMT was articulated in an article by a felIow veteran of the First 
World War and tireless advocate for UMT, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer in John McAuley 
Pall11er, 'General Marshall Wants a Citizen Army', The Saturday Evening Post, 23 December 1944, pp. 
9-57 (p. 57). The foundations of the UMT argument and MarshaIl's position were laid out in his 
mentor's books; John M. Pall11er, America in Arms: Experience of the United States with Military 
Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); John M. Pahller, An Army of the People: The 
Constitution of an Effective Force of Trained Citizens (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1916). 
89 Truman, • Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Universal Military Training,' October 
23, 1945, pp. 407 and 411. On 6 September, Truman requested that Congress create single Federal 
agency that, among other things, would 'promote and support fundamental research and development 
projects in all matters pertaining to the defence and security of the Nation'. 
90 ' Hewes Jr., Frvm Root fa McNamara, pp. 146-154. 
91 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 161. 
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WDGS directors. The six administrative services and eight technical service chiefs 
would once again wear two hats, those of a staff officer supporting a chief of staff and 
a commander responsible for a service or function. 92 The return of the semi-
independent chiefs of administrative and technical services was a course that 
represented nothing more than a 'preparations for a hoped-for tranquil peacetime'. 93 
The Eisenhower reorganization of 1946, represented a mixed bag in terms of 
the evolution of combat developments. 94 On the positive side, a new position, director 
of research and development, was created and placed at the same level as an assistant 
chief of staff. The creation of the position had wide support among the war 
department's senior leadership. Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson, writing to 
Eisenhower in March, stated that 'for some years I have given close attention to the 
Army programs on research and development [ ... ] the importance of the work in the 
future cannot be doubted, and I believe that it would be well to consider certain 
organizational changes.' Patterson called for the position to be filled 'by a man of 
unusual vision and executive ability [ ... ] at the same time he must get on well with 
civilian scientists'. 95 
Post-War Equipment Boards 
As occurred after the First World War, the post-war environment included an 
extensive round of conferences and equipment boards designed to record lessons of 
the war. 96 The post-war boards covered everything from narrow technical topics to 
92 For a description of the ASF view and its demise see Millett, The Organization and Role of the 
Army SenJice Forces, pp. 421-427. 
93 Weigley, IIistory of the United States Army, p. 67. Ironically, by 1958 President Eisenhower would 
bemoan the fact that the 'the entire structure, called the National Military Establishment, was little 
more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units.' U.S. National Archives and Records 
Service, 'President Eisenhower's Message to Congress, 3 April 1958, U.S. Congress,' Public Papers of 
the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1958 (GPO, Washington D.C.: 1959), p. 276. 
94 The reorganization was instituted as a result of the Patch-Simpson Board surveys conducted 
between August 1945 and January 1946. The changes were instituted through AmlY Circular 138, 14 
May 1946. 
95 Memorandum Patterson to Eisenhower, Research and Development Division, 17 March 1946 (COS, 
1946, 321) cited in Dwight Divid Eisenhower, ed., The Papel:~ of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. 7, 
(The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 1978), pp. 999- I 000 (note 1). 
96 The major post-war equipment, organization, and doctrine boards were; The Theater General Board; 
the U.S. Far East Theater Board; he Army Ground Forces Equipment Board; the Infantry, Artillery, 
and Armored Conferences; and the War Department Equipment Board (Stilwell Board). The Army 
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operations and strategy. The two major theatre commands also convened boards and 
studies to capture the specific lessons of their areas and reflect them back to the army. 
The quality and utility of these efforts varied greatly and few endeavoured to look 
ahead and apply the lessons of the Second World War to any possible future context. 
The exception was the 1946 War Department Equipment Board (the Stilwell Board). 
The Stilwell Board articulated the need for a 'long range development 
program,' to serve two parallel functions: 'Vigorous research and development of new 
or anticipated types of equipment, and continued improvement of existing equipment 
as an interim measure [ ... and] supervise continuously research and development, 
merging or terminating projects at the feasible, economical moment and assuring a 
step-by-step change-over from the discarded material to the new' .97 
The Stilwell Board also described the need to account for changes in both 
doctrine and organization as technology is advanced. The board listed two key 
components, under its 'Principles Applicable to Development of Equipment' , of the 
future combat developments system. First, it recognized the dialectic nature of 
developments, where a new tactic or organization might require new technology and 
the opportunity of a new technology might be fully realized only in close 
development with the system of employment. The report, therefore, warned that 
technology might provide 'a new article but lack the demand to create it due to the 
failure of the tactical user to visualize and request what is unknown to him'. Similarly, 
'the concepts of future tactics, organization, and equipment should be examined and 
stated clearly' in order to direct research. Without specifying how the war department 
might achieve this balance, the board did make a specific recommendation to raise the 
visibility of the issue and thereby change the prevailing press for a return to the pre-
war status quo. 'Those responsible for the guidance of the research and development 
program' the board report argued 'should be on the same staff level with and 
participate in all strategical and operational planning in order that needs for new 
Equipment Board (Hodge Board) in 1950 drew on many of these previous boards to update their 
findings to 'orient the equipment R&D program to realistic economies under current peacetime budgets 
[to] ensure maximum security within means available.' Office Chief Army Field Forces, 'Report of the 
Army Equipment Board' (Fort Monroe V.S. Army, 1950). (MHI VC463.V549 1950) 
97 'Report of War Department Equipment Board (Stilwell Board)' (Washington DC: War Department, 
Office of the Chief of Staff, 1946), p. 2. 
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equipment may be determined, and research and development thereof be initiated at 
the earliest moment'. 98 
As a result, the board recommended creation of a 'separate General Staff 
Division on the Directorate Level of the War Department.' This new entity would be 
led by a senior general, supported by a deputy who is a 'nationally known scientist' 
and a staff of experts from the combat arms and technical services. 99 The new 
position, director of research and development, was empowered by a wide-ranging 
mandate including authority to 'supervis[e] the testing of new weapons and 
equipment and for the development of tactical doctrines governing their employment 
in the field'. 100 
Beyond giving research and development the bureaucratic visibility it was 
seen to deserve, the board began the process of separating research and development 
from 'the functions of procurement, purchase, storage, and distribution.' lOt The 
separation was strongly supported by two of the war's most respected scientists, Dr. 
Vannevar Bush of the OSRD and Dr. Edward Bowles, the Secretary of War's 'expert 
consultant' on research. In addition, an important source of support came from 
Brigadier General WilIiam A. Borden, a talented ordnance officer, director of the 
amlY's new developments division, and Marshall's personal research and 
development 'trouble-shooter' during the war. To men like Bush, one of the key 
lessons of the war was that research and production are antithetical. The 'cornerstone' 
of the procurement programs was 'quantity production, with an emphasis upon 
interchangeability of parts and the discouragement of adaptations.' 102 Such a system 
98 'Stilwell Board', pp. 2-3. 
99 'StilweII Board', p. 2. (Part A, Section J) 
100 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 157. Hewes also notes that this proposal would have 
centralized supervision over what became known as 'combat developments' for the first time in a 
single staff agency. 
101 Memorandum to Directors and Chiefs of War Department, General and Special Staff Divisions and 
Bureaus, and the Commanding Generals of the Major Commands, from CSA, Subject: Scientific and 
Technological Resources as Military Assets, COS 020 (10-4-44), Sec I (30 April 1946), Document 
883. The Papers ofDwight David Eisenhower - the ChiefofSta[[, ed. by Louis Galambos, VII 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), pp. 1046-1047. 
102 Jrvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Researchfor War: The Administrative J/isto/y of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p. 330. The creation of the New 
Developments Division during the Second World War was in pmi a reaction to the inability of the 
procurement systems to deliver on near term R&D efforts. See Hewes Jr., From Roof to McNamara, 
pp. 123-124. 
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was incapable of adapting to rapidly changing requirements, small niche capabilities, 
or event the demands of battlefield commanders. The situation was not likely to 
improve in peacetime when demands for efficiency would easily trump arguments for 
future capabilities. 
Despite the temporary liberation of research from logistics under 
Eisenhower's reorganization, the staff functions associated with the emerging combat 
developments grew more complex after the dissolution of the ASF. 103 The creation of 
five staff directorates with a mandate to 'plan, direct, coordinate, and supervise' 
restored the technical services to a position of influence almost equivalent that of 
194 1.104 The bureau chiefs 'kept their own research and development functions which 
remained subordinate to production and procurement almost by definition since the 
technical services were themselves commodity or service commands'. 105 Despite a 
diminution of responsibilities, the technical services' influence over the process of 
creating future capabilities complicated the combat developments function until 
creation of the Army Material Command in 1962. 
Under the terms of Army Circular 138, the AGF continued in its original role 
of providing 'ground force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat 
operations.' 106 The developmental role of the AGF, through the experience of Second 
World War, was maturing as a combined arms voice of the user community. The 
restoration of 'dual-hatted' officers in the technical services, despite the high-level 
advocacy of Research and Development (R&D) at the directorate level, undercut any 
advantage created by the separation of R&D from logistics. It was, as Marshall 
recalled a decade later, the triumph of the bureaucracy over institutional change: 'His 
(Somervell and the ASF) handling of things awakened, naturally, the hostility of the 
staff departments ... I think all the reorganization so far as supply and the services 
103 4 ., It d . . The return to the staff model in place prior to the 19 2 reorganizatIOn resu e m twenty-nme 
individual staffs or division reporting directly to the chief or his deputy. See Weigley, llistory of the 
United States Army, p. 487. 
104 Weigley, /listory of the United States Army, p. 488. 
105 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 161. 
106 War Department Circular 59, 2 March 1942, Para 5b. 
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were concerned was built on avoiding any future development of a man like General 
Somervell.' 107 
The period between the end of the Second World War and beginning of the 
Korean War was, for the army and the concept of combat developments, one of 
constant organizational change, chronic underfunding, and fundamental debates on 
what kind of army was required for the future. The institutional assumption emerging 
from the post-war debates was that the United'States required a regular, reserve, and 
mobilization capability. Speaking in 1947, Eisenhower signalled the army's return to 
the necessarily austere development logic of the 1930s when he stated that although 
the 'methods and weapons of war will be varied and improved'; there would be 
revolutionary change over the next decade. Since a decade was 'as far or further than 
the nature of a future war can be reasonably estimated' he implied little in the way of 
developments would be necessary. Returning to the mobilization logic he knew so 
well, Eisenhower defined the army's requirements as a 'force in being to meet the 
initial aggression and also as a springboard for mobilization.' The actual size should 
rest on the nature of the threat as well as 'the degree of readiness of the reserve 
components and the timing and availability of arms and equipment [ ... ] which must 
be mobilized'. 108 The biggest change from the 1930s model was the speed with which 
the army would have to react not the approach it would take. 
The question of speed was all-important, since the next war, it assumed, would 
arrive with no notice and rapidly reach the scale of the Second World War. There were 
two distinct approaches on how to approach the challenge. One option was to change 
the ratio of forces in being to those that would require mobilization. A large standing 
ArnlY would obviously reduce the pressure on mobilization, but was difficult to 
justify on historic and financial grounds. An alternative was to utilize some form of 
UMT to reduce the time required to mobilize and thereby reduce the need for a large 
standing force. The second option was the quintessential combat developments 
challenge and helps to explain the continued drive to find a combat developments 
107 Forrest C. Pogue, 'George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue, 
Interview 15,' (I4 February 1957), pp. 444-445 http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/pogue.html, 
accessed I August 2009. 
108 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, to Joint Chiet:~ of Staff, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45), Sec I, Subject: 
Military Necessity, Which Exists for A Universal Military Training Program, 13 January 1947. The 
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower - the Chief of Staff, ed. by Galambos, pp. 1440-1441. 
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solution. The army, in order to get out of the force in being versus the speed of 
mobilization spiral, would need to leverage scientific developments in such a way as 
to 'affect the size and composition of the military establishment'. As Eisenhower 
acknowledged, this option was 'dependent upon the willingness of the U.S. to finance 
and support the requisite research and development program'. 109 Politically, arguing 
for a robust program of combat developments undercut the army's argument for UMT 
and made rebutting the air force argument that technology could deliver a faster 
response at a lower cost, difficult. 
An Organizational Battle Between the Army's Past and its Future 
After Eisenhower's reorganization of 1946, changes to the arnly's internal 
organization were driven by or in reaction to the unification of the arnled forces under 
the National Security Act of 1947 and the rapid growth of the new Department of 
Defense."o Significantly, the act created the United States Air Force, formalizing an 
evolution in progress for more than twenty years; created a department of the arnlY; 
formalized the wartime joint chiefs of staff; and created a research and development 
board. In terms of the evolution of army combat developments, the act was, like the 
Eisenhower reorganization, a mixed bag. The act lent tacit support to the position of 
the technical services by failing to endorse an ASF-like entity for the new department. 
Instead it called for the secretary to 'take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary 
duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, 
storage, health and research' . I11 
The Department of Defense grew and changed rapidly over the ensuing decade. 
Despite its support for unification, the changes wrought by the act were perhaps most 
109 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, to Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 320.2 (5-1-45), Sec 1, Subject: 
Military Necessity, Which Exist for A Universal Military Training Program, 13 January 1947, The 
Papers o/Dwight David Eisenhower - the Chic:f a/Staff, ed. by Galambos, pp. 1440-1441. In this 
memorandum Eisenhower was writing to the JCS with recommended changed to a JSSC response to 
President Tmman's ad-hoc board on UMT. Eisenhower's answer can be read, in light of his strategy 
~fter becoming President, as referring to the substitution of nuclear weapons for manpower. However, 
his warning that basic force requirements of Second World War would be relatively stable through the 
late 1950s implies a more traditional view. 
110 The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Military Establishment (NME). The 
NME was later re-designated the Department of Defense (DoD). 
I11 The National Security Act of 1947, PL 235 - 61 Stat. 496, USC 402, (26 July 1947), Section 202 
(a) (3). 
139 
difficult for the army. In the wake of the act, the navy's internal structure was perhaps 
least affected. The new air force started with an essentially blank slate to build 
institutional processes unencumbered by tradition. The army, on the other hand, had 
to build a new department from the remains of the WDGS, which was still 
transitioning from its wartime configuration. The act also reinforced a 'general trend 
with respect to federalism [ ... ] from a loose organization to a unified organization'. 112 
For defenders of the status quo with regard to the technical services and development 
responsibilities, 1947 was a watershed. The centralization of army functions was a 
'slow and painful process' that was 'shaped in conflict with the technical and supply 
bureaus and with other entrenched interests in the Army which survived from its long 
period of decentralization'. 1\3 
In March 1948, after almost two years of study, the army converted the AGF 
from its wartime responsibilities over operational matters to a 'Field Operating 
Agency'. Redesignated as office army field forces, the AFF was responsible for 
'supervising training, preparing training literature, developing tactical doctrine, and 
supervising the activities of the Army Ground Forces boards in developing military 
equipment'. 114 Even as this change was a move toward an institutional capability to 
prepare for future war, there were several regressive moves. First, and in a clear 
concession to the technical services, the same directive circumscribed the AFF's 
mission to only a part of the army. The AFF was restricted from exercising any 
authority over the training and education activities of the technical services, but urged 
'the closest collaboration and coordination' .115 Second, a few months before the 
creation of AFF, the army reversed the move toward a higher research and 
development profile initiated by Eisenhower by abolishing the directorate of research 
and development and moved its responsibilities under the directorate of service, 
supply, and procurement. 116 
112 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics 0/ Civil Military Relations, p. 431. 
113 Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing/or De/ense: The American Militmy Establishment in the Twentieth 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 283. 
114 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 171. The AFF was not a command, hence the 'office' 
designation. The head of the office was designated the 'chief.' 
115 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 172. 
116 Army Circular 73 (19 December 1947). This change was as the result of a recommendation by the 
Eisenhower appointed Board of Officers to Review War Department Policies and Programs (also 
known as the Haislip Board) in preparation for the National Security Act of 1947. 
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Even as the army was settling the question of training and doctrine, the issue 
of the need for peacetime ASF resurfaced. Eisenhower directed his to staff to explore 
the idea of an expansible logistics headquarters for war. Eisenhower's concept was 
that the director of service, supply, and procurement might 'provide the nuclear 
organization for an ASF as an operating command in war.' Jl7 Raising the possibility 
of restoring ASF led to a frenzy of activity on the part of reform minded officers like 
Lieutenant General Henry S. Aurand, director of service supply and procurement. He 
proffered a range of proposals to the new chief of staff, General Omar Bradley. The 
technical services, sensing a threat to their position, argued against ever 'creating 
another ASF or logistics command whether in peace or war'. Such a change would, 
they argued, 'require the reorganization and re-education of all the armed forces and 
war industries' . 118 The assistant secretary of the army Gordon Gray acceded to the 
status quo and the technical services dodged another bullet. 
The next major study of anny organization occurred in summer 1948. 
Building on the work of previous studies, Colonel Kilboume Johnston, then assigned 
to the management division of the army comptroller's office, wrote a two-volume 
staff study that laid bare the complex and unwieldy department of the army. In 
Johnston review of army reorganizations he noted the back-to-back failure in two 
world wars of the army's peacetime staff structure. In both cases, the army failed to 
make the transition to war without the imposition of an emergency reorganization. 
The study also highlighted the 'unwieldy span of control' of the army's peacetime 
staff. Johnston's survey found some 294 divisions, 884 branches, 638 sections, along 
with 86 standing committees and boards in addition to numerous temporary 
committees in the army's organizational structure. The effect, in addition to delays 
caused by excessive staff layering, was that 'there [were] no effective procedures for 
integrating or balancing requirements with resources.' The major cause of the 
problem, Johnston found, was that institutional 'evolution [had] rendered the 
technical services bureaucratic to the point of obsolescence'. Under the conditions of 
the Cold War, as during the Second World War, the army needed to move to a few key 
117 Hewes Jr., From Roof to McNamara, pp. 175-176. 
118 The technical services position was argued by the chief of engineers and cited in Hewes Jr., From 
Root to McNamara, p. 178. 
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functional organizations responsible to the chief of staff. 119 The two sides carried 
'diametrically opposed points of view'. On the one hand 'military procurement in 
time of war is intimately related to all the economic controls and production controls 
necessary on a modem total war'. On the other 'military procurement is intimately 
related to strategy, tactics' demanding the combining as many functions as possible. 120 
This unsettled argument from the First and Second World Wars was just a relevant in 
the new Cold War. 
The response from the technical services was predicable. They argued that 
'functionalization would divide responsibility for producing, procuring, and 
supplying commodities instead of placing responsibility for them properly in one 
agency from factory to firing line'. 121 The chief of ordnance, Major General Everett S. 
Hughes argued that 10hnston's concept for a return to something akin to the Second 
World War model would violate 'generations of experience' and should not be made 
unless they were 'conclusively advantageous'. Ifthere were ever an indication of the 
institutional power wielded by the chiefs of the technical services in the late 1940s it 
lies in the tone and substance of response to their concerns by the chief of staff. 
Bradley pleaded with the chiefs at least to consider supporting the placement of the 
technical services under the deputy chiefs of staff for administration. Because '[w]e 
are every day convinced that the present organization here at the top will break down 
[ ... ] we just can't handle it' .122 In the end the secretary of the army approved Bradley's 
recommendation and the technical services acquiesced since the change affected their 
external but not internal relationships and authorities. 123 
The 1940s came to a close with one final Army organizational study and one 
more failed attempt to break the power of the technical services. This time an outside 
119 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, pp. 182-185. 
120 Major General C.F. Robinson, 'Factors and Objectives on Military Procurement (9 Janurary 1948)', 
Presentatin to the Indllstrai College of the Armed Forces (Washington DC: Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, 1948), p. 3 <https:lldigitalndulibrary.ndll.edulu?/icafarchive,8449>. The records of this 
presentation can be found https:lldigitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?/icafarchive,8449. 
121 Memorandum Brigadier General Christmas, Chief of Logistics Directorate, Procurement group, 4 
Aug 48 (revised 12 Aug 48), sub: Army Reorganization. Johnston Plan - Comments, Tab 13. Cited in 
Hewes Jr., From Roof to McNamara, p. 187. 
122 Quoted in Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 189. 
123 Department of the Army Circular 342 (1 November 1948) placed the "Technical Staffs and 
Services" under the Director of Logistics (as opposed to the Service, Supply, and Procurement), and 
placed the "Administrative Staffs and Services" under the Director of Personnel and Administration. 
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consulting firm of Cresap, McCormick, and Paget was asked to offer 
recommendations to improve the department's management. The April 1949 report, 
and, like the 10hnston Plan the year before, it found the department hamstrung by 
duplication and red tape, inadequate co-ordination, inadequate planning, and over 
centralization by too many activities. This resulted in a situation, according to the 
report, where the department had poor procedures for planning, programming, and 
controlling its operations. 124 
The technical services, for the third time in little more than a year, found 
themselves fighting off what they viewed as an existential threat. In this light the 
response by the chief of ordnance was predictable: 
The report is basically unsound in its reasoning. It follows the line that 
any error in a huge organization can be cured only by reorganization. I 
have been in the army since 1908 and in the ordnance department since 
1912. During that time I have participated in n+ 1 reorganizations and 
have observed that always afterward the ignorant, the undisciplined, 
the empire-builders, the lazy, and the indecisive continued to make the 
same mistakes they made prior to the reorganization [ ... ] the only 
proponents of such a scheme [ ... ] have not become familiar with the 
complete and absolute necessity for an organization established on a 
product basis from research and development though final disposition 
of the end item. m 
Unfortunately for advocates of refoml, the army's new chief of staff, General 
Lawton Collins, failed to recommend acceptance of the more transformative 
recommendations. In a soft argument for maintaining the status quo, Collins noted 
that 'reorganization itself was not a panacea for all ills' and the army's 'state of flux' 
since the end of the Second World War accounted for much of its inefficiency. 126 The 
secretary, while accepting most of that Collins recommended, stated the obvious; 
I am at a loss to know how we can meet new challenges or deal with 
old ones if we are to limit ourselves to what has already been tried. I 
124 H ff I" d " h"' ewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, pp. 194-195. Army sta ana YSls an reaction to t IS mternal 
study was influence by recommendation of the wider ranging Presidential Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Departments Report (known as the Hoover Commission) to modernize 
the development and reporting of the Army budget. 
I2S Memorandum, General Hughes for Army Comptroller, 23 May 1949, sub: Survey of the 
Department of the Army Final Report by Cresap, McCormick and Paget. Tab Ord. to Tab 1, Tabbed 
materials. Cited in Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, pp. 197-198. 
126 Cited in Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, pp. 201-202. 
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feel we should all continuously maintain inquiring, open, and receptive 
minds respecting these matters. 127 
Several long-simmering institutional issues came to the surface in 1950. 
Some, like those associated with readiness and equipment, were publically exposed in 
failures during the early months of the Korean War. Early tactical failures were a clear 
demonstration that the doctrine and weapons of the last war had an increasingly short 
life. Moreover, Korea dramatically changed how readiness, in its broadest sense, 
would come to be defined in the Cold War. Readiness in the post-war world 
increasingly referred to the ability of existing forces to deploy and fight on short 
notice and not solely to on ability to raise an army for war. Attempts to bridge the gap 
between cold-start mobilization and large standing forces through the implementation 
ofUMT had failed. This general result should have come as no surprise given the 
army's experience in trying to mobilize an army with emerging concepts and old 
equipment in 1940. Equipment from the last war may look good on paper and the 
economic potential of American industry may have inspired confidence in a 
conference room, but they were demonstrably no longer the most important indicators 
of readiness. 
But just as it had in every post-war period, the army's demobilization after the 
Second World War was swift, disorganized, and deeper than a rapidly growing list of 
requirements warranted. In 1948, the joint staff estimated a mere two-and-a-third 
army divisions were available to 'put out fires' while the bulk of the army's combat 
forces were occupying Japan and Europe were considered 'political forces 
unavailable for military planning.' 128 Europe was the focal point of national security 
efforts, but the disconnect between word and deed was glaring. In 1948, Field 
Marshal Bernard Montgomery, as chairman of the commanders-in-chief committee of 
the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) forerunner, informed member nation leaders that 'my present 
instructions are to hold the line of the Rhine [ ... J presently available forces might 
127 Memorandum, Secretary of the Army for CoS, 9 January 1950, sub: Recommendation of the Chief 
of Staff to the Secretary of the Army on the organization of the Department of the Army. Cited in 
Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 205. 
128 Waiter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American MilitalY llistory (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1956), p.' 317. Number of forces available based on a briefing by Major General Alfred M. 
Gruenther, 18 February 1948 to the White House. 
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enable me to hold the tip of Brittany Peninsula for three days [ ... ] please advise. 129 
Even those forces nominally available to come to Europe's aid in a crisis were on a 
starvation diet. Despite a small bump in spending in 1949 as a result of international 
crisis, the defence budget for 1950 was one that Secretary Forrestal estimated would 
only allow for, limited procurement, nominal reserves, and restrictive maintenance. 130 
As one historian noted 'the Truman administration's military and foreign policies 
were now rushing forward but in exactly opposite directions' . 131 
Even as the army struggled to reconcile its budget and the increasing demands 
of the Cold War, a more fundamental shift occurred over the question of who 
controlled the institution of the army. Legislative tinkering with the structure and 
authorities of various components of the department of the army and the army staff 
was, and to a degree remains, a favourite activity of congressional committees. The 
situation made it increasingly difficult under the National Security Act of 1947 for the 
army to adapt itself to internal competition for resources and changing requirements. 
One change was a gradual recognition of the fact that the army chief of staff should 
not presume a 'command role' over the army. This change was less about actual 
command - after all similar constraints on the command function stretched back to 
the early nineteenth century and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun - than it was the 
presumption of command and its effect on institutional preferences. 132 The move 
129 Cited in Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance (London: 
Rowan & Littlefield, 2007), p. 151. As late as April 1949 both President Tnnnan and his Secretary of 
Defense believed that it would still be several years before the new NATO could 'hold the Rhine line.' 
Montgomery was also known to say that all the Soviet Union needed to reach the Atlantic was an 
adequate supply of shoes. See Robert H. FerreIl, IIarry Truman and the Cold War Revisionists 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), p. 71. The US plan for general war, code named 
OFFTACKLE, was equalIy pessimistic of holding a defensive line at the Rhine or even a 'bridgehead' 
on the continent in the early stages of a Soviet attack. See 'Proceedings of the Commander Conference, 
USAF' (Ramey Air Force Base: United States Air Force, 1950), pp. 22-23 .. Declassified copy at 
National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/-nsaarchive/llllkev<l1lIt/specialldoc03<l.pdf / accessed 1 Jun 
2009). 
130 Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years 1947-1950, History of the Office of the Secretary of 
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toward a functionally organized anny staff would pave the way for a series of 
subsequent shifts, some of the more noticeable in the area of research and 
development and resource planning. Changes in other areas were more gradual and 
even today retain vestiges of a by-gone era. 133 
Despite the shift away from direct command, the anny staff retained many of 
the structures and processes of an organization with direct command over field forces, 
rather than one optimized to plan, develop, and execute anny policies. In the run-up to 
what would eventually become the anny organization act of 1950, the comptroller's 
management division conducted a study that found almost 400 provisions oflaw 
governing the anny had been passed since 1916. 134 In the words of the study's author 
'the laws governing the organization of the army and the department of the anny were 
in a mess. ' Clarifying the statutory basis of the army would simultaneously provide 
the president, secretary of defence, and secretary of the anny additional flexibility to 
'adapt the organization to changing conditions'. 135 
The passage of the army organization act of 1950 marked the beginning of the 
end for the autonomy of the technical services. In all previous battles between agents 
of refonn within the anny staff and the traditionalists who supported the technical 
service chiefs, authority to make fundamental change rested with Congress. It was for 
this reason that the technical services held to the 1916 national defence act as their 
Magna Carta and fought any attempt to weaken their position. 136 The anny 
organization act passed and, most significantly, authorized the secretary of the anny to 
133 Ambrose, 'The Armed Services and American Strategy' (p. 318). Some habits of culture die hard 
regardless of the level of staff or statutory purpose of the organization. In 1958 the Army established a 
24-hour 'War Room' to 'provide a focal point for Army Staff efforts during emergencies [ ... ] maintain 
general situation maps and other information about current trouble areas [ ... ] keep current combat 
readiness data, and give situational briefings for key officials.' Terrence J. Gough Jr., James E. Hewes, 
Edgar F. Rains, Establishment and Evolution o.fthe Office o.fthe Deputy ChiefofStafffor Operations 
and Plans, 1903-1983 (Washington DC: V.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983), p. 20. 
134 The National Defense Act of 1916, the First War Powers Act of 1941, the National Security Act of 
1947, and the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. See G. Emery Baya, 'Army Reorganization Act of 1950', 
Army Information Digest, 5 (1950), 28-37. 
135 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, pp. 208-209. 
136 'The National Defense ACt _ Approved 3 June 1916', As Amended by 30 June 1921 (Washington 
DC, 1921), p. 10. The act restricted the General Staff from engaging in work 'of an administrative 
nature that pertains to the established bureaus or offices of the War Department' or that would 'involve 
impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or 
unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.' 
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exercise executive authority to reassign duties of the technical services - something 
specifically forbidden by the 1916 act. 
Combat Developments and the Victory of the Functionalists 
The Korean War saw the Army expand from fewer than 600,000 troops in 
June 1950 to more than 1.5 million by June 1953. Appropriations for the army tripled 
during that same period. The particular nature of Korea provided fodder for both sides 
of the institutional argument over funtionalization. The technical services argued that 
the requirement to ramp-up and supply the expanding army justified the efficiency of 
the commodity approach. Those who argued for funtionalization were equally 
convinced improved that readiness and modernization of the existing force was the 
real lesson. As one official history noted 'technological innovation [ ... ] offered a way 
to capture the public imagination and possibly, a large portion of the defence budget 
while at the same time carrying on needed modernization in a force still dominated by 
Second World War doctrine, organization, and equipment'. 137 
Requirements, research, and elements of combat developments were still 
divided and largely unsynchronized. One solution to bridge the gap between 
traditionalists and functionalists was to have key staff officers wear many hats. For 
example in 1948, the assistant deputy chief of staff, 0-3 (atomic energy) was 
simultaneously the chief, armed forces special weapons project, and the senior 
member of the military liaison committee to the atomic energy commission. While a 
common focus on nuclear weapons might have justified the cross organization 
responsibilities, this logic was not always apparent. In 1951 the deputy assistant chief 
of staff (guided missiles) was simultaneously designated the deputy assistant chief of 
staff, 0-4 (special weapons). 138 
The split loyalties and often-conflict of interest between the army's various 
tribes did not disappear under the management concept of 'multiple hats'. Even as the 
army increasingly embraced new technologies and actively sought new concepts to 
137 Gough Jr., Establishment and Evolution p. 16. 
138 Gough Jr., Establishment and Evolution p. 16. 
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resolve its readiness and budget problems, it still lacked an approach for making 
institutional, vice arm or service, choices between alternatives. This basic discOlmect 
between civilian research, military procurement, and the actual needs of the field 
seemed to defy an institutional solution. Dr. Lawrence R. Hafstad, Director of 
Research of the Reactor Development Division, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
and a long serving member of the department of defence's research and development 
board, lamented in late 1950 that the department still lacked an adequate solution to 
the 'evaluation problem'. Evaluating a new weapon after it has been designed and is 
essentially complete 'is a relatively easy thing' . However, 'getting a preview of how 
valuable a thing would be ifit could be made [ ... ] this is a much more subtle 
problem'. Hafstad argued, as had Marshall earlier, that the services need to 'evaluate 
these things before they are completed, [then] we would save ourselves a lot of money 
and save our laboratories a lot of wasted effort [ ... ] this is the direction in which we 
must struggle' .139 
The secretary of the army was briefed on the findings of Project VISTA in 
February 1952. The report covered topics ranging from strategic policy, military 
concepts, doctrine, to organizations and materie!' But most important for the army, the 
report provided a clear description of the institutional context, which had to be 
addressed before requirements determination could occur. The report 'noted that 
America no longer enjoyed the long reaction time provided by her relative isolation 
between two great oceans and that the Army devoted too much time and effort to 
current operations and was thus unable to forecast the future and plan for it 
properly' .140 The Project VISTA report recommended the army create a 'Combat 
Developments Group' to 'forge and develop new tactics, techniques, and tools of this 
new type of warfare' . Such a group, the report continued, would need to: 'be of 
sufficient size to include all elements of a working combat team [ ... and] a permanent 
staff that includes civilian scientists; it must have access to specialists in all relevant 
139 Lawrence R. Hafstad, 'Coordination of Research and Development in Govemment Agencies (3 
October 1950)', Presentation to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (Washington DC: Industrai 
College of the Armed Forces, 1950), p. 7 <https:lldigitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?/icafarchive,36026>. 
140 U.S. Continental Army Command, Report by USCONARC ad lIoc Committee on Evaluation of the 
US Army Combat Development Experimentation Center (HQ CONARC, Fort Monroe, VA: 1958), 
p.l2. Cited in Charles R. Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army: 1942-
1962', I (Washington DC: United States Army, 2006), p. 135. 
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fields; and it must work in close coordination with Operations Research Office of the 
Army.' 141 
Project VISTA's recommendations sharpened the debate over the role of nuclear 
weapons in land warfare. From the army's perspective, it offered in sights into five 
critical questions: 
• How to prepare for the battlefield of tomorrow? 
• How best to organize combat forces to meet these requirements? 
• What tactics and techniques should be employed? 
• What equipment is required? 
• What logistics system will best support such a battlefield? 142 
The challenge was to create an institution capable of answering such questions. The 
authors recommended, among other things, that the army consolidate the traditional 
patchwork of functions and responsibilities for developing new battlefield capabilities 
into a single organization. As the concept matured, the functions of a combat 
developments organization should include 'preparing detailed military specifications 
for new weapons and equipment, for developing new organizational and operational 
concepts and doctrines, for testing these ideas experimentally in war games and in 
field manoeuvres, for conducting combat operations research studies, and for 
analyzing the results in terms of cost-effectiveness' .143 A complete institutional 
concept for 'combat developments' had now appeared. 
Secretary of the Army Pace approved the modified version of Project VISTA's 
recommendations in July 1952. It called for an independent combat development 
group (CDO) that would combine conceptual, laboratory, and testing work on new 
weapons with the development of doctrines and organizations envisioned for their 
employment. The authors hoped that such an organization would 'forge and develop 
new tactics, techniques and tools of this new type of warfare [ ... and] bring to an 
operational state the newest tactics, ideas, and inventions having application to the 
141 Jean R. Keith, Howard K. Butler, 'United States Army Combat Developments Command: Origins 
and Formation' (Fort Monroe: US Army Combat Development Command, 1972), pp. 6-7. 
142 Don K. Price, Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy (New 
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kind of warfare envisaged for Western Europe' .144 The concept behind the CDG 
recommendation was generally well received by the army staff, since there was 
already movement underway to consolidate many of these functions. In March 1951, 
a senior level army conference reported on an 'urgent requirement for an immediate 
study of the impact of atomic weapons developments upon Army organization, 
doctrine, tactics, and logistics'. 145 Discussions were underway between the army G3 
and theAFF during summer 1952 to establish a 'Special Weapons Command' to 
accelerate a disparate collection of activities associated with atomic weapons. 146 
While the chief of the army field forces, General John R. Hodge, concurred 
with general recommendation of Project VISTA, he voiced two major objections. 
First, since most of the technical developmental functions envisioned by for the new 
CDG were already assigned to AFF, he deemed a wholly new organization 
unnecessary. Second, the existing Army schools already assigned to AFF could easily 
accomplish the doctrinal work of the CDG. Collins compromised and ordered 
establishment of a CDG in the AFF. In the establishing directive for the CDG, the 
responsibility for the major functions recommended by Project VISTA was clear, but 
as would be the case in another decade, authority and resources to control them were 
less so: 
The Chief of Army Field Forces is charged with responsibility for 
evaluating the effect on our tactical doctrine of new scientific 
developments. He likewise has the responsibility of developing 
requirements for new weapons, where necessary, to meet the demands 
of new tactical concepts. This dual responsibility cal1s for the 
application of the methods of science to the overall problems of ground 
warfare. 147 
In September 1952, Secretary of the Army Pace approved the AFF 
implementation plan and initiated the army's Combat Development System (CDS). 
144 Cited in Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 153. 
145 'Probable Effects of Atomic Weapons Developments Upon the Structure of Army Operations,' (20 
March), p. 3. 
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This was a significant step in the evolution of army's ability to prepare for the future. 
The AFF plan provided an organizational focus for the 'existing AFF system of 
centres, schools, and boards, including long-established liaison with the technical 
services. ,148 The new combat development divisi'on, embedded within the existing 
AFF G-3 staff, would be overseen by the newly created position of deputy chief, 
AFF. 149 Moreover, to strengthen the coordination of doctrine development, combat 
development activities were created at the CGSC and each of the four major combat 
arms schools. 
The CDG wasted little time in trying to corral the various activities 
constituting the CDS. In early 1953, AFF in coordination with the army staff 
published the 'Combat Developments Planning Guide'. This document was the first 
of what would become annual combat development guidance aimed at orienting the 
entire institution toward an integrated view of the mid-to-far time horizon. Published 
guidance is one thing, reorienting the existing institution is another. In the end the 
CDS was 'superimposed upon an existing Army structure whose role was more of 
influence than control'. 150 
In October 1952 the department of the army published, but never fully 
adopted, a proposal for the complete funtionalization of the army from the 'bottom-
up'. The author of the proposal, KarI R. Bendetsen, argued that previous attempts to 
fix the army's organizational challenges 'treated the symptoms instead of attacking 
the basic issue'. The existing system, as Bendetsen described it, consisted of 
'fragmented field organization(s) where seven major commands were each involved 
in buying, mechanizing, warehousing, distribution, and even research and 
development'.151 Despite significant agreement with his assessment of the problem, 
Bendetsen's proposed solution, essentially the elimination of the technical services, 
was too radical a step. The tone of the proposal did, however, reflect widely held 
148 'V.S. Army Combat Development System', p. 5. 
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frustration inside and outside the department of the army that the institution had 
learned nothing from the Second World War. A contemporary staff history of the 
period noted three general weaknesses in the status quo: 
• Equipment was sometimes developed without full consideration of the 
operational and organizational context in which it would be employed. 
• Technology was moving faster that operational and organizational concepts 
were being modified to take advantage of new material developments. 
• The development of future doctrine and organization were left to agencies 
responsible for current doctrinal and operational activities. These agencies 
could not give adequate attention to future developments. 152 
The organizational changes ushered in by Marshall in 1942 continued their 
sometimes-halting march in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War. Former 
Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett complained in early 1953 that the enduring 
power of the army's technical services with their overlapping functions added 
'substantial complication to the difficult problem of administration and control'. 
Many functions, such as those associated with the concept of combat developments, 
were hopelessly stove-piped in the 'particular' requirements of the technical services. 
Lovett recommended that despite the fact that 'a reorganization of the technical 
services would be no more painful than backing into a buzz saw', it was worth the 
effort and long overdue. 153 A reorganization proposal by Lovett (implementing parts 
of the Bendetsen Plan) in the closing months of the Truman administration made a 
bold attempt to break 'resistance of the technical services and the army staff'. It 
recommended a dramatic shift way from what was called the 'Pershing Model' ofa 
general staff organized like a field command to one with no significant field army 
responsibilities, but instead one providing strategic direction to seven functional 
commands. 154 This was in keeping with his larger view that 'we should not 
152 'U.S. Army Combat Development System', p. 4. 
153 Robert A. Lovett, Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, vol. 90, 10 January 1953, pp. 542-543. Cited in 
Hewes, p. 218. Despite the fact that Somervell aggregated some of the common staff functions of the 
technical services under the ASF during Second World War, he never successfully challenged their 
underlying independence. Mllch to the chagrin ofSomervell the technical services boldly reasserted 
themselves following the dissolution of the ASF in 1946. 
154 The so-called Bendetsen Reorganization Plan was submitted on 22 October 1952. Bendetsen 
described the Anny technical services as a dysfunctional set of self-contained 'professional groupings' 
lacking any functional pattern at a time when integration was identified as an organizational 
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deliberately maintain a department of defence organization which in several parts 
would require drastic reorganization to fight a war'. 155 The proposal also went 
nowhere, but it did set the tone for later reorganizations, which would actually 
reshape the army along functional lines. 
The arrival of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration in January 
1953 brought new energy to arguments over how best to organize the army in a time 
of change. The new president had long been clear in his own mind on what the nation 
need to do to rationalize a peacetime national defence system with the nation's 
economy. In a long diary entry from October 1951, Eisenhower wrote: 
We should institute a basic study at home to examine into the 
economics of [national] security [ ... ] the most economical & efficient 
methods should be evolved. (The Services) should be ruthlessly pulled 
apart & examined in order to get down to the country's requirements 
{ .... ] Ifwe don't have the objective, industry-government-professional 
examination that will show us where & how to proceed in this 
armament business we will go broke and still have inefficient defences. 
We can have security without paying the price of national bankruptcy, 
if we will put brains in the balance. We cannot afford prejudice, 
preconceived notions, fallacies, duplications, luxuries, fancied political 
advantages, etc., etc. Our country is at stake. Many will give her lip 
service; few will give her self-sacrifice, sweat and brains!!! (Emphasis 
in the original) 156 
In February 1953, the new Secretary of Defense Charlie E. Wilson charged an 
ad hoc committee led by Nelson Rockefeller with recommending changes to the 
defence establishment. 157 Wilson, one of the titans of industry brought into 
government by Eisenhower, was clearly seeking to make the department conform to 
the well-established business principles of 'staff-and-line, centralization-
imperative. See Karl R. Bendetsen, 'A Plan for Army Reorganization', Military Review, 33 {I 954), 39-
60. See also Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, pp. 2 I 8-222. 
155 'Charles E. Wilson: Trained in Big Business, Now He Runs Public's Biggest Business', Life, 13 
April 1953, pp. 81-82, 85 (p. 85). 
156 Eisenhower Diaries entry, 18 October 1951. The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, NATO and the 
Campaign of 1952, ed. by Louis Galambos, XII (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1989), p. 651. In this entry Eisenhower described the need to establish a distinguished panel of experts 
from across America's professions to address this challenge. 
157 Among the membership were Nelson A. Rockefeller, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Dr. 
Vannevar Bush, Dr. Milton Eisenhower (the President's brother), and former Secretary of Defense 
Robert A. Lovett. Senior military consultants were General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral 
Nimitz, and General Spaatz. 
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decentralization, headquarters-and-field'. 158 After small modifications by the 
administration, Congress accepted the Rockefeller Committee's recommendations, 
redubbed Reorganization Plan No. 6, in June of 1953. The reorganization plan 
increased the authority of the secretary of defence over the service secretaries, and 
declared his authority 'complete and supreme' as opposed to the more benign 
'direction, authority, and control' of the 1949 amendment to the 1947 national security 
act. As one observer noted, 'the last shadow of federation was exorcised'. 159 The 
secretary, to exercise his increasingly centralized powers, was supported by six new 
functional assistant secretaries (in addition to the existing three) as well as a general 
counsel. 
The most significant effect on an emerging combat developments capability 
came from both the centralization of executive authority and the dissolution of the 
munitions board and the research and development board. These compromise 
creatures of the National Security Act of 1947 were unwieldy. By early 1950, the 
research and development board had become a maze of committees and panels with 
its membership exceeding 1500, overseen by a permanent staff of more than 300 
administrators. 160 These collective bodies were eliminated and their responsibilities 
vested in three new assistant secretaries for supply and logistics, research and 
development, and applications engineering. 
The reorganization plan also increased the authority of the chairman of the 
joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) by transferring to his office responsibility for the joint 
staff and its director. The reorganization also made the civilian service secretaries the 
'executive agents' for the overseas commands ending a practice dating to the Second 
World War where a military service chief fulfilled that role. The service secretary 
would then use the military chief of the department to 'receive and transmit orders' 
158 Wilson wrote a seven-page 'analysis of the organization problem for the members of the 
Rockefeller Committee', which all but directed them to help the him 'organize the set up the way he is 
accustomed to function.' Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956, 
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, III (Washington DC: Historical Office, Office of the 
Secretary of De fen se, 2001), p. 23. 
159 Eugene S. Duffield, 'Organizing for Defense', Harvard Business Review, 31 (1953),29-42 (p. 35). 
The trend in department of defence reorganization from the original 1947 national security act through 
the two major revisions of the law in 1949 and 1958 was to increase the power of the defence secretary 
at the expense of the service secretaries. 
160 Wilbur D. Jones Jr., Arming the Eagle: A History o/U.S. Weapons Acquisition since 1775 (Fort 
Belvoir Defense Systems Management College Press, 1999), p. 325. 
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including 'strategic direction in peace and war of the unified commands assigned [ ... ] 
and operational direction of the commands in war or emergencies'. 161 
In his transmittal of the plan to Congress, Eisenhower made clear his desire to 
use this opportunity to initiate 'badly needed' improvements. He directed that 
additional studies be undertaken to make 'secretaries truly responsible administrators, 
thereby obtaining greater effectiveness and attaining economies wherever possible.' 162 
The press for reorganization was in keeping with the new administration's 
desires to reorient defence in its business processes and a new basic strategy. In July, 
Eisenhower directed his Secretary of Defence to have the newly appointed chiefs of 
staff provide a 'summarized statement of these officers' own views on [ ... ] our 
strategic concepts and implementing plans, the roles and missions of the services, the 
composition and readiness of our present forces, the development of new weapons 
and weapons systems, and resulting new advances in military tactics, and our military 
assistance programs'. The new chiefs were expected to provide 'a fresh view', which 
accounted for 'existing circumstances'. 163 
Eisenhower was briefed on a concept paper drafted by the new JCS during 
their enforced sabbatical in August, which included a pull back of ground troops from 
overseas bases, the preparation of a strong continental defence, an increase retaliatory 
nuclear and long-range air power capability, support for the development of Allied 
defence capabilities, and 'comprehensive' mobilization plan for projecting force if 
needed. When first briefed on the concept in September, Eisenhower was enthusiastic, 
but General Matthew B. Ridgway, the new Army Chief of Staff, and others worried 
161 Edgar F. Raines, David R. Campbell, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evolution of Army 
Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the Us. Armed Forces, 1942-1985, Historical 
Analysis Series (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), p. 78. Reorganization 
Plan No. 6 was implemented by the Department of Defense in March 1954 in accordance with DoD 
Directive No. 5100.1,16 March 1954. 
162 Paul L. Davies, 'Report of the Advisory Committee on Army Organization (the Davies Report)' 
(Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1953), p. I <http://www.whs.mil/library/DiglRpt.%209-
18-53.pdf> [accessed I March 2011]. The navy and air force each conducted a similar review. 
163 Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Top secret) To Charles Erwin Wilson, I July 1953. In The Papers of 
Dwight David Eisenhower, eds., L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 291. World Wide Web facsimile by 
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The 10hns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.orglpresidential-papers/first-
term/documents/291.cfm 
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that the 'proposed cure might be worse than the disease' he was trying to treat. 164 
However, the concept did reflect many aspects of Eisenhower's strategic prejudices. It 
represented the first step towards the administration 'New Look' (National Security 
Council document 16212), a policy that emphasized the 'capacity of inflicting massive 
retaliatory damage by offensive striking power. ,165 From the beginning of this 
process, Ridgway, pressed the national security council to reject any policy that called 
for the withdrawal of forces, or assumed 'that you could prevent war through the 
deterrent effect of any single arm'. 166 Ridgway's early and growing opposition to the 
evolution of Eisenhower's 'Massive Retaliation' strategy did not interrupt the process 
of institutional changes underway in how the army prepared for future war. 167 
In September 1953, Secretary of the Army Robert Ten Broeck Stevens created 
the advisory committee on army organization in accordance with a President's 
directive. 168 The committee was charged with a broad mandate to 'consider all 
elements of the Army' in order to provide the secretary advice on 'ways and means to 
strengthen and improve the organization' as well as any other 'organizational 
problems of significance that the Committee may encounter'. 169 The advisory 
committee was soon dubbed 'The Davies Committee' after its director, Paul L. 
Davies. Davies, a corporate chief executive, was also an expert on military 
procurement and the serving director of the American Ordnance Association. Those 
looking for recommendations that might go to the heart of the army's organizational 
problems might have been disheartened, given that when assembled the committee 
164 Gerard Clarfield, Security with Solvency _ Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Shaping o/the American 
Militmy Establishment (We sport: Praeger, 1999), p. 128. 
165 For the presidents reaction to the JCS concept see, Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Secretary of State, 3 September 1953 in Foreign 
Relations o/the United States, 1952-1954. National Security Affairs (in Two Parts), ed. by, Lisle A. 
Rose, Neal H. Pertersen, II (Part 1) (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 455-
457. For NSC 162/2 see Statement of Policy by the National Security Council (undated) in Foreign 
Relations o/the United States, 1952-1954. National Security Affairs (in Two Part,I), ed. by Rose, p. 
582. 
166 Memorandum of Discussions at the 160lh meeting of the national Security Council, Thursday, 
August 27, 1953 in Foreign Relations o/the United States, 1952-1954. National Security Affairs (in 
Two Parts), ed. by Rose, p. 447. 
167 The phrase 'massive retaliation' emerged from a speech by Eisenhower's Secretary of State John 
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168 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 223. Stevens is best remembered for his confrontation with 
Senator Joseph McCarthy in the Arnly-McCarthy Hearings of 1954. 
169 Davies, 'Davies Report', pp. Transmittal letter, 1. 
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'looked like a gathering of Ordnance Alumni'.17O The composition was deliberate. 
Stevens wanted the committee to create a 'business-like approach' to the operation 
and supervision of the army. 
After interviewing 129 witnesses from across the army, the Davies committee 
made four major recommendations designed to reorient the department on 'men, 
money, and materiel. >171 Two of the recommendations - to strength civilian control 
by adding an assistant secretary position for financial management and to clarify the 
role of the chiefofstaffas the 'operating manager' of the army establishment, 'fully 
accountable' to the Secretary - were in line with the larger changes directed under 
Reorganization Plan No. 6.172 Three other recommendations were significant in the 
final process of creating an institutional combat development capability. 
First, the committee recommended that the General Staff 'be divested of their 
major responsibilities for operating activities' through the creation of two major 
commands; U.S. Continental Anny Command (CONARC) and a supply command. 173 
The commander, CONARC would assume control over the six continental armies and 
the Military District of Washington as well as take over the functions of the AFF. This 
return to a semblance of the AGF model was significant because it tried to eliminate 
the 'diffuse direction' that came from a system of supervision by staff sections. In 
addition to tradition command oversight and accountability of subordinate 
organizations, CONARC would specifically; 
• Develop plans for and supervise training of individuals and combined units 
and integrate this training with [ ... ] the technical services; 
• Maintain the testing boards to insure reflection of the user's views in 
development of material and equipment; 
• Develop long-term plans for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Armies; and 
170 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 223. Other members included captains of industry and 
veteran managers of the Second World War's industrial mobilization programme. The senior military 
advisor was Lieutenant General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. 
171 Davies, 'Davies Report', p. 10. 
m Davies, 'Davies Report', pp. 10-1 J. 
173 Davies, 'Davies Report', p.ll. 
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• Evaluate the performance of the activities for which each army is responsible 
regularly. 174 
The second major organizational recommendation was another attempt to 
settle once and for all, the argument over the technical services and their role in an 
increasingly centralized and functionalized army. The Davies Committee noted that 
because the direction and control of the technical services was diluted through the G-
4, G-l, and comptroller staffs 'much of the momentum gained in improving supply 
management, organization, procedures, and operations during World War II appears to 
have been lost'. 175 The Davies Committee found that: 
In the event of another war, there is little likelihood that the army 
would have the chance to reorganize and develop its supply 
organization after the start of hostilities. The possibility of slow-paced 
conversion and a long build-up, which characterized the early stages of 
Worlds War I and n, disappeared in the smoke over Hiroshima on 
August 6, 1945.176 
In addition to answering the question of whether the current system afforded 
adequate planning, direction, and control over the 'tremendous supply job a war 
would bring,' the Davies report went to the heart of the on-again off-again debate over 
the proper role of the technical services: 'Should those agencies of the Army (the 
technical services) that produce, procure, develop, and distribute essential weapons, 
materiel, and equipment be organized as at present by the type of item supplied or 
service rendered or is there need for change?' 177 
The committee's answer came in two significant, if still conflicted, parts. First, 
it recommended the creation of a vice chief of staff for supply. 178 This position would 
be a counterpart to a proposed vice chief of staff for operations. The primary purpose 
would be to ensure supply matters were properly integrated with 'other aspects of 
military planning' and among other logistics related tasks, resolve 'differences 
174 D . 'D . aV1es, aVles Report', p. 40. 
175 D . 'D . R aVles, aVles eport', p. 48. 
176 D . 'D . R aVles, aVles eport', p. 43. 
177 D . 'D . R aVles, aVles eport', p. 44. 
178 The Davies committee defined supply as 'the sequence of related activities that include research 
and development, computation of supply requirements, procurement, production, storage, distribution, 
maintenance, and disposal of materiel, the rendering of logistical services such as medical, 
communications, engineering, transportation, and the training of specializing troops in the activities 
and services'. Davies, 'Davies Report', p. 43. 
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between those concerned with the development of new items and those concerned 
with procurement and other aspects of supply'. 179 Second, the committee 
recommended creating a supply command to provide direction and control for the 
functions of the technical services. The new command would take responsibilities for 
direction and control over the technical services from the G-4. The Davies report was 
careful to point out - no doubt in recognition of the significant resistance such a 
recommendation would engender - that 'the scope and powers of the envisioned 
supply command would be far less sweeping than those granted the army service 
forces of World War II' .180 The Davies Committee deemed the 'immediate need' to be 
more effective management of the existing commodity oriented technical services 
vice any shift to a functional organization, a position long held by member of the 
ordnance community. 181 
The final major recommendation was to strengthen and consolidate the 
various staff functions of research and development under the existing chief of 
research and development in the G-3. The specific significance of this 
recommendation was two-fold. The first was the recognition on the part of the army 
that its organizational 'deficiencies have impeded the establishment of a creative 
atmosphere, a climate hospitable to innovation and the stimuli needed for scientific 
work.' 182 In the years prior to this recommendation, research and development 
responsibilities as well as the associated responsibility to define requirements were 
divided between the G-3 and G-4 and diffuse within each of these staffs. A series of 
deputy assistant chief of staffs for atomic energy, special weapons, guided missiles, 
were created. In 1952 most of the major functions were consolidated in the G-3 under 
the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Research, Requirements, and Special 
Weapons. Other development initiatives, such as army aviation, found them 
established as third tier branches within other G-3 divisions. The response was more 
favourable in the G-3. The Davies Committee recommendations pushed along an 
already evolutionary trend. By November 1954, all research and development had 
179 D . 'D . R aV1es, aV1es eport', p. 47. 
180 A primary difference was the new command would not have authority over the administrative 
services (Adjutant, Provost, service functions of the Continental Armies), or the overseas supply 
activities. Davies, 'Davies Report', p. 49. 
181 Hewes Jr.; From Root to McNamara, p. 226. 
182 See Davies, 'Davies Report', p. 15; Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 224. 
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moved from the G-3 to an independent directorate, the chief of research and 
development. The emphasis of the new position became 'combat developments rather 
than hardware'. 183 This still did not resolve a fundamental issue and one that makes 
the distinction between research and development and combat developments so 
critical. Who determines the requirements? 
When the army announced its reorganization plans in 1954, it accepted most 
of the Davies recommendations with the exception of the supply command. A 
rearguard action fought by the army's G-4, Lieutenant General Williston B. Palmer, 
succeeded in killing the supply command recommendation and put in place instead a 
deputy chief of staff for logistics with 'full authority for the provision, administration 
[ ... ] direction and control of seven technical services.' 184 
The Secretary of the Army's Plan for Army Organization, better known as the 
Slezak Plan after the army undersecretary charged with implementation, went into 
effect in June 1954. 185 The first phase of the reorganization actually began a few 
months earlier when the AFF came to an end and in its place was the next evolution of 
functional organization, the CONARC. Even as the Slezak reforms were being 
finalized, Secretary of the Army Stevens directed the Army Scientific Advisory Panel 
(ASAP) to establish an Ad Hoc committee to review the current combat developments 
organizations and make recommendations for improvement. 186 Dr. Leland J. IIaworth, 
Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory and a veteran ofOSRD and the MIT 
radiation laboratory during the Second World War, led the committee. The Haworth 
Report followed a well-trodden path in its three primary recommendations: the army 
needed to establish an 'intensive Combat Development program', the current AFF 
activities were 'inadequate in scope and magnitude', and the function of combat 
developments would best be served by 'an autonomous command.'187 
183 Gough Jr., Establishment and Evolution p. 17. 
184 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 232. 
185 Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 232. 
186 The secretary's use of his scientific advisory committee to examine 'research and development 
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In its more detailed recommendations, the Haworth Report made two 
additional recommendations that would, when added to the existing attributes of the 
cns, give form to a fully evolved combat development capability. First, the technical 
services should be brought into the CDS. The ensuing implementation of this 
recommendation was the clearest sign the technical services had lost the battle over 
their autonomy. The second recommendation from the Haworth Report was a repeat 
of one first made in the Project VISTA report, to establish a field experimentation 
activity. The report reiterated the Project VISTA report's finding that training 
exercises built around current doctrine and equipment represented a poor substitute 
for field experiments 'directed at seeking out ways to change and improve 
doctrine' .188 Although this recommendation was tabled as the AFF conversion to 
CONARC moved ahead, the die was cast. 
Continental Army Command and Combat Developments 
The establishment of CON ARC was a return to the general model of the AGF. 
After almost ten years of 'experimentation' on alternative approaches, most of the key 
functions necessary for an institutional approach to combat developments were finally 
vested in a single functional command. In it is initial form the commander CONARC 
was responsible to the chief of staff for: 
• Determining requirements for and military characteristics of new army 
weapons, equipment, and materie!' 
• Preparing and approving tables of organization and equipment. 
• Reviewing, developing, and recommending to the department of the 
army, new and revised doctrine. 
• Testing of doctrine, techniques, and organizations [ ... ] testing 
weapons, equipment, and materials [ ... ] and establishing such boards 
and agencies as are necessary to ensure continued development. 
• Preparation of instructional material. 
188 11 
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• Training within the continental United States. 189 
In practice there were several limitations to the CONARC model. The 
commander CONARC had three functional responsibilities: combat developments, 
training, and operations. Given that the command's primary focus was on combat 
developments, the staff position for the chief of combat developments was elevated to 
that of a deputy-commanding general. The deputy-commanding general, however, 
shared responsibility for the critical functions of combat developments with five other 
assistant chiefs of staff. Each staff section had to coordinate with other staff sections 
and agencies across the department of defence, the department of the army, and within 
its own headquarters. The cns under CONARC was 'supported by eleven agencies 
located at various Army schools under the command of CONARC, and twenty other 
agencies located either at the schools, boards, headquarters or technical and 
administrative services, or overseas commands' . 190 Once again the problem for 
combat developments was the 'wide diffusion of responsibility, authority, and control 
over resources' creating an inevitable 'lack of integration' .191 
While the cns tied together the myriad activities related to combat 
developments already in place and placed responsibilities in the newly created 
CONARC, its only authority over many of the organizations involved in critical 
aspects was through the issuance of 'standards and guidance'. In many ways, it was 
back to the problem identified by then-Brigadier General Eisenhower that too many 
parts of the system were in the hands of organizations that could be deemed 'vitaIJy 
interested-not responsible'. By the beginning of 1955, a rather eclectic collection of 
future oriented ideas, emerging concepts, new technologies, and increasingly complex 
weapon systems were piling up. In both officially sanctioned and a growing body of 
open literature, the attributes of a future oriented doctrine developed. Concepts of 
dispersion, flexibility, and mobility became the army's doctrinal watchwords in 
189 'Organization and Functions, Headquarters, Continental Army Command' (Fort Monroe: 
Continental Army Conulland, 1955), pp. 01.01-01 .02. CONARC also had unified command 
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development efforts at the Army War College, CGSG, and in the various parts of the 
CDS. 192 
Technologies, many dating back to the Stilwell Board and spurred on by an 
often unhealthy inter-service competition for public acceptance and budget share, 
matured rapidly in the middle part of the decade. Long-range surface-to-surface 
missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, tactical rockets carrying low-yield nuclear 
warheads, and increasingly capable helicopters, as well as ideas on how these 
weapons might be employed, were running along generally independent paths of 
development. 
All of this occurred at the very time that the army's new chief of staff, General 
Maxwell Taylor, needed a compelling logic to maintain near-term readiness (funding 
as well a significant role in national security) and a long-range vision for the direction 
of the army. Taylor's drive for a strategy of 'flexible response' provided the final, 
albeit unintended, push to the creation of a combat development capability. 193 Despite 
the frenetic pace of activity, the army's senior leadership was frustrated with the 
apparent lack of substantive change emerging from CDS, especially change that 
delivered near-term capabilities derived from long-range concepts. 
Combat Development and Experimentation Command 
The CDS, by late 1955, was struggling to bring coherence to the ungainly and 
still overly bureaucratic process at the very time the army was entering a frenetic five 
years of development activity. In December of that year, the AWC completed a study, 
which put forth a concept for a radical redesign of the division. 194 The study argued 
for a small, highly mobile, high technology, nuclear capable division dubbed 
'Pentomic' for its organizational emphasis on five-unit battle groups. Despite 
significant senior officer concern that the concept was too radical, Taylor approved 
192 Andrew 1. Bacevich notes that these terms became a mantra that 'obscured as much as they 
enlightened' and that 'moving from the abstract to the concrete would prove much more elusive'. AJ. 
Bacevich, The Pentomic Army: The u.s. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1986), p. 70. 
193 MaxwelI D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 108. 
194 Taylor's predecessor, Ridgway, commissioned the study 'Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts 
for Atomic-Nonatomic Army During the Period 1960-1970,' study (PENTANA for short) in 1954. 
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the study in a May 1956 briefing. 195 His impatience was clear as he told his staff to 
'avoid undue conservatism' and 'be progressive in its thinking' recognizing that some 
aspects of this concept would succeed while others would fail. Taylor agreed with the 
commander CONARC that the concept, with all of its identified limitations, should be 
'put on the wall as an objective toward which we will progress' and directed that the 
Army staff 'stay out of CONARC's business.' 196 The approach, according to the 
CONARC commander, General Willard Wyman, was to start 'by brushing aside the 
man held fast by custom - the fellow who always searched the depths of the past for 
the key to the future. We call a permanent recess for the "stand pat" school of thought 
with its fatal philosophy of "wait and see"'. 197 
No matter how mature the concepts or advanced the technologies appeared on 
paper, there was, in early 1956, little in the away of objective data to validate them. 
The problem of data is both a practical and cultural one. The am1Y had been using 
large-scale field exercises since the late 1930s to test modifications to organization, 
doctrine, and equipment. Field exercises meant to explore the emerging concepts for 
the Pentomic Army, with such names as FLASH BURN, FOLLOW ME, BLUE 
BOLT, and SAGE BRUSH, failed to provide the kind of data necessary for new 
concepts because they were essentially training or validation events for the current 
army. Small-scale experiments were conducted concurrent with the larger field 
exercises by the AFF and later CONARC beginning in 1954, but failed to provide 
data with the necessary scale or fidelity. This was the same for boards that leveraged 
panels of senior officers, such as the 1950 army equipment board (Hodge board). 
Experience and analysis of history proved to be a necessary but insufficient source of 
data in the combat developments process. 198 
195 The Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Samuel D. Sturgis, declared the concept 'completely 
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In March 1956, Wyman, fulfilling the recommendations of the Project VISTA 
and Hayworth reports, proposed the establishment of a 'combat development test and 
experimentation centre' on 166,000 acres near Fort Ord, California. 199 Following 
Taylor's approval of the Pentomic concept, the newly designated Combat 
Development and Experimentation Center (CDEC) was approved and opened in 
November 1956. Wyman announced that the CDEC concept as the doing for the man-
centric Army what facilities like Cape Canaveral and Yucca Flats were performing for 
rockets and nuclear weapons. The creation of the CDEC was itself an experiment. A 
staff of fifty officers led 3000 permanently assigned troops, under the experimental 
supervision of twenty-two civilian scientists. 
The CDEC concept was to move away from subjective field exercises and 
conduct 'controlled two-sided field war games'. Standard research techniques, field 
manoeuvres, troop tests, materiel tests all failed 'to combine what the envisioned field 
experiment was expected to supply, a union of laboratory control with battlefield 
realism'. 200 The emphasis in the experimental approach was to distinguish between 
alternatives, as opposed to validating an 'optimum' solution. 201 The CDEC was, 
according to Wyman, 'literally [ ... ] the battlefield of tomorrow - a place where 
academic theory pointing to a new doctrine can be tested and validated though 
realistic employment of men on the ground'.202 
Despite the enthusiasm, the CDEC struggled in its first few years to develop 
the methodology, systems, and scale necessary to fully examine the Pentomic 
concept. Its creation did, however, mark the beginning of a major institutional change 
in how the army's approach to the future. A 1958 study of the CDEC validated the 
need by noting: 
Military organizations have continued to win battles by adapting 
weapons and methods of operation to changing conditions. Elementary 
Development and Testing, OORR 57-1 (Washington DC: Office of Ordnance Research, 1955) 
<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA41 71 91 &Location=V2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdt> 
[accessed 1 March 2011]. 
199 Personal Letter from General Wyman, CONARC, to General Taylor, Chief of Staff, VS Army, 5 
March 1956. Cited in 'V.S. Army Combat Development System', p. 13. 
200 John L. Romjue, 'Development ofInstrumentation Technology for Military Field Experiments, 
Vsacdec 1956-1973' (Fort Monroe: VS Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1974), pp. 4-5. 
201 Franklin C. Brooks, Floyd 1. Hill, 'A Laboratory for Combat Operations Research', Operations 
Research, 5 Cl 974), 741-749 (p. 743). 
202 Wyman, 'The Pentomic Division', (p. 432). 
165 
wisdom demands that critical changes in military capability be made 
prior to decisive battles. In fact, the national welfare may be 
determined during the first days of a future war by the effectiveness of 
new organizations and methods of operation. Quickly shifting military 
requirements must be translated into new concepts now. There is little 
tolerance for error. 203 
Conclusion 
By 1960 all of the major elements of a fully functional combat developments 
capability were in place - save one. In the years following the Second World War the 
army moved from a traditionalist- to a functionalist-based system of delivering 
capabilities to the combat arms; it consolidated under a single command a 'system' 
for creating new battlefield capabilities; and it created an experimentation centre to 
explore solutions to the challenge of future war in a holistic manner. Despite the 
nearly complete transformation of these activities, the issue of span of control and the 
complexity of coordination remained. 
The ultimate solution was found in the creation of two commands as 
recommended by numerous boards, panels and studies in the previous fifteen years. In 
February 1961, Secretary of the Army Elvis 1. Stahr, Jr., at the direction of the 
secretary of defence, commissioned the first major study of the department since the 
Davies committee and the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958. Led by the army's 
comptroller, Leonard W. Hoelscher, the 'Study of the Functions, Organization and 
Procedures of the Department of the Army Reorganization of the Department of the 
Army' (subsequently called OSD Project 80 or the Hoelscher Study) was unique in 
both quality and depth compared to previous efforts for two primary reasons. 
First, Hoelscher personally selected the study team personnel and sought out 
people with 'inquiring, analytical minds and the kind of broad gauge training at the 
army war college or the command and general staff school which emphasized the 
Army as a whole rather than the interests of a particular arm or service.' Second, he 
drove a study approach that eschewed cloistered debates over organizational charts 
and instead collected data from the ground up. The study developed its finding after 
203 'Report by USCONARC Ad Hoc Committee on Evaluation of the U.S. Army Combat 
Development Experimentation Center' (Fort Monroe: US Army Continental Command, 1958), p. 5. 
(MHI U394.0n U54 1958) . 
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pouring over almost 400 reports and conducting some 600 interviews.204 Following 
the logic of previous studies, OSD Project 80's assessment of combat developments 
under CONARC's management noted many familiar frictions and debates. 
Management issues such as span of control, competing imperatives, functionalization 
versus commodity approaches, which plagued the department of the army and army 
staff were present in miniature under CONARC. In the area of developing future 
capabilities, CONARC for all intents and purposes had become a second Department 
of the Army. 205 
The solution was as simple as it was sweeping. In its October 1961 final 
report, OSD Project 80 recommended the creation of an independent Combat 
Developments Command (CDC).206 In addition to creating a CDC, the report 
recommended the army create an Army Materiel Command (AMC) to manage the 
functions previously held by the technical services. The long and acrimonious fifteen-
year battle between the technical services and the functionalists came to an inglorious 
end. As one historian described it, the chief of ordnance was abolished 'with a stroke 
of a pen'. 207 OSD Project 80 was a compelling study that supported fundamental 
change with a 'strong and continuing emphasis on anticipation of the nature of future 
military demands and on planning and action to meet them'.208 The long and tedious 
process of moving the army from a decentralized, ad hoc approach to developing 
future capabilities finally moved to one where combat developments was an 
institutional priority. The creation of combat developments as the core of the 
institutions capacity for innovation was more than just the natural evolution of a 
previous processes; the change marked the beginning of a significant and still 
underappreciated cultural change. The creation of what would be called a combat 
developments process signalled a fundamental change in how the army approached 
the challenge of preparing for future war. 
204 ' Hewes Jr., From Roof fa McNamara, pp. 319-320. 
205 Martin Biumenson, 'Reorganization of the Army, 1962' (Washington DC: V.S. Army, 1965), pp. 5-
9. 
206 d f h F . 0 .. d Leonard W. Hoe1scher, 'Overall Report (Part J)" Stu y 0 t e unctIons, rgamzatlOn, an 
Procedures of the Departm~nt of the Army - OSD Project 80 (Army) (Washington DC: Depatment of 
the Anny, 1961), pp. I-xi - I-xii. 
207 Rose, American Rifle, p. 376. 
208 Hoelscher, 'Overall Report (Part I)', pp. I-iv. 
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Chapter Three - Education and Doctrine 
Development 
This chapter explores the role the Command and General Staff College 
(CGSC) played in changing the way the army prepared for war in the period of the 
early Cold War. 1 The college served a unique function in the army through this 
period. It was responsible for not only the education of the next generation of senior 
officers, but also for the development of combined arms doctrine. This dual mission 
makes examining the college a useful surrogate for understanding the army's internal 
debates about future war. This chapter traces the debate through a succession of 
commandants as they attempted to reconcile their organization's proven past with an 
uncertain future. After providing some background on the role of military education 
and the college in the army, it breaks the early Cold War into four periods. The first 
period was the immediate post-war years. Even as the wartime success of its 
graduates validated the CGSC of old, the question of what to teach and even how to 
teach in an era of rapid change presented major challenge. The second period is 
characterized by attempts to incrementally apply new concepts to old without 
upsetting the status quo in the early 1950s. Even as combat in the Korean War 
appeared to validate the traditionalist view, the strategic implications of the war 
combined with advances in tactical atomic weapons to drive the college toward 
change. The third period covers the two-year tour of a single commandant, Major 
General Garrison Davidson. Rather than continue with the incremental approach of 
his predecessors, Davidson created a concept to integrate both the education and 
doctrine missions of the college to create a logical link between past, present, and 
future. The final four-year period also fell under a single commandant, Major General 
I The Command and General Staff College changed names several times during the period covered in 
this dissertation. For simplicity, the acronym CGSC will be used to refer to the schools at Fort 
Leavenworth. The institution began in 1881 as the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry 
(referred to at the time as the School of Application). In 1886 it was renamed the U.S. Infantry and 
Cavalry School. In 1901, after the Spanish-American War hiatus, and as a part of Secretary Root's 
reforms, the school was renamed the Army Staff College (which included a School of the Line and a 
General Staff School). In 1922, the school's functions were realigned with the Army War College and 
it became the'Command and General Staff School. In May 1947, the institution was designated the 
Command and General Staff College. 
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Lionel McGarr. McGarr's tour was marked by a significant emphasis on change but 
by little effort to reconcile the inherent tensions between the army's past and its 
obligations for the future. 
Despite the often-circuitous path, the college between 1945-1960 transformed 
from an organization singularly focused on preparing officers to execute existing 
doctrine to one that oriented on developing future-oriented doctrine and educating 
officers for an unknown future. 
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Background and History of CGSC 
For most of the army's history prior to the Second World War, it lived a 
distinctly cloistered, mostly peacetime existence. One commentator described army 
garrisons through 1904 as 'monasteries in which the soldier's father superior was a 
two-fisted sergeant and his abbot a company commander. ,2 America's political culture 
all but guaranteed that outside of occasional national emergencies, a small regular 
army would remain dispersed across a continent, and thus unable to threaten the 
republic. For this and other reasons, the United States was slow to develop the 
education,al institutions associated with a professional military. Slowly, however, a 
few 'schools of application' emerged during the nineteenth century, culminating with 
the direct forerunner of the casc, the U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, a war for which the quality of the 
officers depended more on luck and bloody experience than it did on any form of 
professional study, a post-war study argued for increased military education: 
The march of general science long since elevated the arts of national 
defence from the sphere of muscle to the domain of mind. While rare 
genesis will sometimes supply in part, even in the art of war, the 
results of the patient preparations of study, yet nations cannot, without 
fatuity, entrust their destinies to the vague changes of such miracles.3 
However, the end of the Civil War also unleashed a strong anti-intellectual 
current within the army. Some veteran officers, professionals and volunteers alike, 
discouraged the academic study of war as a distraction from the experienced based 
learning of 'real war,.4 The confederate general John Bell Hood wrote that: 
[T]he highest perfection in the education of troops, well drilled and 
disciplined, can only be attained through continual appeals to their 
pride, and through incitement to make known their prowess by the 
2 Colonel Ernest Dupuy quoted in John W. Masland, Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: 
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 4. 
3 Major Joseph H. Whittlesey, 'Report on National Military Education with the Plan of a System for 
the United States' (Washington DC: War Department, 1867), p. 7. 
4 Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, 
and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 
16, 
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substantial test of guns and colours, captured upon the field of battle. 
Soldiers thus educated will ever prove a terror to the foe. 5 
Nostalgia for the educational value of the battlefield waned as a new 
generation emerged and wars in Europe pointed to the possibility of more bloody war 
to come. In 1875, Brigadier General Emory Upton embarked on a round-the-world 
mission to 'examine and report upon the organizations, tactics, discipline, and 
manoeuvres of the armies along the route mentioned, and in Germany the special 
examination of the schools for the instruction of officer'. 6 Upton's detailed report 
emphasized the need to expand professional military education in the United States by 
contrasting its current state with that of the rest of the world where 'most 
governments have established post-graduate institutions for nearly all arms of service, 
where meritorious officers, from whatever sphere they may enter the army, may study 
strategy, grand tactics, and all the sciences connected with modern war'. 7 Upton saw a 
'war academy' as the essential antidote to 'how ignorant our generals were, during the 
war, of all principles of generalship'. 8 
In 1881, General William T. Sherman, acting in part on recommendations 
from the Upton report, founded the School for the Application of Cavalry and Infantry 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This early predecessor to the CGSC began a trend 
where responsibility to develop professional officers transitioned from an informal 
one to a formalized education system. Sherman, in a 25 October 1882 address to the 
School of Application, reminded the officers that: 
The object of the Army is the same today as it was in 1792 - to 
maintain peace on our extensive frontier; to prepare the way for the 
coming immigrant; to sustain the civil powers in maintaining order 
among our adventurous and somewhat irregular classes; to preserve a 
nucleus for a larger army, should it be needed; and finally and most 
important of all, to preserve and keep alive the knowledge and habits, 
the tone and !>pirit, the peculiar devotion and patriotism of the soldier, 
5 1. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States 
Armies (New Orleans: Beauregard, 1880), p. 132. Hood went on to lionize the educational benefits of 
the 'heroic attempt to scale the mgged heights of Gettysburg' and the 'gallant charge over the 
breastworks at Gaines's Mill.' 
6 Order from Secretary of War WiIliam W. Belknap, reproduced in Emory Up ton, The Armies of 
Europe & Asia (London: Griffin & Co, 1878), p. iv. 
7 Upton, The Armies of Europe & Asia, pp. 362-363. 
8 Letter fronl Upton to Colonel Henry A. Du Pont, 1 April 1877. Cited in Peter S. Michie, The Life and 
Letters ofEl1lory Upton (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1884), p. 418. 
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so that these qualities may be forthcoming, should the nation s honor 
demand them, at the shortest notice. (Emphasis added) 
Sherman noted that merely 'preserving' the knowledge and usage might not be 
enough. 
All real knowledge is of use; but in war, as in science, art, and 
literature, for the higher branches we must look to books - the 
recorded knowledge of the past [ ... ] But you must not stop there. Your 
country expects you to go on, to keep pace with the general knowledge 
of the world, especially of those branches of knowledge, which have 
been and ever must be characteristics of the successjid military 9 . 
officer. (Emphasis added) 
In the decades that followed, this institution, in all of its incarnations, became 
the intellectual engine of a professional army. Post-graduate education and the 
emergence of an intellectual framework through which the army could adapt to the 
context of war made rapid progress from 1881-1898, but the context in which 
Americans would fight wars was changing faster than the curriculum. 
In 1898, the army suspended the school as it mobilized for the Spanish-
American War and the subsequent Philippine Insurrection. Wholesale failures in the 
planning, preparation, and support of military operations in the war led to major top-
down reforms, which would have a major impact on education in the army. In his 
1901 annual report, Secretary of War Elihu Root made the case to reopen the school at 
Fort Leavenworth, but with an eye toward moving beyond the tactical application of 
infantry and cavalry. The redesigned school opened its doors in September 1902 as 
the General Service and Staff College. Over the next fifteen years, the college moved 
through several organizational and name changes. Eventually there were three schools 
at Leavenworth under the title the General Service Schools: the School of the Line, 
the General Staff School, and the Signal Corps School. The curriculum in the early 
twentieth century reflected a mix of the traditional emphasis on the application of 
9 General W.T. Sherman, 'Address to School of Application, Fort Leavenworth KS,' (23 October 
1882), pp. 5,7; CARLDL, <http://cgsc.cdmhost.comlu?/p40I3coIl4,352 > [accessed I December 
2010]. Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth KS (Hereafter CARLDL). 
Sherman later wrote in his memoirs, the phrase that has become associated with his thoughts on th~ 
army's schools when he said that professional soldiers of the regular ar~lY should seek to be ~rga~l~ed 
and governe'd along 'true military principles' that will 'preserve the habIts and usages of war . Wllham ' 
T Sh L{',rG' f W. T. {'I-erman (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1891), p. 406. 
. erman, JV1emOlrs OJ enera . . ,HI 
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combined arms tactics, but moved increasingly toward large unit operations and even 
educational subjects more applicable to a graduate school. 10 
In 1916, as the army oriented itself on a potential war in Europe, the schools at 
Fort Leavenworth closed once again. Graduates of the General Staff School were in 
high demand during the First World War. After the war, the former AEF commander, 
General John 1. Pershing, noted that 'had it not been for the able and loyal assistance 
of the officers trained at these schools, the tremendous problems of combat, supply, 
and transportation could not have been solved'. 11 Having an educated cadre of staff 
officers capable of organizing the mobilization, training, and deployment of large 
numbers of troops was the payoff of the Root reforms and became the focus of the 
education immediately after the First World War. 
The General Service Schools reopened after the war and soon went through 
additional changes in form and focus. Beginning with the post-war classes, most 
students attended both the School of the Line and the General Staff School as a single 
two-year program. The major distinction between the two was increasingly one of 
echelon. Upon the recommendation of a board of officers, the two schools combined 
to form the Command and General Staff School. The curriculum was adapted to a 
one-year program The board also recommended that the higher-level staff functions, 
at the level of army and above, become part of the AWC curriculum. The two-year 
program resumed between 1928 and 1935, but an increased demand for graduates 
returned the program to a one-year model where it has remained. 
Between 1919 and 1940, the veterans of the AEF and the institutions they 
created 'expected to return to Europe to finish the unfinished business of the world 
war'. They also injected an institutional bias into the curriculum that anticipated the 
repeat of tactical and operational challenges of the Meuse-Argonne offensives in the 
next Great War. 12 It would be too simplistic to ascribe the motivation behind this view 
10 The AmlY School ofthe Line (as it was then called) managed its cun-iculum through four 
departments: Military Art, Engineering, Law, and Languages. For details on the specific changes 
during this period, see The Army Service Schools, (Fort Leavenworth: Press of the Army Service 
Schools, 1916). A copy can be found at CARLDL http://cgsc.contentdm.ocIc.org/u?/p4013coIl4,71 
[Assessed 5 January 2011]. 
11 Pershing's 1924 quote cited in Elvid Hunt, History o/Fort Leavenworth 1827-1937 (Fort 
Leavenworth: The Command and General Staff College Press, 1937), p. 155. 
12 Peter J. Schifferele, Americas School/or War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education and Victo/y in 
World War IJ (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010), p. 189. 
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to the well-worn cliche that generals always prepare to fight the last war. For many 
veterans of the AEF, the particular tactical American lessons of the war were well 
documented and adaptable to the defence needs of the continental United States. 13 
Despite reaffirmations of the continued superiority of the infantry, the war sparked a 
vigorous debate on the value and balance of combined arms.14 In some areas, armour 
and aviation in particular, 'the war provided the catalyst for internal reform that 
ultimately resulted in new organizations and doctrine.' 15 At the operational and 
strategic level, the frustration and scandals resulting from mobilization were well 
documented. Both the Awe and the eGSe dedicated much of their curricula to 
mobilization - related issues. 16 But at the same time, debates over fundamental U.S. 
military policy, powerful and entrenched parochial interests among within the 
institution, and twenty years of chronic underfunding conspired to keep the 
orientation on perfecting what was and much less on imagining what might be. 
A military's education curriculum is a pointer to where the institution believes 
its future lies. Prior to the Second World War, a major emphasis of instruction at the 
CGSC was on 'tactical principles and decisions, consist[ing] of increasingly complex 
tactical problems involving increasingly large combined arms formations'. The 
imagined application of such knowledge was immaterial. It was enough to create staff 
officers and commanders of sufficient quality that they could operate the 
organizations they were also being taught how to mobilize and train. Despite some 
criticisms of the interwar curriculum for being narrow, unimaginative, and 
conservative, its influence both before and after World War II is undeniable. ]7 Of the 
thirty-four officers who commanded at the corps level during the war only one, James 
A. Van Fleet, did not either attend or attend and also teach at CGSc. 
13 Dennis J. Vetock, 'Lessons Learned: A History of US Army Lesson Learning' (Carlisle Barracks: 
US Army Military History Institute, 1988), pp. 47-51. 
14 Mark Ethan Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War 1 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 343-364. 
15 William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation o.lU.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), p. 77. 
16 The Army Industrial CoUege opened in 1924 under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War to 
specifically educate officer to work with industry in support of national mobilization in the future. 
17 For a detailed recitation and refutation of the critics, see Timothy K. Nenninger, 'Leavenworth and 
Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940', The Journal of Military 
mstory, 58 (1994),199-231 (p.203). 
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The basic doctrine of the army, which also formed the heart of Leavenworth 
curriculum during the interwar period, was remarkably stable. 18 The basis of all but 
higher level, or combined arms, doctrine during this period was the Field Service 
Regulations (FSR). A board of officers at the General Staff School received the charge 
from the WDGS to revise the 1914 FSR with the express purpose of creating' an 
authoritative reference book for officers in the field.' 19 In a process that would 
become an institutional pattern for doctrinal development in later years, a committee 
of experienced officers at Leavenworth drafted an expansive document. According to 
the committee's covering letter the draft gave 'a comprehensive and correct idea of 
the responsibilities and functions of the various government agencies in the 
preparation for war and the conduct of war, as well as the doctrines thereof'. 20 
The Leavenworth committee, and the subsequent reviews, drew heavily on the 
experience of the AEF in the development of FSR 1923. A common intellectual theme 
ran throughout the army during this period - the fundamentals of the American way-
of-war were sound and the AEF experience validated that notion.21 One should not be 
surprised that existing notions of doctrine carry significant weight, especially with 
those also charged with teaching it take part in any rewrite. Doctrine rarely, if ever, 
begins with a blank page. Doctrine is, as one commentator would later define it, 'a· 
generalization based on sufficient evidence to suggest a given pattern of behaviour 
will probably lead to a desired result. ,22 In the case of the FSR, recent experience in 
Europe provided all of the 'sufficient evidence' needed to validate the status quo. As 
18 The Field Service Regulation of 1923 remained in effect until a new version was finally published 
in May 1941 under the title Field Manual 100-5. The term 'doctrine' was not an official one within the 
U.S. Army until after the Second World War. Regulations served the purpose, as articulated in the first 
official definition of doctrine, of providing a 'compilation of principles and policies [ ... ] which have 
been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought and indicate 
and guide but do not bind in practice.' Special Regualtion 320-5-1, DictionaJY o.fUnited States Army 
Terms (Washington, DC, 1950) (78). 
19 Odom, Ajier the Trenches, p. 30. 
20 Cited in Odom, After the Trenches, p. 33. 
21 Between December 1918 and June 1919, some twenty different boards met to provide input to the 
AEF's Superior Board for Organization and Tactics. The boards included branch-specific combat arms 
like infantry, cavalry, and artillery, as well as technical services such as transportation, medical and 
ordnance. The heroic notions of an infantry-centric army, imbued with 'offensive spirit' while 
executing what was loosely termed as 'open warfare,' were seen as the primary legacies of the AEF 
experience. See Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War, pp. 252-264; Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo 
o.lBattle - the Armys Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 116-150. 
22 I. B. Holley Jr., 'Concepts, Doctrines, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand These Terms', Air 
University Review, 35 (1984), 90-93 (p. 92). 
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the director of Fort Leavenworth's School of the Line wrote in his 1919-1920 annual 
report: 
Our experiences in the European War have been sufficient and the 
results so creditable that we have little or no need to borrow tactical 
doctrines from a foreign country. The tactical principles and doctrines 
heretofore recognized and taught at the Leavenworth Schools have 
been tested in the European War and have been found to be as sound 
today as heretofore. 23 
The dynamics for doctrinal innovation for the remainder of the interwar period 
were established in the middle 1920s. The FSR provided a framework of infantry-
centric combined arms, under or around which the other arms developed specific 
tactical and technical innovations. The 1920 National Defense Act, combined with the 
unwillingness of Congress to fund even its own legislation, all but forced the small 
professional army to perfect the past. The army's institutional focus until 1939 was 
not on the nature of the next waror even the optimal capabilities needed, but on its 
ability to mobilize and train a citizen army to fight. As one historian described the 
army's dilemma: 
By 1930, technological developments clearly demonstrated the need 
for revised doctrine. But without a battlefield to test the new ideas 
. generated by those developments, one person's conceptions are as 
good as another's. Economic constraints prevented large-scale unit 
exercises. The resulting inability to test new weapons, equ~ment, 
organization, and tactics stagnated doctrine development. 2 
This is not to say that interest in the changing character of war during the 
interwar period did not exist at Fort Leavenworth; quite the contrary. The impact on 
existing doctrine and concepts of innovations like mechanization and aviation did 
receive attention, especially in the mid to late 1930s. As one historian noted, 'CGSS 
instructors tested new ideas on employment of mechanized and tank forces, beyond 
what then- current policy and doctrine required' .25 Tentative steps to move beyond the 
current and approved doctrine and conceptualize a potential future were reflected in 
23 Memorandum From Lt. Col. H. A. Drum, Director, The School of the Line to Assistant 
Commandant, The General Service Schools. Subject: Annual Report, 1919-1920, in 'Annual Report of 
Major General Charles H. Muir, Commandant, the General Services Schools, 1920' (Fort Leavenworth: 
The General Services School, 1920), p. 19. Annual reports from the schools at Fort Leavenworth 
between 1882-1936 are available at CARLDL 
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/archivallannualreports.asp [5 December 2010]. 
24 Od om, Afier the Trenches, p. 78. 
25 Nenninger, 'Leavenworth and Its Critics', (p. 220). 
176 
such student texts as Tactical Employment a/the Mechanized Division (Tentative) 
(1937). This document, while not official doctrine and written about a force that did 
not yet exist, did sow 'the theoretical seeds from which grew the World War II 
armored divisions'. 26 This kind of institutionalized intellectual innovation was 
limited, however. To place it in context, consider that during the 1938-1939 class, the 
school dedicated almost 200 hours of instruction to teaching the 'square' division, a 
First World War-era formation, which would disappear only a few months later. At the 
same time, the school allocated only twenty-nine hours to the study of mechanized 
units and a mere thirteen hours to aviation subjects.27 The future, as far as doctrine 
was concerned, had a short horizon. 
Finally, although to a lesser degree than other professional journals of the day, 
the college's journal, Military Review, provided a forum for new ideas or a place to 
defend old ones. Begun in the early 1920s as a supplemental source of instruction 
intended to keep officers up to date, the early versions of Military Review were 
limited itself to book reviews and summaries of published articles. Beginning with an 
article in 1933 by a future chief of staff, then Major, J. Lawton Collins, Military 
Review began to publish more original and 'unofficial' works. By the late 1930s, it 
was regularly publishing articles on the new tactics and technology being 
demonstrated in Europe and Asia and occasionally new capabilities being developed 
in the United States. 28 Military Review played an important role in stimulating 
interwar interest on subjects outside the curriculum. However, it was hampered by 
two traits. First, content was often command-directed or of a semi-official nature. 
This often limited interest and quality because it merely served to reinforce, not 
26 Nenninger, 'Leaven worth and Its Critics', (p.221). 
27 David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and lIeavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 
(Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1998), p. 224. During this last pre-war class, the curriculum did 
manage to squeeze in 31 hours of equitation to the curriculum. A sizable minority of the students 
thought the curriculum inadequately addressed recent innovations. In a survey of the 1939 CGSS 
Regular Class, the subjects that students thought inadequately covered were aviation and mechanized 
units. See Questionnaire, Regular Class in Command and General Staff School, 'Annual Report, 
Command and General Staff School, 1938-39' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff 
School, 1939), p. 8. CARLDL. 
28 Between 1922 and 194J, the publication underwent numerous name change~ ~nstruc~ors' Summary 
0/ Military Articles, Review o/Current Military Writings, Review o/Current Millta'Y. ~/teratur~, 
QZlal·' I R' {~""I't L·t t The COlnmand and General Staff School Military ReView, and ery eVlewo JVlllaJY lera.ure,l' . ,... 
final I . t M' '1' . R . F t R Blackbum 'Military ReVIew, 1922-1972, Military ReView, 52 y JUs I ltary eVlew. orres. , 
(1972), 52-62. 
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challenge, the status quo. The second limitation no doubt owes much to the first. 
Until 1972, Military Review did not include a reader's forum that would allow for the 
exchange of ideas and a continuing dialogue. 29 
Despite the efforts of innovative instructors and a sometime lively discourse in 
the professional journals, graduates of the Leavenworth programme during the 
interwar period were 'intended to become problem solvers rather than visionaries and 
motivators' .30 For many, the Leavenworth interwar curriculum's focus on handling 
large units and mastering staff skills for a force that was not yet mobilized was overly 
narrow. For others, especially those focused on the war clouds in the immediate 
future, it was not narrow enough. 
On 4 March 1939, General George C. Marshall wrote to the new CGSC 
commandant, Brigadier General Leslie J. McNair, to express concern over the 'state 
of affairs' at Fort Leavenworth. Noting that the current staffs were 'too close to the 
trees to see the woods,' he admonished McNair to make swift progress in 
modernizing the curriculum, with special emphasis on the air component and the 
National Guard. Marshall was particular concerned with the relevance of the 
education programme to the near-term training requirement, describing how he was 
'horrified by the methods taken by [r]egular officers in handling these partially 
trained troops', and 'depressed by the laborious [ ... ] command post technique and 
procedure displayed'. Marshall wanted a programme that could prepare the army for 
the 'first three or four months' of the next war. Whereas the pre-war curriculum had 
concentrated on serving a fully mobilized force along the lines of existing 
mobilization plans, Marshall deemed it fundamental that officers address the 
29 Th I' 't' h t k t th r help to explain why the content of Military Review through ese Iml atlOns, w en a en oge e, 
th ' d 1945 1960 I I tl t the prl'orities of the Leavenworth commandants than they e peno - more c ose y re ec s 
d th ' d h' A f MilifaryRev;ewbetween 1945-1959 found that 72 o e mterests of the rea ers lp, survey o· "J 
, ' h d dd d the subject oftactlcal atomIc or nuc ear warfare. 
percent of the 172 artIcles pubhs e a resse , ' 0 ed to twent -two retlectin the 
Between 1960-1965, the number of articles on thIs !su~Ject,~ur PSP "uclear D~'fr;n;: 1945-1 ~80 
W ' P R "''he Evo UfTOn OJ "IV< anmg official interest. See John . ose, l' 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp, 57, 72. I ' , , 
30 , h'l hy of Command , The Journal of Mlltfary IllsfOry, 
Harold R. Winton, 'Toward an American P I osop 
64 (2000), 1035-1050 (p. 1044), 
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problems associated with a partially trained and equipped force rather than the 
'Leavenworth fourth-year-of-a-war type'. 31 
In accordance with the Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939, the army 
modified its school system's mission significantly to satisfy the skyrocketing 
requirements for even-minimally trained staff officers. In 1940, the army's war 
college closed for the duration, followed in 1941 by the Industrial College. 32 The 
senior student body and the highly experience teaching staffs of these institutions 
were just too critical to the rapidly expanding WDGS. The school at Leavnworth, did 
remain open, but with major modifications. 
Beginning in November 1940, CGSC taught a shortened ten-week wartime 
version of the traditional nine-month curriculum termed the general staff course. 33 
The aim of the special course was to train and not educate. The curriculum focused on 
preparing staff officers for the increasingly complex staffs of armies, army groups, 
and combined (i.e., multinational) headquarters. A total of twenty-seven special 
classes graduated more than 20,000 staff officers by the time the wartime programme 
ended in May 1946. 
Throughout the war, the college was heavily involved in drafting, reviewing, 
and teaching revised doctrine. Doctrine development in the interwar years had been 
an evolutionary effort meant to keep the army relevant to the requirements of 
mobilization planning. During the war it shifted to an even shorter time horizon. 
Changes occurred as a result of lessons and insights brought back from overseas 
battlefields, or in an attempt to update existing doctrine based on new organizational 
changes and materiel developments. 
Leavenworth was also no longer the exclusive source of combined arms 
work.34 The post-1942 WDGS reorganizations and the creation of AGF, AAF, and 
ASF staffs all added to doctrine development. Moreover, new organizations and staff 
31 Marshal! to Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.e., 4 March 1939. The Papers of 
George Callet! Mm'shall, "the Soldierly Spirit," December 1880-June 1939, ed. by Larry L. Bland and 
Sharon Ritenour Stevens, 1 (Baltimore: The lohns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 707-708. 
32 The AmlY War College was closed in the summer of 1940 and did not reopen until 1950. The Army 
Industrial College ran a shortened course in 1940, closed in 1941, and reopened in 1944. 
33 Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, /listory of Military Mobilization in the United States 
Army 1775-1945 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1955), pp. 611-612. 
34 For most of the war, the CGSC was under the command of the ASF while its curriculum and its role 
in the drafting of doctrine fell under the G-3. 
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activities focusing on the explosion of new technology, such as the OSRD, emerged 
as surprising sources of doctrinal inputs. 
Determining the form of fut!1re army education in the post-war era began a 
year before the war ended. In July 1944, the War Department's lead planner for a 
post-war army, Brigadier General W.E Tompkins, solicited the commandant of 
CGSC's views on the 'scope of the post-war Command and General Staff College.' 35 
Major General Karl Truesdell, commandant since 1942, replied with a staff study in 
September which recommended that the war department continue with a wartime 
training program often to sixteen-week courses designed to produce air, ground and 
service force qualified staff officers at the division level. In addition, Truesdell 
recommended the creation of a twenty-week-long long advanced general staff course 
called the command class. This course would serve to fill the gap created by the 
closure of the AWC at the start of the war and recreate the dual-track nature of the 
Leavenworth program. While Truesdell's proposal was not well received by the 
WDGS, which anticipated a return to the traditional yearlong program, it did serve as 
the basis for an interim solution until a more comprehensive military education plan 
could be designed. 36 
The first command class began in October 1945. The attendees were a select 
group primarily of lieutenant colonels, with extensive senior staff and command 
experience in combat. TruesdeIl had high hopes for this experiment, noting that it 
would be a 'proving ground to test adequately the high caliber of the students and that 
most of them will be among out future generals as the present ones fade out of the 
picture ... ,37 A graduate of the command class experiment, and future four-star 
general, Hamilton H. Howze recalled that the concept did not, in the eyes of its 
students at least, live up to its promise; 
The students, almost all colonels, had extensive war experience and 
were high quality people - full of beans and glad to be still alive. None 
was inclined to take the course very seriously, but everyone had a 
35 W.F. Thompkins to Commandant, Command and General Staff School, 7 July 1944. Cited in David 
E. Johnson, 'The United States Command and General Staff School During World War II: Transition to 
Necessity' (unpublished Masters of Military Art and Science thesis, Command and General Staff 
College, 1985), p. 96. ~ 
36 Orville Z. Tyler Jr., 'The History of Fort Leavenworth 1937-1951' (Fort Leavenworth: The 
Command and General Staff College, 1951), p. 23. 
37 Major General Karl Tmesdell, 'Command Class, Command and General Staff School', Milifmy 
Review, 25 (1945), 3-5 (p. 5). 
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happy (and instructive) time because of the company [ ... ] there was 
lots of battle-induced know-how among US. 38 
Despite such feedback, the seminar style, small group, collaborative problem-solving 
format was a radical departure from the production-line methods of the recent past 
and was, as one historian would later describe it, 'perhaps the most sophisticated 
course ever presented at the college'. 39 
A Post-War College: Education, Doctrine, and the Bomb 
In his September 1945 biennial report to the secretary of war, Marshall 
declared that for the 'common defense' a critical mission of the army was to 'furnish 
the overhead, the higher headquarters which must keep the machine and the plans up 
to date', including 'the War College, the service schools. ,40 Marshall, already 
beginning to transition major decisions on the post-war army to his successor, told 
Eisenhower on 7 September that 'if we have a Joint War College properly organized 
and directed, neither an Army nor a Navy War College would appear to be 
necessary,.41 This position, based on numerous unstated assumptions about the final 
post-war form of the War Department, became Eisenhower's during the subsequent 
debates over the future of the AWC and had a significant impact on the development 
of the CGSC. 
Given the generally conservative nature of education in a traditionally 
conservative profession, one might reasonably have expected the army's school 
system to simply revert back to its pre-war composition and focus or, as proposed by 
38 Hamilton H. Howze, A Cavalryman's StOlY - Memoirs o/a Twentieth Centwy Army General 
(Washington DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), p. 146. 
39 Robert A. Doughty, 'The Command and General Staff College in Transition, 1946-1976' (Fort 
Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1976), p. 9, in Defense Technical Information 
Center (DTIC) <<http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA030436>>[accessedlDecember201O].This was 
true up until the opening of a select second-year programme, The School of Advanced Military 
Studies, in 1986. 
40 George C. MarshalI, 'Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Am1y (July 1, 1943 
to June 30, 1945) " in The War Reports o/General o/the Army George C. Marshall, Generalo/the 
Army IJ.1l Arnold, and Fleet Admiral King (Philadelphia: lB. Lippincott Company, 1947), pp. 141-
300 (p. 295). 
41 Marshall to Eisenhower, Radio No. WAR-60819, September 7, 1945, in Larry L. Bland and Sharon 
Ritenour Stevens, The Papers o/George Catleft Marshall, "the Finest Soldier," Janurary 1, 1945 -
January 7,1947,5 (Baltimore: The lohns Hopkins University Press, 2003),pp. 295-297. 
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Truesdell, continue along on a modified version of the wartime programme. The fact 
that a high percentage of the army's senior leaders in 1945 were not only graduates of 
Leavenworth but also former faculty instructions, might seem to have worked in 
favour of either proven model. However, the experiences of war caused many to 
reflect on both the good and bad of the conservative model. Lieutenant General Troy 
Middleton's view serves as a useful example. Middleton, a highly regarded corps 
commander in the Second World War, was an instructor at Leavenworth from 1924-
1928 where he taught most of the division and corps commanders who would later 
serve as his peers and superiors during the war. Middleton, not surprisingly, praised 
the pre-war programme as one where the emphasis was placed on thinking, adding, 'I 
cannot think of any great military leaders who did not go through the Command and 
General Staff School. ,42 However, nostalgia for the Leavenworth experience did not 
over-ride the recognition of the danger of repeating the institutional mistakes of the 
interwar period. In 1956, Middleton observed that despite its performance in the 
Second World War, the interwar generation of officers possessed 'a woeful lack of 
imagination and a disposition to relive the days of Meuse-Argonne.,43 
On 23 November 1945, the Secretary of War directed that a board of officers 
designated the War Department Military Education Board, convene to prepare a plan 
for the post-war educational system of the army. The board of four general officers, 
presided over by Lieutenant General Leonard T. 'Gee' Gerow, was to deliver a plan, 
to include the general scope of instruction, for schools operated by the anny's major 
commands and the War Department. 44 Gerow possessed two qualifications that made 
him superbly qualified for this assignment; he was one of the best-qualified soldier-
scholars of his generation, and he was a close friend of the incoming army chief of 
staff. 
42 Quoted in Frank 1. Price, Tray I!. Middle/on: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press 1999), p. 91. 
43 Annex D: Letters to General Officers Regarding Effectiveness of CGSC Graduates and Replies 
Thereto, 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission - Command and General Staff College' (Fort 
Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1956), p. 64. Found in Combined Arms Research 
Library Archives and Special Collections, Fort Leavenworth, KS (Hereafter CARLA) N-13423.90-A. 
44 War Department Memorandum, Subject: War Department Education Board, AG334 (23 November 
1945), reproduced in Annex 1, 'Report of the War Department Military Education Board on 
Educational System for Officers of the Army' (Washington DC: War Department, 1946). (Hereafter 
known as the Gerow Board) CARLA N13423.1-2. Other members of the board, representing the 
ground, service, and air components of the army were Major Generals William G. Livesay, Donald 
Wilson, and Stanley L. Scott. 
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Gerow's career, a widely varying mix of operational and academic 
assignments, seemed tailor made for the challenge of preparing the next generation. 4S 
His record of academic excellence began at the Virginia Military Institute, where he 
graduated near the top of his class in 1911. His early career was a mix of infantry and 
signal corps assignments including deployments to Mexico and later France with the 
AEF. He was honour graduate of the of the Advanced Course of the Infantry School in 
1925 and followed that schooling with a stint at the Command and General Staff 
School where he was also the honour graduate of the class of 1926. It was at 
Leavenworth that Gerow developed a lifelong friendship with Major Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, with whom he spent many hours in their study or 'command post' as they 
called it, preparing for the tactical problems of the day.46 Additional educational 
assignments in schools for chemical warfare and armour were capped off with 
attendance at the AWC in 1931. 
After a series of tactical assignments overseas and senior level staff positions 
including service in the war department and infantry school, Gerow became the acting 
chief of war plans from 1940-1942.47 Gerow once again renewed his close friendship 
with Eisenhower, this time serving as his immediate supervisor. 48 His wartime 
commands included the 29th Infantry Division, V Corps, and finally the Fifteenth 
Army in operations spanning D-Day to the end of the war in Europe. His fellow 
officers considered him both an intellectual and a fighting general that given his 
'tendency in combat to put his headquarters too close to the front,' one not alien to the 
true nature of his profession. 49 Gerow was selected to lead the European Theater of 
45 Not everyone was enamoured with Gerow's selection. While pensively waiting to know his post-
war assignment, General George S. Patton lamented that Gerow was selected for an assignment he 
coveted and wrote, 'he (Gerow) was one of the leading mediocre corps commanders in Europe and 
only got the Fifteenth Army because he was general Eisenhower's friend.' George S. Patton, Jr., diary 
entry dated 18 August 18 1945 cited in Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier's Life (New 
York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 651. 
46 Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier~v Life (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002), p. 178. 
47 Biographical details of Leonard T. Gerow cited in Appendix 1, 'History of the Fifteenth United 
States Army, 21 August 1944 to 11 July 1945' (Fort Leavenworth: United States Army, 1946), pp. 81-
83. CARLA 940.5412. 
48 Gerow's promotion out of war plans division was both based on merit and the fact that Marshall 
knew he 'had grown stale from over-work'. Eisenhower later recalled Gerow's wry sense of humour 
with his parting words in 1942 as 'Well, I got Pearl Harbor on the book, lost the Philippine Islands, 
[and] Sumatra. Let's see what you can do.' Quoted in D'Este, Dsenhower: A Soldier's Life, p. 291. 
49 Forrest C. Pogue, Pogue's War _ Diaries of a WWIl Combat Ilistorian (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 2001), p. 24. 
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Operations (ETO) General Board because, according to Eisenhower, he was the 'most 
experienced and at the same time most progressive officer we could find. ,50 The 
assignment turned out to be was short-lived. In August, General George S. Patton was 
tapped to take over the General Board so that Gerow could return to the United States 
to take charge of a mo~e significant project, the study and leadership of the army's 
post-war educational programme. 
Upon his return to the United States, Gerow assumed his post as the 
commandant of the CGSC, a position that included command of Fort Leavenworth. 
However, his primary duty for the first few months was overseeing the Military 
Education Board, which simply became known as the Gerow Board. The board 
received the task to assess the current officer education programme and develop a 
plan that accounted for the needs of the army as well as those schools 'operated on the 
War Department level' that naturally impacted on the army. 51 
This early post-war board, despite its high visibility, was only one of several 
studies looking at proposals for post-war education. In many ways, all of these studies 
were part of the larger ongoing public debates and bureaucratic manoeuvering over 
the issues of unification. 52 To formulate their recommendations and meet the tight 
50 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), p. 452. The General 
Board was established in the European Theatre of Operations, which produced 131 separate reports. 
While this board examined doctrine, organization, and equipment in great detail its utility to 
conceptualizing the next war was limited. As one volume of the General Board report explained, it did 
'not consider or conjure with the potentials of atomic energy, rocket propulsion, guided missiles, or the 
field of radar or infrared. With the effects of these latter on the concept and conduct of future warfare 
eliminated from consideration, the study is admittedly not completely comprehensive'. 'Study of Types 
of Divisions - Post War Army', The General Board, 17 (APO 408: United States Forces, European 
Theater, 1945), p. 2. Cent er of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC (Hereafter CM H) 
UA25.U586. 
51 Memorandum from R. H. Christie, Adjutant General, WDGS, Subject: War Department Military 
Education Board, 23 November 1945. Reproduced in Annex I, 'Gerow Board', p. 14. 
52 For example: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense 
(Richardson Committee) Report (11 April 1945), recommended, although not unanimously, that a 
single department of the armed forces be created comprising the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As a 
result the Joint Staff directed General John DeWitt, commandant of the Army-Navy Staff College, to 
draw up a plan for joint post-war military education. The resulting 'General Plan for Post-war Joint 
Education of the Armed Forces' (22 June 1945) recommended an education system that would produce 
a 'common indoctrination.' DeWitt recommended a program where up to thirty percent of officers 
would attend schools outside their service. At the highest level, officers would attend an Army-Navy 
College, obviating the need for separate service War Colleges. Neither the DeWitt Plan, nor the 
Richardson Plan was acted upon, but both shaped the debates. See Harry P. Ball, O/Re,l,jJonsible 
Command ,.A History o/the Us. Army War College, Revised (Carlisle: Army War College Alumni 
Association, 1994), pp. 258-260; Masland, Soldiers and Scholars, pp. 132-133. For an overview of the 
lager unification debate in this period, see Paul Y. HaJ11mond, Organizing jar De/ense: The American 
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three- month deadline, Gerow and his fellow board members surveyed all the existing 
post-war organizational and educational plans, considered the draft recommendations 
for unification emerging from the Patch-Simpson Board, and interviewed some 
seventy-seven witnesses, primarily commanders and staff officers charged with 
educational responsibilities. S3 
The Gerow Board issued its report in early February 1946. Its specific 
recommendations were overcome by events and went largely unimplemented. 
However, the Board's report was far reaching in its influence on post-war military 
education philosophy through its propagation of a 'systematic, hierarchic approach to 
officer education'. In the words of one official historian, the Gerow Board' set the 
pattern of the education system for officers of the entire armed forces'. S4 
Gerow recognized, and made clear from the beginning, that it would be a 
mistake to return to the conservative comfort of the pre-war era. In his welcoming 
address as commandant to the command class in March 1946, he captured the tension 
inherent in educating highly experienced students in an environment of rapid 
technological change within the context and traditions of the Command and Staff 
School. In many ways, Gerow's admonition to the class defined the institutional 
challenge in the early years of the Cold War: ss 
We do not expect universal agreement with all of our teachings. Many 
of you have been successful commanders and staff officers by 
following methods appropriate to your particular theatres. There are 
many ways of winning battles and any officer who leaves this School 
with the idea that it can be done by one method only has wasted his 
time. Follow accepted procedures as a general rule but do not hesitate 
to abandon them when conditions warrant. Be flexible in your 
thinking. Study the trends offuture warfare. Adapt your thinking to the 
next war, not what you did in the last one. S6 (Emphasis added) 
Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 
186-226. 
53 Annex 1, 'Gerow Board', p. 14. For a list of the seventeen post-war military education plans 
reviewed and personnel interviewed see p. 20-2 I. 
54 Robert T. Davis II, 'The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-
2000', The Long War Series Occasional Paper (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), p. 
12; Tyler Jr., 'The History of Fort Leavenworth 1937-1951', p. 25. 
55 The Command Class was an extension of the shortened wartime program. There were only two 
session of the five-month program, the final of which graduated on 31 July 1946. The first post-war 
'regular' ten-month class began in September. 
56 Openin~address, Second Command Class, I March 1946, by LTG Leonard T. Gerow, 
Commandant, The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth Kansas. (CARL) A 
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Despite words to the contrary, getting men with several years of recent combat 
experience to internalize concepts not grounded in those experiences would prove to 
be a more difficult educational and leadership challenge. William E. DePuy, a CGSC 
student during one of the first post-war courses and a future four-star general, recalled 
that the instructors had a difficult time managing classes full of combat veterans -
each of whom 'considered himself an expert'. DePuy was appreciative, however, of 
the chance to expand his understanding of the profession and 'learn the grammar for 
one's own native language,.57 
Before the Command and Staff School could complete the transition from its 
wartime mobilization course to its peacetime curriculum, it required a clearly stated 
answer to the question: education for what? The answer to that question would orient 
the school even as the larger debates over the arn1Y's role in the nation's security and 
even the specific scope of the curriculum were being hotly debated. The Gerow Board 
defined the overall mission of the army education system with a clear orientation on 
the future: 
The mission of the educational system for officers ofthe Army is to 
provide instruction which stimulates progress in the art of war, and 
which together with actual duty in command and staff positions, will 
ensure the development of personnel capable of efficient leadership in 
the preparation for war, the prosecution of war, and the execution of 
responsibilities of the Armed forces after the cessation of hostilities. 58 
(Emphasis added) 
The emphasis on 'progress in the art of war' stands in stark contrast to the 
formal mission statement and guidance in the wake of the First World War, which 
with minor exceptions dominated the curriculum until Second World War. The War 
Department in 1919 stated that the objective of the school system for officers was to 
'provide systematic and progressive courses of instruction and training that will 
prepare each officer to perform the highest duties of command and staff 
commandant just after the First World War also 'cautioned against a predilection to base tactical 
studies and conclusions solely on the peculiarities of the World War' Memorandum from Director, 
School of the Line, to Assistant Commandant, The General Services School, Subject: Annual Report 
1920-192 I, in Appendix E, 'Annual Report of Colonel H.A. Drum, Commandant, the General Service 
Schools 1921' (Fort Leavenworth: General Service Schools, 1921). CARLDL. 
57 Henry G. Gole, General WilIiam E. Depuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2008), p. 69. 
58 
'Gerow Board', p. 5. 
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commensurate with his ability'. 59 More specifically, repeated emphasis in annual 
reports from 1920 through 1940 was to 'educate students in the practical skills 
required for effective command and control of divisions, corps, and armies.' 60 These 
practical skills manifested themselves in a tendency to train and not educate students. 
To guide the development of the new curriculum the Gerow Board proposed a 
set of eight objectives. Most of these objectives were derived from the existing CGSC 
model, such as ensuring a balanced system; preparing officers for command and staff 
assignments at multiple echelons; and developing professional traits of initiative, 
resourcefulness, mutual confidence, and respect. In combination, they were intended 
to promote understanding and coordination between the army, navy, other govemment 
agencies, and civil authorities. Two new objectives, however, supported a new goal 
for military education - innovation for an uncertain future. The Gerow Board 
declared that going forward, army education would need to: 
[S]timulate constructive thought to ensure constant appreciation of, 
and adjustment to, the trends, which may affect warfare of the future; 
and point the way to improvement in the organization, equipment and 
employment of the Army. 61 
To some degree the idea that Leavenworth would be on the leading edge of doctrinal 
development is not far removed from policy of the late 1930s where school texts 
attempted to anticipate doctrinal and technological trends. The new context demanded 
that Leavenwrth go well beyond keeping doctrine current with new technology but 
that it was to anticipate change. Or as General Shennan charged the Class of 1882, it 
was not enough just to preserve the habits of war, but to push beyond them 'keeping 
pace with the general knowledge of the worId,.62 
Leveraging his experience on the board, Gerow set about creating an 
organization and curriculum development process in preparation for the upcoming 
59 General Orders No. 112, Military Education in the Army, 25 September 1919 (Washington DC: 
War Department, 1919) (1). The term 'progressive' in the objective statement refers to an emphasis on 
improving the 'art of how to teach others,' and not the art of war. See Memorandum, Subject: 
Explanation o/Course and Other Pertinent Comments, 12 August 1919 (Fort Leavenworth: The Army 
Service Schools, 1919). CARLDL http://cgsc.cdmhost.comJu?/p4013coI14,333 [Assessed 1 December 
2010]. 
60 For a discussion of the interwar mission see Schifferele, America's School/or War: Fort 
Leavenworth, Officer Education and Victory in World War Il, pp. 63-85. 
61 
'Gerow Board', p. 5. 
62 Address to School of Application, pp. 7-8. 
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1946-1947 academic year. In late May, the WDGS issued an education guidance 
memorandum, largely based on Gerow Board concepts. Specifically, the WDGS 
directed that the college look to the future for at least a portion of its curriculum and 
build a curriculum that could more rapidly adapt to the changing character of modem 
war. According to the WDGS's interim guidance: 
The mission of the Command and Staff College is to provide 
instruction in the light o/war lessons and modern developments to 
insure: 
(1) Research and study designed to improve methods of 
administration, intelligence, tactical, and logistical procedures. 
(2) Efficient administrative, intelligence, and logistical support of the 
fighting force. 
(3) Effective development and employment of the combined ground 
anns within the framework of the anny. 
(4) Coordinated employment of divisions and corps units with Air and 
Naval forces. (Emphasis added) 
In language mirroring that of the Gerow Board, the WDGS directed that in 
addition to preparing officers 'for duty as commanders and staff' at the division and 
higher levels, the college was to: 
[K]eep aware of all developments in the means of warfare, to study 
their effects upon methods and doctrine of the army, and to recommend 
changes indicated by these developments. 63 
Organizationally, the interim guidance established a new CGSC and four 
subordinate schools: Combined Anns, Administration, Intelligence, and Logistics. 64 
Each school focused on a functional staff specialty and would be directed by the 
corresponding staff element of the WDGS. The curriculum would use three-quarters 
of the prescribed 10-month school year to teach the core subjects necessary to qualify 
officers as commanders and staff' at division and higher levels'. The remaining one-
63 Memorandum for Commandant, Command and General Staff School, from Brigadier General G.L. 
Ederle, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, WDGS, Subject: Command and Staff College, 27 May 
1946, attached to 'Gerow Board'. General Order No 25, 11 June, 1946 announced the name as 
Command and Staff College (CSC) effective May 29, 1946. General Order No. 16,8 May 1947 
changed name to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), effective 25 April, 1947. 
64 Until this change, the post-war organizations reflected the organizational pattern of the War 
Department with a Staff Division (covering personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics) and a 
Command Division (Covering the air, ground, and service arms). 
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quarter of the curriculum would be controlled by one of the four functional schools 
and be 'devoted to specialization above the corps level.' 6S 
In effect, and as a direct consequence of the failure to reopen the AWe, eGSe 
was being asked to cover in less than one year material that was previously covered 
by, at times, a two-year course plus all of the army-specific subjects included in the 
pre-war AWe curriculum. 66 Despite the otherwise progressive tone of the guidance, 
the combined effect of having to educate officers for command and staff duties from 
the division through the national level - all within a ten-month course -left little 
time for serious thought of the future of war. 
In July] 946 the War Department published its final guidance to Gerow in the 
form of War Department Circular 202. In this document, the War Department 
confirmed most of the interim guidance, added specific personnel qualifications for 
students, and made two substantive modifications. First, the circular specified the 
scope of operational education as relating to the 'effective development and 
employment of all field forces within the framework of the army group'. Second, it 
made explicit that 'doctrine taught at the college will be as prescribed by the War 
Department'. With the first addition, the scope of education was now locked-in as 
ranging from tactical through strategic. The second addition would seem to inhibit 
execution of the mission and objective statements contained in the same directive, 
which encouraged research and study based on 'war lessons and modern 
developments,.67 These contradictions were a reflection of ongoing tensions between 
the newly defined roles of Eisenhower's post-war general staff and the shifting nature 
and authority of the wartime commands - the ground, air, and recently disbanded 
service forces. 68 
65 Memorandum for Commandant Command and General Staff School, from Brigadier General G.L. 
Ederle, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, WDGS, Subject: Command and Staff College, 27 May 
1946, with Annex: Modifications of the WD 'Gerow Board'. The breakdown of schools and sponsoring 
WDGS directorates was that the School of Combined Arms would be overseen by the G-3, the School 
of Administration by the G-l, School ofIntelligence by the G-2, and the School of Logistics by the G-
4. 
66 Doughty, 'The Command and General Staff College in Transition', pp. 10-12. 
67 War Department Circular No. 202, Washington D.C., 9 July 1946, reproduced as Appendix C, 
'Survey ofthe Educational Program, the Command and General Staff College' (Fort Leavenworth: The 
Adjudant General's Office, Personnel Research and Procedures Branch, 1947), pp. 1-2. (Hereafter 
Cited as Henry Commission) CARLA R-13423.7-3. 
68 The Am1'y Service Force was disbanded effective 11 June 1946. The reorganization directive, War 
Department Circular 138 (14 May 1946) also stated the general staffs will 'plan, direct, coordinate, and 
189 
With the first regular course due to begin in September 1947, Ge~ow had little 
time in which 'to prepare a new curriculum, plan the instruction, and get a new 
programme underway'. This meant that the new curriculum would be substantially 
'based on the conduct and lessons of World War II,.69 New instructors flooded into 
Leavenworth in summer 1946, creating what could be argued was 'the most 
experienced military faculty the school would enjoy for decades'. 70 Before students 
filled Leavenworth in September, Gerow put his cadre through an intensive three-
week instructor-training programme. A civilian academic study group noted that the 
positive impact of this programme was commendable and 'probably unique in the 
annals of higher education'. 71 
While still preparing for the first class, Gerow initiated the first of what would 
be a near continuous stream of external studies, boards, and commissions designed to 
examine some portion of the school's purpose, mission, curriculum, organization, 
method, or administration. Referencing Eisenhower's 30 April memorandum, 
'Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets', Gerow requested that Dr. 
Edwin R. Henry from the Adjutant General's Personnel Research Section visit CGSC 
to 'assist materially [ ... ] in the organization, formulation and conduct of instruction; 
modernization of testing and research methods; and the establishment and operation 
of a statistical system'. Gerow also requested assistance in determining the' expert 
civilian personnel' requirements of the college. 72 Henry and a group of 'educational 
consultants', or the Henry Commission as the group became known, visited 
Leavenworth between August and December 1946 and in February 1947 delivered a 
supervise.' See James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration 
(Washington DC: United States Army, Center for Military History, 1975), p. 158. 
69 E. A. Salet, 'Reorganization of the Command and General Staff College', Military Review, 28 
(1948),3-12 (p. 3). 
70 Michael David Stewart, 'Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College 1946-1986' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kansas, 2010), p. 28. 
71 'Henry Commission (1947)', p. 49. The new instructor orientation program is explicated in 
Benjamin F. Boyer, 'Training Staff Trainers', Military Review, 26 (1946), 53-56. 
72 Memorandum to ACofS G-3, WDGS from Gerow, Commandant Command and General Staff 
College, subject: Use of Scientific and Technological Experts at the Command and Staff College, 4 
June 1946. Reproduced in Annex A, 'Henry Commission (1947)" p. 109. Henry was the Chief of 
Personnel Research in the War Department and a psychologist; Dr. Mitchell Dreese was a professor of 
educational psychology at Columbia University; Dr. Harold A. Edgerton, a prof:ssor of psychology at 
Ohio State University; and Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, an education professor at the CIty College of New 
York. 
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report. The commission made several recommendations that over time either shaped 
the direction of the college or correctly identified its path. 
The first was that Leavenworth should follow best educational practices and 
ensure the college was organized around the curriculum - not the other way around. 
The current situation, with four specialized schools, 'did not provide the integration of 
the content that the mission of the college would seem to require'. 73 The commission 
noted that this was not surprising given that, in accordance with War Department 
Circular 202, 'the organization of the college preceded the development of the 
curriculum'. Since it did not directly flow from the educational objectives, the 
organization of the college 'had considerable influence in determining the nature of 
the curriculum'. The solution was to split the college by echelon, where one college 
would focus on division, corps, and army level related material and a new four-school 
'university' would focus on general staff training above army level. 74 
The second commission recommendation was that in the future, curriculum 
planning should rest under the control of the assistant commandant, members of the 
department of analysis and research, and a representative of the other departments. 75 
This was necessary given the 'directive nature' of the WDGS sections charged with an 
oversight role in the education of staff officers, and was the best way to ensure the 
curriculum determined the organizational character of the college. 
Finally, the commission observed that, although the college promoted a 
philosophy of' applicatory and experimental' teaching methods, the students spent 
considerable time engaged in what was described as 'passive learning'. While much 
of this failing was ascribed to lack of preparation time for this first class, it was made 
worse by a tendency to teach core subjects to the entire student body in an 
auditorium. 76 The commission found such teaching techniques 'of questionable 
validity', joking that 'it is for good cause that the college professor had been 
73 'Henry Commission (1947)" p. 5. 
74 This recommendation was the first of many which pointed to the need for a War College to 
adequately meet the army's education requirement. See Ball, a/Responsible Command pp. 267-280 
7S 'Henry Commission (1947)', pp. 15-27. 
76 Gerow estimated that for every hour of platform instruction, his instructors must put in some sixty 
hours of research. 'Conference on the AGF School System (3-4 March 1947), (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and Staff College, 1947), p. 23. CAR LA N-J3423.18. 
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characterized as a man who talks in somebody else's sleep'. 77 By contrast the use of 
discussion groups, although too often narrowly focused on existing doctrine, often 
provoked a 'vigorous debate' between students and their instructors. The commission 
recommended that by leveraging the 'varied backgrounds and special knowledge' of 
the small discussion groups, 'proposed solutions to military problems [ ... ] could be 
consolidated and brought to bear upon official doctrine. ,78 
One final legacy of the Henry Commission was the retention of one of its 
members, Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, as a permanent consultant to the commandant with 
the title of Psycho-Educational Advisor.79 Although Orleans would not remain on the 
college staff for long, he enjoyed a long association with the institution. More 
importantly, he opened the door for the continuous influence of the civilian academic 
community in the college's development. 
The army in this period had no formal concept development process. Its 
doctrine development process was diffuse and while it was clear that the WDGS must 
approve formal doctrine, there was no systemic path to that approval. In the 
immediate aftermath of the war, development came in the form oflessons-Iearned 
studies. Boards of officers were assembled under various commands and staffs to 
consider recent experience and record its lessons. The most forward-looking of these, 
because it dealt with both the content and process of development, was the War 
Department Equipment Board, known popularly as the Stilwell Board. The Stilwell 
Board met in the winter 1945 'for the purpose of reviewing types of equipment 
required for the Army Ground Forces in the post-war Army [ ... ] and such other 
matters as the board deems pertinent and necessary for guidance in developing 
equipment for the post-war Army.' 80 The board's description of the emerging strategic 
77'H C " ( enry ommlSSlOn 1947)', p. 33. 
7S 'IT C " lenry ommlSSlOn (1947)', p. 36. 
79 Orleans would go on to serve on numerous military education advisory boards, panels and 
commissions. Between 1947 and 1950, in addition to CGSC, Orleans assisted the Adjutant Generals 
School, Air Command and Staff School, Air University, the Military Police School, and the Officer 
Candidate School. See biography in Jacob S. Orleans, Karl R. Douglass, M.S. Eddy, H.F. Harding, 
Geoffrey Keyes, Troy Middleton" 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission - Command and 
General Staff College' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1956), p. 131, in 
CARLA N13423.90A 
80 War Department, Adjacent Generals Office, Subject: Appointment of War Department Equipment 
Board, 8 October 1945. Reproduced in 'Report of War Department Equipment Board (Stilwell Board)' 
(Washington DC: War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1946). 
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environment emphasized the impact of 'greatly improved means of warfare' in the 
form of 'atomic explosive[s], nuclear radiological materials, biological agents, and 
chemical gases.' In comparison, and perhaps because of the rapid advances in the war 
years, the board opined that 'conventional weapons can only be slightly improved.' 
This vision of future war, the board argued, necessitated the creation of a new combat 
developments process that would assure the 'step-by-step change-over from the 
discarded material [of war] to the new,.81 
The Stilwell Board identified three components to a combat development 
process: an experimental 'combined arms force under selected [ ... ] progressive 
commanders', the ability to conduct' extensive service tests of new weapons and 
equipment', and a process that would continuously review the' concepts of warfare 
[ ... ] in accordance with anticipated developments in weapons and other agents of 
warfare' that would lead to the formulation of 'tactical doctrine for [their] 
employment' . 82 Although a fully institutionalized combat developments process 
would not exist for more than a decade, two of its three components, combined arms 
forces and materiel development boards, already existed. 83 
The final component of the Stilwell Board's recommendation, the one 
examined in this chapter, was a mechanism to review the 'concepts of warfare 
[ ... and] formulate tactical doctrine'. Before proceeding, it is worth examining the use 
of the terms 'concept' and 'doctrine'. Given the context of new weapons and 
potentially transformational changes in the character of war, the Stilwell Board's use 
of terms is close to the definition of those terms described by a scholar of military 
change. One historian argues that 'where a concept is a hypothesis - an inference 
81 'Stilwell Board', pp. 1-2. 
82 'Stilwell Board', pp. 7-8. 
83 A dedicated 'experimental' force, as called for by the StilweII Board, would wait until the 
introduction of the Combat Development Experimentation Command (CDEC) in 1956. However, ad 
hoc combined arms units were available iftasked. While the War Department reorganization of 1942 
gave the existing board system a more combined arms view, overall the process was still hobbled by 
the same parochial, bottom-up, incremental, technology centric challenges of the interwar version. In 
1946, AGF, Development Section, oversaw three combined arms boards at Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, 
and Fort Knox which were responsible for the 'evaluation of all recommendations for the development 
of new or improvement of existing equipment [ ... ] the study of foreign equipment [ ... ] preparation of 
military characteristics [ ... ] perfon11ance of user tests [ ... ] recommending a basis of issue [ ... ] and 
review of [ ... ] performance'. 'Army Ground Forces Board No. 3, Lecture by BG H.B. Bartness', The 
Infantry Conference (Fort Benning: The Infantry School, 1946), p. 1., CARLDL 
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coIJ8,469 [Accessed 1 December 2010). 
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that suggests that a proposed pattern of be ha vi or may possibly lead to a desired result; 
a doctrine is a generalization based on sufficient evidence to suggest that a given 
pattern of be ha vi or will probably lead to the desired result'. 84 (Emphasis added). 
Formally, the eGSe played a pivotal role as the combined arms integrator of 
doctrine coming up from the service schools and boards of the AGE Moreover, 
through liaison relationships and coordination by the responsible offices of the 
WDGS, the eGSe also served to integrate the administrative and technical services, 
as well as AGF and occasionally, navy inputs. 
During the period 1945-1947, internal reorganizations and the impending 
unification of defence created a period of significant organizational confusion. On 
paper, the commandant had control of the primary sources for concept and doctrinal 
development guidance. The first was the R&D Division of the WDGS. As a result of 
Eisenhower's 1946 WDGS reorganization, research and development became a staff 
co-equal to operations. The Director R&D was charged with 'supervising testing of 
new weapons and equipment and [ ... ] the development o/tactical doctrines governing 
their employment in thejield.'85 (Emphasis added). Despite the stated intent, issues 
concerning consolidating the science and technology aspects of R&D consumed the 
new department, and it addressed the concepts or doctrines of employment only 
tangentially. 86 
The second source was the director for organization and training, who had the 
responsibility for, among other things, direction of the army's schools. In the era of 
sharply decreasing budgets, rapid demobilization, and the support of large overseas 
occupation forces, there was not much in the way of direction for other than the most 
routine and evolutionary development tasks. Interest in thinking about future concepts 
from outside eGSe itself would have to wait until early 1947, when responsibility for 
the combined arms portion of the army school system shifted out of the army staff and 
came to the commander AGE 87 
84 LB. Holley Jr., Technology and Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship (Maxwell AFB: 
Air University Press, 2004), p. 21. Holley has modified an argument first raised by Dale O. Smith, u.s. 
Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1955), pp. 3- I I. 
85 War Department Circular 138 (14 May 1946) cited in Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara, p. 157. 
86 Charles R. Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army: 1942-1962', I 
(Washington DC: United States Army, 2006), pp. 171-172. 
87 Hewes Jr., From Root toMcNamara, p. 168. 
194 
Shifting responsibility out of the WDGS did not, in the end, solve the 
problem. As of late 1947, even as some in the army's senior leadership began to call 
for new concepts for future war, there was no clear or consistent guidance to Fort 
Leavenworth for such developments.88 In late 1947, a study by the army's civilian 
deputy director of R&D recommended the creation of a command where the army 
could consolidate the functions of requirements determination, doctrine development, 
and user materiel testing. 89 This first high-level articulation of the need for a combat 
developments capability was, however, still ahead of its time. 
The first major post-war change that would impact on CGSC's role occurred 
as a result of the Cook Report. Major General Gilbert R. Cook recommended that the 
AGF be converted from a command to a special staff agency. The result was the 
creation of the AFF with broad integrating responsibilities for 'schools, combat arms 
boards, organization and training of units and individuals, and combat doctrine'. 
Under the new organization, the commandant CGSC took on a greater role in the 
coordination and review of doctrine from the branch schools and as a participant in 
the development activities of the boards as well. The development of army combined 
arms doctrine was for the first time consolidated in the hands of the commandant of 
CGSc.90 
In the introductory section of its 1946 report, the Stilwell Board observed that 
creating capabilities for a force within the context of an uncertain future presented a 
series of 'chicken or the egg' dilemmas: 
Changes in tactics and organization affect the development of weapons 
and equipment, since from proposed new tactical uses or 
organizational groupings, demands are created for new equipment. At 
the same time, research and development may be capable of supplying 
a new article but lack the demand to create it due to the failure of the 
tactical user to visualize and request what to him is unknown. The 
concepts of future tactics, organization and equipment should be 
88 The most prominent public call for new concepts, which accounted for the dramatic changes in the 
character of war, was Major General lames M. Gavin, 'The Future of Airborne Operations', Militmy 
Review, 27 (1947), 3-8 (pp. 3-6). 
89 Memorandum, Or. Cloyd H. Marvin to the Secretary of the Army, Washington, 26 Nov 1947, sub: 
Army Research and Development. Reproduced as tab 40 in Lowell R. Eklund, 'Science and the 
Soldier: The Organization for Research and Development in the Army, Past Present, and Future' 
(unpublished MS Thesis thesis, Syracuse University, 1947). Copy found at The Military History 
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (Hereafter MHI) U383.E44. 
90 The changes were promulgated as Department of the Army Circular 64 (lO March 1948). 
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examined and stated clearly in order that research and development 
can be directed intelligently.91 
To one degree or another this challenge, 'to state clearly concepts of future 
tactics, organization and equipment,' confounds all military developments 
programmes during peacetime. For the army of the early Cold War this 'problem' was 
a unique one. For most of the army's recent experience, developing a view of 
requirements for the immediate threat was an inherent part of the mobilization 
process. As the Second World War demonstrated, even where concepts, doctrines, and 
technologies fell short, and not withstanding the sometimes-painful cost of learning, 
these failures were correctable. More importantly, given the advantageous geo-
strategic position of the United States, failures of foresight in this regard were not 
considered strategically fatal. 92 In the post-war strategic environment, the rules 
changed. The strategic, institutional, and operational costs of getting things wrong 
were never higher. 
This tension between the technology 'chicken' and the conceptual 'egg' came 
into the sharpest focus when considering the role of atomic weapons in future war. 
Atomics, as some called research into this new class of weapons, were not the only 
area of conceptual debate in the army. The mid-l 940s were full of discussion and 
debate in the branch journals and in conferences associated with the various 
equipment boards on subjects such as tactical air-ground integration, the next 
generation of tanks, and the balance and relationship between artillery and missiles. 
But in terms of institutional impact, not to mention operational effects, atomic 
weapons were in a class by themselves. While the full range of the contemporary 
strategic debate over the proper role of atomic weapons in national security is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, it is worth identifying the broad outlines. 
The start of the atomic age fundamentally challenged the army's traditional 
conceptual and related institutional framework. The widely accepted belief that 
atomic weapons and not soldiers would soon be the decisive force in war was deeply 
unsettling and a difficult proposition to refute. Closely related to the conceptual 
justification for an army was the resulting loss of institutional position. If the decisive 
91 'Stilwell Board', p. 5. 
92 In many 'cases the example and experience of adversaries and allies provided the corrective to initial 
conceptual errors. This was obviously not an option with nuclear weapons. 
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force was to be an atomic strike, then the army's self-perception as the indispensible 
service - that of being the first among equals - was in jeopardy. 
The possibility oflong-range strategic attacks on a country's heartland, 
coupled with the use of atomic bombs to destroy its industry and associated 
populations, was instantly terrifying and beguiling. Journalist and commentator 
Waiter Lippmann satirized the populist view in 1946, writing that atomic weapons 
were: 
[T]he perfect fulfilment of all wishful thinking on military matters: 
here is war that requires no national effort, no draft, no training, no 
discipline, but only money and engineering know-how of which we 
have plenty. Here is the panacea which enables us to be the greatest 
military power on earth without investing time, energy, sweat, blood 
and tears, and - as compared with the cost of a great army, navy, air 
force - not even much money. 93 
The successful use ofthe atomic bomb as strategic weapon to end the war 
with Japan, combined with the public's fascination with the idea of an 'absolute 
weapon', effectively overwhelmed initial thinking about the weapon's potential role 
in land warfare. 94 As one historian noted, within months of the opening of the atomic 
age, 'all the major elements of [America's] contemporary engagement with the 
nuclear reality took shape'. 95 The essential role of the atomic bomb remained fixed 
93 WaIter Lippmann quoted in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1983), p. 48. Lippmann's essay was an appeal against unilateral disarmament. 
94 Early public reporting was exemplified by popular descriptions of 'push-button wars' of the future 
from famed military journalist Hanson Baldwin, who wrote a few weeks after the dawn of the atomic 
era that' surface forces and piloted air fleets seem relegated [ ... ] to supporting and secondary roles.' 
Hanson W. Baldwin, 'The Atom Bomb and Future War: There May Be Devastating 'Push-Button' 
Battles', Life, 20 August 1945, pp. 17-20 (pp. 17-20). Soon after the first, more scholarly but not less 
strategic centric, efforts like the those by WiIIiam L. Borden, There Will Be No Time: The Revolution 
in Strategy (New York: The MacmilIan Company, 1945); Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: 
Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Hareourt, Brace and Company, 1945). Both of these 
books framed much of the strategic debate and general perceptions of atomic weapons for a decade. 
Another public voice, based strongly on moral concerns and a desire for international and scientific 
control of atomic energy, found voice among the very scientists who brought the bomb into the world. 
For example, see essays by such scientific luminaries as Oppenheimer, Condon, Bethe, Szilard, and 
Einstein in One World or None: A Report on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb, ed. by Dexter 
Masters, Katharine Way (New York: McGraw-HiIl Book Company, 1946). Many of these authors were 
members of the newly forn1ed Federation of Atomic Scientists (later renamed to the Federation of 
American Scientists) who would contribute to one of the only regularly published non-government 
outlets of information of atomic weapons and their potential in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 
beginning in December 1945. 
95 Paul Boyer, By the Bombs Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic 
Age, 2nd (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. xxi. One area, not entirely clear to 
the public at the time, was the degree to which owing to practical problems of cost, fragility, and 
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through late 1949 as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar N. Bradley noted in 
October that the bomb would be our 'principal offensive weapon in any future war'. 96 
When the army discussed the potential impact of atomic weapons on land war 
in the immediate aftermath of the bombings in Japan, it was generally uninformed, 
non-technical, and without any significant impact. Early analysis of military utility 
focused almost exclusively on the strategic implications or in public musings. For 
example, in late 1945 the JCS undertook a study ofthe effects of the atomic bomb on 
'warfare and military organization'. It found that the atomic bomb would 'be 
primarily a strategic weapon of destruction against concentrated industrial areas' and 
that it was 'difficult to imagine specific circumstances in which the present bomb 
could justifiably and profitably be employed in support of the conventional land or 
sea battle'. The JCS went on to say that 'at this time' the atomic bomb did not 'justify 
elimination of conventional armaments or major modifications to the services that 
employ them'. 97 The qualifier was a classic joint staff compromise, where those who 
foresaw a military dominated by atomic considerations could claim equal support as 
those arguing for the timelessness of boots-on-the-ground. 
Against this background, the army's conceptual outlook on atomic weapons 
was hardly promising. In January 1947, General Leslie R. Groves, arguably the most 
. knowledgeable army officer on atomic weapons, drafted the language Eisenhower 
would later use to comment on the aforementioned JCS study. In a wide ranging 
memorandum, Groves argued that the new weapons were 'not an all-purpose 
weapon', but rather ones of 'rapid attrition' that, ifused in sufficient numbers, would 
make war between 'two disciplined nations [ ... ] unendurable [ ... ] unthinkable'. 
Nevertheless, Groves made the point that the atomic bomb could not 'stand alone in 
the nation's arsenal' and did not obviate the need for a 'well-rounded military force'. 
The army of the future, he argued, would be 'markedly affected by the impact of the 
scarcity of materials, any discussion of the general use of atomic bombs, outside of narrowest of 
strategic scenarios, was largely theoretical. 
96 General Omar N. Bradley, 'This Way Lies Peace', Saturday Evening Post, 15 October 1949, pp. 32-
170 (p. 169). 
97 Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 'Overall Effect of Atomic Bomb on Warfare and Military 
Organization, JCS 1477/, (30 October 1945), CCS 471.6 (8-15-45),' p. 4; Records of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, RG 218 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (Hereafter 
NARA). The development of contingency war plan concepts (the Pincher series) by the JCS in 1946 
implied but'did not explicitly call for the use of atomic weapons in a global war against the USSR. 
Steven T. Ross, American War Plans: 1945-1950 (London: Drank Cass, 1996), pp. 25-49, 56. 
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atomic bomb' but in ways yet to be understood. While debates over the potential for 
international control or the most effective means of delivery unfolded, Groves argued 
that 'study, experiment[ation], invention, development, and training' were required to 
determine 'the best army to build around the all-powerful atomic weapon'. 98 
For his part, Eisenhower cautiously approached the question of atomic 
weapons and tried to withhold any judgments or positions that would preclude 
institutional options in the future. As Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower argued that the 
United States should avoid excessive reliance on atomic weapons. It was clear that 
even under the most atomic-centric scenarios, many traditional missions, such as 
seizing bases for atomic bombers, would still require conventional forces. 
Eisenhower's position, one the army would hold for most of the 1940s, was that no 
irreversible decisions should be made until the implications of these weapons were 
fully unerstood. Of course, any understanding would include the role of land power 
operating with, or in the presence of, atomic weapons. 99 
Overcoming what Lieutenant General lames M. Gavin later described as 
'hysterical views' about atomic weapons as wonder weapons required a clear, 
coherent, and feasible counter-argument. 100 Lacking a coherent conceptual basis or 
any empirical data to counter the 'absolute weapon' beliefled many in the army to 
simply ignore the issue or discount the impact of atomic weapons. Between the 
98 Major General Groves, Leslie R., 'Memorandum by the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer 
District (Groves), Sub: Our Army of the Future - as Influenced by Atomic Weapons (2 January 1946). 
" in Foreign Relations o/the United States (FRUS) 1946, General; the United Nations ed. by Bureau 
of Public Affairs Historical Office, 1 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1972) (pp. 1199-
1200). Groves' memorandum formed the basis of the Army's position. 
99 John J. Midgley Jr., Deadly llIusions: Army poliq/or the Nuclear Battlefield (Boulder: Westview 
Press, Inc., 1986), pp. 7-8. One can see Eisenhower's recommendations play out during the often-
contentious policy battles with the air force over access to and control over atomic weapons and 
information. For example both the army and the navy strongly resisted air force attempts to gain 
exclusive control over the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project in 1948, and in 1949 opposed 
changes to the strategic targeting process which would have limited their direct planning role in 
strategic warfare. See Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs o/Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949, 
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, II (Washington DC: Office ofJoint History, 1996), pp. 97-98, 159-
171. 
100 Gavin noted that a number of concepts which existed before the Second World War, like 'airborne 
assault, large-scale amphibious operations, strategic air operations, and far-reaching carrier task force 
operations,' were 'brought to full fmition' as a direct result of the cooperation between the military and 
science and industry. He implied that similar efforts should be made with something as profound at 
atomic weapons. James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1958), pp. 100-10 1. 
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extremes there was a pragmatic middle ground slowly being carved out within the 
existing development bureaucracy. 
In early 1947, the War Department made the first tentative steps toward 
developing a concept of operations for tactical weapons, when it described the need 
for a 'balanced force' approach to atomic weapons. While acknowledging the 
'decision in a package' role of the atomic bomb when directed at a 'major target', a 
war department paper argued; 
Until it has been demonstrated that the atomic bomb can achieve a 
decision by itself (any certainty that it can has yet to be demonstrated), 
conventional military operations will continue to be employed, using, 
for some time to come, substantially the tactics of the end of World 
Warn. 
The paper then noted that the risks of nuclear weapons would necessitate the 
development of tactics 'to evolve methods of quickly massing for offensive action, 
then quickly dispersing' .101 
A few months later, the joint chiefs delivered a report to President Truman 
entitled, The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon. The main point of 
the study reiterated the strategic argument that 'ifused in numbers, atomic bombs not 
only can nullify any nation's military effort, but can demolish its social and economic 
structure'. They presented, the report continued 'a threat to mankind and civilization.' 
However, based on data gathered during nuclear test Operation CROSSROADS, the 
chiefs recommended 'the coordinated development of atomic weapons and weapon 
carriers and their integration into a series of devices, each with a tactical or strategic 
purpose'. In an obvious nod to the army and navy positions, the reported added that, 
'the advent of the atomic bomb has not eliminated the need for ground, sea and air 
forces, although it may affect their composition in sizeable degrees' .102 
Amidst the strategic and policy debate over nuclear weapons, the school at 
Fort Leavenworth embarked on its own debate. Some students agreed with the 
proposition that atomic weapons represented 'a revolutionary development which 
101 War Department, Report to Congress, 'The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on National Security (An 
Expression of War Department Thinking),' March 1947. Reprinted as 'War Department Thinking on 
the Atomic Bomb', Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 3 (1947),149-155,168 (p. 168). 
102 Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads, 'Enclosure 'A' the Evaluation of 
the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon in the Final Report (30 June 1947),' Harry S. Truman Library 
President's Secretary File - Truman Papers, 
<www.trumanlibrary.org/whistJestop/study _ collections/bomb/> [accessed 1 December 2010]. 
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altered the basic character of war itself' .103 A 1946 student research paper from the 







The military, economic, and political structures of the U.S. will 
be completely altered by the advent of atomic weapons and 
atomic power. 
Present concepts of waging war, offensively, defensively, and 
logistically, will, in general, no longer be applicable. 
Offensive operations will be essentially strategical and 
technological in nature ... 
The objective of invading armies will be to occupy the defeated 
power and eliminate isolated, fanatical resistance. 
The basic requirement for the conduct of a successful defence 
will be an efficient offence. 
The only logical and total defence against atomic warfare and 
destruction of civilization as we now know it, is world peace, 
enforced by a world government or by a single dominant 
power. 104 
While it is not possible to know how representative this paper was of the larger 
student body, the fact that it was prepared by a group of Second World War veteran 
officers lends credence to the idea that the so-called conservative view was not 
exclusive. 
At the other end of the spectrum were the voices that argued the atomic bomb 
was 'just a bigger high explosive.' This position was first publically articulated in a 
reprint of a British Naval officer's article in the February 1946 issue of the college's 
professional journal, Military Review. The author argued that atomic bombs 
represented a change in the scale and range of explosives and nothing else. 105 In 1946, 
after witnessing the Operation CROSSROADS atomic test, Major General A. C. 
McAuliffe, the future head of army research and development and sponsor of the 
ORO, noted that while every facet of 'this new atomic business' needed study, in his 
opinion the only defence against atomic weapons was to 'capture and destroy the 
103 This position was best publicaUy articulated at the time in Frederick S. Dunn, 'The Common 
Problem', in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. by Bemard Brodie (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1945) (p. 4). 
104 RP. Harris L.S. Moseley, E.H.F. Svensson, and D.R. Ostrander, 'Analytical Study of Atomic 
Warfare - Committee No. 13 (Command Class)" (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff 
School, 1946), p. 2. CAR LA N-13756. 
105 Oliver Stewart, 'Atoms and Air Forces', Military Review, 25 (1946), 90-92 (p. 90). Originally 
published in The Navy, (Great Britain) in September 1945. 
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source [ ... ] before [atomic weapons] can be launched against us. ,106 The debate was a 
significant topic of interest in Leavenworth's first post-war regular class. One paper, 
entitled Logistical Support of Amphibious Operations in Atomic and Guided Missile 
Waifare, found that increasing the dispersion of logistic units and improving the speed 
oflogistics activity in general could overcome the implications of the enemy's use of 
atomic bombs. Interestingly, the report suggested the army explore through 
experimentation the delivery oflogistics through the use of helicopters. 107 A similar 
report, Logistical Support in Atomic and Guided Missile Waifare, using the best 
reference material available on the actual effects of atomic weapons, concluded that, 
other than the requirements for dispersion, the construction of hardened command and 
control shelters, and the need for more field army logistics, the impact of atomic 
weapons would be minimal. 108 
Early formal instruction on atomic weapons took the form of poorly informed 
conceptual lectures, some of which must have sounded silly when contrasted with the 
general public perception. In the 1947-1948 course, atomic weapons were introduced 
as a part of a general class entitled 'Trends in Warfare'. In 1948 two specific courses 
were offered, 'Nuclear Physics and the Atom Bomb', and 'Military Effects of Atomic 
Weapons'. The material for one course deemed the risks to attacking troops from 
atomic bombs as limited because such fornlations will 'make a poor atomic target.' 
The risks were not zero, however. The instructors at Leavenworth warned that there 
would be dangers, and therefore troops should learn to 'respect [the atomic bomb]-
but do not fear it [ ... ] this danger is more in the open and less deadly than many 
booby traps'. 109 Despite the simplicity of these early efforts, the benefit was that they 
started a discussion, however crudely, for exploring the tactical use of atomic 
weapons. 110 
106 Sidney Shalett, 'McAuliffe Says "Nuts!" To the Atom', Saturday Evening Post, 29 June 1946, pp. 
20-96. 
107 C.W. Chaney, 'Logistical Support of Amphibious Operations in Atomic and Guided Missile 
Warfare (Regular Course _ CGSS 1947-48), (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff School, 
1947). CARLA 2128.158. 
108 Paul A. Anderson, 'Logistical Support in Atomic and Guided Missile Warfare " Regular Course 
1947-48 (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff School, 1947). CARLA 2128.157. 
109 Cited in Rose, The Evolution o/U.s. Nuclear Doctrine: 1945-1980, p. 84. 
110 Official'sources of information for the initial army development of atomic concepts were limited to 
V.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan, 'Atomic Bombs, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Article I, Medical 
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Leavenworth's Tentative Turn Toward the Future 
Lieutenant General Manton Sprague Eddy became commandant of CGSC in 
January 1948. Like his predecessor, Eddy was a highly respected and well-liked 
fonner corps commander. Bradley said of his fonner subordinate 'none was better 
balanced nor more cooperative than Manton Eddy [ ... ] though not timid, neither was 
he bold; Manton liked to count his steps carefully before he took them'. tit Another 
attribute Eddy shared with Gerow was that he had spent a significant percentage of 
his career as a student or instructor of war. By the time assumed command of 
Leavenworth, Eddy had been on active duty for thirty-two years - a full twelve of 
which were in educational assignments of one fonn or another. 112 
Eddy, once described by a commander as 'an average officer', began his 
career in 1916 as a platoon commander after a short enlistment. 113 He served with the 
AEF in France and rose from platoon to battalion command by war's end. Like many 
officers of his generation, and despite his later commands, 1918 France was the 
defining experience of his career. While attending the Infantry Advanced Course in 
the late 1920s, Eddy wrote a scathing monograph about the failure of machine gun 
company tactics and the fact that after 'three years of war [ ... ] no such thing as a 
machine gun doctrine seems to have existed.' Worse, the young Eddy wrote, the 
military bureaucracies were indifferent to the realities of new developments. 114 
Effects', (December 1945) and a short study focusing on the physical effects by the Manhattan 
Engineer District entitled 'The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki' (1945). 
111 Quoted in 'The Personal Story of General of the Army, Omar N. Bradley', Life, 9 April 1951, pp. 
83-86, 89-90,92,95-96,98, 101 (p. 90). 
It2 Eddy's twelve years of educational assignments include attending the Infantry Company 
Commanders Course, teaching ROTC instmctor at a small military college, completing the Infantry 
Advanced Course, graduating from the 1934 two-year class of CGSS, culminating with a four-year 
Fort Leavenworth teaching assignment. 
113 Harold R. Winton, Corps Commanders of/he Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the 
Ardennes (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), p. 49. 
114 Major M.S. Eddy, 'Machine Gun Company, 39th Infantry (4th Division) in the Aisne-Mame 
Offensive (July 18--August 5, 1918)', The Infantry School - Advanced Course 1929-30, 1929), p. I. 
Eddy's honesty and ability to be self-critical caught the attention of the school's assistant commandant, 
Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall. Eddy's monograph and others were assembled at the direction 
of the Infantry School commandant and eventually published in 1937. In then-Colonel George C. 
Marshall's foreword, he cautioned against what he saw as a failing of interwar military education. 
'Battlefield experience,' he noted, must 'check the ideas acquired in peacetime' because 'peacetime 
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Eddy's first encounter with Leavenworth was as a member of the Class of 1932. After 
completing the two-year program, Eddy became an instructor. Over the next four 
years, he would teach and master 'the discipline of higher-level tactics' and develop a 
solid reputation as a dependable officer and man with a 'common touch'. 115 
During the Second World War, Eddy led the 9th Infantry Division through 
operations in North Africa, Sicily, and the landings in Normandy. In late August 1944, 
he took command of XII Corps, known as the 'Spearhead' ofPatton's Third Army, in 
the assault across France and eventually into Southern Germany. In April 1945, with 
only weeks remaining in the war, high blood pressure and a suspected heart attack 
forced to him give up his command and sent him back to the United States to recover. 
In December 1947, after Eddy's short and unhappy stint as the army's chief of 
information, the new chief of staff, Bradley, asked him if he would accept a third star 
and duty as the commandant of CGSC. Bradley told Eddy that he believed the army's 
education system was failing in its vital and traditional mission and was now arguably 
the 'most backward part of the army'. After conversations with both Eisenhower and 
Marshall, Bradley said the primary cause of the failure was the inability of the 
military to unify its education programs as proposed by the Gerow Board. Echoing 
the findings of the Henry Commission, Bradley said that the lack of a war college 
meant the staff college was trying to educate staff officers on everything from 
division-level operations through the army staff - all within ten months. Under such 
conditions, Leavenworth graduates risked becoming increasingly irrelevant to the 
challenges confronting the post-war army. 116 
In January 1947, now a lieutenant general, Eddy became the second post-war 
commandant ofCGSC. For Bradley, sending Eddy to Leavenworth to fix and energize 
the education system represented an important appointment. The condition of the 
army by late 1947 brought obvious and uncomfortable comparisons to the dark days 
of the interwar years. Bradley would later describe the army of 1948 as having 
training in tactics tends to become increasingly theoretical'. In/antlY in Battle, 2nd (Washington DC: 
The Infantry Journal Incorporated, 1939), p. vii. 
115 Winton, Corps Commanders o/the Bulge, pp. 50-51. Eddy was considered too old for the War 
CoIlege when first considered. He was eventually selected but never attended after the college closed in 
the summer 1940. 
116 Henry Gerard PhilIips, The Making of a Professional- Manton S. Eddy. USA (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2000), p. 196. 
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'almost no combat effectiveness' and not able to 'fight its way out of a paper bag'. 117 
Eddy's own assessment at the time was that the rapid demobilization, budget cuts, and 
the 'extra-curricular chores' associated with overseas occupation had devastated the 
army. The nation's war power had become a 'fist without an arm' because, Eddy 
warned, the country had 'no ready [a]rmy forces [ ... ] perhaps three divisions could be 
put in the field in an emergency' .118 As Leavenworth had preserved the army as an 
institution in the 1930s, Eddy's task was now to ensure that it would do so again. 
Bradley's guidance to the new commandant was clear. Eddy was to establish 
more central direction over army schools, to shift the curriculum away from the 
traditional and toward more contemporary problems. Specific issues Bradley wanted 
addressed included 'universal military training, the employment and effects of tactical 
nuclear weapons, application of modem management techniques, joint operations, 
and racial integration.' 119 Taking command at the mid-point of an academic year 
limited how rapidly Eddy could implement this guidance. Instead, he carefully studied 
the problem and began to build a team. 
Two key assistants joined Eddy early in his tour, and both were critical to 
setting instruction on a new course. The first to arrive was a young academic with a 
PhD in Psychology. Ivan 1. Birrer was planning to teach in a small college psychology 
department when he accepted an offer from Dr. Orleans to join the college's new 
Department of Research and Analysis as a statistical consultant in January. By July 
1949 Birrer would replace Orleans as the commandant's' educational advisor,' a 
position he would hold until his retirement thirty years later. 120 
The second was the new deputy commandant, Brigadier General Harlan N. 
Hartness. lIartness, a West Point graduate and infantry officer, was approaching thirty 
117 Omar N. Bradley, Clay Biair, A General's Life: An Autobiography by the General of the Army 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 474. 
118 Manton S. Eddy, 'National Security: The Army's Part in the Unified Land-Sea-Air Team', Vital 
Speeches, 15 (1949), 563-567 (p. 566). 
119 Phillips, The Making of a Professional, p. J 96. 
120 Birrer was familiar with the army having served as a Captain in the Adjutant general Corps during 
the War. He graduated from one of the wartime J 3-week CGSC programs in early 1945. Biographical 
details of Dr. Birrer taken from Robert A. Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan 1. Birrer: Service at the Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978' (unpublished 
thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1978). Given his influence and many accomplishments 
during his association with CGSS, Doughty accords Birrer co-equal status with John F. Morrison, 
Arthur Wagner, and Eben Swift as the army's most influential educators. 
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years on active duty when he arrived at Leavenworth. His time as a student or 
instructor in a military school exceeded even his boss's impressive record. He had 
spent nearly eighteen years of his career studying or teaching his profession. 
Significantly, in addition to a two-year stint as a CGSS student (1933-1935) and then 
instructor (1937-1940), Hartness had attended the yearlong Kriegsakadem ie in Berlin 
beginning in 1935. 121 During the war, Hartness served on the War Department and 
AGF staffs. His operational assignment was as the assistant division commander of 
the 26th Infantry Division from September 1944 to the war's end. Post-war 
experiences included service as part of the ETO's General Board and then, after 
returning to the United States, as president of the AGF Board No. 3 (Fort Benning). 
Both positions, one examining lessons of the past and the other examining 
possibilities for the future, would serve Hartness well as he worked to develop 
CGSC's curriculum. m Together, these three men 'would nudge the [c ]ollege towards 
the future of modern warfare, while adopting a structure and instructional methods 
d · h d . f '1' fi' I' 123 more con UClve to tee ucatlOn 0 ml Itary pro eSSlOna s. 
As Bradley had suggested, Eddy found the college 'still focused on World War 
II combat experience, and not upon new or improved technology and where a greatly 
expanded V.S. role in world affairs indicated they should be'.124 One of Eddy's first 
actions as commandant was to establish a board under the direction of Colonel Stuart 
Wood to recommend how the school should address several outstanding issues 
identified by both the Henry Commission and Eddy's initial observations. 125 
The Wood Board made two major recommendations, both of which Eddy 
approved and implemented prior to the beginning of the next year's class. First, the 
121 From 1937-39, Hartness translated several German monographs on tactics for CGSS's Quarterly 
Review of Military Literature. These included selections out of Die Kra.ftfahrkampfiruppe on such 
topics as cooperation between mechanized troops and the air corps, German views on mechanization, 
German operations in the First World War, and German analyses of French tactical concepts. On 
Hartness' service in Germany, see Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: US. Intelligence 
and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941 (Ithaca: ComelI University Press, 2002), p. 102. See also 
Nenninger, 'Leavenworth and Its Critics', (pp. 213-217). 
122 Biographical details on General Hartness are from General Officer Biographic files, Center for 
Military History. 
123 Michael D. Stewart, 'Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College 1946-1986' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kansas, 2010), p. 46. 
124 Phillips, The Making of a Professional, p. 199. 
125 Dr. Orleans, a member of the Henry Commission, was designated a consultant to the Wood Board. 
Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan J. BirTer: Service at the Command and General Staff College', pp. 15-16. 
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current lecture-hall format, in some cases encompassing most of the class, minimized 
student participation. To remedy the situation, the Wood Board recommended that the 
school break the students into twelve groups of approximately forty officers each for 
all but guest lectures and demonstrations. 126 
The second major recommendation the Wood Board provided, not 
surprisingly, was the organizational structure of the college itself. As currently 
structured, the specialization courses (primarily staff functions oriented toward 
echelons above army) served as the hub of the academic department and the primary 
instruction came through fusing together their inputs. The staff specialization 
orientation was also the last vestige of its Second World War training focus. The 
Wood Board solution was to make the organizational heart of the college a new 
school with its own permanent staff cadre. The focus of the staff shifted to the core 
thirty-week curriculum (centred on the division, corps, army, and comparable levels 
in the communications zone). Moreover, because the instructional staffs were 
consolidated, the new school would teach according to a centrally designed 
curriculum. The use of a new curriculum board to issue annual guidance 'in terms of 
what is desired the students learn, rather than what is to be taught' became the 
standard at CGSC. 127 
Eddy's first opportunity to affect the upcoming academic year came through 
the March planning meetings of the 1948-1949 Curriculum Board. While not making 
any radical shifts in the proportion of material presented compared to the previous 
year, Eddy directed additional emphasis on joint operations and considerations of 
future warfare across the curriculum. The next year's course would be broken into six 
phases, covering the scope of material required of a commander and general staff 
officer: 
• Phase I: Orientation and General Principles (12 days) 
• Phase Il: The Combat Zone (97 days) 
• Phase Ill: The Communications Zone (25 days) 
• Phase IV: Department of the Army and Zone of the Interior (6 days) 
• Phase V: Specialized Instruction (50 days) 
126 Wood Board report cited in Salet, 'Reorganization of the Command and General Staff College', (p. 
7). 
127 Salet, 'Reorganization of the Command and General Staff College', (p.9). 
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• Phase VI: Joint Operations and Future Warfare (12 days) 128 
In the initial post-war courses, the curriculum had encouraged instructors to 
include 'new developments', especially in the combat zone phase of instruction. 
However, the lack of any particular expertise in the staff or even among the student 
body in dealing with topics like atomic weapons and missiles limited discussions of 
the future. Not everyone was impressed with the nature or quality of material being 
presented as a 'new development'. Even Gerow referred to the future warfare courses, 
somewhat sarcastically, as the 'Buck Rogers phase' .129 
Determined to increase the visibility of emerging technologies, Eddy directed 
that the 1948-1949 curriculum guidance include explicit language that instructors 
were to address the impact of 'new developments' in almost every class. For example, 
the approved fifteen hour plan for instruction on the infantry division in the defence 
directed that instructors 'toward the close of the problem develop student discussion 
of the effect of [ ... the] threat of atomic bombardment on defensive positions' as well 
the 'impact uponlogistical and personnel plans' .130 The addition of future trends, 
including discussion of atomic weapons, was becoming more than just an afterthought 
- but not much more. The implications of atomic weapons for existing army doctrine 
were essentially unknown as Eddy and his staff prepared the 1948-1949 
curriculum. 131 
A year into his tour, Eddy followed in his predecessor's footsteps by serving 
as the president of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for 
128 Memorandum from Colonel John H. Van Vliet to The Faculty Command and General Staff(9 
March 1948), found in Assistant Commandant's File, 'Directive for 1948-1949 Regular Course-
Curriculum Board Reports,' (March-November 1948); CARLA N-13423.31. 
129 'Conference on AGF Schools (1947)" p. 6. 'Buck Rogers' referred to the futuristic comic strip of 
the 1920 and later a series of campy movies featuring fantastic weapons. 
130 Curriculum Sheet, Subject No. 6005 Infantry in the Defense (12 May 1948), Found in Directive for 
1948-1949 Regular Course. 
131 The army, thanks in part to very strict security rules instituted by the Atomic Energy Commission, 
still lacked basic technical information about atomic weapons. The first official and unclassified 
technical material of any value to the non-scientific community was not published until June 1950 
through the collaboration of the Department of De fen se and the Atomic Energy Commission. The 
E/jixts 0.[ Atomic Weapons, ed. by Samuel Glasstone (Los Alamos: US Government Printing Office, 
1950). 
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Officers for Officers. 132 The Eddy Board's mandate was to conduct a wide-ranging 
examination of officer education including its adequacy, scope, and efficiency. It 
would also determine 'whether a restored AWC or other institution (at a level 
comparable to the Naval and Air War Colleges) should be included in the Army 
School System.' 133 As Birrer later recalled, 'it was clear from the directive that the 
answer to the [ ... ] question was supposed to be yes'. 134 
The board delivered its report in June, after visiting the major schools and 
staffs and conducting detailed interviews with seventy-five senior officers. It framed 
its recommendations by reiterating that the objective of the army school system was 
to prepare an officer for duties 'to which he may reasonably expect to be assigned in 
war, with an emphasis on the art of command'. As a baseline for its recommendations, 
the board made two observations about the current system. First, the pre-war system 
was 'splendidly organized and withstood in an outstanding manner the severe test of 
the recent war.' Second, the present system was specifically designed to 'take 
advantage of lessons learned in World War JI'. In addition to these generally positive 
but noticeably rearward-looking attributes, the board suggested that the context of 
military education had changed and the army needed to give significant weight to 
lessons from the past three years. 135 
Not surprisingly, the board endorsed the Gerow philosophy of a progressive 
officer school system. The biggest change was a recommendation to divide the 
current CGSC into two distinct levels. The first would be the regular course, 
corresponding roughly to the existing thirty-week core curriculum. The second would 
be the advanced course and would encompass the material in the ten-week specialty 
phase. While curiously avoiding the term war college, the recommendation was a call 
for the return of the pre-war division between two distinct officer post-graduate 
programmes. Other recommendations included an emphasis, in all classes and at all 
132 The Eddy Board was constituted on 4 February 1949. Other members of the board included the 
commandants of the infantry, armoured, and artillery schools as well as members of the anny and 
Leavenworth staffs. 
133 'Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers' (Washington 
DC: Department of the Army, 1949), pp. 12-13, in CARLA U408 AS PBAU. (Hereafter cited as the 
Eddy Board). 
134 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan 1. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College', p. 21. 
135 'Eddy Board (1949)" p. 1. 
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levels, on the 'joint aspects of all military operations' and 'new fields oflearning' 
including 'business management, atomic energy, and future aspects of warfare'. 136 
The Eddy Board recommendations, most of which the army's chief of staff 
quickly accepted, reflected a widely held assessment of CGSc. The lack of a war 
college was crowding out its time and energy to address 'the increased number of 
problems which confront the army as a result of new developments in warfare'. 137 A 
decade after closing its door in accordance with Second World War mobilization 
plans, the AWC reopened at Leavenworth in September 1950.138 Leavenworth proved 
too small for two colleges and two commandants, and in 1951 the AWC moved to its 
permanent location at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Leavenworth had finally 
returned to it two-fold mission of officer education focused at the tactical level of war 
as well as the study and development of relevant doctrines. 
One prominent historian has described the army of the late 1940s as 'very 
much a post-war army, shaped less by military doctrine looking to a future war, to 
which this army so often seemed irrelevant, than by the past, by the last war, of whose 
massive armies it was but a remnant' .139 As a practical matter, the gap between army 
resources and the demands of continuing overseas commitments left the army few 
options but to accept that, for the time being at least, 'air power occupies a dominant 
position in modem warfare'. ]40 For most of the period 1947-1949, the army's senior 
leaders found themselves on the horns of a dilemma between current readiness and 
innovation for future war. If they argued aggressively for resources to pursue 
innovation for future wars, presumably heavily influenced by 'new developments' 
such as atomic weapons, they then undercut their argUments for increased resources 
for current readiness. They would also undercut the logic that success in future war 
required universal military training. 
136 
'Eddy Board (1949)', pp. 6-9. 
137 
'Eddy Board (1949)', p. 37. 
138 The A WC's original home at Fort McNair, Washington DC was taken over by the National War 
College in 1945 and not avaialbe. 
139 Russell F. Weigley, I/isto/y o/the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 
1967), p. 502. 
140 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Final Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, to the 
Secretary of the Army (7 Februrary 1948)' (Washington DC, 1948), p. 13. 
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Of course, if the anny argued against the defence implications of new 
developments, it would not only be undercutting stated U.S. policy, but would be 
accused of undue conservatism. What is more, such an argument would only further 
isolate the army in the ongoing battles over strategy and budget share in a military 
establishment increasingly oriented on new developments. 
The solution was to split the difference. Senior army leaders began speaking 
out publically for improving current readiness, while at the same time increasing the 
anny's involvement and understanding of new developments. One of those speaking 
out was the Anny's Chief of Information, Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain. 
He argued that national security planning could not afford to become one 
dimensional, because, while 'another war will be different from the last [ ... ] it would 
not be entirely different, for no war breaks entirely with the past'. Thus, despite the 
tremendous technical improvements in war, 'the same relationship will exist between 
the weapons of World War II and the theoretical next war as existed between the 
weapons of World War I and World War II' .141 A March 1950 report of a board of 
officers charged with orienting the anny's research and development priorities in light 
of 'current peacetime budgets' emphasized the materiel relationship between the last 
war and the next war. Led by a former Second World War corps commander, 
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the Hodge Board stated that, at some point in the 
future the anny 'must be prepared to employ atomic weapons. ' However, that future 
was more distant than many claimed because equipment requirements for an atomic-
capable army still lacked 'sound concepts.' In the meantime, the board's final report 
listed among the anny's 'urgent' materiel needs as: infantry antitank weapons, tanks, 
anti-aircraft equipment, mine detection equipment, and target location devices. 142 
The argument about current readiness grew louder after CoIl ins became Army 
Chief of Staff in August 1949. CoIl ins told an audience in November that 'much you 
have heard of late - from me as well as from other military men - may have given 
you the impression that our national security is exclusively a function of allocating 
141 Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, 'The Almy's Role: A 1949 Perspective', Military Review, 
28 (1949), 3-1 8 (p. 8). 
142 Office'Chief AmlY Field Forces, 'Report of the Army Equipment Board' (Fort Monroe V.S. Army, 
1950), pp. 1,7,10. (Cited hereafter as the Hodge Board.) . 
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dollars, or specifying numbers of planes, and ships and tanks'. 'There is' he continued 
'a grave fallacy in such assumptions' .143 
While army leaders tried tospotlight conventional readiness for non-atomic 
warfare, small groups in the army were beginning to explore the conceptual, 
technological, and doctrinal implications of atomic weapons on a tactical battlefield. 
In summer 1949, Eddy directed a small CGSC staff group to 'study the army's 
problems in atomic conflict'. Their objective was to produce a draft field manual for 
the 'tactical use of atomic weapons' as well as to inject 'pertinent instruction on 
combat employment of the new weapon' into the CGSC curriculum. 144 Two of the 
instructors participating in the study group, George C. Reinhardt and William R. 
Kintner, were talented conceptual thinkers and prolific writers. Over the next decade 
their names would become closely associated with the armis efforts first to 
understand and then to exploit atomic weapons. Reinhardt and Kintner, working from 
the most basic understanding of atomic effects and within a simple conceptual 
framework of how such weapons might affect a field army, began to define what 
terms like 'dispersion' might actually look like in an atomic setting. 
Creative talent would not be sufficient however. Eddy's team lacked answers 
to the most fundamental questions about tactical effects or any reasonable estimate 
about how the technology of atomic weapons might develop over the next five-to-ten 
years. Information already in the public domain, mostly focused on strategic 
application or civil defence, was hardly a sufficient basis to begin research, to say 
nothing of building a graduate-level curriculum. 145 To augment Leavenworth's 
meagre supply of atomic expertise and gain access to the most up-to-date and 
operationally relevant research, Eddy initiated a partnership with the newly fonned 
ORa. The timing was perfect. The CGSC had reached a point where it needed to test 
its ideas against realistic data, and the civilian scientists at the ORa needed an 
operational context through which they could better evaluate science and technology. 
143 1. Lawton Collins, 'The Importance of the Individual', Vital Speeches of the Day, 16 (1949),140-
142 (p. 141). 
144 O.c. Reinhardt, 'Nuclear Weapons and Limited Warfare - A Sketchbook History' (Santa Monica: 
The RAND Corporation, 1 964), p. 3; Rose, The Evolution of us. Nuclear Doctrine: 1945-1980, p. 84. 
145 A bibliography of publicly available information at the time includes government reports with titles 
such as 'Medical Aspects of Atomic Weapons,' 'What to Do in an Atomic Attack,' 'The City of 
Washingto'n and an Atomic Attack.' See S.A. Anthony, 'Selected Bibliography of the Literature on 
Civil Defense', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 (1950) (pp. 272-275). 
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The result of the CGSC-ORO collaboration became annexes to an ORO study 
entitled Project MAID. 146 The titles of the studies (published as classified annexes to 
the Project MAID report) show a progression from developing basic knowledge of 
tactical sized weapons, to testing predicated effects against a known standard, to 
conceptual explorations against generic doctrine, and finally, application to realistic 
tactical scenarios: 
• The Effect of Variation of Energy on Atomic Weapons 
Characteristics 
• World War 11 Tactical Situations Analyzed with Respect to 
Atomic Weapons 
• Atomic Weapons in Army Operations 
• Atomic Weapons in Western Europe 147 
The Project MAID report acknowledged its limitations by noting that 'such 
analyses as the one presented here leave much to be desired in the character of the 
evidence which can be brought to bear on the subject. ,148 In spite of the fact that the 
conclusions were 'subject to revision in the light of rapidly increasing evidence,' the 
am1Y, had for the first time, an evidence-based analysis of the tactical use of atomic 
weapons in land combat. 149 The classified Project MAID report was delivered in 
January 1950. A few months later, CGSC completed a classified student text Tactical 
Use of Atomic Weapons that the army adopted in November 1951 as its first atomic 
field manual, Field Manual 100-31, with the same name. For army concept 
developers like Reinhardt and Kintner, this unique collaboration demystified the study 
146 Project MAID's primary purpose was to 'study of the pros and cons of providing military 
assistance to foreign countries, and thus it focused on questions of international relations and 
economics.' Shrader, 'History of Operations Research in the United States Army', p. 72. 
147 W.L. Witson, K.D. Bartimo, D.K. Cl ark, A.D. Coox, and W.B. CottreIl" 'Report on Project MAID 
- Part IIJ, Appendix B (Atomic Warfare)' (Washington, DC: Operations Research Office, 1950). 
148 Data collected during atomic tests in 1946 (Operation CROSSROADS) and 1948 (Operation 
Sandstone) were primarily of a scientific and technical nature. Test designs that included a significant 
effort understand potential tactical effects did not occur until 1951. Much of the technical data made 
available through Project MAID, especially concerning radiation effects, were considered out of date 
by early 1952. 
149 . . I d W1tson, 'Report on Project MAID', p. foreword. The report was re ease as a Secret document and 
not declassified until 1959. 
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of atomic weapons and provided the foundation for much of what the army would 
promulgate on the subject for the remainder of the decade. 150 
In June 1950, the North Koreans invaded South Korea in a massive 
conventional assault. For the army, as well as advocates of a more aggressive strategic 
containment strategy, Korea was a validation of both the nature of the threat and the 
need for a larger army as a force-in-being. 151 As McLain and others had argued, 
atomic weapons were an adjunct to, and not a substitute for, traditional forms of 
military power. Strategically, the Truman administration's response was a partial 
mobilization to stem the tide on the Korean Peninsula and an expansion of the regular 
army to facilitate a build-up of forces in Europe. 152 By November] 950 the army 
reactivated an army headquarters at Stuttgart as the leading element of what would be 
a two corps headquarters and four-division build-up. 
Eddy, having partially completed his mission to reinvigorate CGSC, received 
orders to Europe to become the Deputy Commander, US Army Europe with a mission 
to re-establish and take command of Seventh Army. 153 His deputy, Brigadier General 
Hartness, would assume command until Eddy's relief arrived. 
The start of the Korean War, unlike that of World War n, did not disrupt the 
army's education programme. 154 The opening of the AWC and the continuation of 
150 In 1953 an unclassified version of much of the CGSC's conceptual research was published which 
influenced a flood of professional literature and debate. See George C. Reinhardt and WiIliam R. 
Kintner, Atomic Weapons il1 Land Combat (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1953). 
151 At the time of the North Korean invasion debate was underway in Washington DC on a more 
muscular response to communist aggression around the world. The strategy document known as NSC 
68, 'served as a critical catalyst' for implementation and empowered the army's 'balanced-forces' 
argument in the short term. See David T. Fautua, 'The "Long Pull" Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, 
and the Creation of the Cold War Army', The Journal 0.( Military Jlistory, 61 (1997), 93-120 (pp. 95-
96). 
152 Between 30 June 1950 and 30 June 1951 the army's end-strength grew from 591,487 to 1,592,902. 
During the same period, force levels went from) 0 divisions and 12 separate regiments to 18 divisions 
and 18 separate regiments. See Table 3, Development ofFY 5) Strength and Force Levels in Doris M. 
Condit, The Test o.(War 1950-1953, History of the Office of the Secretary of De fen se, 1I (Washington 
DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), p. 238. 
153 The connection between Leavenwol1h and the senior army leadership charged with the ground 
defence of Europe would grow throughout the decade. Eddy would command Seventh Army from 
August 1950 through August 1952. Henry 1. Hodes commanded Seventh Army from 1955-56 and then 
U.S. Army Europe from 1956-59. 
154 The course was already programmed to grow. Class size (US students) grew steadily from 251 in 
the 1946-47 Class to 440 in the 1949-50 Class. After a small dip in the class fall 1950 to 351, CGSC 
classes ran;ped up to more than 500 US students per class for the remainder of the decade. See Table 4, 
Regular Course Graduates in Doughty, 'The Command and General Staff College in Transition', p. 138. 
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CGSC's peacetime mission during war was precedent-setting and would reflect a 
subtle shift in the army's institutional attitude toward the fighting of 'limited wars', 
while continuing to prepare for what could be a different 'next war.' One historian has 
noted that the Korean War 'had less impact on the operations of Leavenworth than 
any previous war' .155 During a December 1950 address to the inaugural AWC class, 
then still located at Leavenworth, the army chief of staff assured everyone that despite 
rumours to the contrary, the year of study at the A WC was more important to the 
future of the army than any contribution they might make in Korea. 156 
Major General Horace Logan McBride took command of CGSC on 6 October 
1950.157 In his thirty-four years of service prior to becoming commandant, McBride 
had spent an astonishing sixteen years in an army classroom as a student or 
instructor. 158 McBride was a 1916 graduate of West Point who saw combat early in 
his career, including a short stint as an artillery battalion commander during the 
Meuse-Argonne Offensive of 1918. His teaching experience included four years 
instructing reserve officer training at Yale University, four years as a tactics instructor 
at the Artillery School, and four year teaching at CGSS. 
During the war, McBride commanded the 80th Infantry Division and had the 
distinction of being the only man to command that unit during its entire wartime 
existence. Under 'Hairless Horace,' as his troops referred to him, the 80th fought 
primarily as part of the II Corps and participated in operations from Normandy 
through the surrender of the German Sixth Army in Austria. Immediately prior to 
taking command ofCGSC, McBride was overseeing the military component of the 
155 Boyd L. Dastrup, The US Army Command and General StafJCollege: A CentenniallIistory 
(Manhattan: Sunflower University Press, 1982), p. 97. 
156 Ball, Of Responsible Command p. 283. The existing mobilization guidance for the A WC stated it 
would close 'in the event of full mobilization '. 'Staff Study - College Mission' (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and General Staff College, 1951), p. IX. CARLA N-13423.5-A. 
157 As the senior officer, Major General loe Swing, newly assigned Commandant of the Army War 
College, was the commander of Fort Leavenworth until the War College moved to Carlisle Barracks 
Pennsylvania in 1951. On the personal and professional tension between the two commandants see 
Stewart, 'Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College 1946-1986', p. 62. 
158 Biographical details from General Officer files, MHI. His West Point Obihmry noted '[o]fall the 
men who graduated in the Class of 1916, none established a more brilliant military career than Horace 
McBride.' 'Ho race L. Mcbride', Assembly - Assocition of Graduates, US.MA., 22 (1963), 107 (p. 
106). McBride was a 1927 graduate of the CGSS and a 1936 graduate of the Army War College. 
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Truman Doctrine in Turkey as the first chief of the V.S. Army Group in the American 
Mission. 159 
Three major events marked McBride's tenure as commandant of CGSC. The 
first was sorting out the relationship and curriculum between his charge and that of 
the commandant of the newly establishedAWC. The Eddy Board had envisioned the 
AWC as the 'second-year' of the CGSC curriculum. The two colleges' curriculums 
would, under this concept, mirror each other with the major distinction being 
delineated by command level. The alternative view, held by the new AWC 
commandant, Major General Joseph M. Swing, and his deputy Brigadier General 
Arthur G. Trudeau, was that these were two different colleges. Swing was especially 
passionate that the AWC would not become a 'super-Leavenworth.' 160 The students at 
theAWC would be graduates ofCGSC but attend the senior course only after 'a break 
between an officer's education and what he had absorbed at Leavenworth and then, 
after re-selection of a smaller number, to go onto higher level schooling' 161 Swing, 
selected for the job in part because Collins thought he was the most non-conforming 
general he knew, set out to create a 'post-graduate school, contemplative in nature and 
mature in aspect' .162 
McBride's second challenge was directly related to the first, and that was the 
question of who was ultimately responsibility for doctrine. The army had up to this 
point assumed that doctrine should be split by command echelon, just as the schools 
were. Both the army staff and the staff of the AFF assumed that the A WC, as the 
'senior' school, would inherit the CGSC's overall responsibility for doctrine 
development and review. It quickly became clear, however, that under the concept put 
in place by Swing and continued by his successor, Lieutenant General Edward M. 
Almond, the AWC would have neither the staffing nor inclination to do the heavy 
lifting of combined arms doctrine. The task was not trivial. During the 1950-1951 
school year, for example, the staff of the CGSC, in addition to preparing student texts, 
159 Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years 1947-1950, History of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, I (Washington DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), pp. 165-166. 
160 Ball, qr Responsible Command p. 282. The curriculum plans prepar~d by the Eddy's staff in 
support of the newly forming A WC staff were rejected wholesale by Swmg. 
161 Calvin J. Landau, 'Engineer Memoirs: Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, USA, Retired - an 
Oral History' (Carlisle Barracks: Corps of Engineers, 1986), pp. 176-178. 
162 Ball, O/Responsible Command pp. 283-288. 
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reviewed or initiated the development of 132 field manuals. 163 This included all 
combined arms doctrine above battalion level as well as several subjects, such as 
logistics, military assistance, and psychological operations, which crossed all 
echelons. In the end, the AFF determined that casc would continue to fulfil its role 
as the army's centre for combined arms doctrine and keep the AWC informed. 164 
By 1951, battlefield observations and experience gained from operations in 
Korea became part of the casc curriculum as veteran students and instructors 
rotated through the course. This new perspective reinvigorated doctrinal debates, 
since there was now a point of comparison with the Second World War baseline. 
Surprisingly, however, the Korean War did not lead to doctrinal innovations based 
directly on that war's combat experience. Rather, it was the implications of a Korean-
like scenario in Europe that energized the concept deve.lopment process. Curriculum 
studies, looking forward to academic years 1952-1953 and 1953-1954, show a 
significant interest by the staff in moving to a 'more practical orientation for the 
curriculum'. Suggestions included adapting some of the courses to future or 
anticipated scenarios as opposed to the standard historical and predominately Second 
World War based ones. Moreover, perhaps in acknowledgment of the readiness 
failures in 1950, the studies suggested that scenarios should include known shortfalls 
in V.S. capabilities against Soviet threats on likely battlefields. 165 
One instructor explicitly connected the operational lessons of Korea with the 
operational requirements of NATO and made it clear that 'any future conflict will find 
us, initially, on the defensive, pending the build-up of sufficient forces' .166 This rather 
elementary observation had implications for the balance between offensive and 
defensive in the curriculum. A review of the 1952-1953 curriculum shows 250 hours 
163 'Staff Study _ College Mission', p. 3. Annex nr 
164 According to a history of the A WC, it 'was not a major participant in the debates over the New 
Look (doctrine), nor was it yet a major participant in the debates over innovations in weapons, tactics, 
and organization'. Ball, Of Responsihle Command pp. 284-289, 305-311. 
165 'Analysis of the Curricula of the Regular Course, CGSC,' 2 November 1951 (CGSC: Fort 
Leavenworth) and 'Study - Curriculum Review Board 1952- Analysis of the Regular Course,' 14 
November 1952, (CGSC, Fort Leavenworth) in CARLA 13423.3 and 4. See also Stewart, 'Raising a 
Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the US. Army Command and General Staff College 1946-
1986', pp. 75-76. 
166 One of the participants in the 1951 curriculum review described the doctrinal shortfall in a journal 
article. Lieutenant Colonel Seneca W. Foote, 'Back up Fighting', Militmy Review, 30 (1951), 42-49 (p. 
42). 
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of map exercises dedicated to offence and only 165 hours to defensive or retrograde 
operations. 167 Army doctrine was also heavily weighted to the offence. 168 Much of the 
case study material for CGSC still came from Second World War experiences, which 
made it biased toward the offensive. The shift would be gradual, but significant. For 
the curriculum and doctrine developers at CGSC, the problem of future war was no 
longer seeking to improve upon the campaigns of 1944-1945, but thinking ahead to 
solve the challenges that NATO confronted. 
If McBride's tour as commandant was relatively calm, despite the ongoing 
Korean War, a conference he hosted in November 1951 pointed to major changes yet 
to come. The event was an annual gathering of the commandants of the AFF schools 
to discuss curriculum issues and priorities. In an AFF presentation entitled 
'Development and Testing of Doctrine for Atomic Warfare and The Related School 
Instruction,' Colonel V.C. Stevens acknowledged that 'army thinking has evolved 
slowly'. He ascribed the primary reason to uncertainty in national strategy and the 
fact that the 'delivery capabilities' were predominately in the air forces. That, Steven 
continued, was about to change. Senior leaders realized that 'atomic weapons 
provided the commander with the cheapest and most destructive force yet brought to 
the battlefield'. Acknowledging that most army schools were still emphasizing 
radiological defence, Stevens announced that 1952 was going to be 'a period of 
transition' where the army's emphasis would shift to 'the tactical employment of 
atomic weapons'. 169 
The conference announced a series of documents to assist the commandants 
ranging from the new draft Field Manual [FM] 101-31: Tactical Use of Atomic 
Weapons to an initial offering of training circulars describing the army's atomic 
167 Stewart, 'Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College 1946-1986', pp. 76-77. 
168 In 1952 a group of former German officers, led by Franz Halder, was asked to critique the new 
draft of FM 100-5 Operations. Their comments, based on end-of-war experiences quite different from 
the US but more reflective of the NATO position in the 1950s, found that the army was 'overrating' the 
offense as a fOl'm of combat 'even in situations where this does not appear wholly justified'. The 
Germans argued that based on the manual's un stated presumption of 'superiority of materiel' and the 
desire to gain the 'psychological advantage' of the initiative, the army was in danger of elevating 'the 
offensive to the level of dogma'. Franz Halder, 'Analysis of US Field Service Regulations' (Heidelberg: 
Historical Division, HQ United States Army Europe, 1953), p. 9. CARL N-17976-4. 
169 Colonel V.C. Stevens, 'Development and Testing for Doctrine for Atomic Warfare and the Related 
School Instruction', Report of Conference of Commandants of Army Service Schools, II (Fort 
Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1951), p. 29. MHI REP-3~ ASS 1951. 
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delivery systems such as Atomic Missile Force Support and Organization and 
Employment o/the 280-mm Gun Battalion. Moreover, the army was testing atomic 
doctrine in exercises like the recently competed Exercise SOUTHERN PINE, where 
staff procedures derived from FM 100-31 were played, albeit in crude form, at the 
army level. In addition, 'operational' test results, such as those from Exercise 
DESERT ROCK, where tactical units were 'disposed in battlefield formation near an 
actual atomic explosion', were to be made available to the school staffs. Upcoming 
events, Stevens noted would include working atomic scenarios with the Seventh 
Army in Europe, an exercise at the division level to test draft defensive doctrine, a 
'free manoeuvre' exercise at Fort Hood where observers could assess casualties from 
atomic explosions, and a logistics exercise to 'test the impact of atomic weapons in 
the communications zone'. While all of this activity aimed at making up for lost time, 
Stevens admitted the AFF still lacked a coherent process to integrate new weapons 
and doctrine at such a pace. 170 
Major General Henry Irving Hodes became the commandant of in March 
1952.171 A 1920 graduate of West Point, Hodes' professional career had none of the 
hallmarks of a soldier-scholar his predecessors had been. He was a member of the 
1937 class of CGSS and the 1940 class of the AWC. Hodes spend most of Second 
World War on the WDGS earning a solid reputation as one ofMarshall's men. He 
eventually served as a regimental commander in the 28th Infantry Division. After 
recovering from severe combat wounds, Hodes returned to the WDGS in 1945 where 
he worked closely with Eisenhower and Bradley as assistant deputy chief of staff. In 
this position, Bodes found himself heavily involved in the staff actions and decisions 
associated with unification. Before becoming commandant, Hodes served in Korea, 
with the 1 st Cavalry Division, then as the assistant division commander of the 7th 
Infantry during actions at Chosin Reservoir in fall 1950. In late 1951, Hodes became 
the assistant chief of staff, Eighth Army and a member of the UN negotiations team 
during truce talks. 
Earning the nickname 'Hammerin Hank Hodes' during his long years on 
senior staffs, Bodes was an interesting choice for Leavenworth. A fellow member of 
the Korean truce talks team described Hodes' impatience with what saw as excessive 
170 Stevens, 'Report of Conference of Commandants " pp. 30-31. 
171 M B 'd ' . t COlllnlander-in-Chief of Caribbean Command, Panama. 
c n e s next asslgnmen was as 
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study and analysis on the part of his fellow negotiators. Hodes, the observer noted, 
had a tendency to 'make quite explicit his suspicions of such intellectuality,.172 Upon 
his arrival at Leavenworth, Hodes announced that unlike his predecessors he was not 
interested in reorganizing the college. One instructor recalled that Hodes declared 
'Leavenworth has been here for years and to disturb it and upset it with reorganization 
takes a year to do and then a year before it settles down [ ... ] whatever you guys are 
doing is right'. 173 Dr. Ivan Birrer, the education advisor, concurred, noting 'nothing 
really much changed' under Hodes' leadership with the exception of 'a tremendous 
upsurge of tactics instruction,.174 An official command history of the period generally 
shared this opinion; it listed Hodes' tour highlights as managing the great flood of 
1952 and establishing the Leavenworth Museum. 175 Whether by background, 
circumstance, personality, or some combination thereof, Hodes was the antithesis of 
an intellectual change agent. 
Despite the comparatively quiet garrison environment during Hodes' 
command, there was some movement in the areas of concept, doctrine, and combat 
developments. Perhaps reflecting on his recent assignment in Korea, the new 
commandant initiated quiet reviews of the curriculum and, eventually the organization 
of the college. The effect of the changes, however, was to place an increased emphasis 
on staff training and less on future concepts at a time when political and strategic 
changes in Washington would soon demand the opposite. 176 Where the school 
emphasized future concepts, such as the concept of an area defence, one can clearly 
172 Herbert Goldhamer, The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1994), p. 8. 
173 Ted S. Chesney, 'Conversations between Lieutenant General William R. Desobry, USA (Ret) and 
Lieutenant Colonel Ted S. Chesney', Senior Officers Debriefing Program, I (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. 
Army Military History Institute, 1978), p. 11. MHI. 
174 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College', pp. 22-24. 
CARL. Before he departed, Hodes directed a major organizational study, which concluded that the 
CGSC's curriculum should strictly follow a tactical focus in accordance with the staff principles of FM 
101-1. The study was thoroughly rejected by the staff as fundamentally incompatible with the school's 
education mission and was never acted upon. See staff study and comments in Colonel John A. Gavin, 
'Study of College Organization' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1953). 
CARL N-13423.26-A. 
175 Talbott Barnard, 'The History of Fort Leavenworth 1952-1963' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and 
General Staff College, 1964), pp. 9-10. 
176 See 'Staff Study on the Adequacy, Balance, and Methodology of the 1953-54 CGSC Regular 
Course' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1953). CARLA N-13423.27 and 
Organization of the Command and General Staff College,' September 1953. 
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see the influence of the Korean War. Developing and modifying concepts for limited 
war was the primary emphasis of the school throughout this period. 
The school did not ignore the implications of atomic weapons. Beginning in 
1953, CGSC began teaching a dedicated special weapons course designed for students 
whose follow-on assignments would require 'Atomic Specialization'. 177 The 
specialization course was in addition to the AFF guidance at the beginning of 
the1952-1953 academic-year that all subjects would assume 'an enemy atomic 
capability' in all tactical situations. 178 Despite the directive, one study found that 
between 1952 and 1955, only fifteen to twenty percent of the curriculum 'integrated 
considerations of atomics' .179 
By 1952 the hesitation at CGSC over fully integrating atomics into the 
curriculum was only partly a matter of limited expertise or natural conservatism. It 
was equally a reflection ofthe ongoing balancing act within the army itself. In May, 
Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr. gave a speech entitled 'Your Army in the Atomic 
Age: You Can't Engineer the Infantry Out of Business. ' Citing Korea, Pace 
emphatically agued that the infantry remained the decisive factor in war. The majority 
of his talk, however, described the army's aggressive research and development 
agenda to 'exploit to the utmost the potential of atomic weapons'. 180 The debut of the 
army's 280-mm atomic cannon was the first tangible proof of the 'dramatic progress 
[ ... ] in the use of new weapons and scientist developments' and its 'extensive 
program to adapt itself to atomic warfare'. 181 
Innovation toward an atomic army was by 1952 emerging from new 
organizations like the AFF's combat developments staff and research activities like 
the ORO. As part of that effort, CGSC, as well as the other AFF schools, were 
directed to open a combat developments office. The idea of becoming a supporting 
177 This was a shortened and much simplified version of the course taught by the AEC's Armed Forces 
Special Weapons Project, Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
178 'Program ofInstruction for Command and General Staff Course -- 1952-53' (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and General Staff College, 1952), p. 3. CARLA. 
179 See 'Curriculum of the Command and General Staff College with Enclosures (1955)' (Fort 
Leavenworth: COl11mandand General Staff College, 1955), p. 4. CARLA N-13423.l01. 
180 Frank Pace Jr., 'Your Army in the Atomic Age', Vital Speeches of the Day, 18 (1952), 505-507 (pp. 
505-507). 
181 J. LaWton Coli ins, 'The Army Today Requires Top-Flight Manpower', Vital Speeches of the Day, 
19 (1952),130-134 (p. 133). 
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activity to an external development process did not sit well with Hodes. As one staff 
member recalled, 'Hodes was a big believer in the idea that, if you teach it, you know 
it [ ... ] he did not see the utility in a combat developments system and established the 
[combat developments] process against his better judgment'. 182 casc eventually 
assigned six officers to the initial combat developments activity with a priority toward 
the development of a mobile defence doctrine. 183 By 1954 the combat developments 
section had grown to twelve officers and, as Hodes had feared, their efforts were 
overwhelmingly directed toward external requirements. 
Hodes disliked the combat developments mission for two reasons. First, it was 
event, or technology, driven and not the result of debate among expert practitioners. 
Secondly, he believe it was a part ofCaSC's mission to '[i]nitiate action as necessary 
to formulate or revise tactics and doctrine'. 184 Hodes did not believe much would be 
gained by bringing engineers and technologists into an already understaffed and 
overworked doctrine process. A report from late 1954 noted that 'the entire effort of 
this section is continually involved in meeting demands of outside agencies on day-to-
day doctrinal matters of essentially immediate impact [ ... ] to the almost complete 
elimination of any constructive, forward thinking on our important doctrinal 
mission'. 185 The external tasks Hodes complained about were growing numbers of 
nuclear related field exercises and tests. From the point of view of the army's senior 
leadership, these events, and not casC's doctrinal efforts, were increasingly 
representative of the army's 'forward thinking'. 
The pressure to accelerate the process of concept and doctrine development 
stemmed from many factors. There were doctrinal innovations and tactical 
improvements based on the lessons of Korea. There were also innovations emerging 
from technological advances in atomic weapons and surface-to-surface missiles. 
182 Chesney, 'Conversations between Lieutenant General WilIiam R. Desobry', p. 12. 
183 Chesney, 'Conversations between Lieutenant General WilIiam R. Desobry', p. 13. The results of 
Hodes's doctrinal efforts were published in a December 1951 Military Review article entitled simply 
'Mobile Concept' and credited to 'studies conducted by the college'. The article lays out Hodes' case 
for a broadly flexible doctrine that accommodated the impact of atomic weapons but one that barely 
acknowledged them. See 'Mobile Concept', Military Review, 34 (1954), 3-10 (pp. 3-10). 
184 Department of the Army, Special Regulation 350-5-5 'Command and General Staff College,' 
(Washington DC, 23 January 1953), p. 3. 
185 Extract Pertaining to Personnel for Development of Tactics and Doctrine, from Reclama to Fifth 
Army Manpower Survey, 22 December 1954 in 'Curriculum of the Command and General Staff 
College (1955)'. 
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However, for the most part these changes were on the margins of existing concepts 
and had little impact on force design or aggregate manpower. 
The prime mover of concept development in this period was the arrival of the 
Eisenhower Administration in January 1953 and the president's determination for 
philosophic, political, and economic reasons to slash defence spending. The 'New 
Look' strategy, was developed and debated during the first summer and fall of the 
new administration. For the army, the familiar pattern of demobilization was once 
again at hand. Having lost the argument to retain the manpower mobilized during the 
Korean War, the Army's Chief of Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, was desperate 
to prevent the army from being forced to rely on 'skeletonized regiments', lest it 
invite a repeat of the Korea debacle. 186 The only alternative to hollowing was to 
change the number and nature of the army's missions, as it would appear the 
administration preferred, or change the way the army organized to accomplish its 
missions. 
On 11 December 1953, Secretary of De fen se Charles Wilson directed cuts 
totalling almost twenty percent of the army's manpower by June 1955. 187 In a 13 
December 1953 speech by the CJCS, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, clearly spelled-out 
the conceptual framework in which the army would have to operate. 
We consider it imperative to improve our ratios of combat manpower 
to total manpower [ ... ] to accomplish these ends we are improving 
greatly our combat effectiveness by the application of new weapons 
and new techniques, and hope ultimately to achieve far greater 
flexibility than heretofore-attainable [ ... ] Atomic weapons have 
virtually achieved conventional status within our armed forces. Each 
military service is capable of putting this weapon into military use. 
Therefore, each service has a tremendous responsibility for living up to 
our expectations for a still greater and more powerful degree of combat 
readiness. 188 
Aside from the military and even moral arguments Ridgway made against the 
strategy, no one, inside the army or out, could answer a basic challenge being put 
186 Matthew B. Ridgeway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1956), pp. 286-288, 303-304. 
187 Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956, History of the Office of the 
Secretary of De fen se, III (Washington DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2001),p.178. 
188 Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 'The "New Look" Defense Plans of the Nation: Speech Delivered to 
the National Press Club, 14 December 1953', Vital Speeches of the Day, 20 (1954), l71-173 (p. 173). 
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forward by Radford: how many and what kinds of atomic weapons could actually 
replace a ground division? 189 In an effort to minimize the impact of cuts and perhaps 
demonstrate that, even as he resisted the logic of the strategy, Ridgway could, to the 
use Wilson's phrase, 'get more bang for the buck', he directed theAFF to conduct 
studies to 'improve the army combat-potential-to-manpower ratio'. The 
organizational studies would need, among other things, to improve the manpower to 
force and support ratios, increase mobility, improve sustainment, maximize 
technology, and be ready for fielding by January 1956. 190 This was a tall order under 
optimal conditions. Throughout 1954, the anaemic combat developments staff at 
Leavenworth, in collaboration with the infantry and armour schools as well as the 
members of staff of AFF collaborated on a series of studies culminating in 'The 
Atomic Field Army' or ATFA-l report in November 1954. While the proposed 
organizational designs for the infantry and armoured divisions did trim 4000 and 2700 
soldiers from each, it was pretty clear that most of the other objectives in Ridgway's 
guidance were not going to be met. The reports from initial field exercises were not 
. . I . d . h C'C' rt 191 encouragmg, WIt 1 most selllor comman ers panlllng t e ellO . 
Reconciling CGSC's traditional development of doctrine mission with the 
rapidly expanding activities collectively known as combat developments would have 
to wait for a new commander. On the specific direction of the studies emerging from 
Ridgway's guidance, Hodes was 'dead set against' using doctrinal concepts to reduce 
manpower and likely set the tone for much of the preliminary work leading up to the 
AFTA-l study. 192 Bodes departed Leavenworth for command in Europe in March 
1954 where, ironically, he would spend a significant portion of his time commenting 
on and integrating new capabilities emerging from the very combat developments 
189 Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, p. 177. 
190 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, 
Army Lineage Series CMH Pub 60-14 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States 
Army, 1998), p. 265. 
191 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 265-267. An August 1954 study by Major General James 
Gavin, then the Assistant Chief of Staff G3, noted overall satisfaction with the CGSC's role as the 
'fountainhead of military knowledge' through its 'continuous research program to study the effects of 
new and possible future weapons on the conduct of operations.' Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff 
G-3, 'A Review of the Army School System' (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1954), pp. 29, 
44. CARLA N-13423.38. 
192 Chesney, 'Conversations between Lieutenant General WiIIiam R. Desobry', p. 14. 
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process he eschewed. 193 By early 1954 the army had reached a crossroads. During the 
previous five years, combat developments, operations research, and an increasingly 
forward looking CGSC emerged as the army adapted to new demands. However, it 
still lacked a coherent process or a vision of how the disparate elements might work 
as a whole. 
The Coach and a Game Plan 
Major General Garrison H. Davidson took command of CGSC in July 1954. 
At first glance he was a decidedly odd choice for the position. Like his predecessor, 
Davidson had not spent much time as a student in army schools. After graduating 
from West Point in 1927, he served a two-year tour as lieutenant of engineers before 
returning in 1929 to become a ,coach, rising in 1932 to the position of head coach of 
West Point's football team. In what has to be one of the oddest career paths to general 
officer, Davidson spent the next five years as one of youngest and most successful 
head football coaches in the school's history. 194 Coaching duties and the start of the 
war meant he would never attend CGSC. Davidson often joked that he was 
'completely uneducated [ ... ] militarily,.195 
Early in the Second World War, Davidson made a name for himself working 
for Groves, during the frenzied building of the Pentagon. He followed this with key 
assignments as an engineer, planner, and administrator during operations in North 
Africa and Sicily. Davidson was promoted to Brigadier General in 1943 while on 
Patton's staff, becoming one of the army's youngest general officers. Throughout his 
career, Davidson credited his notoriety as the former West Point football coach for 
opening doors to critical assignments and even his promotion to general officer. 196 
In the opening months of the Korean War, Davidson, then serving on the Sixth 
Army staff in California, was rushed into theatre to assist in planning the Eighth 
193 Ingo Wolf gang Trauschweizer, 'Creating Deterrence for Limited War: The U.S. Army and the 
Defense of West Germany, 1953-1982' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Maryland, 2006), pp. 
156-213. 
194 Davidson's record offorty-seven wins, thirty-five losses, and eleven ties makes him the fifth most 
successful West Point coach in terms of total victories and seventh in terms of winning percentage. 
195 Dr. John T. Greenwood, 'Interview with Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson' (Oakland: U.S. 
Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, 1980), p. 484. 
196 Greenwood, 'Interview with Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson', pp. 281-282. 
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Army's increasingly desperate defence. Upon arrival and after a brief fifteen-minute 
meeting with the army commander, General Walton Walker, Davidson received the 
task to create a second line of defence if the main Pusan line were to collapse. 
Lacking a staff, troops, or any engineer supplies, Davidson burnished his reputation as 
an energetic leader and capable engineer by cobbling together supplies along with 
several thousand Korean labourers to create a 68-mile second line in a matter of 
weeks. 197 Although the 'Davidson Line', as it came to be called, was never needed, 
Ridgway, Walker's successor, recalled how he 'was deeply impressed with the speed 
and effectiveness with which the job was [ ... ] completed.' 198 Following his special 
engineering assignment, Davidson remained in Korea in various capacities, including 
assistant division commander of the 24th Infantry, until July 1951. 
Davidson credited much of his success to luck, or as he described it, having 
the knack to be in the 'right spots at the right time' .199 One of those 'right time' 
moments came as in July 1951 when, after departing Korea, Davidson joined the 
WSEG. He relieved Gavin, the army's first senior representative on this secretary of 
defense chartered research organization. In his capacity as the senior army officer, 
Davidson participated in or influenced the direction of some of the most important 
studies conducted by the department of defense on new technologies and capabilities. 
Davidson could not have known it at the time, but immersion in broad studies on the 
nature of chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare as well as the detailed analyses of 
tactical atomic munitions, strategic bombing effects, and U.S. capabilities for future 
war was an essential prerequisite for his tasks eGSe. 200 
According to Birrer, Davidson's first impression of Leavenworth was that it 
had lost 'its place in the doctrinal sun' and needed to 'wrest doctrinal initiative away 
from the hardware merchants'. Based on observations while on the WSEG staff, 
Davidson believed the school was failing in its responsibility to the army to provide 
the push, influence, and initiative necessary to drive new doctrine. eGSe had become 
197 Greenwood, 'Interview with Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson', pp. 436-437. 
198 R'd I gway, The Korean War, p.93. 
199 William C. Baldwin, 'Engineer Memoirs: Lieutenant General Garrison H. Davidson, USA Retired 
(Oral History)', (Oakland: Office of History, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1986), p. 34. 
200 For a list ofWSEG studies and reports during this period see 'Exhibit 1 - WSEG Task and 
Accomplishments, 1949-1955' and 'Exhibit 2 - WSEG Reports, 1949-1955' in John Ponturo, 
'Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience, 1948-1976' (Arlington: 
Institute for Defense Analyses, 1979), pp. 99,101. 
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the 'retailer' of doctrine and not its source. 201 Davidson's recollection of this issue 
matches Birrer's, but points to a different cause. Davidson believed the problem was 
not so much the fault of the hardware merchants as it was the quality of the doctrinal 
work being produced to guide them. In other words, the hardware merchants were 
merely filling a vacuum. 'There wasn't sufficient true study devoted to [doctrine ... ] it 
was too much opinion and not enough reason. ' 
Duty with the WSEG had taught Davidson that if one thoughtfully analyzed 
requirements for the next war and carefully projected probable materiel developments 
from existing equipment, then one could reduce the size 'of the field to which opinion 
has to be expressed' .202 What was lacking in 1954 was not the diagnosis of the 
problem, but a coherent process to go about solving it. Davidson's second major 
observation was that recent events had tipped CGSC's curriculum away from 
education and back toward training. Again, Birrer recalled that Davidson believed that 
CGSC 'was still too much a World War JI training school for staff officers' and not the 
graduate professional school 'it ought to be'. 203 Students were being taught 'superbly' 
the 'how,' but not sufficiently the 'why' of combined arms operations. 204 
In the fall 1954 Davidson launched three wide-ranging studies to examine the 
school's relevance and doctrinal responsibilities, its organization for accomplishing its 
mission, and, with the assistance of an external survey, the validity of its educational 
methods. A staff committee quickly produced the first study under the awkward but 
descriptive title, the 'Nature of the Curriculum, Command and General Staff College 
in Light ofImpact of Atomic Weapons, 1955-56'. Davidson tasked the 'Easterbrook 
Committee', so named after its leader, to ensure that the curriculum was 'modern'. 
His metric for 'modern' was simple - ensure the school could not be accused of 
'teaching World War JI tactics in preparation for World War Ill'. Moreover, the 
committee should examine whether the planned instruction was 'realistic and in 
consonance with fact in the sensitive critical areas of mass destruction weapons'. 
Finally, when considering mass destruction weapons, the committee should ensure 
201 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan J: Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College', p. 34. 
202 Greenwood, 'Interview with Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson', pp. 486-487. 
203 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan 1. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College', p. 34. 
204 Greenwood, 'Interview with Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson', p. 485. 
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that CGSC had 'the most authoritative and up-to-date data [ ... ] particularly with 
regard to weapons data, intelligence, and delivery means'. 205 
While the Easterbrook Committee went to work, Davidson initiated a series of 
smaller studies designed to put concept and doctrine development on a firm footing. 
He asked for studies to examine critically what he called the 'standard cliches' of 
recent atomic conceptual work: mobility, dispersion, and flexibility. Without 
betraying his own bias, Davidson asked for historical studies to 'determine from 
historical fact the probable true requirements for each of these characteristics'. 206 A 
few weeks later he tasked another committee to examine the assumptions associated 
with atomic warfare and ground forces in the period 1955-1960,.207 Davidson was 
clearly trying to apply WSEG-like 'scientific' rigor to the school's efforts. 
The Easterbrook Committee delivered its report on 5 November. The 
committee found that the 1954-55 curriculum 'does not fully meet the criteria of a 
realistic and forward-looking approach.' However, where material covering the 'field 
of atomics' was present, the content was as up to date as 'security and text material' 
would permit. It noted that while the total amount of atomic material had increased 
over the past several years, it had done so 'in a piecemeal fashion' and therefore 'the 
significance of atomics is lost in a large variety of non-atomic subjects.' 208 The 
Easterbrook Committee also found the curriculum overly complex and repetitive. The 
1954-1955 curriculum reflected a six phase, narrow, staff and echelon-centric 
approach: fundamentals, staff functions, division, corps, and army operations, and 
administrative support for larger units. The new approach, approved by Davidson, 
emphasized application across a simplified four-phased instruction: familiarization, 
1· . 1 d . 209 app IcatlOn, advanced application, and genera e ucatlOn. 
205 Memorandum, from Davidson to Executive for Instruction, subj: The Nature of the Curriculum, the 
C&GS College, 24 September 1954. Reproduced in Annex B, 'Nature of the Curriculum, Command 
and General Staff College in Light ofImpact of Atomic Weapons' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and 
General Staff College, 1954 ).(Hereafter cited as The Easterbrook Committee Report) CARLA N-
13423.50-A 
206 Memorandum from Davidson to Executive for Research and Evaluation, subj: Additional Studies, 
24 September 1954 in 'The Easterbrook Committee Report (1954)'. The committee, led by Colonel 
Ernest F. Easterbrook, included ten other members of the CGSC senior staff. 
207 Memorandum from Davidson to Assistant Commandant, subj: Report on "Nature of the 
Curriculum, etc.," 15 November 1954 in 'The Easterbrook Committee Report (1954),. 
208 'The Easterbrook Committee Report (1954)', p. 1. (See Appendix 5). 
209 Annex C, 'The Easterbrook Committee Report (1954)'. 
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On the fundamental question of the relationship between atomic weapons and 
the curriculum, the committee split into two distinct camps. Both groups agreed that 
the school needed an increased emphasis on atomic weapons, but they differed 
markedly on the degree of emphasis and basic assumptions. The arguments made by 
each side were representative of the major intellectual arguments within the army. The 
distinction being made was between two approaches to atomic weapons and 
combined arms doctrine. There was a third position not being considerd and that 
would later be closely associated with General MaxweIl Taylor. The third position 
was a political and bureaucratic one where doctrine was a means to position, and 
possiblly preserve, the army against external budgetary pressures. Despite its 
prominence in the history of the period, Taylor's position was not part of the working 
level debates. 
The first group argued that atomic warfare was the 'general type of warfare,' 
because it was 'the more dangerous threat to national security'. There was, in this 
view, two types of warfare. The first type would be where both sides employed atomic 
weapons from the outset. The second 'and less important' type would be a limited war 
in which atomic weapons were not necessarily used, but where each side would 
possess the ability to employ them. The logic of this position required that 'instruction 
must have as its basis the idea that two-sided atomic warfare [ ... ] will be the normal 
battlefield situation.' Warfare 'without atomic support' should be 'relegated to the role 
ofa special operation,.210 
The second group, on the other hand, argued that CGSC should educate 
officers for the 'various general conditions of combat which V.S. forces are likely to 
encounter'. While generally agreeing with the first group on the types of war, the 
second group argued that the relative probability ofa particular type of warfare or the 
even the likelihood of atomic use 'cannot be conclusively predicted'. Therefore, the 
curriculum should not emphasize the atomic battlefield over any other. 211 
Davidson concurred in the approach recommended by the second group. His 
curriculum guidance directed instructors to revise their courses to include the general 
situation, when both sides had and used nuclear weapons, and a special situation 
where atomic weapops might be employed by either side. Regardless of the specific 
210 'The Easterbrook Committee Report (1954)" pp. 2-4. 
211 'The Easterbrook Committee Report (1954)', pp. 2-4. 
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scenario, however, 'the impact of atomics will be considered in all aspects of the 
problem for both combatants.' 212 In addition, Davidson approved a 'Program of 
Atomic Indoctrination' for all instructors based on the existing programme of 
instruction for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) designed Special Weapons 
Course. 
The basic outline of the second group approach matched many of the 
arguments put forward by Taylor when he became the Army's Chief of Staff in June 
1955. In remarks to the army staff he reminded them that 'in our planning, in our 
allocation of means, [we must be] thinking enough about the little war, which can 
always occur, instead of expending everything we have for the big war, which we 
hope will always be deterred'. 213 IIowever, Taylor's decisions, especially those 
associated with pressing ahead with the emerging atomic-capable divisions, more 
closely matched the logic of the first group. Davidson's rigorous approach was going 
to challenge this approach without embracing the conservatives. He was simply going 
ask that advocates of the aggressive approach demonstrate the value of their position 
through the use of a credible process. 
While Davidson's actions were soon to be associated with the more 
'conservative' of the two options, he was far from advocating a conservative approach 
to the curriculum. In a January 1955 conference with facuIty department heads, he 
made the case that 'if you are just teaching a commander or staff officer current 
duties, techniques and tactics, are you adequately preparing him for future command 
ten years from now, when he will be faced with new developments in tactics and new 
techniques?' Although several of the staff expressed concern that the army had yet to 
settle on a 'firm concept' for a time frame ten years into the future, Davidson decided 
the 1955-1956 class would use draft doctrine, especially on subjects involving atomic 
warfare, as one technique to look forward toward future applications rather than 
212 Annex F, 'Guidelines for Authors of 1955/56 Units of Instruction in 'The Easterbrook Committee 
Report (1954)'. 
213 General Maxwell D. Taylor, 'Remarks at His First Meeting with the Army Staff after Assuming the 
Duties of Chief of Staff' (7 July 1955), p. 2; National Defense University Library, Special Collection 
Archives, MaxwelI D. Taylor Papers, Fort McNair, Washington DC. (Hereafter NDULSCA), 
<https:lldigitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?ltaylor,362> [accessed 5 Janurary 2011]. 
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backwards toward historic examples. 214 He warned the staff, however, that such 
instruction: 
must not mislead the student. Since the influence of mass destruction 
weapons on the battlefield have not been defined clearly enough to 
establish new doctrine, it must be made clear to the student that the 
doctrine presented to him represents the best, tentative thinking of the 
college on the subject. 21S 
Having examined the current curriculum, Davidson turned to the college's 
organization, including its organization for doctrine development. In what became 
known as the 'Skinner Report', a committee of senior CGSC staff received the 
mandate to recommend a series of reforms designed to decentralize, simplify, and 
bring the college up-to-date. In addition, Davidson provided specific guidance based 
on his experience with the WSEG. The new organization would combine 'a weapons 
system approach with the present general staff approach considering the six major 
systems of any major combat unit to be: reconnaissance and intelligence, combat 
arms, fire support arms, combat support arms, logistical support, and administrative 
support,.216 
The most significant legacy of the Skinner Report was the recommendation to 
change the way the college approached its standing mission 'to initiate action as 
necessary to formulate or revise (tactical and logistical) doctrine'. The 1954 
organization placed responsibility for doctrine under a small combat developments 
section within the college's Executive for Research and Evaluation. According to 
Davidson's assessment, this meant that doctrine 'was not receiving the attention and 
support it not only deserved but required'. Davidson described the doctrine effort as 
'organizationally awkward with regards to current doctrine and totally inadequate 
with regards to future doctrine,.217 
214 Transcript of Seminar 'Instmctiol1 Mission, CGSC, Grant Hall, 8 January 1955,' cited in Stewart, 
'Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the V.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
1946-1986', pp. 107-108. 
215 Memorandum from Garrison H. Davidson to Assistant Commandant, 'Subj: Guidance for Planning 
the /6 Curriculum,' (12 January), p. 5; MHI CGSC CP 1955/56. 
216 d b" 0 " " f Memorandum from Davidson thru the Assistant Comman ant, su r rgamzatlOn 0 CGSC, 
undated. Found in 'Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Orgnaization ofCGSC' (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and General Staff College, 1955). CARL N-13423.26-B (Hereafter known as the Skinner 
Report). 
217 David'~on estimated that when he accounted for the external projects only 15 percent of the 
college's research and development resources were being devoted to the doctrine mission. Garrison H. 
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The Skinner Report recommended, and Davidson accepted several staff 
modifications: First, that the Executive for Research and Evaluation be redesignated 
the Director of Research and Analysis and made co-equal with the Director of 
Instruction. This was significant in terms of bureaucratic influence and access to 
resources. Accordingly, the number of officers assigned would rise from twelve to 
forty-two. The elevation in status was further enhanced when Davidson personally 
contacted the senior officers of each service and arm to assign their best officers 
directly.21s Davidson argued that it was only through improving the quality of the 
doctrinal efforts at Leavenworth that it could compete with the ideas of 'the hardware 
merchants or the commercial think-tanks'. 219 
The second innovation was to split doctrine according to both expertise and 
time. Responsibility for current doctrine would fall under the director for instruction. 
Davidson explained the logic of this approach in his command after-action report by 
noting' [w ]hat we teach is current doctrine. ' 220 The instructors responsible for 
teaching current doctrine and preparing educational literature on current doctrine were 
the experts and should be responsible for commenting on or updating it as required. 
The development of future doctrine, on the other hand, required a 'weapons 
system approach.' To accomplish this, the director of research and analysis was 
organized into three time-phased entities. First, an Advanced Operations Research 
Department (AORD) was to look at the 'long-range' development horizon -judged 
to be ten-years into the future. Its mission was essentially conceptual and it would 
deliver a 'body of ground force tactical and logistical principles' that would act as a 
guide for the development of doctrine and provide weapons characteristics to materiel 
research and development agencies. 221 As Davidson told the CONARC commander, 
the army's current problem with regard to concept development was the lack of an 
inclusive process that took advantage of the power of 'the group.' 
Davidson, 'After-Action Report by Major General Garrison H. Davidson, Commandant Command and 
General Staff College' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1956), pp. U-1. 
218 GarrisonDavidson, 'Talk by Major General Garrison Davidson to General Wyman on Combat 
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219 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College', p. 37. 
220 Davidson, 'After-Action Report " pp. 11-1. 
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232 
For instance, some of the present concepts that we are working on, 
now, were originated by a group of three officers at the Army War 
College. Now over a period of months this project has been expanded 
and developed, and in my opinion has reached a stature that 'perhaps is 
not justified. 
By the time guidance had flowed down from the army staff through CONARC to 
CGSC, Davidson complained, concepts 'have been so restricted that we have not been 
able to contribute very much original thought to the final product'. 222 AORD would 
fix this by getting out, ahead of the planning and guidance time line. 
The second entity was the Combat Developments Department (CDD). 
Organized along the same lines as the AORD, the CDD had a shorter time horizon, 
five-years, and more a more realistic set of constraints. The CDD's mission was to 
'provide the first recommendations leading to the formulation of current doctrine or 
the revision of existing doctrine. ,223 Given its shorter time horizon, it was 'largely 
limited to weapons and equipment currently available to troops that exist or are in 
prototype stage'. 224 This allowed interface with the growing combat developments 
efforts of the CONARC, like the CDEC. Davidson was adamant that to be effective, 
the CDD would need high-quality data in the form of 'concrete figures [ ... ] so you 
could know the effect of one tactical organization against another'. 225 
The final part of the Skinner Committee's proposed organizational design was 
a Current Analysis Section (CAS). The CAS would serve 'as a buffer to absorb the 
shock of projects originating outside of the college.' 226 The Skinner Report noted 
almost 50 external projects levied onto the existing CGSC doctrine office during just 
part of the 1954-55 academic year. Davidson's hope was that he could use the officers 
assigned to the CAS to participate in such events as CONARC's development, testing, 
222 Davidson, 'Talk by Major General Garrision Davidson', p. 100. Davidson was referring to the 
concept work begun in November 1954 by the Army War College entitled 'Doctrinal and 
Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army During the Period 1960-1970' generally known 
by its short name PENT ANA. Field experiments with the AFT A-I concept in 1955 indicated the 
potential for larger divisions in order to fight both atomic and non-atomic wars. This did not sit well 
with the army's senior leadership and although much more conceptual in nature, by late 1955 the 
PENT ANA became the focus of doctrinal development effort. See Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 
pp. 264-276. 
223 Davidson, 'Talk by Major General Garrision Davidson', p. 98. 
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226 Davidson, 'After-Action Report " pp. If-I - II-2. 
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and evaluation of the ATFA-l concept, thereby allowing the AORD and CDD to 
remain focused on future doctrine. 227 
The key to Davidson's concept was a five-step process that led to what he 
called a 'self-perpetuating system ' of doctrinal development. The five-step process 
would begin with a 'visualization' of the battlefield in the timeframe under 
consideration. 
I. 
I five STEPS IN DEVUOPMENT OF DQCUUNE 
FIGURE". I 
Figure 1: Davidson's Five-Step Program 228 
The image of the future would then develop with additional specificity by type 
of operation and then the broad capabilities necessary to accomplish the mission . The 
third step would be critical, since capabilities represent a combination of organization, 
doctrine, and weapons. Skipping this step could lead to 'weapons, pieces of 
equipment, various types of munitions, and features of organization' being developed 
'without any pal1icular use or need in mind'. 229 The fOUl1h and fifth steps were to be 
dynamic and interactive. Lt is in these phases that experiment, field trials, and 
scientific development would take place. The concept was simple, but required an 
investment of time. 
227 Davidson, Talk by Major General Garrision Davidson', p. 100. 
m Robert C. Cassibry, 'Development of Doctrine', Mililwy Review, 36 (1956), 22-34 (p. 27). 
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Working on a tlu'ee-year work cycle, the AORD would develop a set of long-
range principles, which would in turn inform the material and doctrinal development 
efforts of the COD and related agencies. At the end of each three-year cycle the 
process would begin again. Based on this concept and work already underway, 
Davidson told the commander CONARC that the first cycle would finish in June 
1958. 
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Figure 2 Davidson 's Three-Year Development Cycle 230 
Davidson 's vision of a process that linked long-range concept development 
work to combat developments in the mid-term was ground breaking.23 1 It was the 
intellectual framework within which the more technological combat developments 
activity should occur. Bin'er later described this institutional illllOvatiol1 as havi ng a 
' s ignificant long- term impact ' on how the army developed doctrine. 232 The problem 
was that Davidson 's solution, while significant in its long-term impact, was several 
years too late to affect decisions already unfolding. 233 
In keeping with the general tm'ust of both the Easterbrook and SkinJ1er 
analyses, and no doubt the influence of hi s own engineer background and WSEG 
experi ence, Davidson took a pragmatic approach to the 1957- 1958 curriculum design. 
230 C Ob '0 ° ass I ry, evelopment ofDoctnne', CP. 29). 
23 1 See Cassibry, 'Development of Doctrine', (pp. 22-34). 
232 According to Bin'er the basic outlines establi shed by Davidson defined the army ' s overa ll approach 
to doctrine and combat deve lopments through the late 1970s. Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan J. Bin'er: Service at 
the Command and General Staff Co ll ege', pp . 36-3 7. 
233 In February 1956, Taylor approved a CON ARC plan to reorgani ze the airborne division through a 
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Atomic weapons would play a much larger role in the curriculum, but not at the 
expense of other forms of war. Davidson was concerned, based on his direct 
experience at the WSEG, that proponents in the army of some of the more radical 
organization and doctrine designs were guilty of 'very shallow' thinking. Accordingly, 
Davidson told the staff the 'we should resist any attempt to introduce ATFA into our 
[1956-1957] program of instruction, except in a minor way'. 234 
Davidson's final major contribution during his time as commandant was to 
sponsor an educational survey commission's examination of the college. Davidson 
sought to obtain unbiased advice on the college's organization, curriculum, and 
methods in sufficient time to impact development of the 1955-1956 curriculum. A 
six-man commission of civilian academics and retired general officers began their 
work in January 1956. 235 After conducting staff interviews, classroom observations, 
and surveys of senior officers, the commission issued what Davidson described as 'an 
extremely searching report' just prior to his departure. 236 
The overall tone of the report was positive. In fact, while the commissioners 
did make several substantive recommendations, they did not believe any of them 
required 'major changes in the basic structure of the program'. 237 This is perhaps not 
surprising since, as Davidson's education advisor, Birrer drafted and coordinated the 
report in support of the commission membership.238 With regard to the curriculum, 
the commission noted that its scope was, like its pre-1950 predecessor, crowded. This 
forced the staff to expend their energy in a 'hopeless effort to design the perfect 
234 'Curriculum Plan for Regular Course C&GSC 1956-1957 - 21 December 1955' (Fort Leavenworth . 
Command and General Staff College, 1955), p. 2. (MHI CGSC CP 1956/57) 
235 The military members were Manton Eddy, the former CGSC commandant; Geoffrey Keyes, who 
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War and during most of his service in the WSEG; and Troy A. Middleton, President of Louisiana State 
University and a frequent advisor to the DoD on educational issues. The civilian members were; Dr. 
Jacob Orleans, the first CGSC civilian advisor 1948-49; Dr. Harold F. Harding, a reserve colonel who 
spent the summers between J 948-5 J at CGSC helping to prepare curriculum; and Dr. Harl R. Douglass 
of the University of Colorado, the only member who appears to have had no prior relationship with the 
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236 Memorandum from Davidson to The Chief of Staff, subj: Recommendations of Educational Survey 
Commission, 27 June 1956. Found in 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission (1956)'. 
237 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission (1956)', p. 4. 
238 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College'. Not surprisingly, 
one of the major findings was a call to 'energetically developed and imaginably pursue' Birrer's three-
phase curriculum concept (familiarization-application-advanced application). This became the college 
standard for decades to come. 
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curriculum' in order to fit time constraints - not, as they should, educational 
objectives. 239 
The other major criticism of the commission was stated indirectly, but implied 
that the current approach to future war, as well the impact of atomic weapons, was, at 
best, merely adequate. 
The curriculum is geared at command and staff [ ... ] in light of present 
knowledge of atomic power and other new developments. It is 
manifest that the conditions of warfare 10 years from now will find the 
present graduate less than adequately prepared [ ... ] It is far better to 
improve the student's ability to solve problems of the future than to 
master details that will be outmoded this year or next. We live in a 
dynamic age. 240 
Finally, the commission also noted that the current approach was failing to 'encourage 
independence, initiative, resourcefulness, originality, creativeness, reasoning, 
judgment, and the like'. The commission encouraged the school to continue to pursue 
'methods more nearly approaching those of a typical graduate school than is the usual 
CGSC custom,.241 
On the eve of his departure in 1956, Davidson wrote a personal letter to the 
commander CONARC as a cover to his end-of-command after-action review. In it he 
described the college's accomplishments and challenges over the previous two years, 
endorsing the work of the educational survey commission that had highlighted what 
he described as his 'two great concerns' with regard to the college's mission. The first 
Davidson described as 'a serious deficiency in the knowledge and education of senior 
officers' with regard to current tactical concepts and weapon systems. He pointed out 
that the average officer attended CGSC, or the 'terminal' phase of his tactical 
education, at approximately the twelfth year of service. If that same officer went on to 
command at the division level or above, more than fifteen years would have passed 
since Leavenworth and 'a great deal of what they have learned will have become 
outmoded. ' Given the accelerating pace of technological and doctrinal change, this 
problem was only going to get worse. Not stated, but clearly implied, was an 
argument that many current senior officers were tactically dated and perhaps unable to 
239 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission (1956)" pp. 14, 18. 
240 'Rep art of the Educational Survey Commission (1956)', p. 13. 
241 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission (1956)', p. 11. 
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adequately judge the real value of emerging tactical capabilities. Davidson's criticism 
does not appear to have been aimed at any particular group - futurists or the 
conservatives - but at the growing evidence gap between experience-based and 
intuition-based approaches to doctrine and combat developments. Davidson asked for 
Wyman's support for a supplemental 'Refresher or Advanced Course' in tactics for 
senior officers after twenty years of service. 242 While nothing came of the broader 
intent behind this recommendation, Davidson's successor did begin a senior officer 
atomic employment course designed to 'increase and enhance [ ... ] knowledge of the 
effects as well as the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the employment of 
atomic weapons'. 243 
Davidson's second major issue was also the heart of his after-action review. 
His concerns reflected apparent frustration at his inability to impose some order on 
what he saw as the army's incoherent approach to developing capabilities for the 
future. Davidson's basic outline for a coherent doctrine development program proved 
to be ahead of its time, as his observations on the state of affairs the summer 1956 
were prescient. 
[W]hile in a few days I will be out of the developmental game after 
spending five years in it, I will carry with me an extreme concern over 
the procedures for the development of tactical and logistical doctrine. 
The basic deficiency can best be illustrated by the fact that when recent 
chiefs of staff have assumed command, they did not find thoroughly 
analyzed and developed, new, modem concepts of tactical and 
logistical doctrine and organization within which they could readily 
incorporate their own ideas and be confident of the timely 
development of the best means to carry out their mission. Instead, it 
appears that the Department of the Army staff, on occasion, has been 
compelled to direct development of new concepts on a more or less 
arbitrary and crash basis. 244 
Davidson's critique was clearly directed, in carefully crafted language, at 
Taylor's recent decision to approve a modified version of the PENTANA concept. In 
242 Letter from MG Garrison H. Davidson to General Willard G. Wyman, HQ Continental Army 
Command, Fort Monroe VA, 6 July 1956 appended to Davidson, 'After-Action Report '. (See 
Appendix 6) 
243 Lionel C. McGarr, 'Opening Remarks _ Senior Officer Atomic Employment Course, 11 March 
1957', Addresses by Lionel C. McGarr, Major General V.S. Army, Volume I 3 August 1956 - 2 May 
1958 (Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College, 1957), p. 135. 
244 MG Garrison H. Davidson to General Willard G. Wyman, HQ Continental AmlY Command, Fort 
Monroe V A, 6 July 1956 appended to Davidson, 'After-Action Report '. 
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his assessment, 'not only do we not now have the type of answers which the 
Department of the Army's staff requires, but neither are we laying a sound foundation 
to provide those answers in the future. ' Davidson questioned whether the army could 
avoid repeating the missteps of the recent past and gave it as 'his fixed opinion' that 
'until the [a]rmy develops an adequate system for the development of future doctrine, 
future chiefs of staff will again find themselves in a similar position'. 245 The answer, 
as he saw it, was to leverage the power of 'collective thinking' and avoid the 
tendency, again in a thinly veiled critique of the Pentomic decision, for ideas to: 
come down from the top with such a degree of detailed guidance and 
with such close time limits, they tend to stifle the thought of 
subordinate agencies, require superficial thinking deadlines, and in 
general dissipate the total effort. A proper system would instead be 
based on feeding new ideas up from the bottom [ ... and] tap our vast 
. fb . d' 246 reserVOIr 0 rampower an expenence. 
Davidson once asked his staff if they knew the definition of proper tactics. He 
assured them that if their response was 'the opinion of the senior officer present,' they 
were wrong because that was diametrically opposed to his philosophy.247 At the end 
of his tour, Davidson had concluded that the army was preparing for the future based 
on a dash of senior opinion and little else. By summer 1956, it was clear that he had 
come too late. His successor was chosen in large measure because he would drive in a 
preordained future direction and not foster an intellectual process along the way. 
Davidson's tenure was a point of transition. CGSC was trying to reconcile its 
traditional role - transferring the profession's hard-earned knowledge to a new 
generation - with a growing perception that even as it was being taught, that 
knowledge was out of date. The same dilemma squeezed the arnlY in terms of its 
place in the nation's strategy and defence budget. The only way out of what Taylor 
would call its 'Babylonian Captivity' was by a compromise position emphasizing a 
flexible army that was both atomic and non-atomic capable. 248 
245 Letter From Davidson to General Willard G. Wyman CG Continental Army Command, 
'Transmittal Letter to End of Tour AAR,' (6 July), p. 2; CARLA N-13423.92. 
246 Letter from Davidson to General Willard G, Wyman, p. 2. 
247 Garrison H. Davidson, 'Commandants Talk to the Staff and Faculty of the C&GSC, 25 August 
1955' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1955), p. 2. MHI CGSC 1-26. 
248 MaxweIl D. Taylor, The Uncertain Tru~pet (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 108. There 
are many examples of Taylor's rhetoric on this point and much before the use of the term 'Flexible.' 
Beginning in late 1955, he emphasized' [b ]alanced strength means flexible proportioned strength, 
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The Eisenhower Administration's drive to economize defence hit the army's 
budget particularly hard, and the promise of new technologies was increasingly 
competing with traditional missions for declining army resources. The long rmming 
debate with the president over the direction of national strategy, as it related to both 
its nature and impact on the army, which had begun under Ridgway, was heating up 
again under his successor. Armed with a significant advantage in eloquence and 
charm over his predecessor, Taylor pushed back against the president's strategy. 
Eisenhower told the CJCS, Admiral Radford, in April that he believed Taylor's 
arguments resulted from the army's 'rather hazy' role in national security, which had 
'left them somewhat unsatisfied and even bewildered'. The Chairman agreed and 
added that 'the [a]rmy's tendency to resist basing its forces on an atomic concept 
tends to work in just the wrong direction'. 249 
Taylor's solution was to offer a more flexible alternative, one equally adept at 
atomic and non-atomic warfare. Flexibility worked at the strategic level as well by 
allowing Taylor to argue the need for 'tri-dimensional' deterrence of land, air, and sea-
lest parity with the Soviet Union in one domain of war encourage adventurism in 
another. Flexibility also addressed the problem of finding a place for the army in a 
defence budget increasingly dominated by atomic weapons and their delivery 
systems. Finally, by embracing this framework, Taylor could rhetorically leverage 
some of the main themes of the administration's policy and secure funding for 
modernization, even as he continued to fight to preserve the army's traditional non-
. b'l" 250 atomIc capa I ItIes. 
Such a strategy required Taylor to move quickly. It was unlikely that the 
administration would support the army's logic if its atomic capabilities were still on 
the drawing board and its units still perceived as being organized for the last war. In 
including military means of various forms appropriate to deter or fight small wars as well as big wars 
[ ... ] wars in which atomic weapons are used, wars in which atomic weapons are not used'. General 
Maxwell D. Taylor, 'Speech to the Executives Club of Chicago - the Army Deterrent to War,' (7 
October 1955), p. 20; NDULSCA, <http://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?/taylor,199>. 
249 Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 30, 1956,3 
p.m. and Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President, 
April 17, 1956 found in Foreign Relations oJthe United States, 1955-1957. National Security Policy., 
ed. by William Klingaman, David S. Patterson, I1ana Stem, XIX (Washington DC: Govem1ent Printing 
Office, 1990), pp. 280, 298. 
250 For a discussion of Taylor's logic in settling on the Pentomic am1Y as a rational compromise to 
what he saw as an existential threat from the administration's policies see Donald Alan Carter, 
'Eisenhower Versus the Generals', The Journal oJ MilitQ1y lIistory, 71 (2007), 1169-1199. 
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spring 1956, while wrestling with the administration and JCS over strategy and 
resources, Taylor dramatically moved the army in what Radford might have 
considered the 'right direction.' While expressing some doubts about the army's 
ability to develop both atomic and non-atomic capabilities in a single organization, 
Taylor nevertheless acceded that it was 'increasingly difficult to visualize a general 
war without the use of tactical atomic weapons.' 251 On 15 May, he approved the 
'broad concepts expressed in PENTANA' and directed the army staff to 'avoid undue 
conservatism [ ... ] and be progressive in its thinking.' In a telling statement, Taylor 
said he had no doubt the army could 'put a dual-capability organization on a chart' but 
worried aloud that the real thing might not be 'feasible under [current] fund 
limitations' . 252 
Despite many questions about its feasibility, Taylor approved the PENTANA 
concept as a vehicle 'to provide organizational, planning and research and 
development guidance and to provide a basis for further experimentation, war-
gaming, field-testing, and evaluation'. He directed CONARC to 'develop a detailed 
plan for phased transition to the PENTANA organization' as if the concept were fully 
developed and tested. In a gambit to preserve the institution for the future, Taylor 
embodied Davidson's cliche that tactics were 'the opinion of the senior officer 
present.' It is ironic that the doctrine and combat development processes and 
analytical tools just then coming into maturity were effectively sidelined even as 
Taylor admitted to his staff that 'we have no experience to guide our thoughts for the 
next 10-15 years.' 253 For Taylor, the issue at hand was a near-term institutional crisis 
- not necessarily determining the best capabilities for a future war. He encouraged 
251 Brief From Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for Chief of Staff, 'Army Organization 
1960-1970 (Pentana),' (15 May 1956); MHI UA 25.E32 1956. Attendees to the briefing included the 
army G-3, Lieutenant General Eddleman and the CONARC commander. 
252 Briefing on Army Organization 1960-1970 (Pentana), pp. 3,6. (See Appendix 7). 
253 Taylor quoted in staff notes appended to Briefing on Army O:ganization 1960-1970 (Pentana), p. 
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the so-called 'Airborne Club.' For the view that Taylor's deCISIOn was not dnven by such thmgs as 
budget 'd' A J B . h The Pentomic Army: The u.s. Army between Korea and 
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those in attendance, including the CONARC commander, to 'be optimistic and 
farsighted in developing concepts for the future. ,254 Change, at least in the near term, 
was not a question of 'what kind' but rather 'how fast'. 
Keeping Pace with McGarr 
Major General Lione1 e. McGarr was one of the longest serving (1956-1960) 
and most controversial commandants in the history of CGSC. However, he is 
probably best remembered for his controversial assignment after CGSe. From 1960-
1962 McGarr served as the commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group-
Vietnam (MAAG) as the United States moved from advice to participation. However 
he might be remembered for his role in the Vietnam War, it was through his four-year 
tour as commandant of CGSC that left his most enduring legacy. 255 
McGarr was a 1928 West Point graduate who served most of the interwar 
years in tactical infantry units of the Regular Army and National Guard. In 1941, he 
joined the 3rd Infantry Division, a unit in which he would serve with distinction 
throughout combat operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Germany. In four 
years of almost continuous operations, McGarr earned a well-deserved reputation for 
aggressive and successful tactical leadership. The fact that he earned the second 
highest award for valour, the Distinguished Service Cross, a Silver Star, and five 
Purple Hearts, all while in command of an infantry regiment, says a great deal about 
his take-charge style ofleadership. 
After graduating from the National War College in 1947, McGarr served in his 
first high level staff assignment as a member of the army staff's intelligence division. 
Two years directing, training and serving as Chief of Staff ofU.S. Forces Austria 
followed. In 1952, McGarr received an assignment to Korea, where he became the 
assistant commander of the 2nd Infantry Division and where he earned two more 
254 B 'fi ) 5 ne mg on Army Organization 1960-1970 (Pentana ,p. . 
255 During his first year in Saigon, McGarr was the energetic optimist famous for saying how he 
intended to 'out conventional the unconventionalists.' By his second year, he was something of a 
realist, if not a pessimist, who warned America could fail and the military be blamed if it did not 
pursue a more rational c()unterinsurgency strategy. On McGarr's evolution see Robert Buzzanco, 
Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 90-91. Tt perhaps says something about how little the army was thinking about 
Vietnam that it would assign as its senior military advisor an officer who spent the previous four years 
immersed in all things Pentomic. 
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Purple Hearts during bitter fighting in June and July. In 1953, just as the truce took 
effect, McGarr took charge of the prisoner of war command and then command of the 
i h Infantry Division. Early in 1954, he departed Korea to take charge of the 
Caribbean Command in Panama. 
From the perspective of academic qualifications, McGarr was probably the 
least qualified of the post-war commandants. His sole encounter with post-graduate 
education was a year at the National War College. Moreover, as someone charged 
with developing the army's future staff officers, he had little senior staff experience. 
However, it was clear that McGarr's assignment to Fort Leavenworth rested not on 
his specific qualifications, but rather his leadership style. McGarr was a reflection of 
Taylor's need to show immediate progress toward a more flexible future, even if that 
progress was ephemeral. 
Where Davidson had embarked on creating a deliberate process for change, 
McGarr was simply going to create change. Birrer believed McGarr received the 
simple, if simplistic mission, from Taylor to 'go out there and get Leavenworth into 
the present century'. 256 According to John K. Singlaub, an instructor at the time and 
future general officer, Taylor found just the right man for the job in McGarr; 'a crusty, 
sawed-off West Pointer with a brilliant combat record [ ... ] and the type of old-school 
ffi h b I· d . h" d ,257 o lcer woe leve 111 aut ontanan comman . 
McGarr understood the mission - what mattered most was change. He 
described the context and primary task of his assignment in his 1960 end-of-tour 
report: 
[T]he fast-moving tempo of doctrinal change required by technological 
advances urgently demanded a forward-looking, properly balanced 
curriculum with a well-integrated supporting organization. At the same 
time, a number of important events occurred which pointed up both the 
advisability and necessity of a complete revision and reorientation of 
the course of study. 258 
Like most new commandants McGarr arrived after the basic curriculum for the , 
upcoming year was already approved. Everyone on the staff expected McGarr to 
256 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan 1, Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College', p. 39. 
257 John K. Singlaub, Ilazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twenty First Century (New York: 
Summit Books, 1991), p. 235. 
258 Lionei C. McGarr, 'Special Report of the Commandant' (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General 
Staff College, 1959), p. 1.·CARLA 355.0071173 U56 1959. (See Appednix 8). 
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follow precedent by spending the first half of the year conducting an assessment of 
the current program with an eye toward the following year's guidance, while 
depending on the deputy commandant to manage the current year's execution. 
McGarr's deputy for the first year was Brigadier William F. Train. Davidson 
brought Train to the CGSC in 1955 from the WSEG, where the two had worked 
closely together on army related studies. Train was very much a man in the Davidson 
mold and the officer most familiar with the upcoming curriculum. For McGarr 
however, Train was a daily reminder of what was wrong with CGSC: cautious, 
deliberate, and 'obviously opposed to progress and change'. 259 The friction between 
the two is clearly visible in oral histories of the period and in stiff staff memoranda. 
McGarr's leadership style did much to alienate everyone at the college, but not 
his superiors. Train described his last year at Leavenworth as 'one of the most 
difficult years I ever had in my life.' He described McGarr as 'underhanded' and a 
'very dishonest man.' 260 Even by his supporters McGarr was generously described as 
'colourful and controversial' and a man who could be 'blunt, rough, humourless, and 
suspicious -not easy to like. ,261 
McGarr studied his new command before arriving and was thoroughly 
familiar with the results of the educational survey. What he needed was a specific 
actionable vision to create the kind of change his mission required. The answer came 
in the form of an unsolicited plan for reform presented by two junior members of his 
staff. Majors Richard 'Dick' Hallock and John H. Cushman were perhaps typical of 
many in the post-Second World War transitional generation. 262 Too junior to be 
259 This is McGarr's assesment of Train, as recalled by Ivan Birrer. Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan 1. Birrer: 
Service at the Command and General Staff College', p. 40. 
260 Reginald G. Moore, 'Oral History _ William F. Train, Lieutenant General, USA Retired', II 
(Carlisle Barracks: US Army Military History Institute, 1983), p. 403. Train's major issue with 
McGarr's style was the use of junior officers as 'spies' to keep tabs on the staff, their progress, and 
attitudes toward his directions. McGarr was also known for directing by staff memorandum, not 
consulting with key staff prior to major decisions, and generally remaining aloof to a majority of his 
subordinates. 
261 John H. Cushman, 'Fort Leavenworth _ A Memoir, Vo!. 1,' p. 17; U.S. Al111Y War College Library, 
UB 200.C87 2001 VI;; Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan 1. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff 
College', p. 39. 
262 Cushman entered service at the very end of the Second World War, trained as an engineer, his early 
career included service as member of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Hallock was a 
highly decorated Second World War paratrooper, intelligence officer, and young Korean War battalion 
commander. Both were enthusiastic members of a group of mostly young officers pressing the army to 
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wedded to the last war and frustrated over the conceptual drift of the institution, they 
were aggressive and impatient advocates for change. In early 1955, Cushman, then a 
student in the regular course, published a call-to-arms in Military Review entitled 
'Harness the Revolution.' Cushman argued the arn1Y was in the midst of a revolution 
'so vast that it will reach into every aspect' of the institution. What was needed were 
leaders capable of harnessing the technology and tools of analysis that currently 
existed, and 'the vision to see the entire problem' and the imagination 't6 accept 
revolutionary answers'. 263 Cushman's unbounded enthusiasm for revolutionary 
change came to symbolize much about the McGarr period. 
In summer 1956, Cushman's ideas and Hallock's Willingness to work outside 
the normal bureaucratic boundaries came together in a collaboration to transform 
CGSC. In September, they presented their unsolicited plan to the new commandant. 
The document began; 
CGSC instruction is inadequate. It is out of date, sterile stereotyped, 
inflexible, [and] unimaginative [ ... ] its doctrine is essentially ETO-
World War II and its approach to atomic warfare is to superficially 
impose atomics on conventional doctrine. 
According to Hallock and Cushman, the problem was that the current CGSC 
system was 'complacent, inbred, essentially negative in outlook, closes ranks against 
change, and stifles growth.' They proposed changing both the structure and content of 
the college concurrent with the execution of the current year. 264 Young, smart and 
impatient, Hallock and Cushman accepted without reservation the strategic and 
operational context underpinning the Pentomic army. Any process, such as 
Davidson'S, or standard, such as the weight of history, that allowed for an alternative 
was anathema. McGarr was impressed, ifnot with their ideas, then with their 
enthusiasm, and made two immediate decisions. First, he accepted both of the young 
263 John H. Cushman, 'Harness the Revolution', Militmy Review, 34 (1955), 13-18 (pp. 13-18). 
264 Extracts of the Hallock-Cushman proposal are reproduced in Fort Leavenworth - A Memoir, pp. 
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officers diagnoses of the problem and the proposed solution. Second, he assigned 
Hallock and Cushman to work for him as a shadow staff to ensure the plan was 
executed and to report on any resistance to the changes on the part of the staff. 
To meet the requirements of the 1956-1957 academic-year, and in accordance 
with the plan of his 'Young Turks,' McGarr left in place the instructional staff 
organization of his predecessor. Day-to-day supervision was the mission of his 
deputy. Simultaneously, McGarr established a 1957-1958 coordinator position, 
effectively a second deputy commandant, under which the next year's staff would 
assemble. Slowly over the course of the year, the current staff and a slate of new 
instructors would matriculate into the new organization. 
The new staff's primary mission during the transition year was the complete 
rewrite of the curriculum to reflect the new Pentomic division organization (which 
was still an evolving force design emerging from the ATFA and PENTANA concepts). 
The college would move away from the seven staff- and mission-centric functional 
departments of the current year to five departments organized around unit type and 
echelon. The new departments were: (1) armoured division, (2) infantry division, (3) 
airborne and army aviation, (4) larger units and administrative support, and (5) a 
catchall department for staff and general education. Train argued that such an 
organization scheme duplicated what the tactical schools already taught. Moreover, 
such a design would detract from CGSC's core mission of educating officers in the 
application of combined arms. 265 McGarr's design had little to do with combined 
arms education and everything to do with creating an organization suited for the rapid 
development and promulgation of new doctrine built around an organizational design 
- the Pentomic division. 
It was clear to McGarr that a complete rewrite of combined arms doctrine 
would not allow for normal doctrine review and approval procedures. The dispensing 
of normal review quickly became the norm. To support the Pentomic decision, 
CONARC issued a directive to all of its schools to emphasize atomic warfare in the 
upcoming year. The commander of CONARC authorized McGarr to use draft 
doctrine (awaiting Department of the Army level approval) and even recommended 
265 Moore, 'Oral History - William F. Train', p. 407. 
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doctrine (awaiting CONARC approval) at his own discretion where approved doctrine 
'was lacking or out of date'. 266 
Taylor's decision to convert the army's airborne and infantry divisions to a 
Pentomic model made Davidson's process of deliberate doctrine development 
unworkable. McGarr elevated the role of current doctrine and severed its 
developmental relationship with future doctrine (including combat developments). 267 
This allowed the drafting of the new curriculum and the rapid development of 
manuals reflecting the Pentomic organizations to occur as a single rapid process. To 
further accelerate the changeover, the normal curriculum 'murder board' review 
process was decentralized to the director level and the standards relaxed. 
McGarr's philosophy, supported by the CONARC command and the chief of 
staff's directives, was 'modern doctrine of necessity is based more on evaluated 
theory, supported through field tests, than in the past'. 268 McGarr's predecessor would 
likely have agreed but would have subjected the field 'tests' to some degree of 
scientific scrutiny.269 But, for the time being, this was neither Taylor's nor McGarr's 
prImary concern. 
Future doctrine, or combat developments as it was termed outside the college, 
once again became a stand-alone function within the school. The top-down nature of 
the Pentomic concept and the compressed timeline left little need to emphasize 
developments in the five-ten year timeframe. For all intents and purposes, McGarr 
was on a mission to implement, not develop, future doctrine. In the near-term at least, 
there would little value in Davidson's 'self-perpetuating' development concept. 
McGarr issued his 1957-1958 curriculum guidance in early December 1956. 
In keeping with the general recommendation of the educational survey, the school 
weighted sixty percent of the more than 1200 academic hours toward the application 
or advanced application subjects under the infantry, armoured, airborne, and larger 
266 McGarr, 'Special Report of the Commandant', p. 110. 
267 Unlike his predecessor and much of the army at the time, McGarr did not distinguish between 
Combat Developments and future doctrine. For a detailed view of the Davidson plan for doctrine 
development at the college see Robert C. Cassibry, 'Development of Doctrine', Military Review, 6 
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269 For some detailed discussion on the generally negative feedback from field tests of both the AFT A 
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unit departments. A block of instruction on future war that had begun under Davidson 
was expanded from sixty to eighty hours. The purpose of this section, taught by the 
research and analysis staff, was to prepare students to 'adjust rapidly to conditions of 
future war' and provide the college with a means 'of evaluating future doctrine'. 
Again, the definition of future under the McGarr model is telling. The future warfare 
instruction 'covers application of methods and procedures for developing concepts of 
future warfare and for evaluating concepts, and weapons systems in the midrange and 
the short range time periods'. 270 In other words, for the upcoming year, McGarr 
shortened the time horizon for 'future doctrine' to the given Pentomic concepts. 
As might be expected, McGarr's enthusiasm for shifting the eGSe program to 
an atomic-centric one was especially evident in his first year. The rhetoric was that of 
a revolutionary. McGarr told a group of senior officers, early in his first year, 'that the 
advent of these weapons is forcing a revolutionary rather that evolutionary approach 
to a re-examination of the art of war' . McGarr argued that the success of the newly 
developed Pentomic division and doctrine was based on the 'planned progress on the 
potentialities of weapons and organizations'. 271 (Emphasis added). 
To make his points McGarr would often use 'straw-man' comparisons. On the 
one hand '[w]e can feel our way slowly and cautiously forward, making certain of 
each hesitant step, with one hand firmly attached to the past.' On the other 'we can be 
guided by advanced thinking based on the results of research and analysis, combat 
developments, and tests [ ... ] retaining that which is applicable but breaking clearly 
with the outmoded concepts of the past,.272 All that was lacking 'for optimal 
application' of the new material was proper dissemination. 273 
While the language of McGarr's first year continued to cycle through his 
gudience, Military Review articles, and correspondence with his staff, the last three 
years of his command were much more pragmatic. In retrospect, the seeds for the 
rapid fall of the Pentomic concept were inherent in the dogmatic pronouncements of 
its enthusiasts. Doctrine and organizations approved before any major successful field 
270 Memorandum from McGarr to Assistant Commandant, 'Subj: Decisions on /9 Curriculum, " (4 
December 1957); CARLA. CARLA CGSC/9. 
271 McGarr, 'Opening R~marks _ Senior Officer Atomic Employment Course, 11 March 1957', p. 136. 
272 Lionel C. McGarr, 'USA Command & General Staff College Keeps Pace with the Future', MUtmy 
Review, 37 (1957), 3-13 (p. 4). 
273 McGarr, 'Opening Remarks _ Senior Officer Atomic Employment Course, 11 March 1957', p. 136. 
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tests were complete, tied in many cases to essential weapons systems or supporting 
organizations that did not yet exist, could only be sustained by words for a limited 
period of time. 
One area where McGarr's first-year curriculum guidance had a major long-
term impact on CGSC was on the diversification of the curriculum. In keeping with 
Taylor's strategic argument that the army must be prepared for all types of warfare, 
McGarr drafted a 'strategic settings paper' to rationalize the strategy with the newly 
emerging doctrines. Validated by the army and CONARC at a CGSC-hosted 
conference in March 1957, McGarr's structure offered a logical breakdown between 
the forms of war, the atomic 'levels of use' within each, and the locales where such 
war might realistically occur. 
In order to jump-start change, McGarr directed a complete break from the past 
by enshrining the premise that future operations were 'completely atomic, since in the 
future all ground operations will take place under the threat of the use of atomic 
weapons. ' This required all fundamentals and most tactical instruction be taught under 
the assumption of active-use of atomic weapons. So-called 'nonactive atomic' 
operations (situations where atomic weapons had not been used but might be at any 
time) were taught to the extent necessary to ensure that 'the [student] is capable of 
performing with equal facility in either active or nonactive atomic conditions'. 274 
The new approach broke warfare into three categories: general, limited, and 
situations short of war. General war was assumed always to be an atomic war. Within 
general war, CGSC envisioned a small chance of the 'unrestricted' use of atomic 
weapons where land warfare was not possible. The second category, limited war, was 
generally seen as active atomic, but as Table 1 indicates, the percentage of non active 
atomic increased throughout McGarr's tenure. Finally, there were situations described 
as falling 'short of war. 'These were by definition 'nonactive.' 
274 'V.S. Army Command and General Staff College: Catalog of Courses 1957-1958' (F0I1 
Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1957), p. 17. Nonactive atomic operations were 
only applicable to limited and situations-short-of-war scenarios. 
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1956-57 1957-58 1959-60 1960-61 
General War 98.8 45 35 35 
Unrestricted * 2 3 4 
Intermediate * 98 97 96 
Limited War 0 48 55 55 
Intermediate * 70 50 45 
Nonactive * 30 50 55 
Situations short of 1.2 7 10 10 
war (all non active) 
Table 6 - Fonns of War and Degree of AtomIc Use 
fC . I 275 as a Percentage 0 urncu urn 
The second major and long-lasting curriculum shift was the diversification of 
locales (see Table 2). As noted in earlier studies, most of the applicatory material 
since the end of Second World War, had focused on historic European battlefields or, 
at the least, familiar European terrain. The growth of NATO in the 1950s only 
increased the anny's pre-occupation on fighting the next war in Europe. By the end of 
McGarr's tour, however, a student was more likely to discuss the application of 
tactical doctrine on a map of Asia or the Middle East than he was on one of Central 
Gem1any. The logic was consistent with the assumption that future operations, 
including those outside of NATO, were 'completely atomic'. 
1956-57 1957-58 1959-60 1960-61 
Western Europe 89 28 11 14 
Eastern Europe 3 32 19 21 
USSR * * 10 10 
M idd1e East and 5 Africa 20 
33 32 
Asia 3 20 27 23 
Table 7 - CGSC Curnculmn Locales (1956-1961) 1. If) 
Just as the first year under McGarr's command drew to a close, a department 
of the army-sponsored education and training review delivered its report. The 'Officer 
275 Lionel C. McGarr, 'End of Tour Report of the Commanding General Fort Leavenworth and 
Commandant United States Army Command and General Staff College' (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and General Staff College, 1960), p. 100; McGarr, 'Special Report of the Commandant', p. 
36. 
276 McGarr, 'End of Tour Report', p. 100; McGarr, 'Special Report of the Commandant', p. 36. The 
division between Eastern and Western in the locales chart is not as apparent in the course programs of 
instruction as these statistics portray. (*) For 1956-57 and 1957-58 the Eastern Europe locale category 
included the USSR. 
250 
Education and Training Review Board,' known as the Williams Board after its 
president Lieutenant General Edward T. Williams, met throughout the spring of 1957 
and delivered its report in July. The charter of the Williams Board was to 'determine 
the adequacy of the present system of education and training of [a Jrmy officers. ' The 
board generally praised McGarr's efforts to institute 'the pentagonal structure, the 
modem concepts of the [aJrmy's missions, the implications of atomic warfare, and the 
impact of new weapons systems and other developments.'277 Ironically, the one area 
where the board found fault was the adequacy of future doctrine. 
The board did not question the quality of doctrine but its' lack of timeliness'. 
The board found that Pentomic infantry units had been reorganizing for almost a year 
and were still using 'training texts' which were 'written and distributed on a crash 
basis' in lieu of approved doctrine. Cleary the board was captured by the same 
enthusiasm for all things Pentomic that was permeating the rest of the system. It did 
not find fault with the doctrine development process, or even the quality of the 
material provided, such as it was, but said the problem 'reflects an inability rapidly to 
produce training literature rather than a failure of the part of the schools or any 
. I I . d . ,278 partIcu ar segment of the system for deve opmg octnne. 
The trauma ofMcGarr's first year was sufficient to make the last three years 
of his tenure quiet by comparison. Birrer later said of that first year that it probably 
'took some kind of violent action to just move the institution and overcome all the 
inertia which was built into it'.279 The basic outline of the next few years' curriculum 
remained the same in terms of basic themes and emphasis on the application phases of 
division- level instruction. Guidance for the staff for the 1958-1959 curriculum 
described it as a 'year of refinement.' McGarr noted that additional development of 
doctrine and curriculum material would be necessary since the army 'began its 
conversion to the Pentomic division organization.' However, an increased awareness 
of the arrival of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union had 'decreased likelihood of 
277 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission (1956)', pp. 1,27-28. WilIiams was not a 
disinterested party. While serving ad president of the board he was also deputy commander of 
CONARC and directly responsible for CSGC. 
278 'Report of the Educational Survey Commission (1956)', p. 278. 
279 Doughty, 'Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General StaffCo!lege', p. 40. 
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general war, nuclear war and increased the likelihood of limited war (both active and 
nonactive atomic) and situations short of war' . 280 
In his first year's guidance, McGarr emphasized a 'bold approach', 'an ample 
availability of atomic weapons', and the necessity of not letting the experience of 
Korea 'unduly influence our doctrine and organization' . 281 For his second year, while 
restating the college's continuing work on the 'Missiles-Atomic-Air-Age Army,' 
McGarr directed an increased emphasis on 'the important subject of Unconventional 
Warfare'. Describing unconventional warfare as a subject that 'assumes tremendous 
significance for the present and future battlefield,' McGarr directed that it be 
'integrated into all other departmental courses of study'. In an echo of the same 
problem that existed for atomics only a few years before, McGarr noted that 
unconventional warfare still lacked a 'doctrinal basis for instruction'. Nevertheless, he 
anticipated increased emphasis in this area in the 1959-1960 curriculum. 282 
The structure for the development of doctrine established by McGarr during 
his first year remained throughout his tenure. As noted, the emphasis on developing 
and promulgating Pentomic doctrine during the first year skewed the development 
process begun under McGarr's predecessor. Development went from an integrated 
cycle beginning with long-range concepts to one focused on current concepts. By 
1960, fully firty-eight percent of the college's staff and faculty workload was 
dedicated to some part of the doctrine effort. A significant percentage of that work 
focused on current doctrine and therefore fell to the instructional department for 
completion. Combat developments grew in importance over McGarr's tenure and 
eventually evolved back into a version of Davidson's 'self-perpetuating system'. The 
major difference was in McGarr's inverted conception of development. The 
revolutionary concepts in place in the current army would drive refinement and 
materiel development in a future army. Accordingly, mid-range studies looking at 
280 'The Commandant's /9 Curriculum Guidence and Decisions on /9 Curriculum' (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and General Staff College, 1957), pp. 2-5. 
281 Brigadier General Train, 'Commandant's policies, 18 September 1956' (Fort Leavenworth: 
Command and General Staff College, 1956), pp. 2,6. 
282 'The Commandant's /9 Curriculum Guidence and Decisions on /9 Curriculum " p. 30. 
Unconventional warfare was taught as a 3D-hour block within the De~artment of ~irborne, Army 
A viation Department's I 50-hour allocation of instruction. By ~ompanso~, the B.aslc NUc1ea.r Weapons 
Course of Study, which provided the basic knowledge for t~e mteg:ated lllstructlon of atomIC through 
the rest of the curriculul11,was taught in a 45-hour block ofmstructlOn. 
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time frames out to five years were seen as 'evolutionary' and were intended to assist 
in transition 'rather than toward the development of revolutionary new concepts. ' 
Long-range studies, those ranging from five-to-ten years into the future, were also 
evolutionary in nature and designed to 'provide guidelines for the organizational, 
operational, and materiel concepts that should continue to be developed as well as 
those on which development should cease'. Finally, McGarr's process included an 
area of very long-range study. These studies looked out ten to fifteen years and while 
less constrained than the other two groups, McGarr warned that they must not be 'cast 
in the framework of futuristic fantasy but are projected against a backdrop of 
practicability' . 283 
The irony ofMcGarr's inverted process was that CGSC found itself 
increasingly defending a status quo against new concepts being introduced by other 
combat development activities and commands. Formal coordination between the 
diversified developments activities in the arnly became more difficult as CGSC's 
comments became dismissed as 'Leavenworth Propaganda'. 284 In March 1959, 
McGarr complained that CONARC was submitting the results of Pen to mic field 
exercises to the Department of the Army without first clearing them through CGSC. 
Any decisions could have a significant impact on the 'organization, operation, and 
doctrine pertaining to these divisions' and since 'the College has been active in this 
doctrinal area for some time', it should be consulted prior to any change. 285 McGarr 
had in fact run into the very problem Davidson set out to resolve, namely how to 
develop doctrine dynamically in a time of change. 
By 1959, the reports from fielded Pentomic units were increasingly negative. 
Early in the year, CONARC, now under the command of General Bruce C. Clarke, 
was already exploring a heavier alternative, dubbed the Modem Mobile Army 1965-
1970 (MOMAR I). By 1960, CGSC was directed to continue the development of the 
MOMAR concept based on CONARC's staff study. 286 McGarr's response was to 
283 McGarr, 'End of Tour Report', pp. 18-22. 
284 Memordnaum From McGarr to Assitant Commandant and Chief of Staff, 'Subj: Letter to General 
Clarke (SASFA),' CARLA N-13423.232. 
285 Letter from McGarr to Major General A. S. 'Red' Newman Chief of Staff CONARC, 'Re: General 
Clark's Visit' (March); CARLA N-13423.232. 
286 Robeit A. Doughty, The Evolution o/US Army Tactical Doctrine. 1946-76 (Fort Leavenworth 
Combat Studies Institute, 1979), pp. 19-21. 
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return to the Davidson model by establishing 'a progressive and orderly transition 
toward the goals established by MOMAR'. He expressed concern that MOMAR 
objectives be evaluated 'in the critical light of what had actually been achieved' and 
warned of problems if the concept were considered 'in a vacuum' without sufficient 
'lead-time in material research and development'. In his end-of-tour report, McGarr 
noted that 'the coordination of future doctrine was 'of such importance as to justify 
close study and supervision of my successor'. 287 The revolutionary had become the 
conservative. 
Conclusion 
From their earliest days, the schools at Leavenworth existed 'to facilitate 
change.' Throughout most of its existence, the pace and degree of change at CGSC 
were limited by the nature of the strategic environment. Conservative approaches to 
what was taught, how it was taught, and the development of doctrine served the arnlY 
well. The success of Leavenworth graduates in managing and employing a massive 
citizen arnlY in the Second World War validated the status quo and created a 
significant psychological barrier to change. Nevertheless, a significant amount of 
change did occur over the period described in this disseration. 
The college moved from training centric organization focused on near-term 
army requirements to an educational organization that considered requirements across 
the probable longevity of its products, its graduates, and doctrine. Like combat 
development, the innovations associated with CGSC did not spring from the mind of 
a single maverick or flow naturally from a comprehensive plan. 
Many of the elements of change were serendipitous. For example, lacking a 
clear basis for major doctrinal and curriculum changes, early post-war commandants 
focused their efforts on modernizing the college's educational methods. The gradual 
shift from a college with a significant emphasis on training to one resembling civilian 
graduate school programmes was a necessary precondition to significant curriculum 
and development changes to follow. 
287 McGarr, 'End of Tour Report', pp. 23-24. 
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The Korean War and subsequent partial mobilization put tremendous pressure 
on the college to return to a more proven model of preparing officers for the future. 
However, two countervailing pressures continued to drive the college in another 
direction. The development of tactical atomic weapons, coupled with the economizing 
pressure of a national security strategy focused on strategic atomic weapons, forced 
the college, for the first time in its history, to focus its efforts beyond the current war. 
In some ways this was inevitable given the direction of the nation's strategy; however, 
it was also a reflection of the move toward education and a clear break with the past. 
Under the leadership of Davidson, the college became an integral part of the 
army's growing process of capability development. Davidson anticipated the 
integrated process that would finally emerge in the early 1960s and mature through 
the army's post-Vietnam intellectual renaissance. However, CGSC was not immune to 
the influences of the larger institution of which it was a part. Pressure from the top for 
a dramatic change in the army's tactical character forced a temporary halt to the 
integrated development of doctrine. During McGarr's command, the CGSC executed 
a radical change in its orientation and processes. The McGarr period was important 
not for what it accomplished but for the negative example it came to ptovide. Despite 
pronouncements to the contrary, the changes to CGSC in 1957-1958 aimed at 
promulgating a concept that was not the considered result of the innovative processes 
then in place. 
Changes in the CGSC are rarely seen on their own terms but instead judged on 
the basis of contemporary events. Like most education programs, the evidence of 
success lags the actual process of learning. To a lesser degree, the development of 
future oriented doctrine shares this attribute since its utility requires the alignment of 
associated developments in materiel and an amenable strategic context. In both of the 
college's missions, education and doctrine, changes across the early Cold War moved 
the arnly's intellectual preparation for future war from a single or narrow definition of 
the requirements for the next war to one where the capacity existed to adapt to a 
relatively broad range of possibilities. 
Having a capacity to innovate and getting the innovation correct in the short 
term are two very different things. The failure of the Pentomic concept was perhaps 
the best example of innovation proceeding down the wrong track. The relative 
balance between a requirement to be prepared to fight and win outnumbered in 
Europe versus one to face a growing threat from guerrilla movements and 
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insurgencies was not affected by the processes used to prepare for either. Nothing that 
occurred at Leavenworth could change the constant of an unknowable future. Nothing 
in Davidson's process or the variations that followed eliminated the internal frictions 
of policy, budget, and personality, when it came to setting priorities within the system. 
However, without a structured intellectual process, the army's capacity to innovate 
would have no chance of 'keeping pace with the future.' 
257 
Conclusion 
This dissertation argues that in the period 1945-1960 the institutional army 
created the capacity to innovate. This capacity did not exist, except in the most 
nascent form, before the Second World War. It continued to develop organizationally 
after 1960 and the capacity to innovate is stilI broadly in place in today's army. 
In their examination of the army's record during these years, scholars have 
tended to analyze the results of peacetime innovation in light of the relative success or 
failure of change. In the case of innovation in the early Cold War army, there are two 
dominant innovation 'results', both of which were failures. The first failure of 
innovation occurred in the late 1950s when the army raced to create an ultra-modem 
force under the purposely-evocative name Pentomic. The Pentomic experiment has 
become a modem case study of peacetime innovation run amok where enthusiasm for 
untested concepts-dependent on risky technological development ran ahead of 
common sense and military judgment. Upon closer inspection, however, it seems 
clear that the Pentomic concept, and the decisions which brought it to fruition, were 
not the result of the emerging processes of innovation. Rather, both developed in spite 
of them. The second failure derives from the perspective of the army's performance in 
Vietnam. The governing view is that the army was wedded to a Second World War 
concept of how wars ought to be fought, the so-called 'Army Concept'.) According to 
this view innovation, insofar as it occurred ~t all, did not succeed in creating an army 
to meet strategic requirements because to do so would have violated 'Army Concept'. 
Both conclusions derive in part from a methodological bias. One can look at 
innovation from two different perspectives: the results or the process. The more 
common method is to judge by results, using this to frame an understanding of the 
larger question of innovation as a phenomenon. The primary problem with this and 
related arguments stems from the problems of hindsight and the unstated assumption 
that given a range of possible futures, peacetime innovations can ever be accurate. As 
Michael Howard observed almost forty years ago, despite the best of intentions, those 
working on the development of doctrines in peacetime 'have got it wrong'. It turns 
) The characteristics ofthe 'Army Concept' are 'a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and a 
reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties - in effect, the substitution of material 
costs at every available opportunity to avoid payment in blood.' Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army 
and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 5. 
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out that using a results-based approach to understand peacetime innovation during this 
period says surprisingly little about the innovation process itself. The key for 
peacetime innovators, continuing Howard's observation, 'is their capacity to get it 
right quickly when the moment arrives'. 2 
This dissertation began as an attempt to understand the relationship between 
innovation in the U.S. Army during the early Cold War and the army's performance in 
the Vietnam War. It is telling that in both cases, the processes described were never 
brought to bear on the problem. The Pentomic concept, although it included some 
useful elements, was an incomplete product of an immature process accelerated by 
political concerns. In the second case, the army of the late 1950s lacked the strategic 
justification to anticipate that counterinsurgencies would become a co-equal problem 
to the still unresolved issue of how to defeat the Soviet Union in non-atomic combat. 
A more appropriate question for army planners in the early 1960s was not how to 
move more aggressively to a force capable of conducting large-scale 
counterinsurgency operations, but rather how could the army develop two forces. It 
was a question famously not considered by the army, as its chief of staff boasted in 
1962, 'any good soldier can handle guerillas'. 3 
The findings laid out earlier suggest that in a large and technologically 
complex army, the institutional capacity to move from ideas to concepts to 
capabilities does not emerge simply or chiefly from the support of a few key leaders, 
the agitation of mavericks, or the admonitions of external reformers. 4 These drivers of 
innovation must create or move bureaucratic processes in order to produce actual 
change. Service culture, individual officers, institutional will, fiscal realities, and 
political and strategic constraints all interact and impact, in a chaotic fashion, the 
process of innovation as it unfolds. Finally there is the role that chance plays in 
determining which senior officers are in which key positions when critical decisions 
are being made. General WiIliam Westmorland's decision to emphasize destruction of 
enemy forces over the protection of the population has been singled out as a critical' 
early mistake of the Vietnam War. Given that there were alternative strategies 
2 Michael Howard, 'Military Science in an Age of Peace', RUSJ Quarterly, 119 (1974), 3-9 (p. 7). 
3 General George H. Decker cited in Robert Buzzanco, Masters a/War: Military Dissent and Politics 
in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 90. 
4 This dissertation does not argue that one or the other of the factors which drive innovation described 
in the introductory section is dominate - only that they are insufficient or lacking some underlying 
institutional capacity for change. 
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available, it is reasonable to believe a different commander might not have pressed, as 
Westmorland did, for conventional units to fight 'the big unit war. ,5 
The degree and speed with which the army could adapt to the actual 
requirements of the Vietnam War directly related to its institutional capacity to do so. 
This dissertation asserts that such a capacity existed in the army as a result of three 
innovations that occurred between 1945-1960: the expansion of professional 
knowledge through the use of operations research, the creation of a coherent combat 
developments system, and the evolution of the CGSC's mission from training and 
current doctrine to education and near-term future doctrine. 
The elevation of operations research from a new and to the army relatively 
unknown academic discipline to a critical tool in pursuit of military innovation 
signaled a significant expansion in what was considered to be professional 
knowledge. The traditional sources of military knowledge, derived from the lessons of 
history and recent experience, both drew primarily on the known past and the 
informed judgment of other military professionals. The strategic and technological 
context of the early Cold War made these inadequate. The navy and air force, being 
inherently more technologically oriented, were quickly to add operations research to 
their philosophies. The army followed somewhat reluctantly in the late 1940s, 
primarily in order to remain competitive in the increasingly data-driven competition 
over budgets. Despite coming to operations research later that its sister services, the 
army soon adopted the field's underlying logic: operational decision makers can 
benefit from the close collaboration with scientists and their analyses. In the 
increasingly complex and fast paced context of the early Cold War, the army 
discovered that 'such analysis can be of the utmost value, and the lack of such 
analysis can be disastrous'.6 
5 Westmorland quoted in Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam, p. 140. On alternative strategies, see 
the March 1966 army study short-titled PROVN, which advocated a strategy centered on pacification 
and long-term development noting that the U.S. and South Vietnam 'must accept the principle that 
success will be the sum of innumerable, small and integrated localized efforts and not the outcome of 
any short-duration, single master stroke'. 'A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term 
Development of South Vietnam', I (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1965), p. vii. (DTrC 
AD37743). On the debate over Westmorland's early decisions, see also Andrew 1. Birtle, 'PROVN, 
Westmorland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal', The Journal/Military llistory, 72 (2008), 1213-
1247; Lewis Sorley, 'To Change a War: General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study', 
Parameters, 28 (1998), 93-109. 
6 P.M.S:Blackett, Studies a/War: Nuclear and Conventional (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962), p. 
172. B1ackett's 1941 quote refers to operational analyses in general. 
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As promoted by the ORO under Ellis A. 10hnson, army operations research 
provided a vehicle through which the army could explore an ever-expanding array of 
missions, tasks, and issues. The continued existence of the army's relatively weak 
staff system and the diffusion of responsibilities between combat arms, technical 
services, and field commands made the exploration of new issues, especially those 
that challenged an existing interest, difficult ifnot impossible. The ORO catalogue of 
studies ranged widely, including the first concepts, doctrine, and procedures for 
tactical atomic weapons; the implications of racial integration on readiness; weapons 
effectiveness tests under actual conditions; analyses of psychological operations; and 
the development and testing of new concepts. It is worth noting that the ORO or its 
direct spin-offs, the HumRRO and the SORO, produced a large body of work on 
military capabilities that would not meet the test of Krepinevich's 'Army Concept'. 
The ORO existed for thirteen years, opening in 1948 and closing in 1961. Its 
influence and legacy extended well beyond the direct role it played in the 
developments and decisions of the time. The existence of the ORO spawned a series 
of similar research organizations throughout the army. By 1960, the increasing 
number of activities employing operations research as a primary tool of analysis 
moved the field from outside the army's intellectual mainstream to near co-equal 
status with history and experience as a source of professional knowledge. 
Analytical research, regardless of how accurate or timely it may be, can carry 
innovation only so far. Military innovation is, for all its potential, an extremely 
practical endeavor. If a process does not result in an actual physical, organizational, or 
doctrinal change, then it has failed the definitional tests. Until the Second World War, 
the army developed new capabilities through a disparate system of arm-and service-
based boards and a few government-owned research and manufacturing arsenals. 
Assuming any resources existed, the process by which a future requirement was 
identified, articulated, developed, tested, and delivered to the ultimate user was, at 
best, ad hoc and uncertain. In many cases the determination of requirements was just 
as likely to be in the hands of the procurement officers as it was in those of combat 
arms officers. The pace and complexity of new developments during the Second 
World War dramatically changed this process, but did not leave in place a model 
useful for the peace that followed. 
The creation of a combat developments process after the war was, like many 
of the issues described in this dissertation, a gradual one that occurred after it became 
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clear that a return to the pre-war state was not going to happen. The story of combat 
developments had two major components. First, the decisions on who was responsible 
for the generation of requirements and the development process that followed were 
inextricably tied to the institutional questions nagging at the army since the 1902 Root 
Reforms. After the dissolution of the wartime ASF, the army entered a period of 
transition with regard to developments. The return of the traditional power and 
independence of the technical services and their representatives serving as logistical 
officers on the senior military staffs led to a contest over diminished resources and 
authority against the increasingly centralized authority of the AFF. 
The intervention of outside parties moved institutional change forward when 
Project VISTA and later the Haworth Committee strongly endorsed an integrated 
model of combat developments, wherein the process would retain a degree of 
continuity from cradle to grave rather than being passed off between staff sections, 
arms, and services. An important consequence was the gradual weakening of the 
technical services as tools to develop new capabilities. The CONARC created a 
combat development system that gradually moved from the collaborative to one 
directive in nature, further strengthening the idea that combat developments could be 
centrally managed and de-centrally executed. 
The final component of the innovation process examined in this dissertation, 
the Command and General Staff College, existed in generally the same form after the 
Second World War as before it. The changes that have been charted unfolded in a 
series of gradual shifts over a fifteen-year period. By shifting the horizon from the 
'as-is' army to one that might emerge during the second half of their careers, forward-
looking commandants not only affected not only how and what officers were taught 
but also changed the army's collective and institutional expectations. By the mid-
1950s, officers graduating from CGSC were increasingly the product of a graduate 
education programme and not merely a staff-training academy with an educational 
tlavor. In addition to familiarization with existing programmes, officers were 
increasingly asked to plan for future contingencies under combat conditions that, 
because they involved atomic weapons, were not part of historical scenarios. 
The secondary mission of CGSC was the development of doctrine. Its role in 
this regard began prior to the Second World War but was never an authoritative one 
or, given the relative autonomy of the arms and services, a comprehensive one. The 
advent of tactical atomic weapons forced a significant reconsideration of army 
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doctrine. The CGSC increasingly carried the weight of developing the new doctrines 
of the Cold War while the combat development system matured. The pressure on the 
army to produce new doctrines that had the potential to force dramatic changes to 
long standing norms was disruptive and, as the Pentomic debacle demonstrated, 
fraught with risks. 
At the apex of the debate, Major General Garrison Davidson, probably the 
most thoughtful of the post-war commandants, instituted a logical set of processes to 
develop and test doctrine and concepts. His five-step doctrine development process 
and three-year development cycle were holistic, accounting for context, capabilities, 
weapons, and organization simultaneously. Davidson's replacement, Major General 
Lionel McGarr, brought in by General Maxwell Taylor with a narrow mission to 
institute an untested organizational concept, masquerading as a war-fighting doctrine, 
abandoned the deliberate approach. McGarr's tenure was proof that rapid change is 
possible in peacetime but at the risk of widening the gap between the doctrines one 
has and the doctrines one will need. The utility of Davidson's approach to 
development was validated when McGarr found himself, by the end of his tour, 
fighting to regain CGSC's place in a process that was rapidly maturing around it and 
that was generally following his predecessor's approach. 
There is nothing in the creation of an institutional capacity to innovate that 
insulates the user from the realities of the human condition. The development and 
growth of operations research in the service of land warfare did not prevent the later 
application of a broader cousin of the field, systems analysis, from warping the 
decision making process under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's so-called 
"Whiz Kids'. 7 Similarly, there was nothing in the combat development process that 
would require the anny's senior leaders to insist that a logical series of development 
and test regimes be applied to new concepts before they were promulgated to the field 
army. As already noted, in hierarchical organizations individuals matter. 
Although the creation of a capacity to innovate appears to have had a limited 
impact on the army's readiness for the nature of the Vietnam War, the capacity did 
nevertheless exist. The army reorganization of 1961 gave much of what had been a 
diverse set of capabilities a clearly defined place in the larger institution. The fully 
matured capability to innovate in peacetime would have to wait until the withdrawal 
7 Systenl analysis used many of the same tools and methods as operations research but with an eye 
toward comparing cost, effectiveness, and risks and if necessary proposed alternative course of action. 
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of the army from Vietnam in 1972 to demonstrate its potential under the right set of 
leaders. 8 Nevertheless, leaders alone, no matter how talented, cannot reshape or 
redirect a modem army. The institution itself requires a set of capabilities that uses all 
available tools and sources of information, maximizes the intellectual capital of its 
best practitioners, and applies as rigorous a peacetime testing regime as possibly can 
be devised. 
This dissertation set out to explore and analyze the innovation process in the 
United States Anny as it related to the onset of the Vietnam War. What it discovered 
was the disjointed creation of a set of capabilities that for the first time gave the army 
the capacity to innovate in peacetime. A concentration on the vagaries of the Pentomic 
division, and on the miscalculations and misfortunes that colour the history of the war 
in Vietnam, has concealed the existence of an increasingly sophisticated innovation 
process that provided the Anny with new and effective tools with which to exercise 
its profession. Put simply, these 'failures' do not demonstrate that the Anny lacked the 
requisite capacities. As Michael Howard has noted, having the capacity to innovate is 
a necessary but insufficient condition for successful innovation. Other factors will 
determine the degree to which an anny gets things 'least wrong', when preparing for 
the next war. 
8 For a description of the post-Vietnam renaissance see Henry G. Gole, General WilIiam E. Dupuy: 
Preparing the Army for Modern War (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008), pp. 213-
274; Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition 
of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Papers 16 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988). 
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Appendix 1 - Memorandum from General Eisenhower, Subject: Scientific and 
Technological Resources as Military Assets 
CCS 020 {l0-4-44), Sec. 1 
TO DIRECTORS AND CHIEFS OF WAR DEPARTMENT, April 30, 1946 
GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF DIVISIONS AND 
BUREAUS, AND THE COMMANDING GENERALS 
OF THE MAJOR COMMANDS 
Memorandum 
Subject: Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets 
The recent conflict has demonstrated more convincingly than ever before the 
strength our nation can best derive from the integration of all of our national resources 
in time of war. It is of the utmost importance that the lessons of this experience be not 
forgotten in the peacetime planning and training of the Army. The future security of 
the nation demands that all those civilian resources which by conversion or 
redirection constitute our main support in time of emergency be associated closely 
with the activities of the Army in time of peace. 
The lessons of the last war are clear. The military effort required for victory 
threw upon the Army an unprecedented range of responsibilities, many of which were 
effectively discharged only through the invaluable assistance supplied by our 
cumulative resources in the natural and social sciences and the talents and experience 
furnished by management and labor. The armed forces could not have won the war 
alone. Scientists and businessmen contributed techniques and weapons which enabled 
us to outwit and overwhelm the enemy. Their understanding of the Army's needs 
made possible the highest degree of cooperation. This pattern of integration must be 
translated into a peacetime counterpart which will not merely familiarize the Army 
with the progress made in science and industry, but draw into our planning for 
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national security all the civilian resources which can contribute to the defense of the 
country. 
Success in this enterprise depends to a large degree on the cooperation which 
the nation as whole is willing to contribute. However, the Army as one of the main 
agencies responsible for the defense of the nation has the duty to take the initiative in 
promoting closer relations[s] between civilian and military interests. It must establish 
definite policies and administrative leadership which will make possible even greater 
contributions from science, technology, and management than during the last war. 
In order to ensure the full use of our national resources in case of emergency, the 
following general policies will be put into effect: 
(1) The Army must have civilian assistance in military planning as well as for 
the production of weapons. Effective long-range military planning can be done only 
in the light of predicted developments in science and technology. As further scientific 
achievements accelerate the tempo and expand the area of our operations, this 
interrelationship will become of even greater importance. In the past we have often 
deprived ourselves of vital help by limiting our use of scientific and technological 
resources on contracts for equipment. More often than not we can find much of the 
talent we need for comprehensive planning in industry or universities. Proper 
employment of this talent requires that civilian agency shall have the benefit or our 
estimates of future military problems and shall work closely with Plans and the 
Research and Development authorities. A most effective procedure is the letting of 
contracts for aid in planning. The use of such a procedure will greatly enhance the 
validity of our planning as well as ensure sounder strategic equipment programs. 
(2) Scientists and industrialists must be given the greatest possible freedom to 
carry out their research. The fullest utilization by the Army of the civilian resources 
of the nation cannot be procured merely by prescribing the military characteristics and 
requirements of certain types of equipment. Scientists and industrialists are more 
likely to make new and unsuspected contributIons to the development of the Army if 
detailed directions are held to a minimum. The solicitation of assistance under these 
conditions would not only make available to the Army talents and experience 
otherwise beyond our reach, but also establish mutual confidence between ourselves 
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and civilians. It would familiarize them with our fundamental problems and 
strengthen greatly the foundation upon which our national security depends. 
(3) The possibdity of utilizing some of our industrial and technological resources as 
organic parts of our military structure in time of emergency should be carefully 
examined The degree of cooperation with science and industry achieved during the 
recent war should by no mean be considered the ultimate. There appears little reason 
for duplication within the AmlY an outside organization which by its experience is 
better qualified than we are to carry out some our tasks. The advantages to our nation 
in economy and to the Army in efficiency are compelling reasons for this procedure. 
(4) Within the Army we must separate responsibility for research for research and 
development from the functions of procurement, purchase, storage and distribution. 
Our experience during the war and the experience of industry in time of peace 
indicate the need for such a policy. The inevitable gap between the scientist of 
technologist and the user can be bridge, as during the last war, by field 
experimentation with equipment still in the developmental stage. For example, 
restricted-visibility operations with the aid of radar, such as blind bombing and 
control of tactical air, were made possible largely by bringing together technologist 
who know the potentialities of the equipment and field commanders familiar with 
combat conditions and needs. Future cooperation of this type requires that research 
and development groups have authority to procure experimental items for similar 
tests. 
(5) Officers of all arms and services must become fully aware of the advantages 
which the Army can derivefrom the close integration of civilian talent with military 
plans and developments. This end cannot be achieved merely by sending officers to 
universities for professional training. It is true that the Army's need for officers well 
trained in the natural and social sciences requires a thorough program of advance 
study for selected military personnel, but in addition we must supply inducements 
which will encourage these men in the continued practical application of scientific 
and technological thought to military problems. A premium must be place on 
professional attainments in the natural and social sciences as well as other branches of 
military science. Officers in each arm and service must familiarize themselves as 
much as possible with progress and plans made in other branches. Only then can the 
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Army obtain the administrative and operative talent essential to its task and mutual 
understanding by the arms and services of their respective problems. 
In general, the more we can achieve the objectives indicated above with 
respect to the cultivation, support, and direct use of outside resources, the more 
energy will we have left to devote to strictly military problems for which there are no 
outside facilities or which for special security reasons can only be handled by the 
military. In fact, it is our responsibility deliberately to examine all outside resources 
as to adequacy, diversity, and geographical distribution and to ensure their full 
utilization as factors of security. It is our job to take the initiative to promote the 
development of new resources, if our national security indicates the need. It is our 
duty to support broad research programs in educational institutions, in industry, and in 
whatever field might be of importance of the ArnlY. Close integration of military and 
civilian resources will not only directly benefit the Army, but indirectly contribute to 
the nations's security, as civilians are prepared for their role in an emergency by the 
experience gained in time of peace. The association of military and civilians in 
educational institutions and industry will level barriers, engender mutual 
understanding, and lead to the cultivation of friendships invaluable for future 
cooperation. The realization of our objectives places upon us, the military, the 
challenge to make our professional officers the equals in knowledge and training of 
civilians in similar fields and make our professional environment as inviting as those 
outside. 
In the interest of cultivating to the utmost the integration of civilian and 
military resources and of securing the most effective unified direction of our research 
and development activities, this responsibility is being consolidated in a separate 
section on the highest War Department level. The Director of this section will be 
directly supported by one or more civilians, thus ensuring full confidence of both the 
military and the civilian in this undertaking. By the rotation of civilian specialists in 
this capacity we should have the benefit of broad guidance and should be able to 
furnish science and industry with a firsthand understanding of our problems and 
objectives. By developing the general polices outlined above under the leadership of 
.. 
the Director of Research and Development the Army will demonstrate the value it 
places upon science and technology and further the integration of civilian and military 
resources 
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Appendix 2 - Memorandum from Major General A.C. McAuliffe, Subject: General 
Research Office (circa May 1948) 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
General Staff, United States Army 
Washington 25, D.e. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
GENERAL RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Two general types of research will be conducted under this Program which, although they 
are independent of one another, are closely interrelated. They can probably be best defined as 
"Operations Research" and "basic research of a non-material nature". Initially, the latter will 
constitute a minor portion of the Program. 
Specifically, research on problems or phases of problems which are unique to the 
Department of the Army, in the following general fields, will be processed by or for this 
Group: 
Combat and strategic intelligence techniques; 
Combat psychology and morale; 
Analysis of weapons and weapons systems; 
Comparative over-all economic cost of various methods of waging ground warfare; 
Psychological warfare and "Cold War" techniques; 
Logistics; 
Analysis of general progress in psychology as it pertains to Army application and 
other related broad fields of non-material research. 
The entire Program will be under the direct supervision of a civilian scientist. He will have at 
his disposal a General Research Office, staffed with the necessary scientific and 
administrative personnel to implement this Program. The entire Project will be handled on a 
contract basis with a civilian university or institute. The specific problems will be formulated, 
analyzed, and evaluated by the staff of the General Research Office. Certain of these 
problems will be carried to their conclusion by this group; others will be sub-contracted to 
various universities and non-profit research institutions. 
Although the initial cost of this type of research is expensive, the eventual savings to 
the Govemment in time, money, materials, and manpower, will be immeasurably greater. 
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The following statement is extracted from the Report of the Civilian Scientific 
Advisors to the Research and Development Board: 
"We should like to point out that our general investigation into these matters revealed 
that although the Navy and Air Force have operational analysis sections working on 
problems particular to their respective services, the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
have no analytical groups of a similar nature within their organizational structure. 
This, we believe, is a serious shortcoming an one which we recommend should be 
corrected at the earliest possible date. 
"The application of scientific analysis techniques to military problems offers a useful 
adjunct to military thought. We believe the next war will so completely drain our 
national resources that ever military plan will have to be rigidly examined to permit 
our leaders to choose the one with the minimum cost-result ratio. We suggest 
therefore that our armed forces expand the facilities and the scope of their operational 
analysis units. 
"Also, there is a requirement for true engineering-type analyses of the weapons and 
weapon requirements which will result if current research and development projects 
are completed successfully. We believe such investigations will indicate the probably 
critical limitations of these yet undeveloped instruments of war; will reveal future 
requirements for critical materials and will point out probably avenues for future 
research; and will also give a preview of the training problems which might be 
expected to arise when these new items of equipment are turned over to the service 
for use." 
Organizations now conducting research of this nature for the other armed services are: 
Operations Evaluation Group, Office, Chief of Naval Operations 
Office of Naval Research, Office, Secretary ofthe Navy 
Operational Analysis Section, Office, Chief of Air Staff 
Research Division, Air University 
Project RAND, U.S. Air Force 
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All problems falling within this Program will be arranged in order of priority. Only those 
that have the very highest priority can be undertaken with the amount of money requested for 
this Fiscal Year. 
Some of the suggested problems which should be analyzed and evaluated under this 
Program are shown in a separate list. It is requested that this list be excluded from the record 
owning to the fact that some of the problems listed therein are classified. 
A.C. McAuliffe 
Major General, GSC 
Dep Dir for Research & Development 
Logistics Division 
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Appendix 3 - Letter from Ellis A. Johnson, Director Operations Research Office to Dr. 
Detlev W. Bronk, President The Johns Hopkins University, 11 November 1949. 
Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, President 
The 10hns Hopkins University 
Charles & 34th Streets 
Baltimore, Maryland 
Dear Dr. Bronk: 
I have an appointment to discuss the general status of the ORO, its progress, and its 
policies with General ColI ins, Chief of Staff of the Army, on 21 November. This briefing will 
probably result in important policy decisions. I believe that it is essential that I discuss with 
you and with Mr. Macaulay the probably subjects to be discussed and the possible effect 
upon the Operations Research Office, the Army, and the University. I believe that the 
following are the broblems [sic] that will be discussed and given serious consideration. 
First, the scope of the ORO's work will be considered. Should the scope be very wide 
and include a serious attempt to apply operations research methods to the strategic problems 
of the Army? In the Army itself there is a wide and normal distribution of opinions and 
attitudes with respect to this question. On the extreme right are officers who believe that this 
is solely the function of military personnel and that scientists should be concerned solely with 
consideration of the design of weapons. On the extreme left are officers who believe that the 
strategic problems can be solved only by civilian groups who work with some assistance 
from the military. It is difficult to determine where the median lies, and whether or not the 
particular decision will be chosen at random and on the basis of immediate advices of the 
officers concerned in the decisions. 
The second question, resulting in part from the problems which have arisen in 
connection with the first, is whether or not operations research should attempt to integrate the 
findings of social science in its solutions of action problems. Again there is the same wide 
difference of opinion within the Army. It is obvious the strategic problems cannot be 
considered at all unless the economic and other human factors are given prime consideration. 
There are, however, many tactical and human engineering problems in which the findings of 
social sciences are also deeply concerned. 
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I have discussed this widely with the leaders in the social sciences. I enclose a copy of 
a letter that I have sent to our consultants on this problem, also a list of consultants to whom 
it was sent. In addition, Dr. Pendelton Herring of the Social Science Research Council has 
been preparing, with the assistance of Dr. Donald Young, Head of the Russel Sage 
Foundation, a study to answer the question of what applications of social science were 
successfully made in World War n, what research findings from the social science disciplines 
are now substantially ready for most application without further research, and how these 
findings can be most effectively applied in the Army. I have further discussed this problem in 
the meetings of the Joint Operations Research Group. These meetings brought out the fact 
that the Navy was neutral, or possibly negative to the use of social science disciplines in 
operations research, and that the WSEG was at best luke warnl, that the Air Force, and in 
particular the RAND Corporation was enthusiastic and believed that the application of the 
social science disciplines constituted the only new and hopeful approach towards the solution 
of action problems. hl this respect it should be noted that RAND and ourselves are interested 
in cold war solutions that go toward peace as well as the ones that need to be considered as 
going toward a hot war. 
I need to face the fact that there is an exceedingly strong contingent within the Army 
which feels that although social science is important and may have much to contribute, the 
Army ought to stick strictly to hardware and tactical problems, leaving these more difficult 
problems to the higher echelons. My own opinion is that, although ORO should restrict its 
studies to problems of direct concern to the Army, it would be a mistaken and short-range 
policy which eliminated the exceedingly important questions of the vulnerability of our allies 
and ourselves to subversive actions on the part of Russia, the will of the populations of the 
Atlantic Pact Allies to fight in our mutual defense, the relation of Army actions to our 
announced cold war or hot war aims (an unconditional surrender policy can effect an Army's 
operations, including the ability to complete an occupation), our treatment of civilian 
populations, both during combat and after occupation of enemy territory (note the serious 
mistakes of the Germans in the Ukraine which probably greatly effected [sic]their ultimate 
defeat by the Russians), and on down to such mundane human engineering problems as the 
size of the seats and closeness of controls in AA guns with respect to the average size ofU.S. 
men, or our capability of finding an adequate number of Army personnel with a high IQ score 
to service our complicated electronic gadgets (it appears that taking all of our designed 
gadgets and extrapolating to full scale productions, it will take on the average one to two 
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years to train personnel in their use, and there is only a remote possibility that there will be 
enough O.S. personnel to service the planned mechanisms, let alone operate them). 
The third question is concerned with the freedom to be given to ORO in its work. At 
the present time there is an intensive effort on the part of the Army to develop a ststem for 
detail and specific control over all ofORO's research work. This is accompanied by a very 
high pressure to provide immediate and useful answers to the General Staff. This is the usual 
effect which results from a lack of understanding on the part of the customer of the way in 
which research can contribute. If this Army effort is successful, it will in my opinion result in 
a lowering of integrity in ORO, and in ultimate and serious conflict with the General Staff, 
because we will be competing with them or will act as skilled technicians under their 
direction to answer only immediate problems. There are, however, cogent reasons why we 
should compromise with respect to this pressure. On the other hand, to yield completely, as 
the Army desires, will mean that we give little or no consideration to long range solutions. It 
is a truism that if you work only with the short-range solutions, you will never be able to 
achieve maximization of the more desirable and possible long-range futures. In military 
operations this means that the best battleships or the best tanks will be developed, only to find 
that when the war actually occurs, that battleships or tanks may no longer be useful weapons, 
in proportion to their costs. A war can be lost because of such reasons (Germany is a case to 
point). 
The present situation arises because the General Staff of the Army has a very limited 
internal technical competence with respect, for example, to guided missiles, atomic weapons, 
etc., in fact, most of the weapons the future. Daily decisions are being made. They want and 
need immediate help in making these decisions. Ifwe refuse any assistance on such short-
range studies, then the road along which the Army goes will be decided from day to day, and 
a point is then gradually reached such that a long-range plan cannot be adopted because of 
the many serious commitments and the establishment of many powerful technological and 
tactical empires. It is for this reason that I believe some compromise must include a 
reasonable proportion of short-ranged studies carried out by the ORO without prior approval 
by the Army. It is this last proportion which is in controversy. These must be included 
because only research personnel can have a full appreciation of the fact that the answers 
urgently desired at a later time by the customer when these become the short-ranged 
questions asked by the executive as he is faced with a decision. It is my opinion that ORO 
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can retain and attract a top staff only if the Army exercises control with a very light rein, and 
agrees to reasonable freedom in proportion of our studies. 
There are two things that you might do to help me. First, to discuss these questions 
from a viewpoint of what you believe would be a good policy for ORa, and which the 
University would support and, second, you might consider joining me in a discussion with 
General CoBins. You might either join the discussion on the 21st of November, or it might be 
better to discuss the problems separately with General Collins, perhaps some evening. Dr. 
Bush might be interested in such a discussion. 
I have several other questions which need to be discussed, separately and apart from 
the Army. The first is the question of whether or not the University would approve eventual 
separate contracts in operations research with industry, or with city or state governments or 
agencies. There is a question of where personnel engaging in such work should be housed. 
Second, our professional working conditions at the War College are distressing, in that there 
is insufficient space to permit adequate privacy which will allow maximum efficiency in 
thinking by the individual. 
I will return from Kansas on the 17th. I hope I may have the opportunity to discuss 




ElIis A. J oOOson 
Director 
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Appendix 4 - Extract 'Project VISTA - A Study of Ground and Air Tactical Warfare 
with Especial Reference to The Defense of Western Europe'. Series B, Volume B of 
Eight Volumes, Ground Force Operations, Chapter 3. Appendix III (4 February 1952), 
pp. 89-92. 
3F. Development and Research 
3F. Ground Combat Development and Research 
3Ft. Integration of Ground Weapons 
The additions to and modifications of our weapons systems discussed in the previous 
sections are believed to represent and important increase in our effective firepower capability 
achievable in a relatively short time. Rockets can give a very considerable increase in short-
range barrage fire capabilities and relieving the artillery for missions in which its range and 
accuracy of fire are uniquely demanded. Systematic and extensive use of mines will add 
greatly to the effectiveness of small arms, artillery, and rocket fire, as well as being a most 
important part of an obstacle and barrier system. A highly mobile anti-tank vehicle such as 
the ONTOS appears to represent the most rapid means of producing a strong anti-tank 
capability. 
We have chosen to discuss these particular weapons in some detail because we 
believe that they can remedy the most conspicuous weakness in our present defensive 
firepower system. However, it is clear that a similar examination must be given to all 
components of the fire system, to determine to what extent augmentation within probable 
manpower limitations is possible. Proposals have been made, for example, to increase the 
numbers of automatic weapons in the rifle company, to increase the number of mortars, to 
introduce the eight gun battery in the field artillery, all with the objective of increasing the 
firepower per man. We believe that many of these proposals have merit, but hesitate to give 
them our unqualified support because it is not clear to us to what extent such changes may 
upset the rather delicate balance within the fire team. The present weapons system has 
evolved as the result of extensive battle experience and presumably such questions as the 
optimum ratio between riflemen and automatic weapons have been resolved through the 
examination of such experience. 
At the same time, we must realize that the situation now confronting us is rather new 
and requires a careful evaluation of our basic philosophy of weapons systems. Certain factors 
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which have strongly influenced our choice of equipment and organization in the past are no 
longer pertinent and have been replaced by others whose effect must be taken into a~count. 
Perhaps the most important of these factors in the past has been the United States military 
emphasis on offensive capability. As we look back upon wars in which we have enjoyed 
ultimate success, we find, not unnaturally, that victory came as the result of offensive, not 
defensive action. The present organization, and present military thinking is therefore strongly 
slanted toward offensive action. Acknowledging the fact that we will not start the next war 
and that we will inevitably be less prepared for it than the aggressor, it follows that the initial 
action will be defensive on our part and our present organization may be inappropriate. It is 
believed that the US Army has not developed as fully as possible the tactics of defense nor 
the techniques of withdrawal. 
New factors which modify the problem of the defense are the impact of new enemy 
weapons; for example, the atomic bomb and other mass-destruction media. Not only are the 
space factors in a division layout affected by the threat of such new weapons, but perhaps 
also the interrelation of the defensive weapons systems will take on quite a different aspect in 
this new situation. Although the evolution of doctrine from historical studies is undoubtedly a 
most necessary an fruitful pursuit, it is absolutely essential that the most careful consideration 
be given to the effect on that doctrine of new elements for which there is no historical 
precedent. 
In the present chapter, we have attempted to indicate, in a limited way, how certain 
features of the situation in Western Europe bear on the tactical application of the weapons 
described. Many of these applications have been suggested by the Army War College study 
"Defense on a Wide Front," and by the extension of that study by Lt. Colonel A. C. Miller 
presented in Appendix IIIA5 of this report. Studies by the Operations Research Office (ORO) 
and the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) have been of invaluable assistance. However, it 
has not been possible for VISTA even to make a complete paper study of the optimum 
integration of these weapons into a defensive fighting system, nor is it the belief or 
experience of VISTA that this can be accomplished without a considerable amount of 
experimentation in the field. 
Tactical experiments must be carefully designed and critically analyzed, using the 
cooperative effort of expert operational analysts, such as may be available from the staff of 
the ORO, and military experts such as found on the staffs at Headquarters, Army Field 
Forces, the Army War College and the various Field Forces Boards. Technical assistance on 
weapon performance (particularly when the weapon is being simulated) must be made 
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available from such organizations as the Ballistics Research Laboratories. But, to be truly 
effective, these tactical studies must be under the direction of an organization planned 
specifically for this type of work. Such an organization, a Combat Development Group, is 
proposed in the following section. Its first and immediate mission should be to develop by 
study and by field tests the integration of the weapons system proposed here with tactics 
uniquely suited to the defense of Western Europe. 
3F2. Combat Development Group 
The most effective method for developing sound doctrine for ground force operations 
lies in the combination of analysis, of combat synthesis, and experimental research. It is the 
strong belief of the VISTA staff that no one or two of these elements is sufficient: analysis of 
past battles must be injected into the frame-work of future situations and synthesized into 
new techniques and doctrine. Once so synthesized, however, new methods must be tested 
experimentally in the field by a task group organized and equipped for the purpose. We 
cannot overemphasize the importance of carrying out experimental research in problems of 
ground combat by close coordination of experimentation in the laboratories and in the field. 
There is today great emphasis on systems studies, operational analysis, doctrinal application, 
staffplal1l1ing, and the preparation of directives and requirements for research and 
development. These activities are all worthwhile but it must not be expected that new 
developments in devices and concepts will follow from them as a matter of course. Rather we 
must look to the joint pursuit of experimental research and field operations to yield the 
greatest dividends in new ideas and hardware. As corollaries to this point of view it is 
essential, first, that the laboratories and experimental ranges be in close proximity to the site 
of regular field maneuvers and war games and, second, that the experimental scientists, both 
civilian and military, work closely with the field soldier. In this connection it will be the 
function of research and development staffs in headquarters establishments to serve primarily 
to facilitate in all possible ways the operations of all laboratory and field agencies. 
Therefore, we propose a new agency - the Combat Development Group - to establish 
and operate a combined laboratory and field research team. The functions of this new agency 
will somewhat overlap !hose of the Technical Services and Field Forces Boards but this 
overlap need not be extensive nor harmful, since the latter agencies will continue, as now, to 
be properly concerned with the production and testing of items of equipment for field 
operations in the terms of established doctrine. Furthermore, it will be imperative that some 
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of the graduate work in the War and Staff colleges be closely integrated with laboratory and 
field research rather than being devoted primarily to the theoretical and often somewhat 
artificial studies of organization, doctrine, and war plans. Finally, the activities of the Combat 
Development Group (CDG) must be very closely coordinated with the Operations Research 
Office (ORO), which has already reached a preeminent position in the military science, and 
with the research activities of university and industrial laboratories. The findings of this 
agency should be made available on a periodic basis to the Weapons Systems Evaluation 
Group and these findings should serve in considerable measure as the Army contribution of 
raw material for the careful and detailed analytical studies in overall national defense made 
by this group. 
Maneuvers, as they have normally been carried on in this country, have been largely 
for the purpose of training units in current doctrine. Occasionally one or two new elements 
are introduced in an experimental way (e.g. the considerations of the A-bomb at Operation 
SOUTHERN PINE) but these maneuvers rarely have the flexibility or the controls for truly 
effective experimentation. Careful planning of the field experiments must be done if the 
results are to be meaningful and if they are to complement existing and future battle 
experiences. Appendix IIIF, Statistical Battle Study, is particularly pertinent to these 
operational experiments. 
The development and establishment of new combat tactics, techniques, and doctrine, 
discussed in the previous paragraphs, must be very closely coordinated with the operational 
testing and evaluation of new weapons, devices, and equipment. The organization entrusted 
with one of these missions must be entrusted with the other. Only in this way will it be 
possible to effect the rapid introduction of new ideas and concepts into ground warfare. In 
some cases the impetus will come from the discovery of new devices which will demand new 
tactics for their most effective employment in combat. In other cases, new tactics uncovered 
in war games and maneuvers will establish needs and requirements for new weapons and 
other devices. 
At the same time that a group for research and development in ground force 
operations is established it will be necessary to expand in considerable measure army-wide 
support of fundamental research and correlated development. This army-wide program will 
be absolutely necessary_ if a healthy atmosphere is to be created in which the Combat 
Development Group can participate in the over-all scientific effort of the nation. Moreover, 
this program will supplement in a conclusive manner the very properly limited research 
programs of the Technical Services. This army-wide program will serve as the direct basis of 
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support, financial and otherwise, of the ORO and of university and industrial research 
programs which are of interest to the laboratory-field development unit. It is specifically 
recommended that the army-wide program include the direct administration of contractual 
arrangement for university projects, such as Project VISTA, independent of the Technical 
Services. It is therefore recommended that: 
Ft. The United States Army establish a Combat Development Group. 
We make the following comments in summary form on this command: 
The Combat Development Group should report to the Army Chief of Staff through 
the research and development staff in his headquarters. Although we do not wish to make 
specific recommendations concerning the functions of the research and development staff, we 
do suggest that it augment and extend and army-wide program of research in the basic, 
applied, and military sciences including close coordination of all Army sponsored research in 
universities, industrial laboratories, and the technical services. 
The first mission ofCDG should be the development of new tactics and techniques in 
battlefield combat. Because of the urgency, the first projects under this mission should be 
concerned with the defense of Western Europe. The organization for the proposed CDG in its 
broader and long-range concept can evolve from these studies as a nucleus. 
The second mission of the CDG should be the evaluation and operational testing of 
the new weapons, devices and equipment which are or may be applicable to the 
accomplishment of its first mission. Because of the great promise in such systems as MT!, 
Lofar, Magnetic Induction Communication, and Infrared Signaling, it is suggested that one of 
the major projects under this second mission would be a research program on problems in 
battlefield communication and combat intelligence. Another major project might be a 
comprehensive study of weapons effectiveness. 
The CDG should include the largest combat unit consistent with the deployment of 
military forces; this unit might be a reinforced battalion, a regiment, a brigade, or even at 
times, a division. In any case, it should always be broadly representative of a combat unit and 
not just of infantry, armor, artillery or signal. The units assigned to CDG should be rotated at 
regular intervals consistent with project commitments. Units furnished with basic and 
advanced training and awaiting combat assignment should be those primarily considered for 
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attachment to COG. In this way, the findings of COG will find most rapid introduction into 
the combat armies. 
The COG must have adequate maneuver, range, and laboratory facilities located 
insofar as practicable in one central location. 
The COG would have a permanent staff of civilian scientists. This staff should 
include experimental specialists in all equipment fields including artillery, rockets, guided 
missiles, atomic and chemical weapons, radar, electronics, etc., as well as competent 
theoretical specialists. Operations analysis may be assigned from ORO but will retain the 
independence and objectivity essential to the operations of that office. 
The administrative staff of the COG scientific group should be kept to the lowest 
possible minimum, with administrative duties and responsibilities entrusted to the technical 
staff. At the same time every effort should be made to restrict insofar as possible such 
functions as report writing, preparation of job descriptions, etc. It is imperative that the COG 
not be hampered by restrictive regulations which defeat their own ends. 
CDG would not perform the difficult dual functions, as do the Field Forces Boards, of 
writing requirements and then testing new devices in the light of these requirements. Rather 
the COG would be informed from time to time by the headquarters research and development 
staff ofthe general and over-all Army needs, as expressed by field commanders. It would 
attempt to meet these needs through norm al scientific procedures rather than through the 
requirements-evaluation system. 
The COG should not be concemed with the established operations of the Technical 
Services and of the Field Forces Boards, but it should supply the capability to supplement 
and short circuit these agencies when there is need for crash programs designed to bring the 
newest ideas and inventions of modem science into combat employment. The COG may· 
serve as a much needed mechanism for cooperative action on the part of the Technical 
Services and the Field Forces Boards. 
The COG should work in close collaboration with other experimental and operational 
groups such as the Operational Oevelopment Force of the Navy and the Tactical Air 
Development Wing of the Air Force on all joint problems. 
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Appendix 5 - Extract: Easterbrook Committee Report - Nature of the Curriculum CGSC 
in Light of Atomic Weapons (5 November 1954) (Letter of Transmittal) 
NATURE OF THE CURRICULUM COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 
IN LIGHT OF IMPACT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS 
PROBLEM 
1. To establish a concept for the 1955-56 curriculum which will reflect the impact of atomic 
weapons on the conduct of tactical operations in an authoritative, realistic, and forward 
looking manner. 
2. To establish a body of guide lines for authors which will ensure understanding and 
effective implementation of the curriculum concept. 
3. To establish a method for indoctrinating the faculty in those matters necessary to 
accomplish the above 
ASSUMPTIONS 
1. US forces will conduct tactical operations either with or without the employment of 
atomic weapons. 
2. Current T/O&E will be applicable for units of instruction during the 1955-56 course of 
instruction. However, in appropriate units of instruction, new or developmental items of 
equipment may be introduced within this organization. 
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 
1. Both the U.S. and the enemy have the capability of employing atomic weapons tactically. 
2. Department of Defense planning includes the conduct of operations with or without the 
employment of atomic weapons in the event of a major conflict. 
3. Basic doctrine for the conduct of atomic warfare is contained in current and proposed 
training literature. 
4. The concept as established by this paper constitutes a guide for detailed curriculum 
planning for the academic year 1955-56. 
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DISCUSSION 
1. General. The discussion of this study is developed in the following sequence: First, the 
present curriculum is reviewed to detennine the adequacy of the present instruction in 
atomic warfare. Next, the desired objective of the curriculum with relation to the impact 
of atomic weapons is developed. To meet this objective, two plans are proposed and 
analyzed. Finally, the guide lines necessary for the preparation of units of instruction and 
a plan for indoctrination of the faculty are presented. 
2. Adequacy of the 1954-55 Course ofInstruction 
a. In light of the latest developments, the atomic coverage and the concept of atomic 
instruction in the 1954-55 curriculum does not fully meet the criteria of a realistic 
and forward looking approach (Annex C). However, instructional material 
presented in the field of atomics is considered authoritative and up-to-date as 
security and text material will pennit. 
b. College policy peliinent to the past development of atomic coverage in units of 
instruction is contained in Academic Staff Memo 33, 14 Feb 52; Faculty Memo 
22,21 July 52; and Faculty Memo 12,2 Mar 54. As understanding of the 
application of atomic weapons in warfare has increased over the past few years, 
atomic considerations have been added to units of instruction in a piecemeal 
fashion. As a result, the atomic coverage in the present curriculum contains 
deficiencies in proportion, realism and impact. Proportion is not in balance as 
evidenced by the high proportion of non-atomic coverage over atomic coverage. 
Realism capability is ignored or treated as an incident. Impact is considered 
lacking since much of the atomic coverage is diffused throughout the curriculum 
so that the significance of atomics is lost in a large variety of non-atomic subjects. 
3. Objective ofInstruction 
a. The committee is agreed that increased emphasis is needed in the curriculum in 
subjects related to atomic warfare. However, the committee differs as to the 
degree of emphasis that should be given in the 1955-56 curriculum. Furthermore, 
the committee differs as to the best approach for incorporating the increase in 
instruction in atomic warfare into the curriculum. (Annex D) 
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b. These differences as to emphasis and approach result in the split views of the 
committee as to the objective of the curriculum. The basis for this divided view is 
the estimated employment of atomic weapons in future wars. 
c. The differences expressed within the committee are reduced to two views. Each 
view reflects the degree of emphasis to be placed upon instruction in the field of 
atomic warfare. Those two views (View A and View B) are presented in parallel 
to facilitate comparison. 
d. Committee Views 
View A 
(1) Command and General Staff 
College instruction in atomic 
warfare must primarily reflect the 
general type of warfare which 
constitutes the more dangerous 
threat to national security. 
(2) There are two basic types of 
operations which must be 
considered. 
a. The first and more important is 
that of conducting war where both 
sides employ atomic weapons. 
b. Second and less important is 
that of limited operations in loss 
vital areas with restricted 
objectives, neither combatant 
employing atomic weapons; 
however the national capabilities 
to employ atomic weapons exists. 
(3) The objective of instruction 
should be to prepare the student to 
perfonn command and staff duties 
ViewB 
(1) The curriculum should be 
designed to prepare the student to 
perfonn his duties as commander or 
staff officer under the various 
general conditions of combat which 
U.S. forces are likely to encounter. 
(2) Those conditions of combat are 
predicted to be either of the 
following: 
a. Each side will use atomic 
weapons in support of tactical 
operations to the extent that his 
capability will permit. 
b. Each side will have an atomic 
capability, but US forces will not 
employ atomic weapons unless the 
enemy forces use their own. When 
this occurs, the condition becomes 
that describe in 'a' above. 
(3) The relative probability or 
frequency of occurrence of either 
condition of warfare cannot be 
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under the two general conditions 
predicted. The objective of 
instruction must have at its basis 
the idea that two sided atomic 
warfare, which constitutes the 
greatest threat to our national 
security, will be the normal 
battlefield situation. Instruction in 
conclusively predicted. 
Additionally, in establishing the 
objective and proportion of 
instruction under various potential 
conditions of warfare it is necessary 
to recognize that an instructional 
procedure need not necessarily 
stress one or the other condition of 
operations where atomic capability combat in the same proportion that 
exist, but are not executed, must 
be clearly identified as special 
operations. A detailed evaluation 
of the relative importance of each 
is presented in Appendix 1 to 
Annex D. 
it is believed those conditions may 
actually exist in future war. 
(4) Therefore the objective of 
instruction should be to prepare the 
stuident to perform command and 
stuff duties in combat under the two 
general conditions predicted. The 
emphasis and scope of this 
instruction should recognize that 
there exists no way of establishing a 
relative probability of occurrence 
between those two conditions; that 
the student may require complete 
knowledge of either condition of 
warfare; and that the concept of the 
course should give weight to the 
most simple, most easily 
understandable method of teaching 
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4. Courses of action. 
both conditions. See Appendix 2 to 
AnnexD. 
a. As a logical result of the basic differences between the two objectives explained in paragraph 
3 above, two different plans are prepared. These two plans are summarized below and developed 
in detail in Annex E. 
b. Plan A: Emphasis is placed on operations in which atomic weapons are employed. The bulk 
the course is therefore devoted to operations in which atomic weapons are allocated, and 
operational plans considered for their employment. To attain this objective, instruction based 
upon employment of nuclear weapons begins with the fundamental subjects. In a limited number 
of subjects which are taught as special operations, atomic weapons are not employed but the 
capabilities exist. 
c. Plan B: This plan provides for an initial orientation on the effects of atomic weapons to 
provide a common understanding of the influence of an atomic capability on warfare. This will 
be followed by the presentation of fundamentals, staff techniques, division, and initial corps units 
of instruction under conditions where both sides have atomic capability but no employment of 
the weapon is planned by US forces. This will be followed by a series of division, corps, and 
army units in which atomic weapons are actually employed by US forces and Aggressor forces 
as appropriate. 
d. For amplification of the threat imposed by the atomic capability see paragraphs 2a and b, 
Annex F, Guide Lines to Authors. 
View A ViewB 
Basis of Plan Any war between major Any future major war will be 
powers in which the objective one in which both sides will 
is destruction of the other possess a significant atomic 
government will most likely capability. There is a 
employ atomic weapons. Wars possibility that the use of 
in which major powers are not atomic weapons will be denied 
Emphasis of Instruction 
Proportionment 
Impact on Students 
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directly engaged or the 
objective is something less 
than the total defeat of the 
enemy may be less likely to 
employ atomic weapons 
College instruction must 
to both sides through political 
maneuver. If one side uses the 
weapon, the other side will 
also use it. 
College instruction must give 
emphasize combat in a major equal consideration to combat 
atomic war since atomic wars in which atomic weapons are 
offer the greatest threat to our used and combat in which the 
national security. Instruction capability exists but is not 
in combat under non-atomic employed. To accomplish the 
conditions will follow atomic emphasis need not coincide 
instruction and will be treated with any estimated probability 
as special operations. or frequency of occurrence of 
either condition of combat. 
This concept is proportioned This concept is proportioned 
on the assumption that atomic on the assumption that either 
warfare is the primary atomic or non-atomic warfare 
consideration of our may occur and both should 
instruction. Warfare without receive emphasis. 
atomic SUppOlt is relegated to 
the role of a special operation. 
The concept will have The impact of instruction 
considerable impact on the where atomic weapons are 
students by the very frequency used is strengthened by 
and volume of atomic contrast with preceding non-
coverage, and will make the atomic instruction; by the 
students extremely conscious concentration of atomics in a 
of the effect of atomic segment of the course; and by . 
weapons on warfare. The the possibility of a scenario-
student is provided maximum type series being developed to 
Faculty Preparations 
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time while attending CGSC to portray the cumulative effect 
consider the atomic of atomic warfare. 
employment problem. The 
impact of the course with 
respect to warfare where 
atomic weapons are not 
employed will be reduced 
considerably. 
(1) Many of the units of instruction will require revision under either Plan A or Plan B to reflect 
realistically the impact of the enemy's atomic capability and the employment of atomic weapons 
by US forces. Under both plans, where capabilities only are being played, revision to reflect the 
enemy's atomic capability will be about the same. A larger number must be revised under Plan A 
to reflect the employment of atomic weapons than under Plan B. 
(2) The graphic portrayal below is intended to show the approximate placement and extent of the 
coverage envision by the two plans is the sequence and length of the blocks of instruction of the 
present course should remain unchanged. 
6. Guide Lines for Authors. In view of the wide range of opinions as to the impact of atomic 
weapons on tactical operations, and to provide a common starting point for the coordination of 
units of instruction in which atomics are applicable, a set of guide lines is submitted for College 
use (Annex F). 
7. Faculty Indoctrination. A program for the faculty indoctrination should be prepared and 
conducted in order to develop understanding of the data, techniques, and procedures used in the 
tactical employment of atomic weapons. The scope of this program should be sufficient to assist 
instructors in the preparation and conduct of atomic instruction in /6 subjects under either Plan 
"A" or Plan "B". The outline of course to include the subjects, scope, and time considered 
appropriate is presented in Annex G. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. The committee as a whole agrees on the following conclusions: 
a. Atomic employment coverage in the 1954-55 cUlTiculum does not fully meet the criteria of a 
realistic and forward looking approach 
b. Instructional material presented in the field of atomics is considered as authoritative and up-to-
date as security and text material will permit. 
c. The College must qualify students for command and staff duty under combat conditions where 
(l) Each side will have atomic weapons available and will use them to the extent that his 
capability permits 
(2) Each side will have an atomic capability, but atomic weapons may not be employed. 
d. Two plans, either of which will improve atomic instruction, are proposed. See Annex E 
e. Guide lines enumerated n draft Faculty Memo in Annex F are essential to the coordinated 
production of 1955-56 units of instruction. 
f. An indoctrination program for the faculty is necessary to ensure a proper basis for the 
preparation and conduct of the 1955-56 course. 
2. The committee as a whole does not agree on the following conclusions. These are offered as 
conclusions supported by View A and View B. 
View A 
a. The 1955-56 cUlTiculum must be based on 
the premise that our primary concern is with 
all-out atomic warfare. 
b. Plan A is the prefelTed plan for integration 
of atomic coverage into the 1955-56 
cUlTiculum. 
ViewB 
a. The 1955-56 cUlTiculum must be based on 
the premise that we must give emphasis to both 
all-out atomic warfare and warfare in which 
the atomic capability exists but is not 
employed. 
b. Plan B is the prefelTed plan for integration of 
atomic coverage into the 1955-56 curriculum. 
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RECOMMENDA nONS 
1. The committee as a whole recommends: 
a. That the proposed faculty memorandum presented in Annex F, Guide Lines for Authors, be 
approved. 
b. That the outline plan for indoctrinating the faculty present in Annex G be approved and 
implemented without delay. 
2. The committee as a whole disagreed on the following recommendations which are therefore 
the separate recOlmnendations of a majority and minority group. 
View A (Minority Group 
That the concept of Plan A contained in Annex 





R. L. Shoemaker 
Lieutenant Colonel, Artillery 
Member 
Coleman W. Thacher 
Lieutenant Colonel, Artillery 
Member 
Robert L. Wool folk III 
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry 
Member 
View B (Majority Group) 
That the concept of Plan B contained in Annex 
E be approved as the basis for the 1955-56 
curriculum. 
James 11. Lynch 
Colonel, Infantry 
Member 
John W. Romlein 
Colonel, Artillery 
Member 
C. F. Kane 
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry 
Member 
John E. Kinzer 
Lieutenant Colonel, Artillery 
Member 
Howard C. Parker 
Lieutenant Colonel, Armor 
M.ember 
John R. Barc1ay 
Major, Annor 
Member 




Appendix 6 - Letter from Major General Garrison Davidson, Commandant CGSC to 
General Willard G. Wyman, Commander CONARC, 6 July 1956 
General Willard G. Wyman 
Headquarters Continental Army Command 
Fort Monroe, Virginia 
Dear General Wyman: 
On the eve of my departure from this fine College, I am writing to let you know how pleasant 
it has been serving with you, and also to leave with you, personally, two problems with regard to the 
College mission that give me great concern. 
I have drawn up an "after action" report of my tenure here and am leaving it for such use as 
General McGarr cares to make of it. In preparing it, I have received the many aspects of the College 
and recorded those comments that I consider appropriate. From these I have selected two problems 
which appear to me to be of the greatest importance because they have such a serious effect on the 
Army as a whole. One involves the College instructional mission; the other concerns its related 
mission to develop doctrine for the combined anns and services. 
First, in my opinion, a serious deficiency exists in the education of our senior officers in the 
tactical employment of the combined arms and services. This results from the fact that command and 
General Staff College schooling, which the average offices receives during his twelfth year of service, 
is the END of formal tactical education in preparation for command and senior staff duty at division, 
corps, army and comparable levels of the communications zone. World War II experience indicates 
that at least fifteen years will pass before and officer can aspire to those commands. During this 
period of time some, perhaps a great deal, of they have learned will have become outmoded. My 
apprehension in this regard is substantially confirmed in a report resulting from the recent survey of 
the College by and Educational Survey Commission consisting of three senior retired officers 
(Generals Eddy, Middlcton, and Keyes) and three equally able civilian educators. As a result of the 
Commission's report, I am forwarding through channels, a recommendation to the effect that a 
Refresher or Advanced Course in tactics, or approximately three to four month's duration, for more 
senior officers (20-25 years of service) be instituted at this College. This I feel is essential to the 
proper tactical education of our senior officers. 
Secondly, while in a few days I will be out of the developmental game after spending five 
years at it, I will carry with me and extreme concern over our procedures for the development of 
tactical and logistical doctrine. The basic deficiency can beat be illustrated by the fact that when 
recent chiefs of staff have assumed command., they did not find thoroughly analyzed and developed, 
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new, modern eoncepts of tactical and logistical doctrine and organization within which they could 
readily incorporate their own ideas and be confident of the timely development of the best means to 
carry out their mission. Instead, it appears that the Department of the Army staff, on occasion, has 
been compelled to direct development of new concepts on a more or less arbitrary and crash basis. 
To a certain extent, this is a repetition of what I said when I briefed you here last October. In 
my opinion, not only do we not now have the type of answers which the Department of the Army staff 
requires, but neither are we laying a sound foundation to provide those answers in the future. I 
question, then, whether we actually will avoid a repetition of the situation outlined above and insure 
the timely, periodic and continuing availability in the future of new concepts arrived at through a 
sound, logical and systcmatic procedure. I give it as my fixcd opinion, that until the Army develops an 
adequate system for the development of future doctrine, future Chiefs of Staff will again find 
themselves in similar positions. 
I read the speech you made at Benning with great interest and enthusiastically support your 
views. I, too, am a finn believer in the power of collective thinking which will tap the vast reservoir 
of military experience and brains in our Army. An optimum system would make the maximum use of 
these assets, which we are not now doing. To my mind, as I also mentioned last October, the key to 
the success of any development system will lie in the manner of implementation of the phrase which 
is contained in the typical development directive -- within the concept guidance furnished. 
Under current procedures, new ideas with regard to tactical and logistical doctrine very often 
come down from the top with such a degree of detailed guidanee and with such close time limits, they 
tend to stifle the thought of subordinate agencies, require superficial thinking to meet deadlines, and 
in general dissipate the total effort. A proper system would instead be based on feeding new ideas up 
from the bottom through a process that would tap our vast reservoir of brain power and experience that 
can be brought to bear if given an adequate chance. 
Such a system, to be realistic and most valuable from the operational point of view, should 
essentially include a plan of study which: 
a. A definite objective is established; 
b. All components of the plan SUppOlt that objective; 
c. Logical, step by step development of each component and logical coordinated development 
among components are provided for; 
d. Each step is realistic as to appropriateness and as to time and space factors; 
e. All agencies looked to for support have similar plans closely coordinated with the master 
plan, particularly with regards to timing and emphasis. 
The Combat Development Objective Guide is a step in this direction, but only a very limited one. 
It does list all the deVelopment work that is going on and is a good catalogue in that respect. However, 
insofar as its constituting a program of studies is concerned, it has up to the present remained only a 
catalogue; and because of this, the direction furnished by the guide offers little promise yet of 
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providing an orderly and repetitive cycle of development which would insure a self-perpetuating, 
logically developed and scheduled program. An adequate system, once established, would continually 
have available studies reflecting the most modern, up-to-date thinking. 
I urgently recommend that you give these thoughts most careful consideration. They are not 
intended to be critical of any individual or headquarters. These situations are merely developments of 
our time when overly busy must consider first things first and depend on established procedure to 
provide for the things that seem least important at the moment. Unfortunately, our traditional 
procedures are inadequately under existing circumstances. This assignment and my previous one have 
brought me face to face with this problem. It impresses me as being sufficiently important to the 
future of our country to the extent that I feel compelled to bring it to your personal attention now as I 
am about to relinquish command here. 
General McGarr arrived Tuesday afternoon. I turned over command here Monday, after I have 
acquainted him with the innerworkings and hidden mechanisms of the College. Let me repeat how 
very much I have enjoyed serving with you. I am looking forward to seeing you someday at 
rockbound highland home. 
Best regards. 
Sincerely, 
Garrison H. Davidson 
Major General, USA 
Commandant 
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Appendix 7 - Briefing for Chief of Staff on Army Organization 1960-1970 (PENTANA) 
15 May 1956 
OPS OT DC 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations 
Washington 25, D.C. 
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
15 May 1956 
SUBJECT: Briefing for Chief of Staff on Army Organization 1960-70 (PENTANA) 
1. An action briefing was presented by ODCSOPS representatives to the Chief of Staff 
in Room 2E687, at 0945 hours, 12 May 1956. The purpose was to present staff 
recommendations on the Continental Army Command PENTANA ARMY study 
which forecasts organizational and doctrinal concepts for the 1960-70 decade. The 
following personnel were present: 
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff 
General Willis D. Palmer, Vice Chief of Staff 
General Willard G. Wyman, Command General, CONARC 
Lt General J. M. Gavin, Chief of Research and Development 
Lt General C. D. Eddleman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations 
Lt General Williams, Deputy Commanding General, CONARC 
Major General O'Neill, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 
Major General Bouth, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
Major General Bush, Office, Comptroller of the Army 
Brigadier General Frederick, Office Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 
Brigadier General Metheny, Chief, Coordination Group, OCS 
Brigadier General Abrams, OCS 
Colonel Surles, Deputy SGS, OCS 
Colonel Fuqua, Deputy Director of Organization & Training, ODCSOPS 
Colonel F. C. Feil, Chief, Doctrines & Combat Developments Division, ODCSOPS 
Colonel S. W. Horstman, Chief, Organization Division, ODCSOPS 
Colonel R. C. Gildart, CONARC 
Colonel Cobum, Coordination Group, OCS 
Lt Colonel Roberts, Assistant SGS, OCS 
Lt Colonel Nelson, ODCSOPS 
Lt Colonel Bennett, ODCSOPS, Briefer 
Lt Colonel Cowles, ODCSOPS, Assistant Briefer 
Additional Observers 
298 
2. The briefing officer, ODCSOPS, presented staff evaluation of and recommendations 
on the subject of study. Recommendations provided that 
a. CONARC be directed to revise and resubmit the study in phased increments 
incorporating staff comments prior to Department of the Army approval 
b. Both the Department of the Army staff and the CONARC prepare additional 
studies or take additional action related to further defining organizational and 
operational concepts for the 1960-70 period, including preparation of a 
detailed plan for transition to the PENT ANA organization as modified. 
3. General Wyman, CG, CONARC, expressed his non-concurrence with staff 
recommendations and recommended that: 
a. The broad concepts expressed in PENTANA be approved, with minor 
modifications based on new data, for further development by continuing 
detailed analysis, war-gaming, and field testing. 
b. CONARC be directed to develop a detailed phased transition for the Army 
based generally on equipment that can be made available by the end ofFY 
1959 or 60 and include improvements of present divisions based on the results 
of AFT A and ROT AD tests. 
4. Discussion disclosed differing views concerning the exact role of PENT ANA. 
CONARC proposed PENT ANA for the entire 1960-70 decade as broad concepts or 
objectives that were not firm, and which would form the basis for continuing study 
and revision. The Army Staff, while recogninzing that PENT ANA, as directed by the 
Department of the Army, forecasts broad organizational and doctrinal concepts for the 
1960-70 decade. 
a. Considered that PENT ANA proposes concepts which are, in general, 
desireable objectives for the latter part of the decade, but 
b. Considered that PENT ANA must be looked at closely, particularly for the 
early part of the 1960-70 decade, due to its immediate influence on planning 
and on research and development and considered that PENT ANA must be 
revised extensively for the early part of the decade to reflect greater 
consideration of attainability and joint and budgetary implications. 
5. During and following discussion of major problem areas by senior officers present, 
the Chief of Staff issued the following comments and/or guidance: 
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a. The Anny staff should avoid undue conservatism and should be progressive in 
its thinking and approach to new ideas. New ideas and progressive thinking 
should not be discarded on the basis of preconceived notions. 
b. CONARC must tell the Anny staff what is required. The Army staff should 
accept these requirements and analyze them based on their merits. These 
requirements should be so framed as to give guidance to science and industry 
in producing the equipment which is needed. The allegation is frequently 
made that scientists are not given positive guidance on Anny requirements. 
We must, therefore, project our ideas on material requirements ahead and with 
a progressive approach if we are to exploit to the maximum technological 
advances of science and industry. In a progressive program, it must be 
recognized that some items will succeed while others will fail, but we must 
not reject requirements submitted by CONARC as unattainable unless 
information is available here which is not known to CONARC 
c. PENTANA should provide objectives for research and development and 
should be considered in that frame; therefore, it should be looked at closely. 
d. The Chief of Staff agreed with General Wyman that PENT ANA, as modified, 
should be put on the wall as an objective toward which we will progress. The 
gap will be filled by a series of evolutionary, modified versions of PENT ANA 
closely related to availability of new weapons and equipement. 
e. The Chief of Staff stated that he expects to visit CONARC at an early date to 
discuss ATF A and to talk with CON ARC small-war planners 
f. Single-type Anny for AtomiclNon-Atomic War. The Chief of Staff has doubts 
concerning our abiulity to attain both capalities equally well in a single 
organization. He agrees with the Army staff approach to detennine the 
optimum atomic anny and the optimum non-atomic anny and then examine 
these tp see where our most pressing requirements lie. We must have 
flexibility. It is increasingly difficult to visualize a general war without the use 
of tactical nuclear weapons. General war probably will be atomic, but will be 
fought under some ground rules. What would be the effect on our planning if 
we accept the fact that we would have to develop the necessary capability for 
conventional general war after D-day? This would require an organization 
which is basically atomic, with conventional fire support other than in 
divisions available from corps/army on a pooled basis. The problem is 
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essentially one of what is feasible under fund limitations; we can put a dual-
capability organization on a chart, but can we put it in the budget? The Chief 
of Staff desires that further examination be made of the restrictive effects upon 
organizational structure of the dual-capability requirement. Also, the Chief of 
Staff desires further examination be made of the restrictive effects upon 
organizational structure of (1) the degree of use of air lines of communication 
proposed in PENTANA and (2) the requirement stated in PENTANA for a 
completely air-transportable field army in 1965. 
I 
g. Integrated Combat Group. The Chief of Staff favors attachment as opposed to 
integration. The principal [sic] criterion in judging relative merits should be: 
"are all elements necessary all of the time"? CONARC will have to support 
integration strongly to obtain Chief of Staff approval, if war-gaming and field 
testing result in a recommendation for its adoption. 
h. Single-type Division. This is a desirable objective; however, more than one 
type will be required for the transition period. 10 I st Abn Div organization is 
visualized as the pattern for the light division, with the infantry division being 
a reinforced version thereof, and the armored division being essentially the 
same plus tanks. 
1. Pentagonal Structure. This is a desirable concept. We should have the same 
pattern throughout (all echelons and type organizations). CONARC should 
isolate this problem and analyze it to see if five (5) is the proper number. This 
structure is excellent for disperision and for conduct of all-around defense. 
The control problem must be analyzed. 
J. Army-Air Force Agreements. This problem does not belong in the PENT ANA 
study; however, the Army staff and CONARC should not limit their thinking 
on the basis of any existing restrictive agreements. 
k. Target Acquisition. Has this problem been given enough consideration in 
PENTANA? Do we not need a special armored reconnaissance type unit with 
SKYCAV capabilities to operate with divisions? We must have elements at 
division and corps echelons available to go out and seek targets with the 
capability to call down and control REDSTONE and comparable missile fires. 
Such elements must contain engineers, survey, and similar elements. Do we 
need special target acquisition units in divisions? Perhaps we should change 
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the name of the Special Operations Units in PENTANA to reflect the target 
acquisition requirement more clearly. 
1. Mechanized Division. PENT ANA proposes a completely mechanized, very 
expensive division with limited ground holding capability. We need other 
types of units capable of sweeping operations, securing lines of 
communication, and holding ground. The effect of mass destruction and of 
enemy guerrilla operations is to increase requirements for forces which can 
hold areas and provide security for rear areas. CONARC should study this 
problem. Perhaps large divisions with reduced equipment are required, as 
opposed to the smaller, mobile type divisions required for active offensive 
operations. The use of National Guard divisions in these roles should be 
considered. 
m. Tanks. Tanks are useful for the transition period. Tanks should be smaller, 
lighter, and use less fuel. The eventual role of tanks is not clear. 
n. OPFRAG. OPFRAG is visualized as something to back up atomics. The staff 
has been asked for an evaluation. The present system has little anti-material 
capability. A different principle is probably necessary to obtain an anti-
material capability. 
o. Engineers. Agree with the Army staff that a requirement exists for engineers 
within divisions. 
p. Atomic Capability. An atomic capability should be developed for direct 
support artillery at the earliest practicable date; planning should consider 
modification of the diameter to fit the atomic shell, if necessary. 
q. Fire Support. CONARC should develop the ideal dual-capability system; 
consideration should be given to providing conventional fire support for 
conventional general war from corps/army pools. Should we develop HE 
warheads for HONEST JOHN and other comparable systems? CONARC 
stated we cannot afford to do so. 
r. Air Lines of Communication. Maximum use of air lines of communication is a 
desirable objective toward which we should progress. However, we could not 
be credited with a very practical approach if we state that we will rely 100% 
on air lines of communication in all theaters world wide [sic]. In some limited 
areas and situations, we may approach 100% air LOC. We should study all 
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possible applications of air lines of communication, particularly the problems 
of air bases and POL requirements. 
s. Further Studies by CONARC Related to PENT ANA. The additional studies 
recommended by the Army staff (Para 4(2), DCSOPS Summary Sheet) should 
not be DA directed studies. The letter to CONARC should note these as areas 
which the staff considers require additional and continuous examination and 
exchange of information between CONARC and Army Staff. 
t. Requirements for the Army Staff. Actions required of the Army staff (Para 
4d(3), DCSOPS Summary Sheet) should be completed only if required. The 
Army staff should not get in CONARC's business. CONARC should be 
contacted prior to initiation of these studies to avoid duplication. 
u. The Chief of Staff is impressed with the work done on PENT ANA. We should 
look deeper all of the time. We have no experience to guide our thoughts for 
the next 10-15 years. We must be optimistic and farsighted in developing 
concepts for the future. 
6. The Chief of Staff directed that the implementing directive to CONARC be revised to 
include the following: 
a. The concepts in the PENTANA ARMY study will be approved, with 
modifications, as goals or objectives to provide organizational, planning, and 
research and development guidance and to provide a basis for further 
experimentation, war-gaming, field testing, and evaluation. 
b. The specific requirement for CONARC to revise and resubmit the PENTANA 
study, as such, for the Department of the Army approval will be deleted. 
c. Department of the Army staff comments and evaluation will be made 
available to CON ARC as guidance. 
d. The requirement for CONARC to develop addition studies will be withdrawn, 
in view of the fact that CONARC is already undertaking man of the studies 
recommended, and the study areas will be noted as areas requiring continuous 
consideration. 
e. CONARC will be directed to develop a detailed plan for phased transition to 
the PENTANA organizations, as modified. 
7. DCSOPS is charged with responsibility for revising the implementing letter to 
CON ARC to incorporate the guidance and decisions noted above. 
Distribution: 
SCS - cys 
CONARC - 10 cys 
Vice C/S - 1 cy 
Coord Gp, OCS - 1 cy 
DSCPER - 1 cy 
DCSLOG - 1 cy 
CRD - 1 cy 
COA - 1 cy 
ACSI - 1 cy 
Dir O&T, ODSCOPS - 1 cy 
ODCSOPS Ex - 1 cy 
ODCSOPS file - 1 cy 
Info copies to: 
Dir Plans, ODCSOPS - 1 cy 
Dir Opns, ODCSOPS - 1 cy 
Ch Org Div, ODCSOPS - cy 
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Appendix 8 - Extract: Special Report of the Commandant, V.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 1 January 1959 
u.s. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
1 January 1959 
Foreword 
This Special Report represents a record of events occurring during my tenure as 
Commandment, which I consider especially significant. It treats 1956-57 College in sufficient 
detail for orientation with respect to changes instituted in the 1957-58 school year. In addition 
it indicates refinements and continued improvements developed for the 1958-59 course being 
conducted and the 1959-60 course now in preparation. The report correlates and places 
events of this period of change in proper perspective. 
My assignment to the College in July 1956 provided a unique and challenging 
opportunity, coinciding as it did with the Pentomic reorganization at the division level and 
the resultant necessity for the development of completely modem doctrine for its 
employment. Forced by the fast-moving pace of technology, the College, at the time, was 
also faced with the concurrent requirement for the accelerated production of doctrine for the 
use of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Even more important, the complete 
integration of these interacting developments into instruction was a vital necessity if the 
Army was to remain an eminent part of the Tri-Service Defense Team. 
This report makes no attempt to treat all period of my tour with equal priority. Rather, 
it concerns itself primarily with the chain reaction of problems growing out of the rapid 
compression of time on the nuclear battlefield caused by the unusual set of circumstances 
described above and the consequent resulting decisions for planning, preparing, and 
presenting the 1957-58 course. 
In recording in detail the interrelationship of the reorganization of the College and the 
complete rewrite and reorientation of the 1957-58 curriculum, I am hopeful that other school 
commandants who may be faced with the necessity for fundamental change may find this 
report helpful. 
Lionel C. McGarr 





At the time of my assumption of command in July 1956 as Commandant of the USA 
CGSC, the fast-moving tempo of doctrinal change required by technological advances 
urgently demanded a forward-looking, properly balanced curriculum with a well integrated 
supporting organization. At the same time a number of important events occurred which 
pointed up both the advisability and necessity of a complete revision and reorientation of the 
course of study. As a result, the College made an exhaustive study of previous College 
curriculums and organizations. This study was then objectively considered by a number of 
special College boards in determining the course of action which led to the curriculum 
rewrite with required reorganization of the resident instruction departments, Staff, and later 
the Combat Developments Department. 
Most important among these events impacting on the College revision were the 
Report of the USA CGSC Educational Survey Commission dated 1 June 1956, pending 
pentomic divisional reorganizations, Army Roles and Environments as stated in the Chief of 
Staffs National Military Program, and the US CONARC directive requiring increased 
emphasis on nuclear instruction while at the same time authorizing a more flexible approach 
to the use of doctrine in the instruction. 
The Educational Survey Commission recommended far-reaching changes in the 
College curriculum, instructional philosophy, methods of instruction, and operating 
procedures, and suggested the need for changes in the College organization. 
The pending decision of the Chief of Staff, US Army, on division organizational 
changes indicated a complete rewriting of almost every tactical unit of instruction (Subject) 
and the partial revision of the others. 
A staff visit by two members of the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Arn1Y, in April 
1956, indicated a requirement for strategic settings of units of instruction (Subjects) to 
conform with the forms of war as described in the Chief of Staff s National Military 
Program. As practically all the College Subjects portrayed general war in Western Europe, 
frequently in a World War II type environment, this adjustment indicated the rewrite of a 
majority of the curriculum. 
On 20 August 1956 US CONARC directed that emphasis on nuclear instruction be increased 
so that the student would develop "equal facility" in atomics and nonatomics and directed 
that atomics "not merely be superimposed" on previous nonnuclear Subjects. Implementation 
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of this directive indicated a rewrite of the majority of the curriculum. This directive also 
authorized and encouraged a more forward-looking and flexible approach to the use of 
doctrine in instruction and directed improvement in the quality of this doctrine. 
Recent fast-moving developments in the Army had caused obsolescence of the 
majority of the training literature (field manuals, special texts, etc.) for which the College was 
responsible and indicated a major modernization effort. 
About the same time, US CONARC directed that the nonresident instruction program, 
which, due to workload, was lagging an average of 2 years behind resident instruction, be 
brought up to date. 
My own investigation and study substantiated the need for the above changes and 
indicated a unique opportunity to incorporate other essential revisions in conjunction with the 
directed changes so as to comply with DA and US CONARC policies and directives. 
The most recent Fifth Army Manpower Survey, as well as the Educational Survey 
Commission, noted that the Staff and Faculty, to include instructional support agencies such 
as the Army Field Printing Plant, were already heavily committed. 
Because of the yearly cycle of the curriculum, the directed changes could not be made 
in the 1956-57 course which had already been planned and prepared by my predecessor. That 
curriculum could not be adjusted to meet subsequent, new requirements because of 
preparation lead times and inherent inflexibility of the crowded curriculum. Further, basic 
changes for the 1957-58 College year could be made only if action was taken within 5 
months of my arrival. This decision had to be made ifI were to influence the next, 1957-58, 
course. Otherwise changes could not be made until the preparation of the 1958-59 course for 
which I had not expected to be present. This situation is inherent in the 2-year tour of a 
Commandant in relation to the annual cycle of planning and preparation. This was pointed 
out by my predecessor and undoubtedly accounts for some deferred modernization in the 
Army School System. (My tour as Commandant was subsequently extended, which enabled 
me to present the 1958-59 course and plan the curriculum for 1959-60.) 
The College was organized and staffed for the normal annual correctional curriculum 
and doctrinal adjustments of previous years. This curriculum adjustment had consisted of 
minor revisions of most units (Subjects) based on after-action reports and the writing of 
approximately 1 to 3 new Subjects each year. A full curriculum rewrite for the Regular 
Course alone as indicated by the new directives mentioned above would involve about 180 
entirely new Subjects as well as much new doctrinal material. 
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To capitalize fully on any changes made, required programming and completion 
within a single year because of the interlocking nature of the elements of the curriculum as 
well as instructional methods, evaluation procedures, operating methods, and College 
organization. 
After research mentioned above, on 30 October 1956, an intensive examination was 
initiated by the College on how best to carry out the directives of higher headquarters for the 
coming 1957-58 course. After careful consideration of the recommendations of special 
College boards and committees, I issued the required curriculum, organization, and personnel 
decisions on 4 December 1956. These decisions were based on a complete rewrite of the 
curriculum and the necessary adjustments in College organization to support this new 
curriculum. 
The plan selected involved establishment of a planning group for the 1957-58 College 
year which would gradually expand, as 1956-57 teaching commitments decreased, into the 
new College organization by the end of the 1956-57 course. 
[Chart Showing Annual Class Schedule Deleted] 
This plan permitted the 1956-57 course to be taught as planned by those who had 
prepared it, and within the same organization that had existed prior to the 4 December 
decisions. At the same time it provided for the concurrent writing of the new curriculum 
within the framework of the new organization and by personnel who would be responsible 
for teaching it in 1957-58. The plan temporarily increased the workload of the Staff and 
Faculty but ultimately reduced this workload through improved organization and procedures. 
This was a practicable method of accomplishing the directed changes and capitalizing on the 
other improvements, which could be made because of the revision, while at the same time 
teaching the 1956-57 course without lowering traditional USA CGSC standards. 
The decision involved a definite, calculated risk. The College had no experience with 
a rewrite or reorganization of this magnitude, time was short, and no additional manpower 
was available. However, there was no alternative. The exceptional quality of the personnel of 
the Staff and Faculty was a favorable factor and, in addition, time could be saved by 
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